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PREFACE

The following thesis on the "Development of Railways in Palestine from
1838'\ does not, at first sight seem to deal with a theme with which an institution devoted to Hebrew Learning would concern itself.

The writer. there-

fore feels a deep sense of obligation to Dropsie University for the permission
nevertheless gra~nted to him to carry out research in this field, which has
never been touched before.

It is hoped that perusal of the complete thesis, for all its imperfections,

will prove that the subject dealt with, did indeed have a considerable bearing
on the fortunes of Palestine in the 19th - 2 0th centuries, and on its political,
military. social, and economic history.

It is also hoped that the thesis will

prove that the development of railways in the Holy Land, which in its early
stages came to symbolize progress , and industrialization to the infant Zionist
movement, was in the long run of great value for the growing Jewish Yishuv
on its way towards statehood.

The thesis could not have been completed but for the encouragement and
sometimes gent!_ e prodding, of two scholars to whom the writer owes an infinit,e debt

of gratitute.

One is Professor Abraham Katsh, President of Dropsie University. but
for whose practical assistance, paternal interest, and capacity for bringing
problems into correct focus, the writer would not have been able to overcome
the pressure of external circumstances while the thesis was being written.

.
t •

-LfThe other is Professor Isaiah Friedman, Head of the Department of
Modern History and Political Science at Dropsie University, but for whose
patient supervision, deep delving criticism, and unstinting advice, both
as to the contents and shape of the manuscript, the thesis would not have been
completed at all.

Whatever contribution to the study of Palestine and the Middle East, the
thesis may possibly make, will be due to a decisive extent to the influence of
these two distinguished mentors of the writer.

Finally, the writer would like to express his profound gratitude also to
Dr. Eliahu Elath, late President of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and
Doyen of Israel's Middle East experts, for his willingness to read the thesis,
and comment upon it.
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THE PHYSICAL LAYOUT OF PALESTINE
A Land of Transit
Throughout tts long ftistory Palestine has been called many
names , ranging from Cana ran, the Land of Israel, and Palestine, to
11

•

the Buckle on the Belt of the World", and the

11

Battleground 11 •.

It might, wtth some justification also 5e called the "Bridge",

linking the Euras·ian landmass with Africa, the ancient civilizations
of Mesopotamia and Anatolia with pharaonic Egypt, and modern Europe
and the Middle East witft the BlacR Continent.

Its central location

between three out of th.e five major su5divisions of tfte globe has
no equivalent elsewftere.
To oe sure, other lands· oeside Palestine have, bY' reason of
their location and geograpnical features, served as distinctive
11

6ridges 11 linking vari'ous areas· of tfie world--Anatolia and th.e

Iberian peninsula Being prime examples (and tnere are others )-.-5ut

•

none of th.em ever funnelled the flow· of civilization, trade or war
into quite such. a disti'nct and narrow pass·age as Palestine has always
done.

None 1tnl<ed to one anotfier areas of quite such permanent

importance to mankind .

With the Medtterranean Sea on the one hand,

and the Syrian Des·ert on the other, none 1eft its prospective users
so few, and dangerous·, alternative routes.. And 5Y' reason of t ts
easy· and tnviting physi'cal confi'gurati'on, none was quite as adapted
to a role as a country of transit as· was Palesti ne .

A Delimitation of Pal e stine's Boundaries
Before analysing tlie geographical layout of Palestine, and th__e
physical features that made i.t so obvi ous:ly a 5ridge between continents, and so emtnentl,y- a land of transit, tf1e exact limits of th__e
area K.nown as: Palestine should be defined for th__e purpose of the following study.

The operati:ve w_ord here is "exact'', because the borders

of Pales:Une in their oroadest sense may be regarded as. a,lomatic.
They w:ere always the Mediterranean i:n the west, Syria in the north_~
t ile Desert in the east, Ara6.ia and Sinaf i.n tfie south.

H.ow:ever , th_e

actual fiorders: of Palestine, or ratn.er, tfte oorders of th__e historical
entfti_es. tftat exis:ted in tftat country, nave always shifted~

Since a

line frns: to 5e drawn s:omewftere, if only i:n order to have points of
reference, and even if thts s.houl d neces:si.tate some aroitrarines:s:,
for the purposes of this study the name "Palestine" should lie taken
to refer to an area liounded by the following li:nes:

l}

In the wes:t -. tfte Mediterranean Coast from Ra fa (_H.ebrew -

Rafiah1 i.n the s.outn, to the mouth. of tt1e Litani. (_ancient Leontes)
rfver i:n th.e north_.
2)

In th_e nortft -· a line drawn due east from the mouth of

the LHant river, across. t5.e s;outh.ern extremfty of Mout H.ermon,
to a point jus.t nortn_ of tl'l.e Lejja Massif (_ancient Batanaea).

31

In tfte east -· a line drawn due south from just north of

the Lejja MassH, very roughly along the edge of the Syrtan Desert,
to a point due east from Akalia.

/

4)

In the soutft - a line from a point in the desert due

east of AkaEia, to the ftead of the Gulf of Akaba (Hebrew - Gulf of
Eilat}, and from there i ll. a straight line to the Mediterranean
at Rafa.
While the ooundaries. of Palestine

i_n

its wider sense, as

outli.ned aoove, and including the area east of tlie Jordan river,
are perliB.ps somewhat approximate, it is floped th_ey will serve the
purposes of the following study.

Anyliow, it, does not appear that

a different outline of Pales. ti.ne I s. fluctuating l:iorders wi 11 prove
to b.e of greater use.

In any cas.e, Palestine, as a typical land

of transi.t, can never be treated as a country entirely divorced
from nei.ghbouring 1ands.

Therefore, while most of the fo 11 owing

inquiry w..ill revolve around Pales.tine, adjoi.nirig areas will also be
deat witfl, altho~gh ~erfunctorily, as occasion ari ses, to a greater
or lesser degree.

These areas include mainly Stnai-Egypt in the

south-west, the H_eja a in the south-east, and Syria (_including Lebanon),
i.n tne north_.
The Influence of Geog_raphical Facto r s on Palestine
Pales.tine's age-old role as. a coun t ry of transit, will be found
to l:i.e Eias.ed on two cardinal facts:

1)

Its overall geographical

pos.iti on as a land-Eiridge linking continents;

2)

Its. internal geo-

graphJca l l ayout that favoured north.-to-south communkati ons to a
very significant degree, but to a l ess.e r extent also permitted lateral
communications. from west to east.

It was Palestine's ready accessibility

. c;

lo , -

·- I

to movement along its north-south axis that lent practical importance
to the otherwise almost academi c fact that the country linked Eurasia with
Africa.

Conseq ue ntly, Palestine ' s geographical build-up deserves a close

look.
It should be noted fwwever, that the following summaries of Palestine's
geograph.ica l s u6div·i'sons, and of its historical road communication patterns,
liased to a great extent on tne country's physical layout, in no way are
intended to constitute a reasoned inquiry into the subject.
The sole purpose of the following survey, based on generally known
facts, and other people I s re searcf1- , is to pro vi de a background against
wbjch the following chapters, devoted to a study of the development and
ftistory of railways in Palestine, should, and indeed must, be read .
The Geograpn.i cal S ubdi vis.ions. of Palestine
The most significant feature of the geography of Palestine is,
th.at its four very disti.nct physical suo..divisions all run from north
to south, and thus, with the possible exception of the Galilean mountainmass in the extreme north, do not bar comunications in these dire ctions,
but on the contrary, usually facilitate them.

These four main subdivisions

are the following(J);

(l}

The ques. tion of whether to use th.e geographical nomenclature of
Pales.tine in its traditional Biblical or Arabic (and sometimes Greek
or even lattn)_ vers,ion that i.s usually used in western publications
of all kfods, or whether to lis.t names in the new Hebrew:.-Israeli version, i,s a vexed one, and perhaps has no logical solution.
In the immediately following section, geographical names will be given
in the i. r traditional form, as far as possible, with the new Hebrew
names. (if any) in paranthes.es.. In the subsequent ch_apters of this
study, names will b.e used as they were current in th.e period under
di:scus.ston; though there wi_ll be exceptions to this. rule, and more
modern names w.ill 6.e employed, if this. will prove necessary in context.

A)

The Coastal Plain
This ranges from the borders of Si nai , into which it merges in

the south, northward through tlie Philistine lowland (the Shephela
coastal plain), and the Sharon coastal plain that adjoins it, to the
Carmel range.

North of the Carmel range, the coastal plain continues ,

as the plain of Acre lAcco, or the plain of Zevulun) to Ras-el-Nakura

•

CRosn Hanikrah), where the mountains of Western Galilee fall into the
sea . f rom Ras--el-Nakurah the coastal plain continues north, as a
narrow, level , strip of 1and between the sea and the mountains, to the
moutft of the Litani river.
The two mountain spurs th,at bisect the coastal plain, namely the
Carmel range, running south-east to north-west, and the Nakurah range,
running east to west, impede progress, but have never stopped it in
historical times .

They lend variety to the coastal plain, rather than

sliut it off into closed segments.

The Carmel range could easily be

5ypassed around its northwestern promontory, Cape Carmel, and when that

•

passage, some dozens of metres wide at its narrowest point, was closed ,
the range could easily 5e crossed by at least three low passes traversing it at Tel Kamun (Yokneam) , Lejjun (Megiddo) , and Balameh-Jenin
(}t bleam-Ein-Ganim) .

The crossing of the Ras-el-Nakurah range was

slightly more difficult, but never stopped the flow of trade or war,
anymore than did the far more difficult passage of the Nahr-el-Kelb
Coo _ River) further north.
Movement along the coastal plain was easy , for most seasons of
the year, except in winter, when it was clogged by rain-soaked soil .

1)

- '")"---,
Its very few perenn i al rivers are all short, and could be crossed
without trouble when necessity arose.
in winter, the~could 5e forded .

Usually, except for a few days

What dunes there were, could be

avoided, and also the few swamp areas, where river mouths had filled
"P•

Nor did the forests, that existed in the Sharon and on the slopes

of

Carmel until a few generations ago, constitute serious obstacles . ( 2)

Tne width of the coastal plain ranges from some 50 kms ~ about Gaza,
to between 3-15 kms. further north, and it thus always afforded ample
space to circumvent natural or human obstacles .
B1

The 'Mountain Back6one
This very pronounced physical subdivision of Palestine runs parallel

to the coastal strip of the country--that is, also from north to south.
It reaches an eleiation of 1,000 metres only in three places, Halhul
near Hebron, Tell Assur (Har Hatsor , north of Jerusalem) and around Safed
(Jsfath l, where Jebel Jef ak (Har Mei ron) rises to 1,206 metres.

•

Most

of the mountain strtp is plateau-like, with no conspicuous differences
in height, and a relatively ample main ridge in its southern part.

Its

western slopes, towards the sea, are generally fairly moderate, though
not everywhere easily negotiable .

Its eastern slopes, towards the

Jordan valley , are steep throughout, and mostly , forbidding.

It starts

just north of Beersheba (Beer-Sheva) and continues past Jerusalem to

(2)

The wooded areas in Palestine ls coastal belt show plainly on the
maps of Conder and Kitchener drawn about the 1880's .

)

- \ ~Nablus (Shehem)_.

Tftere it is cut across 5y a very pronounced, though

narrow, valley, linking the coastal belt with tne Jordan Rift.

North

of the Nablus valley, the mountainous backbone of the country continues
on its way till it is cut across oy a pronounced plain, the Valley of
Jez reel (Emek Jezreel), and its extensions, the Plain of Acre (Shefel ath
Acco/Emek Zevulun} in the west, and the Valley of Beisan (Emek Beth-Shean)
in th_e east.

The hilly backbone between Nablus and the Valley of

Jezreel--the mountains of Samaria (Shomron )-; lack a well-defined ridge,
and are rather an agglomeration of hills, some fairly high, with a number
of small plains enclosed by them.

The north-western extension of the

mountains of Samaria is the Carmel range.

The continuation of Palestine's

mountainous backbone on the other side of the Jezreel Valley, and towards
the north, are the mountains of Galilee.

This mountain massif, and its

northern continuation towards the Litani river, has no central backbone
at all.

•

In its southern part it has a distinct east-to-west trend, with

two parallel tiers of heights, one lower and one higher, that mark
roughly the border between the Jezreel Valley and Lower Galilee, and
the border between Lower and Upper Galilee respectively.

The northern

part of the Galilee massif, up to the Litani river, is a rather confused
jumble of medium-sized hills and mountains.

Owing to the absence of a

central ridge, and the east-to-west tiers of hills, the Galilean massif
has never in history been easy of access, and has always been one of the
most impenetrable parts of Palestine, with traffic by-passing it on
the east and west.

i-

)

It might be said, without bending facts too much , that the
Valley of Jezreel and the mountainous block of Galilee adjoining it
in the north, have a counterpart of sorts in the south of the country,
where the Valley of Beersheba cuts across the land from south-east to
west, with the arid and uninhabited hills of the southern Negev
bordering the lateral passage on the south.

•

While the fastnesses of Galilee never made a significant
contribution to Palestine s role as a country of transit, and the
1

contribution of the Negev hills was even less, the central mountain
Backbone of the country, far from being an obstacle to communications,
indeed favoured them, by providing a secondary north-to-south link
along its ridge, parallel and alternative to the coastal plain.

Though

broken up enough to make movement off the central ridge fairly strenuous,
the main mountain range always provided quite a feasible way of travelling along the watershed between the Mediterranean and Jordan on its
top.

Natural obstacles along the top of the ridge were relatively few,

rivers non-existent, and differences in height insignificant.

Actually,

except during driving rain or snow, Palestine s mountain backbone pro1

vided quite a viable alternative to travelling along the coastal plain,
whEnever the going there was difficult owing to the vagaries of the
weather or human interference.
C)

The Jordan Valley and the Arava
This, perhaps the most distinctive feature of Palestine s four
1

physical subdivisions, is part of the vastly long Syro-African Rift Valley.

- iS' -

lO)

It too runs in a north-to-south direction , parallel to the country ' s

mountainous backbone, and parallel to the coastal plain .

This va ll ey

of the Jordan and the Arava would have been ideal for the purposes
of human movement but for two facts:

a)

almost halfway through its

length, it is 5arred, practically entirely, by the 5asin of the Dead
Sea, which in some places has no passable shoreline at all; and b) its
greater part, from north of Lake Tiberias (Yam Kinneret) to a considerable
distance south of the Dead Sea, lies below sea level and is so torrid
that up to World War I, most of it was considered u~inhabitable.( 3)
Its role in the country's natural layout was always that of an
o5stacle, to be passed as swiftly as possible.

The only exception to

this was the northern stretch of tne Jordan Valley, from north of
Lake Tiberias to Beisan, which 1 though also below sea level, was not
unbearably hot.

It was therefore the only stretch of the Rift Valley

that was fit for human passage, and throughout history played a vital
role in Palestine's destiny as a land of transit .
D)

The Transjordanian Plateau
This too , like the other three subdivisions of Palestine that are

paralleling it to an unusual degree, trends, mostly unbroken, from
north to south.

(3)

cp.

It runs from ttte southern slopes of Mount Hermon and

A. Wavell , Allenby, London Harrap, 1940, p. 255.
"Nothing i S' known of the climate in summer-time, since no
civtlised human being nas yet been found to spend summer there . "
The author quoted from a British Intelligence Hand6ook, · about 1917.

)
- \ la from the northern tip of the basaltic Lejja massif, with the Syrian
Desert as its eastern boundary, down to where it merges into the
mountains of the Arabian province of Hejaz.

Throughout its way, the

Transjordanian plateau is bounded on the west by the Jordan Trench and
the Arava, in to which it descends steeply all along its length.

-

Close

to the drop into the rift valley there are some high mountains (north
of Salt and about Petral, and also the western slopes are cut up by a
number of perennial streams, Yarmuk and its trioutary Rukkad, in the
north; Zerka-Yabbok in the north-central part of the plateau, and
Moji5-Arnon further south.
the Gulf of Akaba.

In the south there is a steep descent towards

But east of all these features the plateau of

Transjordan is flat, and easily passable1 all along its length from
north to south at all seasons, even providing a modicum of water for
thirsty wayfarers.

This, the easternmost, and fourth natural subdivision

of Palestine, is no less, and perhaps more than the others, favourable
to communications from north to south making it a land of transit par
excellence.
Lateral Links Between the Geographical Subdivisions
Palestine
The parallel physical subdivisions of Palestine are not, of course, isolated
from one another.

Except for the slopes of the Transjordanian plateau

into the Arava rift, south of the Dead Sea, that are very largely
impassable, the four physical subdivisions of the country communicate

- \1 more or less easily along their entire length.

Some of the geographical

features that permit lateral communications are very promi nent,
especially on the ci s-Jordani.an part of the country,; others are less
obvious, though still important .

The lateral links of the four physical

subdivisions of Palestine , are the following, going from north to south:
1.

The Jezreel Valley
With its subsidiaries, the Plain of Acre and the Valley of Beisan

this valley cuts right across Western Palestine, from the Mediterranean
coast in the north-west to the Jordan rift valley in the south-east.

It

links up with the coastal plain, though rathe r circuitously, around
the Carmel Promontory , and is more directly connected with it by the
three previously mentioned passes. across the Carmel range . The Jezreel
valley has always been, from times immemorial, Palestine's most
important lateral link, either in peace or war.

For the sake of complete-

ness it should be mentioned that north of Jezreel Passage there was an
ill-defined and little-used west-east natural link between the Mediterranean
and the Sea of Galilee.

It linked the Plain of Acco, througft Wadi Melekh

with the Battauf Basin (Emek Beth Natofah} .

from there it went east

and down into the Jordan Valley .
2.

The Central Palestine Passage.
This runs east to w,est between J:'lount Geriz i m C3ebel-.et-Tor) and

Mount Ebal lJe5el Islami_yeh}.

I.t leads from the coast , oy, war of the

-,\i Wadt Iskanderun (_Nattal Alexanderl througfL Wadi_ Sh_a;r, past Nablus
(the ancient Shehem), to th_e head of th_e Wadi Fara .
an easy descent into the Jordan Valley.

This wadi provides

There is a su5stdiary branch

of this passage going from Nablus, north-east, to Betsan.
3.

-

The Ascent of Beit-Horon (Beit Ur)
This lateral link is rather extraordinary in that it uses a

mountain ridge, rather than a valley, for its ascent.

It climbs from

the coastal plain about Jaffa and Lydda (Lad) into the mountains and
is the historic gatew-ay (together with the steep Wadi Salman to the
south of it) into the south..ern hills of Ephraim, and the northern htlls
of Judaea, including Jerusalem.

-~

This lateral link has only a preca~ ous

conti'nuation from the top of the mountain backbone down to the Jordan
Valley.

This is the descent through the Wadi Suweinit which joins the

Wadi' Kelt (Nahal Krtt), and reaches the Rift Valley about Jericho.

-

4.

Wadi Sarrar (_Nahal Sorek_)

Thts starts on the coast, south of Jaffa, as Nah.r Rufiin Nahal
t/o.,kti,l, 501-e-k
'Rubinl, and continues i,nto th..e hjlls as Wadi Sarra?i. In the hills it

u

s,plits.

One Branch_ (Wadi_ Kolontya, later called Wadt Beit-H.aninal,

reac6:es- the top of the rtdge just north of Jerusalem.

lts eastern

contfouat1"on ts th..e Wadt Fara th.at turns into Wadi Kel t whi cf\_ reaches
tfte Jordan.

Th._e other Branch CWadt Bittir, which turns into Wadi-el

Ward), reaches Jerusalem froJJl ttle ~outh_-w~est.

Its eastern continuation are

tfLe Htnnoru and KJdron yalleys, ~hjch_ combine to form the Wadi-en-Nar,

\4)

which falls into the Rift Valley, at the north-western shore of the
Dead Sea.
5.

Wadi-es-Sant
This starts on the coast as Wadi Sukreir (Nahal Lahish), turns into

the Wadi - es-Sant (Emek Ha'ela), and then climbs to the top of the

•

mountain backbone, as the Wadi el Mazar.

Its eastern continuation is

formed by the Wadi el Mashash, ending at the Dead Sea near Ein Gedi .
6.

The Ascent of Beit Jibrin (Beit Guvrin)
This starts in the Coastal Plain iii tl.1 C~l Plri:n in the Gaza-

Ascalon area and climbs into the hills past Beit Jibrin (and Lahish),
Tarkumiye, and through the Wadi el Marj, to reach the mountain ridge at
Hebron.

There is a continuation of sorts of this lateral link to the

south-east , in the direction of the Wadi Zuweira (Nahal Zohar) , end i ng
near the southern end of the Dead Sea .

•

7.

The Beers,heba · Gap
This broad lateral ltnk across southern Palestine, where the country

is widest, starts in the Coastal Belt about the Wadi Gaza (Nahal Besor) .
It then follows the Wadi Beersheba , past Beersheba itself , to turn southeast , following the Wadi Arara (Nahal Aro'er) to Kurn ub (Mamshit) .

Here

the natural descent into the Arava stretch of the Rift Valley continues
through Wadi Kurnub and Wadi Hafb,ira . Most of the lateral natural
descents from the mountain ridge into the Rift Valley are very difficul t .

.)
Some other, s,utisidtary, lateral links across Western PalesUne
exist, But their local, and often temporary, importance does not warrant
ela6oration.

Chief of them, for a time, was the ill-defined track

that 6i sected the sourth_ern Negev, with its focal point at E5oda (Avdat}.
Lateral Ltnks:

Transjordania

The countrY' east of the Jordan also has its natural lateral links.

•

The relati'vely flat surface of the eastern plateau always presented few
o6stacles to any movement.

On the oth_er hand, the steep western slopes of

the plateau made lateral communications with the Jordan Valley difficult,
and the relative paucity of population on top of the plateau through most
of historical times made the majority of these links, with some notable
exceptions however, unimportant.

It is a curious fact that two of the

three river valleys running down from the plateau into the Rift Valley
never served as natural routes of transit.

These were the Wadi Zerka,

th t fiver Yab6ok, and the Wadi Moji6, the ancient Arnon River.

•

The

third ~Jiu:, the River Yarmuk (now Sheri at el Menadire), began to fulfil tts function as a natural passage only at the beginning of the
present century.

The non-use of these river valleys as lateral links

was perhaps due to their narrowness, and the lack of ftuman environment.
The most important natural lateral passages from the Transjordanian
plateau into the Rift Va 11 ey, counting from north to south, are the
following:
1.

The Banias Passage
This climbs the plateau from near the sources of th,e Jordan,

around the southern tip of Mount Hermon, towards the north-east.

(,}

2.

The Hatzor-Damascus Passage
This lateral link, relatively, steep, but otherwise qu i te un-

obstructed (except for the short crossing of the Jordan Gorge), has
from times immemorial been the most important link not only between
the two parts of Palestine, east and west of the Jordan, but also
Between the countries of the Middle East as a whole.

•

Through this

wide passage travels the northerly Branch of the famous "Via Maris" ,
which will be discus.sed later.

Its traffic-.wise implications made

this lateral l ink (actually running south-west to north-east) one of
the most important natural features that have constituted Palestine
a land of transit between countries and continents.
3.

The Wadi Samakh Link
The steep, but short, passage climbs from the eastern shore of

Lake Tiberias up onto the plateau .

It, and probably to a lesser

extent its parallel wadis, served the second, more southerly
branch of the Via Maris in its progress across Palestine .
4.

The Wadi Sakhlib Link
This passage from the Jordan (just where it is reached By· the

eastern outlet of the Jezreel Valley} , to the plateau at Irbid,
apparently substituted for many centuries for the practically impassable
Yarmuk Gorge .

It climbs from the Rift Valley along . the southern edge of

the Wadi Sakhlib .

Its importance until recently was minor.

l

5.

Tffe Ascent DamtefL-&s~al t
Thi's passage apparently, suostitutes for the natural, But unused,

highway of the Zerka River, which itself is actually the eastern continuation of the Wadi Fara that comes down from the heart of Western
Palestine.

However, the Zerka River leads nowhere, while whatever

concentration of population there was in Transjorania always mostly
centered about Jerash (Gerasa), Es-Salt, and Amman Cancient Philadelphia; today's, and biblical, Rabbath-Amman).

Therefore, like some

of its counterparts in cis-Jordania Cfor instance the route JerusalemJordan), this lateral link from north-west to south-west follows no
very obvious natural features, and just climbs steeply the western
slopes of the Jordanian plateau, from Damie (Adam) up to Jebel Osha,
where it enters
6.

inhabited areas.

The Jericho Fords..:.Amman Link
There are several fords across the Jordan opposite Jericho, and

they form a continuation of the lateral links, like Wadi Suwenit and
Wadi Kelt, that pag5across Western Palestine's mountain ridge in the
Ju ean Hi'lls about Jerusalem.

Tftere are actually two, more or less

parallel, natural axes of communication from the fords onto the top
of the Transjordantan plateau.

One, the more northerly one, starts

at what used to oe known as Ghoraniye Ford (today 1 s Allenby, or King
Hussein, Bridge) and climbs through Wadi Nimrin and Wadi Shaib to
Es-Salt and Amman.

The other one, more southerly, starts at the

nei'gh5ourtng fords of Mal<lLadet ~ajla and El Henu, and goes up directly
to Amman, alongside the Wadi Kufrein and Wadi Nau 1 r .
7.

The Akaba-Ma an Link
1

This lateral route, actually running north-east to south-west, is
the most obvious, and, despite its steepness, the most convenient,

J

-

natural line of conmunications between the Arava Rift Valley, at the
head of the Gulf of Akaba, and the entire southern part of the plateau.
It goes up the Wadi Yatm, and through subsidiary valleys, climbs the
narrow pass of Nakb-Ashtar, and then follows the Wadi Zahira to the top
of the plateau.
Like Western Palestine, the Transjordanian plateau has some
su6sidiary natural passages down to the Rift Valley whose minor practical
importance does not warrant description.
mentioned.

Only two, however, might be

One is the Wadi Kerak leading down to the Lissan peninsula

in the Dead Sea, where it ends.

In periods when the fluctuating water

level of the Dead Sea was lower, it continued in sort of a ford across
the lake, to link up with the desolate and precarious paths that came
down to its western shore from Beth-Lehem, and Hebron, respectively.
The, at present, practically trackless slope of the plateau into the
Arava lfrom the Dead Sea to the Gulf of Akaba) at times had a possible,
out very difficult, lateral natural path through the wadis Uweir and
Feinan lPunon).
In conclusion of the survey of Palestine s physical layout, it
1

will oe noted that slightly more space has been devoted to the description

of the country 1 s lateral conmuni~ations, than to its physically more
extensive, and in practice, much more dominant, north to south trends .
This, on account of the fact that the country's length-wiSe build-up,
and its four parallel subdivi s ions, are not complicated, while its
transversal features are much more involved, and relatively little known .
Basically, however, Palestine's lateral features, with a few notable

-

exceptions, have always had more local importance, while the country's
major north-to-south moulding always had far more than local implications.
This, any map showing Palestine in context with neighbouring countries,
and even continents, will prove.
The country's physical layout has been described in conformity with
the definition of the term Palestine
11

of the chapter.

11

,

as laid down at the beginning

This left out, however Palestine's south-westerly

continuation, the Sinai Peninsula . Sinai's geographical build-up is
radically different from that of its northern neighbour.
Be descrioed here.

It will not

What references there will be, further on in this

chapter, to the physical layout of Sinai, will only- be in connection
with its communications, but only in so far as they were an extension
of those further north_. (_4)
THE HIGHWAY SYSTEM OF PALESTINE
The physical configuration of Palestine, as described above,
invited both local and long-distance travel.
(4)

This moved through the

Details of the physical layout of Palestine will be found in any
reasonably good atlas, especially the Atlas of Israel, and the
National Geographic Society Atlas. There are useful maps in the
Encyclopaedia Hebraica, vol. 6. , col. 41, and 111-112. For details
c~. the bibliography attached to this chapter.

country, following its most suitafale natural contours. fo r uncounted
ages .

In the process there developed in the country, a system of fligh -

ways, most of whi'ch played, either permanently or temporarily, a
significant role in the country 1 s history.

The traces of this highway

system are well preserved to this day, either physically in various
parts of the country,, or in a more abstract, 5ut no less credi5le way,
in written sources.
The country 1 s highw~ays may be divided, just ltke the country's
natural features which tfley follow, tnto longitudinal and l atitudinal
ones.

The following are only the most important

@f-

Palestine's high -,

ways, C5 ) as they· were in early times, and from which most later
traffic arteries developed.
The Longitudinal H-ighw_ays
1.

Via Maris - the Coastal Highw:ar
Along Palestine's · physically easiest geograph_ical subdivision, the

Coastal Plain, there developed from very early times onward a most important section of the great international highway connecting Egypt and
the North.

This led through the length of Syria to Asia Minor, Anatolia

and possi5ly Europe, on the one hand, and by way of various Branch
routes to Mesopotamia, Iran and possibly India, on the other.

(5)

This

Good maps of the historical road system of Palestine will be found
in the books by Aharahi, and Liver, listed in the attached bibliography

- ?_ -

highway, best known as the Via Maris, i.e., "Way of the Sea", because
it paralleled the Mediterranean coast , started about Rafa (Rafia) , and
had two side-by-side alignments, both going north, one immediately
following the coast, and one wending its way further inland , along the
foothills of the country 1 s mountain backbone .
The two branches of the coastal highroad ran approximately as
follows:

a.

Rafa - Gaza - Ashkelon - Ashdod - Jaffa (Yaffo) - Hefer

(Tel Afshar on the Nahr Iskanderun), there turning east towards the
opening of the Wadi Ara (Nahal Iran );

b.

Rafa-Yursa/Arza (Tel Jemma) -

Gerar (Tel Abu Hareira) - Gath (Tel-es-Safi) - Ekron - Aphek (Antipatris) - Ya~am (Khirbet Jama), from there going north-west to the
entrance of Wadi Ara.

There was an important lateral link, Jaffa-Aphek,

between the two routes.
At least four branches of the Via Maris crossed, or by-passed,
the Carmel Range.

One turned north-east of Yaham, and went past Dothan ,

Yibleam (Salameh) and Beit Hagan (Ein Ganin, Jenin), to contine north
and east.

One, apparently by far the most important one , went throuqh

the Wadi Ara, and today 1 s Musmus Pass, to Megiddo (Lejjun, Tel Muttesselim),
and the Jezreel Valley.
Another branch went from the mouth of the Wadi Ara (for which it
probably substituted when it was blocked) north-west and then north-east
through the Wadis Shakak and Milh (Nahal Tuth and Nahal Yokneam) to
reach the Valley of Jezreel at Tel Kamun (Yokneam) .

The fourth, and

last, branch of the coastal highway by-passed the Carmel Range altogether,

- L1-,
and continued north-.west from tn_e mouth of the Wadi Ara to reach Dor
(Tantura) and then went north along the coast, and round Cape Carmel,
through the narrow- defile between it and the sea, to debouch into
the Plain of Acco (Emek Zevulun).
After the Via Maris had run along the open coastal plain, and
had either crossed the relatively low and passable Carmel Range, or
had gone around it, to reach_ the plains beyond, it faced on their o~ r
side, a serious natural obstacle.

This was the Galilean mountain

f>lock, running east to west, and the mountains to the north of it.
Thus the lay of the land forced the continuation of the coastal
highway from Megiddo, towards the north-west, via Yokneam where another
f>ranch came in, through the Plain of Acco, where yet another branch
joined up, past Acco itself, and onward into a narrow defile This
started at Akhziv (Es-Zib), passed Ras-el-Nakura (Rosh Hanikra) and
Ras-el-Abiad (collectively Scala Tyriorum), until it widened into a
more easily passable plain about Tyre (Sur).

Then it continued north

along the sea, to the mouth of the Litani River.

While this north-

western section of Palestine 1 s coastal highway was feasible for
traffic, it was, on account of its defile , relatively difficult to travel
on in peacetime, and easily blocked in wartime.

Also, Damascus, the

historical and commerical centre of Syria , and a main staging point on
the routes to Mesopotamia, was situated not towards the north, but
in the north-east.

Consequently, at Megiddo the Via Maris split into

several more branches,its true continuation through Acco to Tyre, losing

- zJ much of its importance.

Two of the four branch.es splitting off at

the focal crossroads of Megiddo, came to be the true continuation
of the coastal highway, considering their military and commercial
importance, though they could be called "coastal

II

or only in relation to th.e Middle East as a whole.

either not at all,
The remaining two

Branches were unimportant.( 6)

•

Of the two main branches mentioned above, of the Via Maris leading
to Damascus , one led straight north-east, diagonally across the mountains
of Lower Galilee where these are easily passable , but giving a wide
5erth to the difficult heights of Upper Galilee.

Going around Mount

Tabor (Har Tavor), the highway turned north past Lubie (Lavie), past
the Horns of Hattin in the east, and went down into the Plain of KinnerethGinnosar .

From there the highway climbed to Hatzor, where it split.

A

lesser branch continued straight north , following the Rift Valley,
paralleling the Jordan River to a point near its sources, and then going
th.rough the length of Coele-Syria, the Rift Valley between Mounts

•

Lebanon and Hermon, to distant Hamath (Hama) and onward .

The more

important branch by far turned north-east at Hatsor to cross the Jordan ,
pass through the Kuneitra Gap of today, and ultimately reach Damascus .

(_6}

One of the lesser branches linked Megiddo with the easternmost stretch
of the Via Maris at Beit Hagan (Jenin). It had local importance onl y.
The other subsidiary branch cut right across the center of the Valley
of Jezreel to Hanaton (probably Tel Jpdawiye; south-west of the Sahel
(Plain of) Battauf (Bi ~ t Beit-Netofa), from where it turned east .
This seems to have been important only sporadically, perhaps because
it was 1iable to heavy flooding in winter, where it crossed the
Jezreel Valley and th.e Kish.on River , and about the Battauf Plain .

--l.~ The second main branch_of ttte Via Maris leading away from Megiddo
went almost straight east, along the Valley of Jezreel, and continued
down its eastern extension to Beisan (Beth-Shean).

Here it divided.

Its eastern continuations, which in any case were of minor
importance owing to their steepness, are in any case uncertain.

These

climbed the Trans-Jordan plateau either through the Wadi Sakhlib

•

(already mentioned above), or through its northerly parallel, the Wadi
Arab.

Whichever way they climbed, they passed Arbel (Beth Arbel, today's

Irbid} and Ramo th Gilead (Remthe) to reach the "King I s Hi ghway 11 (Derekh
Hamelekh}, which will be described later, on its progress along the
plateau towards the north_ and Damascus.
Th_e more important continuation, by far, ~

s, turned

north at Beisan, to follow the Jordan Rift Valley, to Yanoam (Tel
Ubudiye), near the south_ern tip of the Sea of Galilee (Lake Kinnereth
or Ti5erias}.

From here a trail went up, paralleling the western shore

of the lake, to join the oth_e r branch of the Via Maris (from Megiddo to

•

Hatsor} at Kinnereth.

But the main track of this branch of the Via

Maris turned north_-east about Yanoam, and, ignoring the impassable
Yarmuk Gorge, is- continued to a point about halfway up the eastern
shore of the lake.

It then climbed to the Transjordanian plateau

through the wide Wadi Samakh_ (or on either side of it) to join the
11

King 1 s Highway" to Damascus somewhere near the present Nava, north

of Ashtaroth-Karnaim (Tel Ashtor-SAeikh Saad).

So much for Palestine's

most important, and presumably one of history's best defined and most
travelled, highways.

past Dothan (Tel Dothan), (7) where it was joined by a subsidiary branch
of the Via Maris coming from Yaham.
Yi5leam to Beit Hagan (Jenin).

It then went through the Pass of

From here the road went north to join the

Via Maris going from Megiddo to Beisan, somewhere in the shadow of the
Gi v I atfl Hamoreh (Nebi Dahi}.

The other seconda,ry branch of the Ridge Road

struck out north-east from Shehem, passed Thirza (Tel Fara), another

•

royal city (from which there was a track to the Via Maris about Yibleam),
and then went down into the Jordan Rift Valley, through the Wadi Malih,
to end up at Beisan.
The traffic-wise importance of the Ridge Road was hardly that
of the much easier, grand international highwayalong the coast.

Yet it

V'i

was of great importance locally, linking from times immeorial the important
'
towns of the hjll country, providing a highroad for the Patriarchs, and
providing a backbone for the Kingdoms of Israel and Judea, and the bodies
politic that were their successors.

While laden caravans, working their

way from Egypt to the north, and vice-versa, could hardly be expected

•

to climb the mountain ridge of Palestine, up one side and down the other,
without a particular need, the Ridge Road did nevertheless serve as a
secondary international link.

However, besides its local importance, its

wider use was, presumably, mostly more military than commercial.

A good

many conquerors who had to operate in the hill country, used it perforce.(B)
The ridge road h_ad no con ti nuatton north of the Jez reel Valley, there
5etng no useable ridge in Galilee.

(7)
' (8)

Cf.

the biblical story of the sale of Joseph near Dothan to a
caravan going to Egypt, Genesis 37:17-28.

cp. the prophet Jesaia s description of the Assyrians progress
1

a,ong the Ridge Road, Jesaia 10:28-32.

1

'l

3.

The Jordan.:.Arava Rift Valley, Highway
Tfte Syro-East-Afrtcan Ri,ft "Valley, begins its course in nortftern

Syrle}i).

ln this, its first section, it always served as the main

fltghway, of tfte country,.

Purttter south it lost some of its- pre-,eminence,

as the most important centres of population, Damascus in the east,
Sidon and Tyre in the west, developed away from it.

•

However tile Rift

Valley road always retained some importance, as it continued south
past Iyyon lMerj AyyunL Abel Bei_t-Maakha (Abil Kamhl, past the sources
of the Jordan; and by, Lake Hule and its swamps to Hatsor.
From Hatsor onward to tfle south, all along the way to Bei san, as
it dipped below- sea level, and passed along the western shores of the Sea
of Galilee, this stretch_ of tfle Rt ft Valley highway became tftrougft
mos,t of its 1ength an artery, of great importance.

Ttti s, on account of

the fact that between Hats or and Ki nnereth, and between Yanoam and
Beisan, it was identtcal with the two branches previously described of the
Via Mari,s whtctt 1ed from Megtddo to Damascus.

•

The continuation of tile 'Rift Valley road from Beisan, thougft
crossing relatively- flat country to Jericho, was probably never of
any, importance.

It passed tftrougfl_ ever more desolate and sun-baked

country, with ever steeper, and uninhaoited1 slopes hemming it in on
5otft sides, to come to a brotHng dead-end at the northern tip of the Dead
Sea.

This road had some lateral communications, going into the llills

east and west,a~

Damien and Jerich_o , but they were of no use to long -::

.,., ~)

-,

distance travel 6ecaus-e nobody would naye dreamt of go t ng eyer dee per
into the Rift Valley furnace, to climb in the end even steeper tracks
into the mountains .

As Ute northern shores of the Dead Sea on both

i'ts sides were totally- impassabl ~ ( a goat track climbing into the
oroken Desert of Juda provided some link Between Jericho and Ein Gedi
and furth_er south ) Eat it was never a viable link.
A continuation, of sorts,

of the way- along the Rift Valley

was probably formed, south of the Dead Sea, by lateral roads coming
down the mountains from the west (Wadi Hathi t,"d and D~scent of the
Scorpions) and possibly from the east (Punon).

This continuation

went down the Arava Valley-, but on account of heat and lack of water
was probably never used except by an occasional caravan engaged in
desultory trade or carry-i ng ore.

This road came to a stop on the

searing coast of the Gulf of Akaba.

In all, except for the short,

and very important stretches between Hatsor and Beisan, the road
down the Rift Valley never l:tad, especially in its sourthern reaches,
any- importance comparable with_ that of th_e Via Maris along the coast,
and the Ridge Road along the mountains.
4.

The King ~s Hignway
The generally flat plateau of Transjordania naturally invited

the development of a north-to-south highway.

There too, as happened in

the coastal belt to the west, the wide open expanse even invited the
growth of two, parallel and rather ill-defined, arteries, both possessinq
the same terminals.

One, Ute acutal

11

King's Highwai 1 (the biblical

11

Derekh Hamelekn11 l began at Damascus, and went soutn (possioly under

the local name of the

11

Way of the Bashan 11 , Derekh. Habas han) past

Ashtharoth-Karnaim , Edrei (leria ' a} to Rab6a of the Ammonites
'-'

(Rabbath-Amm&n , Philadelpnia, Amman).

From there it continued through

Hesbon (Hesban) Aro ' er (Arara), Kir-Moav (Kerak) to Botsra (Butseira),
crossing on the way two steep-,sided river valley's it could not by-pass .

-

These were the Arnon River (Wadi Mojib) and the Zered River (Wadi Hasa).
From Botsra it continued south, until it split into two branches .

One went

down south- west into tne Rift Valley, where it r e ached the Red Sea at
ancient Eilath (Etsion-Gaber, Akaba) and from there crossed Sinai to
Egypt .

Th.e other one continued south-east into Arabi a .

The other

parallel branch of the highway along the plateau, also called loosely
the King ~s Highway, left Damascus in a wide sweep to the east, skirting
the Lejja lava block, ultimately to come also into the chief city of
the Ammonites.

-

From here it continued south in an easterly sweep under

tne name, "The Way of the Desert 11 ~perekh Hami dbar 11 } , referring to the
Moabite and the Edomite deserts, to rejoin the actual King's Highway,
which i't had paralleled all the way from Damascus , somewhere on the
plateau nortn- east of Eilath.

Whoever came down the eastern trail , also could

continue either to Egypt or to Arabia.
Unlike the

11

True 11 King rs Highway that, at least in its northern

and central sectors , passed through relatively well-watered and cultivated
countryside, and linked several towns on its way, its more easterly
counterpart ran for practically all its way along the border between

~

th,e plateau and tne North_Arabian Desert, touching no 5i g settlements

i n its progress.

It may have been a su5stitute for the ma i n highway ,

used 5y wayfarers who did not, or could not , use the Kinq,s Highway at
various times, as it was controlled 1and some times barred, by the various
peoples through whose territory it passed . ( 9 ) However, regardless of
whether the western or the eastern route was used, the Plateau Highway

•

wai, beside its coastal counterpart, probably one of the most important
traffic arteries in the Ancient East as a whole

It was the sole means

of access from the north (and from the Mediterranean Coast), to Western
Arabia, and also provided a secondary road to Egypt for whoever
preferred it .
The four parallel highways described above, constituted a
concentration of traffic lanes in a small area with pr oba5ly few
equals in the world.

However, an appreciation of their importance will

be incomplete without a descri,ption of the country,1 s lateral road

•

sys·tem, running east-west, complementl'ng and interconnecting tfte matn
north,- south highways .
The Latitudinal Roads
In the course of time tnere developed tn Palest,'ne quite a number
of Jateral roads, connecti'ng tne four phystcal su5dtvt si'ons of the
country .

At least a dozen of them can eas1' ly, 5e counted ., Tfte following

descr i ption of the roads w-ill take account however only of the more
important ones, which had more than local importance .
l9}_

Cf.

the btolical account of the Is,raelites barred from using the
K,ng I s, Hi:ghway by th_e Edomites and the Moabi tes , Numeri 20: 14-21 ;
Judges 11:17 .

~,
,.

The Nortttern La terq 1 Roqds,
This started wittt tfLe Plain of Acco (Ze5.ulun}, hav t ng Acco itself

lrespecitvely Haifa-Shj_kroona/Tel-es-Samakh} as· a terminal.

It first went

s·outtt-east and tnen mostlY' east, followtng ttte Valley of Jezreel past
Megiddo, and continuing into th.e Jordan Valley at Beisan.

On account

of its favouraBle geograph.ical features tftis was always By far tf1e

•

eas·iest and the most important lateral hi'gn.way across nortttern Palestine .
rn tt termtna ted tne Ridge 'Road, a 1ong the country I s moun tai•n 5ackBone,
and--a fact of far greate.r tmportance---into it merged the Vi a Maris, in
its progress bottt along the coast to~ards the north_, and inland towards
Damascus, in th.e north.- .east.
the east.

It a1so had extensions to the Plateau in

For tfl..e sal<e of completness, however, an even more northerly

road, across Lower Gali.lee, shDuld be mentioned, though it rarely seemed
to have Been of any i_mportance.. Tttis led south-east from Acco through
W.adi /Melekh to Hanaton.

•

2.

I.t then went east to join the Via Maris.

The Central Lateral Road
This raod link.ed th.e coast ~ith Sh.ehem (_Nablus) through_ th.e easily

pass·a5le Wadi Shair, w:h.i_cli provided an extraordinarily easy crossing of
tfte ·main mountain range.
tfirough th.e Wadi Fara.

From

Slenem

it continued into the Jordan Valley

TfiJs cross-country· road also had an extension,

eas•tw.ard i_nto th.e Transjordantan plateau, utilizing the Jordan crossing
at J)qmten.

3.

The Lateral Roads of Judaea
Perhaps owing to the growing importance of the Judaean hill country ,

as the history of Palestine unfolded, there developed in the course of
time not one, but several, lateral roads from the coastal plain into
Judaea .

-

Amongst their special characteristics was the fact that not

all of them conformed to geographical features.

This, perhaps because

favourable features of this kind were either not available at all (as
for instance along the broken steep, eastern slopes of Judaea down into
th£ Jordan Rift Valley), or because th£ need for short communications
took precedence over more circuitous although perhaps easier natural
routes Cas in the case of the steep Ascent of Beit Horon).
The most important lateral artery in that part of the country was
the road from about {rod in the coas 1a l plain, which went up the Ascent of
Beit Horon, to join the Ridge Road along the top of the mountains just
north of Jerusalem.

This road, which did not use any of the natural

ascents through lateral valleys, climbed straight up a mountain spur,
and proE>aE>ly was for ages ttte most important link of Jerusalem with the
coast.

It was apparently supplemented by an even more difficu l t, narrow

land blockable) ascent through. the Wadi Salman, just south of it .

Th.is

li.kewise continued to Jerus alem through Giebon (El Gib) and past Mitspa
(NeE>i Samu• il) . ClO)

(10)

Th.e easterly continuation of the main road coming

The present main road to Jerusalem, from the coast through Bab-El -Wad
(Shaar Haga;}, probably was never of much importance until the construction of the Turkish road in 1869, as it involved a very steep
descent into the Wadi Beit Hanina that barred the way, and a very steep
climb following it.

up through Bei t Horon, w:as: prona6.ly- a little-used track through the almost
impassable Wadi Suwenit which jo t ns the Wadi Kelton its way to Jericho .
The continuation of the Wadi Salman ascent, down the eastern slope, may
nave been the Wadi Fara, which also joins the Wadi Kelt.

These tracks

never amounted to much, on account of their difficulty, and because whoever
came up from the coast, in any case went first to Jerusalem before going
into the Jordan Valley.
South of the lateral as:cents mentioned there w:as the way of the
Naftal Sorek, (Wadi Sarrarl, which pro5ably was never more than an occasionally
used track.

This, Because at its western entry into the mountains, it

formed an extraordinarily narrow defile which could be held by a few
people against an army.

Part of its. course also l ay right in the bed of a

wild torrent that blocked it tn winter.

If it was used at all (until the

liutlding of the railway, to Jerusalem in 1892), it was Because it occasionally
provided access ri'ght into th.e most important parts of Judaea.

In the

hills this tracR di'Vi'ded into two sections , one (following the Wadi Beit
Hantna) getting to th_e top

of the plateau just north,-wes-t of Jerusalem ,

and tlie otherlfollowing Wadis Rittir and El Ward) reachJng the ridge south_west of the town.

Tile natural continuation of the Nahal Sorek track

from Jerusalem to tile [as.t sttoul d flave fo 11 owed the Htnom and Ki dron
-Va 11 eys. that go down to tb_e Dead Sea after formfog th_e Wadi en-Nar.
However, tflis natural 1 ateral 1 i:nR._ across the Judaean Ht ll I s was totally
unus:ea51e E>ecause tfie Wadi' e,n-Nar, a narrow, steep, and furnace--like
passage in t ts upper readies , Becomes totally tmpassabl e just oefore tt

reaches: the Dead Sea.
are not negotiable.

Here t t ts olod._ed by a series of high steps that
In its stead there developed 1 perforce 1 what might be

called a man-made highway from Jerusalem down the eastern slopes of the
mountain ridge to Jericho.

This followed no particular natural features ,

but (not unlike the Beth Horon ascent, and the Damieh-Es-Salt ascent in
Trans j ordania) , took the shortest route cutting across the Desert of
Juda, to join the Wadi Kelton its way to Jericho and the Jordan, about
half down the way to its destination.
Second in importance amongst the roads into the Judaean Hills was
probably the road from about the (supposed) site of Gath (Tel-es-Safi),
past the gate-fortress of Azeka (Tel - es-Sakartye), through the Wadies-Sant .

This well defined, and relatively easy highway continued along

a western spur of the main range, to join the Ridge Road just south of
Beth-Lehem.

There was also a not very important track that climbed from

about Ascalon on the coast, via Lakhish (Tel-ed-Duweir), through the
Wadi Mar'j to Hebron.

Both last mentioned ascents had rather precarious

continuations to the Dead Sea, one about Ein Gedi and the other about
~

-

~~~

Jebel Us f dum (Har Sdom) which at times extended across i¼;" and onto the
opposite plateau.
4.

The Southern Lateral Track.s
Palestine 1 s easiest lateral highway , probably only ,an undefined

track across a wide, mostly dry expanse, started in the relatively well inhabited coastal belt, and turned inland, probably near Sharuhen (Tel-

el - Para), following the broad valley of the Wadi Gaza and its
extension Wadi Bir-es- Seba (Nahal Besor - Beer Sheva) , which forms a
conspicuous gap (not unlike the Jezreel Valley, its northern counterpart), between the country's main mountain ranges and the hills of the
sourthern Negev.

Passing Beersheba, Horma (Tel Mashash) and Aroer,

this track probably went up to the not very pronounced watershed

•

between the Mediterranean and the big Rift Valley, to drop down into
the Arava where it had con ti nuati.ons towards the south, the Gulf of
Akaba, and also up the eastern plateau.

Across the sourthern Negev there

passed a lateral track, from about Kadesh-Barnea (Ein Khudeirat) past
Eboda (Avdat) and through the Wadi Fikreh (Nahal Tsin) into the Arava
and beyond .
These, the most southerly of Palestine's lateral communications, differed
from tlleir more northerly- east-to-west counterparts by not serving as
essentially- local arteries.

••

There was no need for local traffic in

those uninhabited wastes, and they served long-range travel.

However,

except in very peaceful periods trade caravans must have been few on
them, arid warlike expeditions non-existent, as the arid country would
not permit the movement of large armed bodies.

It will be noted that

lateral communications across the Transjordanian plateau, and down its
western slopes into the Jordan Valley and the Arava, have only been
mentioned fleetingly and by implication . Most of Transjordania's
lateral links probably never developed into recognisable roads and

l -,
highw-ays, since traffic, 6ot1Lcommercial and milttary, overwhelmingly
trended north and south, and not east and west.

Whatever lateral movements

there were, utilized the natural lay of the land, described at the
6eginning of this ch.apter, where the natural subdivisions of Palestine are
discussed.
The Highways of Sinai

•

While the north-.to-south highway system of Palestine was being
described, there had already been occasion to mention fl eetingly its
continuation to the north (Syria) and to the south-east (Arabia).

Nor

did the Palestine highway system end in a void at its southern extremity .
All its components continued into the Sinai Peninsula, which is the
geographic, though not the geologic, link between Palestine and Egypt.
As Sinai lies west of Palestine, all the highways made an approximately
90° turn in order to enter it, crossing it roughly in an east-west
direction.

•

Had Palestine's highways not been able to turn into Sinai

and cross it, Palestine could never have laid claim to being a Country
11

of Transit
Africa.

11

,

as it would have been cut off from the Nile Valley and

Since a description of the Palestine system of road communications

would not be complete without reference to Sinai, a short outline of the
roads in its northern half must be given.

As the western boundary of

Northern Sin ai, a line will serve running along the shortest distance
between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, at the Gulf of Suez.

No

reference will be made to Southern Sinai, as its sun-scorched and sea-girt
triangle, practically throughout history, lay beyond civilization, and

1-

had no roads at a11 of any i:mportance.
Th.e ttighways wh t ch cros:sed North._ern Sinaf were th.ree in all, one
of them being a continuation of two out of the four of Palestine's own
highways, previously described.
1.

•

The Northern, or Coastal, Hi'ghway

-

Tflis linked Rafa, at its eastern extremii ty on the border of Palestine,
via El Arish (Risa-Rhinoculura) and via Sileh (Eitam, Tel Abu Tseifeh),
near today's Suez Canal, with Tanis (Ramses, Tsoan, Tsan el Khajer),
inside Egypt proper.
11

ThJs highway was the direct continuation of the

Via Maris- 11 , the main north-to-south. artery along the coastal belt of

Palestine.

This road running along the Mediterranean was the shortest

of th.e three Trans-Sinai links, and fairly well supplied with water.

It

was probably the biE>li'cal "Way of the Land of the Philistines" (Derekh
Erets Pelishtim).

Far more important than the other two parallel routes,

it was always the most practica5le link on the intercontinental highway
between Eurasia and Africa.
2.

The Central Highway
This, probably the biblical "Derekh Sh.ur" (The Road of Shur), may

h.ave been the track travel led .by th.e Patriarchs when they went down to
Egypt.

It was probably the least important path across Sinai, the least

well defined, and perhaps very precarious on account of its limited water
supply.

It was the direct continuation of the Ridge R6ad along Palestine's

mountainous backbone, through Beersheba.

It went down from there to the

general area of Kadesh Barnea, and from there proceeded due west across

- LG Central Sinai {_pro6a5 ly, 6y- way, of today' s Bi'r Has sane and Bi r Gafgaf a)
to emerge from the wilderness at the outskirts of the Land of Goshen
(prooably today's Wadi Thumilath}.
3.

The Southern HighwayThis was a continuation of Palestine s Rift Valley road that
1

ran down the Arava to Ell ath (Akaba), and chiefly al so a continuation

•

of the south-western branch of the King's Highway which came down to
Akaoa from the Transjordanian plateau .

This, the most southerly

of the three highways across Northern s t nai, went in A.a, fairly straight
line from the northern tip of the Gulf of Akaba, to the northern tip of
r

the Gulf of Suez (and the city of On- Hel6polis beyond).

Despite the

dearth of water, and difficutl mountain passes (Ras-en-Nakb and Mitla)
at both ~

ends, this was one of the great highways of the Middle East,

and second in importance only to the Via Maris itself .

Tfo ugh it passed

all the traffic from Arabia, and all the hosts, peaceful or warlike , who
chose, or were forced, to move from Egypt to Damascus and vice-versa,
wi.thout passing through western, cis-Jordanian, Palestine rhad to go down it.
SUMMING UP
At the conclusion of the above survey of the physical layout of
Palestine , and of the network of highways , roads, tracks, trails and
paths which developed as the result of the country's favourable
geographical fea t ures, several contributory factors should be stressed
which helped make Palestine a 11 Land of Transit 11 with few, if any ,equals .

I

Though the differences in height within the area belonging to
"Palestine" (as defined at the beginning the the chapter) , range from
about 2,250 metres at the southern tip of Mount Hermon, to about 400
metres below sea · 1eve l around the Dead Sea, most of the country's
traffic-lanes, longitudinal as well as latitudinal 1 passed either through
flat country, or through medium-sized hills of about l ,000 metres at the

-

most, which did not obstruct passage.

There were no big rivers or ex-

tensive swamps which could not be by-passed, and the vagaries of weather
and temperature never constituted a serious obstacle to movement.

Lack

of water in some areas, though irksome at times, was never total enough
to prevent large bodies of men and animals from finding some alternate ,
better endowed, route which had more copious supplies.

Finally, there

'almost never arose in the country local concentrations of power, military
or political, which were strong, l ong-lasting, and geographically extensive1enougfl to block passage through the country entirely, and for
long periods of time, without leaving through-tr affic some alternative
routes· of passage.
Tfterefore, along the htghways of Palestine there moved caravans and
armi'es throughout history.

Most, though not all, of those highways in

due course turned into the asphalted traffic arteries of .the pr-esent day .
But even Before the pres·ent dense road-net of the country started
developing , very slowly at ftrst , from
lay· down railways in Palestine .

1869

onward, plans were afoot to

Some of these plans never materialized,

but during a significant period in the country's history those railways

-.,, l\- w,hJ dL were actually, built turned out to be-.- as wt ll be shown i.n the
succeeding chapters--far Jnore t mportant titan its roads.

I't will 5-e the object of th_e followi'ng chapters to sh.ow, and to
d1' scuss, how ratlways in Palesti'ne were planned and built.

Tlte following

pages will try to trace tn detai'l fi_ow· tfte ratlw_a ys in the country were
initi'ated, came to fruition, were dismantled, or kept operating, or were
added to, from 1838 when they were first mentioned as a possibility,
to the present day.

An attempt will also 5e made to assess h_ow far the

railways of Palestine h.ave conformed to tn_e country 1 s salient physical
features and how far they, were the successors of its historical road system,

tf they El.ave di verged from i. t I and why.
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SELECTION OF
MAJOR RAILWAY BUILDING PLANS

•

rN PALESTINE TO 1890 11 s

Initiator or Source

•

Layout
(Planned)

Date
(Approximate)

l} No details

Ismailiya-Sinai-Kuwait

Ca. 1835

2) Montefiore

Jaffa-Jerusalem

1838/39-1862

3) Khayat

Jaffa-Suez

1848

4) Chesney-McNei 11

Jaffa-Jerusalem

1856

5) Sandwith

Hai ~a-Mesopatamia

1861-1865

6) Zimpel

Jaffa-Jerusa 1em

1864

Damascus-Jerusalem-Jaffa

No details

Jaffa-Jerusa 1em

1864

Ja ff a-Jerusa 1em

Ca. 1866

Jaffa-Jerus a 1em

1872

Jaffa-Jerusa 1em

1872--1873

12} Thevoz

Ja ff a-Jerusa 1em

1873

13} Ahmed Rashid

Damas cus ... Hejaz

1874

14} Neil

Jerusalem-Jaffa-Port Said

1875-1876

15} Ludwig Sa 1vator

Coast Line/Jordan Valley Line

1877-1878

16} Pines

Jaffa-Jerusa 1em

1878

17) Cameron

El Arish ... Kuwa it

1878

7} Zimpel

8} Hammagid

,,

I.

9} Schick
•

101 11Hahavatsel eth

I/

11) Forbes
/

•

\:::\
c;t..
~

'y
~

18) Phelps

Haifa-Basra

1878

19) Conder

Haifa-Jerusalem

1879

20) Conder

H_a tfa-A 1eppo/Moab

1880

JI

21) Erlanger

Jaffa-Jerusalem

1880

'(--

£
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u

-
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(_cont• d.)
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Initiator or Source

Layout
(Pl ,a nned)

-

Date
(Approxi mate)

22} Franco- Belgian Syn dicate

Jaffa - Jerusalem

1880

23) Watson

·Gaza-Po rt Said

1880

24) French(Saul cy)

Jaffa-Jerusalem

1880

25) Hassan Fehmy- (Turk . Govt . )

Aleppo-Jerusalem-El Arish, etc .

1880

26) Oliphant

Haifa - Syria/Egypt & Branches

1880

27) Sursock

Hai fa-Damascus

1882--1883

28) Lutfi-Navon

Syria-Jerusalem-Egypt

1885-1887

29) Elias-Pilling-Hill

Haifa-Damascus & Branches

1892

30) French Hauran Line

Damascus-Meserib

(_ Ca. 1892
)
( Completed 1894

I

EARLIEST RAILWAY PLANS FOR PALESTINE IN THE CONTEXT OF
TRANSPORTATION SCHEMES FOR Tl{E MI DOLE EAST AS A WHOLE

Tfte world's first steam-worked railway started operating in
England between Stockton and Darlington in 1825.

Eleven years later, in

1836, London, the British capital, Etad its first working Hne, the LondonGreenwJcft Railway

Cl}. Plans to lay down lines in Palestine seem to have

da ted from very early in the Railway Age.

Sometime about 1835 it was

first suggested to shorten tne journey from Britain to India by building
an overland link from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf.

This would

h.ave involved building a railway running practically west-east, from
Is.mailia in Egypt to Kuw.ait on th.e Gulf.

The line would have crossed

s.outb_em Palestine by way of th.e Negev.

Nothing, however, apart from a

pass;ing reference is known about this plan. (2)

1t appears that the first documented project of building a railway

in tne Rolyland dates. from 1838 or from 1839.

The concept of building

a lfne from Jaffa to Jerus.alem occurred to Sir Moses Montefiore, either
while he was preparing, togetner with his wife, for their second visit
to Palestine in 1839, or while he was actually in the country.

In any

cas,e, in his "Diaries" for 1862, it is stated that he first thought about a

1Railway Directory, 1975, pp. 648-649. Full details of the sources
quoted in the following notes will be found in the bibliographic •
s.ecti on appended to t!ii s. work.
2R.C. Woods, Geographic Journal, 1917, pp. 32-33
cf. bibliographical section.

railway 24 years earlier (3).

It is intriguing to speculate on what

made Sir Moses have such a far-fetched idea at a time when railways
were still new and untried.

However, he had been Sheriff of London

when the first trains began to serve the capital; he may also have
heard of Mohammed Ali's abortive scheme of building, 1834-36, with the
help of the British engineer Galloway Be· , a first railway in Egy~t,
between Alexandria, Cairo and Suez (4).

•

Most likely, however, Sir Moses

was led to have his original idea by the difficulties he and his wife
experienced when going up from the coast to the Holy City.

At that time

there were no roads at all anywhere in Palestine; the first one, from
Jaffa into Jerusalem ,was only to be built in 1869 for the visit of the
Austrian Emperor Francis=Joseph.

Ami

1he

threat of the robber-sheikh

Abu-Gosh looming over the outskirts of Jerusalem no daub~ added to the
physical difficulties which travellers like Sir Moses and his wife were
exposed to.

Thus the idea of going to Jerusalem by rail may have

suggested itself to the practical mind of the Jewish financier.

However,

nothing more was heard of Montefiore's railway plan for another etghteen
years, until 1856, the year in which the end of the Crimean War opened
up new vistas for the Near East and one year after Montefiore had paid
his fourth visit to Palestine (5).
3L. Loewe (ed:,). Diaries of Sir Moses and Lady Montefiore, II., p. 133
( cf , bibl iography).
4c. Issawi, pp. 410-411,

Karkay , pp. 108-109, also Elath pp. 100-103.

5Montefiore visited Palestine seven times: 1827, 1839, 1848, 1855,
1857, 1866 and 1875. In 1856 the Ottoman Government published the
11 Hatt-I-Humayun 11 ,
its great internal reform scheme, a fact that may
have influenced Montefiore to undertake serious steps to implement
his scheme for the railway to Jerusalem--as will be outlined further on.

-

S-J -

While Montefiore's tentative plan was tile abeyance, there llad
been another suggestion for a r ailway in Palestine.

1848 5-y the native British Vice-Consul in Jaffa,

This was made in

Assad Yacoob Khayat .

He wanted a 1ine to 5e 5-ui lt from Jaffa to the town of Suez, probably to
link up tllere with the B.ritis.h mail service to Indi.a .

Suell a line would

pern.aps ftave 5.een a British-supported rival of the Alexandria-Cairo-Suez
railway envisaged, s:ince the middle 1830 1 s, by the not very anglophile
regime in Egypt.

Th.is proposed line had one feature in common wHh

s:everal 0th.e r railway plans for Palestine that will be mentioned
later on.

Nothing is l<nown about it except one short reference (6).

It also llad somethi_ng in common with. the 1835 suggestion, mentioned
above, to liuild a line from Ismailia to Kuwait across southern Palestine.
It w:ould likewi.se have been an international or even an intercontinental
rail link.

Both lines, proposed at the earliest outset of the Rai lway

Age, prove Palestine's importance as a Land of Transit, as amply discus.sect in th.e introductory ch.apter.

Wh.-ile Montefiore's s cheme for a railway from Jaffa to Jerusalem
had been consigned to cold storage during the years 1838/39-1856, quite
a numlier of suggestions were meanwhile being aired, and even were put
into execution, regarding the introduction of steam l ocomotion into
tile Near and Middle East.

cr·•

He may possibly not have known about Khayat's

6
S.. Avits.ur, 11 A Dry-Land Canal Jaffa-Suez" (Hebrew) in Teva Va ' Aretz,
vo . 10, No. 5, July-September 1968, pp. 307-309, referring to Public
Records Office file No. 78/70.,, 705, 755. Assad Khayat is also
mentioned by Lane-Poole ( cp. bib 1 i ography) in connection with the
visit to Pale~tine in 1856 of Sir John McNeill and of F.R. Chesney-botll of whom will be mentioned in due course. He also met Montefiore.
Khayat served as Vice-Consul from 1847-65, to his death.

plan, but he must have been aware of other schemes, or at least of
some of them.

In 1853, the British engineer Robert Stephenson completed

the first railway in Egypt, and in the Levant as a whole .
112 km ~ line from Alexandria to Kafr-es-Zayat.

This was the

The line, which also

was tfle first one on the African continent, was extended to Cairo in 1856,
and reached Suez from Cairo in 1858 (7}.

Montefiore presumably knew of

tflis development in a country he had visited.
to Egypt in 1857, fte went to Cairo by rail .

In fact, during this visit
About the same time, approxi-

mately, negotiations went on in Turkey for the construction of the first
railway in Anatolia.

Tflis resulted in 1856 in the granting of the first

ratlw.ar E>uilding concession in Turkey proper.

This was to become the

Bri:tisfL-5.utlt line Smyrna il'(Izmir)_-Aidin, which was finished 1866 ( 8).
Tnere were otfler railway schemes mooted for Turkey, as far as can be
made out, all in the 1850's and probably most of them by Britans.
Some of tftese schemes mus.t have come to the ears of Montefiore.

The

following names of potential &uilders are mentioned by E. Elath in his
work on Britain's. Routes to India through the Euphrates Valley:

M.

Stepftenson, A.F. Campbell, J. Wyld, A. Wright, and Dr. J.B. Thompson (9).
All these visionary railwar schemes for Turkey foresaw very large-scale
building activities, in comparison with_ which a 75 km. (as the crow flies)

1 IssawJ, p. 411; Karkar, p. 109; Railway Directory, p. 100, where
tfie date ts erroneously given as 1856.

8Karkar, p. 110; Issawi, p. 91, where the completion date is given
as 1867; also l{ecker (_cp. bibliography).
9

.

Elath, pp. 114-115.

railway from the Mediterranean to Jerusalem looked very modest--but
much more capable of being carried out.

A backdrop to all these railway activities in the Ottoman Empire,
of wh_ich_ Egypt formally was part at tnat time, was provided after the
middle 1830's 5y the so-called "Euphrates River Scheme" of Captain, and
finally General, Francis Rawdon Chesney.
scrutiny for a num5.er of reasons:

This scheme deserves closer

a) It also envisaged in its later

stages the building of railways within the Ottoman Empire, a fact that
may nave lieen in principle of interest to Montefiore; b) Its sponsors
for a time wanted to widen its scope by building a railway from Jaffa
to Jerusalem, independently of Montefiore; c) Its sponsors stole a
marcft on Montefiore by surveying proposed routes on the spot in Palestine
in 1856, one year 5efore Sir Moses himelf did so in 1857 (events
whicn_will be dealt with exhaustively later on in th.is ch.apter}; d) Its
main sponsors: and their aims were known to Montefiore, at an early
s;tage (about 1852), and later came into personal contact with him
08621 i.n tnei.r endeavors.

CHESNEY 1 S EUPHRATES RIVER SCHEME
In tfie middle 1830's, F.R. Chesney became known in England as the
initiator of a plan to organize a steamboat service down the River

Euphrates (_10).

This, so Chesney- and Flis supporters claimed, would
~n.ave oeen for various reasons, practical 1 po1 i?'a1 ,v: and military, a

more advantageous way to India than the route across Egypt (which as
yet had no Suez Canal) and down the Red Sea.

Chesney's Euphrates River

Scheme of 1834-1837 failed, after he had carried out a rather ill-fated expedition

down the river, but the idea of using the Euphrates river

valley for communication purposes was never really entirely shelved (11).

•

One of its interesting aspects was that it envisaged the application
of steam locomotion to traffic needs in the Near East.

Had the scheme

materialized, it would quite inevitably have led sooner or later to
the building of a railway between one of the roadsteads on the Mediterranean,
across northern S, ria, to the northern terminus of the Euphrates
steamships.

•

The Euphrates scheme, and Chesney's appearance before the

1°Francis R(lwdon Chesney, 1789-1872, was a soldier1 engineer, traveller
and visionary, who spent his life trying to further British interest~
in the Near East. In 18301 while in Egypt, his surveys proved the
levels of the Mediterranean and the Red Sea were equal, and the building
of a canal between them feasible. For this the actual builder of the
Canal, F. de Lesseps, called him in 1869. le pere du Canal. Chesney
died a full general, but he failed to bring to fruition his life's
ambition of opening the Euphrates Valley for international traffic. His
life is summarised in the British Dictionary of National Biography,
Vol X, p. 195 {p. 232 in the Concise edition of ca. 1939). His biography
by his wife and daughter, and edited by S. Lane-Lane, appeared inl885
( cf . -~ bl i ography).
11

11

11 Theo. complete tale of Chesney's Euphrates Scheme is given by Elath
( c . _o,i bl iography) pp. 54-97. There al so wi 11 be found a list of
Chesney's own publications about his exploratory travels. Haskins
(c ., ,ti f>liography) provides useful background material on the subject
as a whole, as does Hecker (cf · ,&; bliography) p. 777.
I

)
Parliamentary Select Committee on Steam Navigation to India {12). in
which he explained his concepts, undoubtedly must have come to the
attention of Montefiore.
Chesney s defunct steamer scheme was resurrected after a lapse
1

of 19 years ,

.

Ln 1856 (rather like Montefiore s Jaffa-Jerusalem railway),
1

in the form of a proposed Euphrates Valley Railway.

•

The initiator · of

this slightly altered Euphrates River Scheme, originally proposed by
Chesney, was Patrick Wlliam Andrew, a leading British figure in Indian
railway affairs (13).

Andrew, like Chesney, before him, had not only

commercial, but also British strategic interests vis-a-vis Russia,
at heart.

As will be noted later on, in connection with Montefiore s
1

activities in 1852, there is even a possibility that the original idea
of substituting a railway for river steamers in the Euphrates Valley
came from Chesney himself, who had never given up his idea of utilizing
that river valley.

•

Andrew, who as director of an Indian railway company

had ample means at his disposal, may merely have taken up an idea mooted
by his predecessor.

However that may have been, Andrew founded The

Euphrates Valley Railway Company Ltd. (from the Mediterranean to the
Persian Gulf).

12

Early in 1856 he asked Chesney to join the new company

cr.

Elath pp. 66-82. It was as the result of the Select Committee s
recommendations of 1834 that Chesney undertook his 1835-37 expedition
down the Euphrates, which involved the loss of one of his two ships,
and the failure of his scheme.
13About W.P. (later Sir William) AH.drew: Elath, p. 113 (Andrew's
writings are listed on pp. 116-118); Issawi, p. 137; Grunwald
(cf . ,&-i bliography), p. 248.

1

and Chesney responded enthusiastica]ly (14 ). Chesney was to be the
new company's engineering adviser (15) . Another of Andrew's supporters
became Sir John McNeill, a very important man indeed, and destined to
become a Privy Councillor within a year (16).

He had been a n ardent

supporter of Chesney's original scheme.
In the autumn of 1856 McNeill and Chesney set out for Constantinople,

•

ostensibly in order to obtain from the Porte a building concession for
Andrew's Euphrates railway.

On their way, however, both men landed in

Palestine in order to study a proposed railway from Jaffa to Jerusalem
(17).

Th i s was a development as interesting as it was abrupt, since it

1 4rhe

whole story of the Euphrates Valley Railway is described at
length by Elath. The background of the railway on pp. 98- 113, and
the efforts of W.P. Andrew on pp. 113-135. About Chesney's enthusiastic
response, cf. Ela th, p. 120 o
15 Lane-Poole (c-p" ·bliography); p. 423.

•

16 sir John McNeill will be found in the D. N.B . , both in its full and
in its concise edition. His name is sometinies spelled MacNeil. He
lived 1795-1883, and was a doc.tor by profession. He also seems to have
had qualifications as an engineer. He became envoy at Teheran, and
played an important role there in 1836-41. He then had a distinguished
public career in England, Cf . also Elath, p. 120 et~-, and
Grunwald, p. 247.
17 Lane-Poole, p. 438; Elath, p. 121 . It might be noted that Elath
in his book made a small mistake in stating that Chesney went directly
to Constantinople, with only McNeill, surveying the proposed railway
route. In fact, Chesney also went tot Jerusalem . When landing at Jaffa,
both men were attended by the British Vice-Consul, the same Assad Khayat
(who later also looked after Montefiore), who in 1848 had already suggested
a railway from Jaffa to Suez, as noted above . For this, ct,. Lane-Poole,
p. 437 . Also cf,. Mrs. E.A . Finns, Reminiscences (cf · ,k ib1iography) 1
p. 163. In pas ~ing it might be mentioned that Elath (on p. 123) also
possibl y slipped in saying that McNeill ultimately joined Chesney at
Constantinople. Whatever the intentions with which he set out, according
to Lane-Poole, p. 438, he immediately returned to London from Palestine .

marked yet another plan to build a railway in Palestine, apparently
having no connection with Montefiore's plan to build a line linking
the very same towns.

The motives for this new scheme, linked as it was

with the plans for the Euphrates Valley Railway, cannot be found in
It can only be guessed that the task of the two

the available sources.

men was to survey the coast of the Levant for suitable terminals for
the Euphrates Valley Railway, and that they used their visit to explore
Palestine also {18).

What possible connection a line to Jerusalem

could have had with the Euphrates railway remains a riddle.

The exact

activities of McNeill and Chesney during their visit--and they were
illuminating--will be detailed later.
MONTEFIORE'S JERUSALEM RAILWAY SCHEME, 1856/57.
How far was Montefiore informed in 1856 of the activities of the
Andrew-McNeill-Chesney group?

In view of his close involvement with the

affairs of the Holy Land for some three decades, it might be assumed
that he was aware of them.

According to Elath, he definitely even had

been in touch with Chesney (19).

According to Grunwald, McNeil had

even joined the body {described in the following paragraphs), that
Montefiore had set up to further his own parallel scheme (20).

18c . Elath, p. 121; also Grunwald, pp. 247-248. Both authors offer
no explanation for the sudden emergence of the new Jaffa-Jerusalem
scheme ; or its connection with the Euphrates ~ ilway.
19 Elath, p. 14~.

Unfortunately no source is quoted.

20 Grunwald, p. 247.

Here too, proof seems to be lacking.

- ~Montefiore s Diaries for May 1852, four years before the events
1

11

11

described above, serve as proof for two facts:

a) that Montefiore

had kept wat¢hing railway developments in the Levant; and b) that he
was indeed aware of Chesney s activities--though he did not, possibly,
1

keep in personal touch with him.

At the beginning of May 1852(!)

Montefiore noted that Dr. Thompson of Beyrouth came to inform him that
he was about to proceed to Constantinople to obtain a firman (roughly
11

equivalent to

11

concession

11 )

11

for the Euphrates Valley Railway, and

that he proposed forming a company under the directorship of Chesney (21).
This, as already noted above, raises the possibility that Chesney had
been the originator of the Euphrates Railway concept, even before Andrew.
The fact is, anyway, that Dr. Thompson found it necessary to inform
Montefiore--in 1852--of the proposed railway s~ me and of Chesney s
1

involvement in it.

Moreover, Montefiore saw fit to record the visit ..

A second entry in the Diaries of a few days later, May 17, 1852, mentions
Montefiore s banquet for the Lord Mayor of London and notes that on
1

this occasion he conversed with several gentlemen on Chesney s railway
1

(not steamer!) scheme (22).

The diary entries of 1852 form a base

21 Loewe, II, p. 25. The question as to who was Dr. Thompson of
Beyrouth remains unanswered. Perhaps he was the Dr. Thomson (sic)
mentioned by Elath, cP. lote 9. Possibly he was the American
missi gnary resident ih Beyrouth in 1837 mentioned by ,~~~ Shalom
(er . .,i·ibliography), p. 592.
22[.
. oewe, II, p. 25 .

t

for ~ evaluating Mon tefi ore's renewed effort on behalf of his Jerusalem
railway scheme of four years later (23).
By the time McNeill and Chesney set out for the East, on
September 2, 1856 (24}, Montefiore had actually been engaged for several
months in an i.ntensive effort to get his idea of 1838/39 for the
Jerusalem line going.

The Crimean W.ar had come to an end in February 1856,

and already at the beginning of th.at year he attended meetings convened
for the purpose of discussing a scheme for a railway from Jaffa to
Jerusalem (25}.

Incidentally, it might fae noted th.at Montefiore's idea

to build a windmill in Jerusalem, wnich still exists, and was the very
first "industrial" undertaking in the modern history of Jewish. Pa1estine,
seems to have Eleen contemporaneous with tne revival of his railway plan-the very first attempt to give Palestine a modem means of locomotion (26).
The story of Montefiore's railway scheme, which , unrolled between
early tn 1856 and sometime in 1862, nas partially been dealth with elsewhere,

23 rn tne quaint arcnaic language of the Hebrew translation of Montefiore's
"Diaries" th.at appeared in W..arsaw in 1899, (cp. bibliography), Part II,
Book 3, pp. 82 and 89, there are references to Ch.esney's Euphrates
railway and to the nope that Montefiore had in 1852 for that 1 ine to
fae th..e beginning of railways in the Holy ;1Land. From th.at, not very exact,
translation it also appears. th.at following his return from Palestine
in 1855, Montefiore took part in several meetings at unspecified dates,
regarding th..e bui 1 ding of a railway to Jerusalem. Furth.er rEfferences in
thJs translation to Montefiore's railway -activities are to be found on
pp. 90, 91, 92 and 103.
24Elatft, p .. 121.
25
.
Loewe, II, p. 58; also Grunw.ald, p. 245.
2~Montefiore's windmill was actually built about 1857, but conceived
earlier. ~p. the arti.cles "Monteffore" and "Jerusalem" in the
Ency cl opaedi a Hebraica (Heb..rew; cp. bib-1 iograpny).

by Grunwald, Elath, and also Avitsur (27) .

Consequently only its most

salient features and some aspects that have perhaps been overlooked, wi ll
be di scussed here .
arise:

In dealing with the subj ects a number of questions

a) What were Montefiore s motives in 1856 (except the ones in 1838/39
1

speculated upon at the beginning of this chapter) when he was planning
the first railway in Palestine; b) who were the people he tried to interest
in his scheme , and what were their incentives as far as can be ascertained;
c) what track did Montefiore have in mind for his proposed line, and
what practical steps

11

in the field did he take to reconnoitre it?
11

This last question, in particular, does not even seem to have interested
researchers, who have discussed the theme only from its political, historical
or econanic aspects.
As stated above, Montefiore started his activities for his railway
about the time the Crimean War drew to its close, and when Turkey was
about to become, more than ever before, open to European interests.
On February 18, 1856, the Hatt-I-Humayun had been promulgated by
the Porte, the Reform Edict that was intended to ameliorate the position
of the non -Moslems in the Ottoman Empire.

This edict also enabled

foreign subjects to hold properties in their own name, an indispensable
prerequisite for initiating the building of railways (28) . Montefiore

27 The most exhaustive treatment of the subject is by Grunwald.
Elath also dealt with it thorough l y, but only as a side-issue of
the Euphrates River Scheme. Both have already been quoted liberally.
Avitsur also mentions Montefiore s railway, in the two different
versi ~ns of his summary of railway history in Palestine/Israel, both short•
(C . .B;i bliogra-phy).
28 Karkar, p. 74.
1

seems to have been interested enough in this new law to make the
British Ambassador to the Sublime Porte, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe,
send him a copy, and a French translation (29).

It can hardly be

doubted that the change in political circumstances in Turkey contributed
greatly to Montefiore s willingness to
1

11

push his scheme.
11

It is also

obvious that the wish to "improve the situation" of his correligionists
in the Holy Land, also had a great deal to do with Montefiore s efforts
1

•

to advance his scheme.

Indeed, this is practically the one and only

explicit reason that can be gleaned from most of the Diaries
11

11

(though

he must have expressed also others, in other ways, and on other occasions).
The dearth of motives for the railway scheme, as apparent in the diaries,
is, in fact, remarkable.

On the other hand, it is quite clear what

Montefiore did not want, namely, he was quite detennined in his wish
that he did not want the scheme to become what he called a sectarian
11

11

undertaking, that is a denominational body, i.e., one having a Christian
missionary tinge (30).

•

Views like this were not surprising in a

philanthropist who had fought the activities in Jerusalem of the
British Mission to the Jews for many years.

What is surprising is that

even a railway scheme in the Holy Land had its religious aspects 1 nor
was this the last time that religious issues were to crop up in connection
with railway building in a country that was traditionally a battlefield
between the various faiths.
29 Loewe, II, p. 62
30 Loewe, II, p. 58

Quite early in 1856, Montefiore took pains

to explain to his Jewish-descended associate, Sir Culling Eardly--who
will be mentioned again--that he himself did not expect the proposed
railway to induce even 50 Jews to return to the Holy Land 1 but he did
insist on its philanthropic aspects in improving the lot of the local
Jews (31).
However, there is also another motive of Sir Moses quite discernible

•

in the Diaries, not expressly stated, and by no means incompatible with
his explicit wish to help the Jews in Palestine.

He seemed to have been

genuinely convinced that his railway schane was a sound financial investment, provided basic working conditions were suitable.

Otherwise he

would not have made such earnest efforts (as detailed later on) to interest
in his plan people to whom Palestine itself presumably meant little, but
whose names--as he explained to Sir Culling--were well known for wealth
and connected with other railways (32).

It seans to be a fact that

Montefiore once declined to join de Lesseps in his Suez Canal Schane

•

because it was not likely to prove successful from a financial point
of view (33). It may therefore be assumed that he was well known in
_llttv
the ~
as a sound and careful financier, who would on no account have
involved others as well as himself, in a plan
I

he thought unsound.

31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Loewe, II, p. 57. ~ontefiore refused to get involved not only
with the Suez Canal, but also with an early Panama Canal Schane.
C. Loewe, I, p. 31.

Montefiore s determination to have a paying investment runs like
1

a red thread through all his efforts from 1856 onward .

To safeguard the

investors he asked during his interview with the Prime Minister, Lord
Palmerston, on April 7, 1856, for a Royal Charter limiting the liabilities
of the shareholders (34). He also asked the Prime Minister to apply for
a firman for the railway from the Turkish government, also for a stretch
of land on both sides of the proposed line and/or a guarantee for a

•

~

minimum rate of interest.

He even requested Pal rston to make him a

present of the Balaklava Railway--apparently a surplus British military
line in the Crimea (35).

To this Palmerston replied that, on the contrary,

he hoped that Montefiore would pay him a good price for the line.
Montefiore may have had good reasons for expecting the proposed
railway to pay.

The num~er of pilgrims and tourists going up from the

Coast to Jerusalem in 1856 is not known, but in the early 1860 s, it
1

34 Loewe, II, pp. 58-59.

•

35 Ibid. Palmerston said to Montefiore that it would be some time before
the railway became available. The idea of building the line cheaply
out of second-hand materials, strangely foreshadows what actually
happened in 1890-92, when the first railway into Jerusalem was actually
built out of the leftovers of the defunct French line between Panama
and Col on, following the Panama scandal.
The idea of using the Bulaklava line may have come from Count Paul
Edmond Strzelecki, one of Montefiore s associates, who had been to the
Crimea. According to Grunwald, pp. 245-246, it may have been Strzelecki
who early in 1856 visited Palmerston and suggested purchase of the soonto be redundant railway by a company headed by Montefiore, to lay
it down between Jaffa ~ d Jerusalem.
1

was estimated between 60 , 000 and 80,000 a year (36) . The building
of a convenient railway may have been expected to increase the fl ow
of travellers .

In any case, Montefiore was adamant in his intention

to have a railway concession only with a guaranteed income on the
moneys invested.

In 1856/57 he wanted a return of 7%, which figure

he lowered to 5- 6% in 1862 (37).

In 1862, apparently when he saw no

chance to build the railway under attractive financial conditions, he
withdrew.

It might then be stated with some confidence, that whatever

incidential benefits for the Jews in the Holy Land Montefiore expected
from his railway schane, his motives were to a certain extent monetary .
It might be noted in passing that Montefiore's request to have the
redundant Balaklava railway as a gift, may provide the only extant clue
36 Zimp (~f. .li bliography), p. 9; Elath, p. 144. Elath, quoting
Lane-Poole, refers to an exchange of letters between Chesney and Sir
A. Slade, a Britisher serving as a Turkish admiral. Slade expressed
his opposition to the building of a railway to Jerusalan. This for
a reason characteristic of the international struggle over the Holy
Land. Slade said that most pilgrims were either Catholics or EasternOrthodox, with few Jews or Protestants. According to Slade, the new
railway would lead to another (schismatic.!) crusade, and to extraterritorial demands on Turkey.
37 For this, Hyamson's work on the British Consulate in Jerusalem
(cf . ibliography), II, p. 247 . Here the British Consul, the famed
James Finn, in a dispatch to Lord Clarendon, the Foreign Secretary,
quotes in 1857, the Austrian Consul in Jerusalan, Count Pizzamano to
the effect that Montefiore will never get the 7% he wants for his
railway. Pizzamano also claimed that there were not enough travellers
for a railway. (Avitsour, puts their number at only 5,000 before the
Crimean War). From Pizzamano s ranarks it might also be learnt that
in his opinion, an extension of the railway to Damascus, or even to
Baghdad (!!)would not pay . For Montefiore's insistence on 5-6% in
1862, c"{>, Loewe, II, p. 133 .
1

r,

as to what gauge his railway would have had.

In the middle of the 19th

century, mostly wide or standard lines were being built in England
(i.e., lietween 12,140

and 1,435 mm).

11111

The Crimean line must have

ki.v

one of these gauges and relaying th.em to the Judaean Hills would have
fieen a costly undertaking.

When the first railway to Jerusalem was

ultimately opened in 1892 (as detailed in the following chapter} it was
of the narrow and cheap l , 000 mm type ; .
Returning to the April 1856 meeting with. Palmerston, Montefiore
th.ougnt it had been successful (38).

The Prime Minister expressed his

optnion to Montefiore and Eardly th_at the proposed line would be of use
to increase Turkish. commerce and revenues.

He also stressed its

military importance in enab-1 ing troops to be moved qui ckly--th.us becoming
tEie first, fiut by no means the last, man to link the question of railways

in Palestine with military considerations (39).

Montefiore on his

part also stressed the advantages to Turk.ey--beside his unwillingness
to lose on the deal (40).

Some six weeks later in May 1856, Ali

Pas ha, the Turkis Grand Vizier, visited London.

Montefiore and his wife,

JudftfL, went to meet fdm at Eardley's residence, where speeches mentioning
the railway were made.

Next day, Montefiore led a delegation of his

supporters for a two-hour meeting with Ali Pash a , who however rema i ned

38

.
Loewe, II, p. 59

39 Ibi d.
40

.
Hyamson, II, p. 246

non-conmittal, without saying

11

no outright (41).

He agreed to

11

forward a memorandum home, but wanted to consider either a land
grant, or a guarantee of interest on investments, but not both.
Towards the end of 1856, some six months later, Count Strzelecki
went to Constantinople on behalf of the scheme and reported the
Turks wanted to guarantee 6% but refused to grant land (42).

-

There

the matter rested for some months.
Who were the prospective investors and partners Montefiore had
succeeded in 1856 in enlisting on behalf of his Jerusalem railway scheme?
They were a variegated lot (43).

One of the most interesting amongst

them may have been Lawrence Oliphant (1829-1888), colourful writer,
traveller1 and mystic, who took part in Montefiore s deputation to the
1

Grand Visier (44). What Oliphant s role was in Montefiore s efforts,
1

1

whether he came as an entrepreneur, as an acquaintance of Stratford de
Redcliffe, the British ambassador at Constantinople, or as an experienced
eastern traveller, is not at all clear.

He was just 27 years old at the

41 Loewe, II. p. 59 ~
42 Grunwald, p. 24l
43 Grunwald. pp. 245-249, provided interesting particulars about
Montefiore 1 s supporters. However, the following biographies differ
slightly.

44 Loewe, II, p. 59

time .

But some 24 years later he was to become a most fervent pro-

tagonist of other railway lines designed to further the affairs of
Palestine (45).

There is far less doubt as to what Sir Culling Eardley ' s

place was in the context of Montefiore's plans.

Sir Culling (1805-1863)

was to be involved, with a few interruptions, in the Jerusalem railway
scheme from its revival in 1856 to its abortive conclusion in 1862.

-

The D.N.B. calls him "a religious philanthropist (46).
11

According to it,

he obtained a firman of religious liberty from the Sultan in 1856, and
also from the Khedi Ve of Egypt.

He later on supported the cause of

Catholics in Protestant Sweden, and advanced the casue of the GreekOrthodox-Bulgarian Church . He himself was a Protestant, a fact that
may be inferred from his founding the British Evangelical Alliance in
1846 . A less known fact is that he was a direct descendant of the

Jewish financier {gf Sepharadic extraction / as was also Montefiore), Sampson
Gideon (47).

-

Gideon's son became a Baron Eardley in the Irish peerage (48)

and Sir Culling was apparently his heir.
While Oliphant and Eardley may have been the most interesting amongst
the people Montefiore had mobilized in support of his railway scheme,
the others, all listed by Loewe or by Grunwald, and most by .the D.N .B.,

45 About Oliphant: c . D.N.B., XIV, PPo1027, et seg.

Also Loewe, II, p. 59
%
~~
D.N.B . , concise ed., p. 379; also Grunwald, p; 246. He
a
member of Parliament at the age of 25.
47 Goodman (c-p. "bliography) p. 109, 120.
48 D. N.B., concise ed., p. 492.

-10also rate a passing glance (49).

They were:

the Honorable Evelyn

Ashley (1836-1907) who, though only 20 years old at the time, was invited
as the son of Lord Shaftesbury, the philanthropist.

He was a relation

of Lord Palmerston, and destined to become his private secreatry in 1858.
Perhaps by inviting him, Montefiore wanted to get in touch with the
Prime Minister; a Mr. Barkley, who may possibly have been--there are some

•

spelling mistakes in the Diaries--Mr. Barc~ y, the financier, of what
was later to become Barclay's Bank; a Mr. Baxter, possibly the merchanttraveller, M.P., and future Secretary to the Admiralty, William Edward
Baxter (1825-1890); a Mr. Redhouse, who was possibly (some of these
tentative identifications admittedly are speculations) James William
Redhouse (1811-1892), who was plain 11 Mr. 11 until knighted in 1888.

He

was an outstanding oriental linguist, bad been an employee of the
Turkish government at Constantinople for several years 1 and later was
Secretary of the Royal Asiatic Society; Count (afterward Sir) Paul

•

Edmond Strzelecki (1796-1873), the Polis ~ Prussian-born, Britishnaturalized, explorer and company-promoter.
in society and London financial circles.

He had many connections

His home seems at times to

have served as the meeting place of the people involved ~ith the
railway scheme.

As already noted, he had been to the Crimea and

may have been the visitor who suggested to Palmerston handing the
Balaklava railway over for Montefi6re's

use (50); Mr. Matthew U~ielly,

49 Loewe, II, p. 58 et~.; Grunwald pp. 245-247, in whose list there
is a slight oversight: Oliphant died not in 1902, but in 1888. Also
Grunwald spelled the name Barcley wrongly. It should be Barclay.
50c~. Ph. Guedalla, Palmerston (1926), p. 386 as quoted by Grunwald
p. 245. Also Grunwald, p. 246.

-11which had had early

a member of the banking house Charles
railway interests.

No details could be found about this gentlemen, but

his name pennits speculations about his possibl

Jewish descent (51).

As already noted, late in 1856, Count Strzelecki returned to London
from his mission to Constantinople practically empty-handed.

About

February 1857, all the gentlemen concerned had a meeting at the Count s
1

•

house, and agreed that nothing could now be done in the matter of the
"Jerusalem ailway 1 whereupon Montefiore pa id his part of the expenses
11

and withdrew from the scheme.

So according to his Diaries (52)

However,

there exists what may possibly be a different version of this surprising
development.

It is based on a note by Chesney, quoted by his biographer,

Lane-Poole and mentioned both by Elath and Grunwald (53).

As already

noted above, Sir Culling Eardley, Montefiore's Jewish-descended associate,
had a distinct background of Christian proselytizing interests, and at
an early stage (in fact before both went to see Lord Palmerston in April

•

1856) Montefiore had made it quite clear to him that he, Montefiore,

wanted his project to have no

11

sectarian aspects (54).
11

Sir Culling had

quite agreed to this . However, according to Chesney, when the railway
scheme was pretty well advanced in 1856, at a meeting at Count Strzelecki's

51 The name Uzielly figured in the British Who s Who
as late as
1952, as that of a Christian family. There seems to be a prominent
Catholic banking family in the U.S. as well, bearing this name.
11

1

11 ,

52 Loewe, I I . p. 63 .
53 Elath, p. 142-143, and Grunwald, p. 248. both quoting LaF1e-Poole, p. 453.
54Cf. Loewe, II, p. 58.

-·'1 l....-

home, Sir Culling told Montefiore that making converts in Palestine was
his (and hi s associates) expectation--whereupon Montef iore took his hat
and left.

It remains a moot point what this episode in 1856 had to do

with the decision of February of 1857 that nothing more could be done in
the matter of the railway.

The fact is that Montefiore continued to

remain in touch with Sir Culling Eardly with regard to the railway for

•

five more years (55).

What is more important--Montefiore in actual

fact did not at all give up his Jaffa-Jerusalem line.

--

CHESNEY IS AND MC.....NEILL S JERUSALEM RAILWAY SCHEME
1

While Montefiore was busy in London, McNeill and Chesney set out,
as mentioned before (56) in September 1856, to explore Palestine.

As

will be noted in due course, their object was to ascertain on the spot
what choice of routes there was for a railway from the coast to Jerusalem.
This particular aspect of their visit, namely the actual detailed survey

•

of routes has never been dealt . with previously.

It has been pointed out

before that the link between Chesney s and McNeill 1s Jerusalem ,l ine and
1

Andrew's Euphrates Railway Scheme has remained a mystery.

It can only

be conjectured that their idea was to extend the Jerusalem line at some
later stage to join the Euphrates track.
already abroad.

Perhaps in 1856 similar ideas were

The fact is that within a few years, as will be shown

55 Grunwald, p. 249.

Loewe, II. p. 134.

56 see above note 18. Not only Mc~ eill visited Palestine, as
claimed by Elath, but also Chesney. c, . A.E. ·~--- p. 163. This,
oc course, is also apparent from Lane-Poole.
~""""

further on, at least three people, Pizzamano, Sandwith and Zimpel,
considered the idea of a railway link between Palestine, Syria and
even Mesopotamia.
From what can be gleaned from Mrs. Fi

\\1
1

s reminfscences--she was

the celebrated wife of the celebrated British consul in Jerusalem in
the 1850 s-- and Montefiore s Diaries, a pretty good reconstruction can
1

•

1

be made of the track that Mc- Neill had in mind for his 1856 railway (57),
"

the first railway scheme in Palestine for which more than vague details
can be reconstructed.

The first stretch of the line, Mc ~Neill told

Montefiore, would lead from Jaffa to Lad (as the line was actually
built 32 years later).

Mrs. Fi i\l\\, in herrnReminiscences

about the remaining part of the line:

11 • • •

11

supplied details

Chesney and Mac Neill (sic)

came with a view to the construction of a railway through a northern
valley ... Wadi es-Suleiman:(58).
be summarized as follows:

•

Hence the track Mc Neill wanted can

Jaffa-Lad-Wadi es-Suleiman-Jerusalem .

57 Fi
(cf . _&i bliography), p. 163, et~-, Loewe, II, p. 60.
Montefiore s entry, although dated June 1856, expressly says that
McNeill came to see Montefiore a few months later, apparently after he
returned from the East towards the end of the year 1856. The peculiar
fact that the diary entry for June refers to events that occurred
months later, is probably due to the editor (Loewe) telescoping events.
Loewe also says that McNeill in 1856 ultimately suggested a railway
Jaffa-Lad only 1 with Lad and Jerusalem linked by a MacAdamized (all
weather) road. This because he feared the line would not pay. This
idea of McNeill s for a combined rail-road scheme never cropped up
again, if indeed it was ever seriously made! There was no logic in
building a 20 km railway from Jaffa to Lad, over flat country
eminently suited for a road, if the rest of the scheme was to consist
of a road anyway!
1

1

58Mrs. Fi was writing in 1913, 57 years later. Since, however, she
presumably was not interested in railway layouts and the Wadi es- .
Suleiman line was never built anyway, she probably was not being W\t;e,
after the events, and her details were genuine.
--

Three of tfte above-mentioned places are, of course, well-known.
But wftat a5out tne Wadt es--Sul etman? Hr.ts wadi can be found on both
British and Israeli' maps (59), under tfle name Wadi Salman. Though not
well known generally, it is a very prominent feature of the north-western
slopes of tne Judaean hills. Th.e wadi s;tarts at a height of about 780
metres, some 2-3 kms north-west of El Ji6. (ancient Givon), and descends very

•

steeply some 500 metres in 14 kms, <to the Coastal Plain near Beit Nuba,
in th.e ancient -Valley of Ayalon.

Its· northern boundary is the mountain

spur along which runs (at a distance of about 1-2 kms) the age old highway
into the hills through upper and lower Beit Horon (Beit Ur). The villages of
Beit Likia and Beit Dukku lie to the south of it. Near its head there
are the remains of three ancient roads, apparently all Roman, one of
which, at least, descended through the wadi and perhaps served at times
as a substitute for the Ascent of Beit Horon, when it was blocked.

From

near Beit Nuba the Wadi es-Suleiman runs in a wide semi-circle to the
north-west and is now called Nahal Ayalon (formerly in Arabic, Nahr el Kebir).
It passes tne outskirts of Lod, and flows into the Yairkan River (formerly
•
El AuJa) sHghtly north of Jaffa. In other words, McNeill wanted to puild

his· railway alongside the ancient highway from Jaffa through Lod, parallel
to and a5out 1-2 kms from the Ascent of Beit Horon, past El Jib, to

59 The reference is to sheet 9 of the Survey of Palestine, (English)
1:100,000 map and to sheet 8 of the 1:100,000 Survey of Israel
(Hebrew) map. Cp. the ~te on Maps at the end of this chapter.

l)

.,.. I

Jerusalem l60l.
However, a glance at the contours of any detatled map showing the
Wadi' es-Sul ei:tnan will show why McNeill for a time was to despair of
6utlding tile Loci-Jerusalem stretch.

He nad certainly gone up it himself--

as will 5e sh-0wn later on--and had concluded that the utilisation of
the wadt for a railway track would cost approximately

'

4,000-4,500

per mtle as- agatnst aboutj l50 (approximately} for an all-weather
road (611 .

He said as much to Montefiore.

McNeill was, no doubt, for

a whtle frightened off by the unusual steepness of the wadi , whose
oovtous advantages of Being an extremely short ascent into the hills
and one of tne most suitable lin kps, as the crow flies, between Jaffa
and Jerusalem, were unfortunately offset by the slope

60 on Bett Horon and the road that has of old been climbing
througll tt to Jerusalem: Vilnay "Yehuda ve 1 Shomron 11 (Hebrew},
pp. 56-59 Lcp. bibliographyl . Also, Y. E~l, "Ttte Battle of
Gtvon and Joshua "s Campaign tnto Soutfter n Pal estine 11 (Hebrew),
~P · 82"'83, and note 14, p.89; also a very good photo on p. 112,
Ctn Ltver; cp. 6t5liograpby'1. Als:o ~- Gifion, The Fortification
System of Judaea (He5rewl, pp. 411-418, ;ncludtng a very good
n_i'sJortcal road map lalso tn Liver; cp, btbliography), A good
map of ttie roads and t racts tn s:outbern palesttne before ttte
col])tng of tlie railways wtll ue found tn Baedeker\s Guide of 1891
G:p. otoH:o gra~~l facing p. 14, T6Js: map, and the one attached
to ·Gtfiori "~ art1._cl e, sfio~, t6:a stretdi of road from Lod to Beit Horon
gotng stratgELt east and cutttng off tfie soutftern sweep of the Naha l
Ayalon (~dt es-Suletman/Nanr el-Ke6:trl, Tb5s: was probably also
tne. layout ~cNetll !:Lad tn mtr,d. Tne offtctal Brittsll Historr of
ta.a (jreat Wqr~ Egl{)t and Palestine, vol, U:, part 1, p. 195 Lcp.
ot6119grap~l calls tlie track. 1eading up ttte Wadt Selman (Salman/
Sule,~an L oy tn._e. name of 11 anc1._'ent ror1dlt , TEte map cas_e attaclied
t9 the Sql])e yol UIJ)e, map 9- (Battle of Nafit Sal])wtl l wnich ts very
detatled 1 c~ea~ly s;now,s an 11 ancient road11 r~nnt~g up tne W:adt
S,e)JJJijni-"' lle-91~n1_,ng at about 1 1 050feet at Be1;t Lrkta and endtng at
a·p~rox\l)la,te.1,r 21550 ft, riear El 'G"to (GtyonL

of the ground that could only have been overcome by an inordinate
number of cuttings (possibly tunnels and bridges) which alone would
have enabled the track to gain elevation.

Indeed, 61 years later,

it is recorded that Allenby s troops on their way to capture Jerusalem
1

had extraordinary difficulties in climbing the same wadi (62).
that was f ar off.

But

Far more interesting, however, is the fact that

only a few months later, early in 1857, Montefiore himself and his
wife, climbed up, at considerable personal risk, through the same
wadi (or one of its tributaries) and for the same purpose as McNeill,
namely, to find a passage for the railway to Jerusalem!

As for McNeill

himself, after proposing a road Lod-to Jerusalem, to Montefiore, he
apparently overcame his temporary fright of the Wadi-es Suleiman.

He

continued his efforts at least until 1862, for a railway1 and nothing
but a railway 1 to Jerusalem and his idea of having rails only between
Jaffa and Lod, and a road from there onward is never mentioned again (63).
However, the proposed Beit Horon alignment was to crop up again.
A totally unknown aspect of the McNeill-Chesney expedition of
late 1856 is that the two men explored not one routeto Jerusalem, as
suggested by the reminiscences of Mrs. Fi ftl', and by Elath and Grunwald,

62Military Operations (c . _ ibliography), II, part 1, pp. 195-196.
63 The writer had occasion in 1970, in connection with the present
research, to visit the western outlet of the Wadi es-Suleiman and
was left wondering how the ,weak l0com0tives of the end of the 1850's
had been expected to negotiate the gradients of the wadi.

-11 but two!

Lane-Poole's biography of Chesney states explicitly--a fact

strangely overlooked-- that

11 • • •

during the ride to Jerusalem the party

had divided, in order to examine two routes, and careful observations
were made, and levels were taken in view of the possibility of carrying
the proposed railway from Ja

11

(64).

Putting together what is known

about McNeill s conclusions regarding the line, Jaffa-Lod-Beit~Hor~n1

Jerusalem, it is quite clear that he proceeded from Jaffa via Lod.
Chesney, on the other hand, as explictly stated by Lane-Poole (65),
rode from Jaffa to Ramle, with the intention of reaching the Cisterns
(pools) of Solomon.

From Ramle, General Chesney {who was 67 years old)

and his companion, Captain Burgess, rode to El Bab, which perhaps was
El Kubab, (Mishmar Ayalon) and, more likely, Bab el Wad (today's Sha'ar
Hagai).

From there they went to a place called Isooma, where they

spent the night.

As a reference to any map will show, ther e never was

a place called Ishoma.

The odds are that Chesney stayed at the village

of Ishwa (today's Eshta'ol), near Artuf(Hartuv), a place that would fit
very nicely with the general route, Ramle-Solomon's Pools ~ that Chesney
proposed to take (66).

From

11

Ishoma 11 Chesney ultimately reached the

Pools of Sdlomon by a pretty good1 but rocky1 road1 with a "winding ascent" (67} .
64 Lane-Poole, p. 438. As already mentioned in Note 17, both men
were met at Jaffa by the Vice-Consul K)abat, who, eight years before
had suggested to Palmerston a Jaffa-Suez<ly,ailway.
65 Lane-Poole, p. 437, et.~-, for the following details in the text.
66 rt is quite lJ kely that Lane-Poole, the editor, by mistake read in
Chesney's hand~ting Ishoma instead of Ishwa. Both El Kubab and
Bab-el-Wad were on the main road, Ramle-Jerusalem. Ishoma/Ishwa is
called Ashuwa in Baedeker's map mentioned above, in :twte 60, and on a
map of the British War History mentioned in the same note it is
referred to as Eshua.
11

67 Lane-Poole, ibid.

11

-1iA reference to the map will show that there are two roads from Ishwa
to the Pools of Solomon, both ultimately meeting after climbing the
western slope of the Judaean hills.

Both follow ancient Roman roads (68).

One goes up very steeply through Makseya (Deir Ab~ of Chesney s times).
1

The other winds its way up with only a moderate gradient further south
through Beit Nati f (69).

As the road past Beit Nati { is probably the

easiest ascent of all in Judaea from the coastal plain onto the main
ridge of the mountains, rising most of its course almost imperceptibly,
and therefore eminently suitable for a railway (a characteristic that
cannot be applied to the steep climb past Makseya (peir Abar~ it might
perhaps be assumed that it was this road that Chesney explored.
reaching Solomon's Pools, Chesney turned north to Bethlehem,

After

and from

there continued to Jerusalem.
After this, nothing more is heard of the second, southerly, railway
route from Jaffa to Jerusalem.

It can only be guessed why.

Possibly

the reason was that the proposed track would have taken the tentative
line too far south, and building it ould have proved too expensive.
However, just as the proposed railway through Beit-Horen, or rather the
line through the neighbouring Wadi-es-Suleiman 1was due to crop up again
in slightly changed guise, so the idea of the line to Jerusalen via
Beth1ehem was again due to be at least partly resurrected.

68 Personal reconnaisance of the writer.
69 Today Net iv ,- Ha lamed Hey has replaced Beit Nat if.
I

An

- 1~interesting aspect of Chesney's ride was that his tentative line would
have used partly, in its upper extention, or in its entirety, the
ascent of the Wadi es-Sant, the ~

alley of Elah, with its ancient

road to the coast down which the future King David passed on his way
to meet Goliath the Philistine.

From the Pools of Solomon to the north,

Chesney s track would have followed the age-old ridge road from Hebron
1

to Jerusalem.
thus:

~\Q \

Summing up, ChesneY''s railway would have run approximately

Jaffa-Ramleh-Artuf-Wadi es Sant-Solomon's Pools- Bethlehem-Jerusalem.
It seems to have been the opinion of scholars who dealt with

Montefiore s Jerusalem Railway Schane, that no development of consequence
1

occurred in this matter for several years, following the February 1857
decision (outlined above),
matter.

11

11

1

that nothing more could be done in this

In fact, nothing could be further from the truth.

It is indeed

remarkable that the same chapter in his Diaries (chapter VIII in Vol. II}
which recorded the apparent demise of his plan, contains quite a number

-

of entries attesting to his undiminished interest in the railway.
MONTEFIORE S RAILWAY ACTIVITIES ON HIS FIFTH VISIT TO PALESTINE, 1857
1

Sir Moses must have left London on his fifth visit to Palestine
almost immediately after the negative meeting at Count Strzelecki s house UO) ..
1

On his way he met at Malta his associa'le in the railway scheme, the young
Lawrence Oliphant.

In Alexandria he was the guest of tne engineer, Galloway

7O Lo ~we II, P. 63, e t ~ , also .the Hebrew edition (Warsaw 1899;
cf> . ..&-i bl iography} of his l)iaries, p. 91.

- -lo who was to accompany him to Palestine--as it turned out--in connection
with Montefiore's railway scheme, which was apparently still alive.

While

in Egypt, Montefiore took a ride in the first railway just opened in the
Levant.

He went by train from Alexandria to Cairo and back (71).

On

reach_ing Jaffa, Sir Moses was welcomed, as were his predecessors M( Neil 1
and Chesney, by Mr. Khayat, the local British Vice-Consul, who has
been mentioned before (72).

Khayat used the opportunity to ventu~e his

opinion tttat there would soon be a railway from Jaffa to Jerusalem, 11 with
or wi tho • t ttte Bri tis:tt11 (_73}.
To anticipate a little-,-on Montefiore's return from Jerusalem, he

received a report at Jaffa on the sorry state of the
l?lantation) he ttad purcftased in ttte neighbourhood.

11

garden 11 (i.e., the

The Diaries note that

tte consoled himself with tfle thougflt th_a t the property would increase in
-value once it was decided to build a railway to Jerusalem, im whi'ch
case tfte garden would be most suita~le for the railway station (74).
From whJcfL episode it might be tnferred tftat the problem of the railway

71 For all these details, cp. Loewe II, p. 64, et seq.

72 t p. note 6, a~ove.
73 Loewe, II, p. 65
74( p. Loewe, II, p. 67 .. The plantation mentioned became, several
decades later, the Montefiore Quarter of Tel Aviv, on the r ead from
Tel Aviv to Petah- Tikvaft. What made Montefiore, or his emissary,
the Engineer Galloway, consider the place suitable for a railway
station, remains a mystery, as i.t was 2-3 kms. distant from the then
existing walls and gate of Jaffa. In due course, however, two
stations (_Tel-Aviv South an-d Tel-Aviv Central) came to be built in
ttte vi:cinity, and if present plans C,976) are carried out, Israel's
main railway line from Haifa to Jerusalem will pass by the quarter
w_ithin a few years. The wnole plantation episode once more demonstrates
the financial motives of Montefiore's railway scheme.

was still a matter of interest to him.

As it was, Galloway, the

engineer, went to inspect the plantation on behalf of the ailing
Montefiore (who was 72 years old at the time).

Perhaps its was he

who pointed out to Sir Moses the garden's favourable location for a station.
However, easily the most fascinating chapter in Montefiore s fifth
1

journey is the tale of his going up to Jerusalem, and of his sojourn in

•

the Holy City.

This, like McNeill 1 s and Chesney 1 s peregrinations of
~~e,v/ .

several months ~

has never been dealt · with thoroughly before.

Sir Moses left Jaffa for Lod accompanied by Mr. Galloway, his host in
Alexandria (75).

As for Galloway ' s business, the Diaries state plainly

that he only came to Lod to ascertain what facilities the place offered
11

for the projected railroad to Jerusalem 11 (76).

From this it can be

inferred that Galloway was not a plain engineer, but a railway engineer.
As a guess it might be surmised that he may have been the same Galloway
Bey (or perhaps his son?) who some 22 years earlier had planned the
first abortive railway in Egypt (77).

•

The question whether he came to

Palestine on his own, or whether Montefiore had invited him because he
had not given up his railway scheme1 must remain unresolved.

The statement

in the Diaries, that Galloway only came as far as Lod, did not conform to

75 Montefiore s Diaries never state expressly that his host in
Alexandria was the same man who accompanied hjm to Palestine.
But there were scarcely two men by the same name.
1

76 on Montefiore s and
. Yourney, c-p. Loewe, II, p. 66,
et~- The use of the Americanism 11 railroad 11 , instead of the British
11 railway 11
1 in the Diaries seems to be due to their hav'ing been
published in the U.S.
1

77 Cf . Karkar, p. 108; Elath, p. 100; Issawi, p. 141.

the actual facts (78).

A contemporary despatch of James Fi tvn,, the

British Consul in Jerusalem, to Lord Clarendon, the Foreign Secretary
in London, said explicitly that Montefiore had arrived in Jerusalem
attended by Mr. Gallow~y, the celebrated engineer of Egypt,

11

they having

come together over the road which is generally recommended for a line
of railroad between Jaffa and Jerusalem

11

(79).

Fi

also reported that

Galloway considered the railway practicable but unusually expensive,
probably on account of the difficult country .

•

The question
to Jerusalem.

is which was the road Montefiore travelled from Lod

The road that had been generally recommended ? The
11

reason for the expression,

11

generally

11

11

is unknown, for all its interest.

But the Diaries are quite definite as to the route he took.
and his wife rode on May 19, 1857 from Lod to Geeb.

Montefiore

They did so at con-

siderable risk for themselves as night had set in when they were
climbing the hills.

They arrived in Jerusalem next day (80).

Geeb is undoubtedly El Jib (Givt n).

Montefiore's

A glance at any map will show that

going up to Geeb from Lod, he cou_ld only have gone into the hills up
11

•

11

the steep 1and at night positively dangerous, Wadi es-Suleiman, or possibly
up one of its parallel ridges.

This means that he almost certainly used

the same track that McNeill had taken some months before him, parallel

78 Loewe, II, p. 66.

Here Loewe says in explanation that somebody
(McNeill, cf . Loewe, II, p. 60) had previously suggested having a
railway as far as Lod only, the continuation to Jerusalem to be a
road.
79 Hyamson, II, p. 240-24~. referring tp despatch No. 184.,, datep
June
6, 1857.
"f"J""''\\.- •I~ ~ Aw.a~ ~ e.A. "'l=~""-', ~n.&-v ,t_,, \n
l
~ ii ~ e-W.V\.\.4At:4M.(.,~ '

80

Loewe, II, p. 66 ·0

'

-i3to the historical Ascent of Beit Hontn.

·-~ere is the only reasonable

intimation of where Montefiore had wanted to build his railway, i.e.,
following McNeill s trace:
1

Jaffa - Lod-Wadi es-Suleiman (or Beit Horan) -

El Jib-Jerusalem.
Consul Finl, himself, in Jerusalem, assured Montefiore of his
11

hearty desire for a railway, and noted that Sir Moses stressed the
11

advantages of such a line for Turkey--and his own unwillingness to lose

•

(81).

\\ltl.S

More interesting ~ Fi

1

s report as to the reactions of Count

Pizzamano, the Austrian Consul, to Montefiore's railway scheme, which
was apparently known in detail in Jerusalem.
Montefiore-- A Jew is always a Jew
11

11 - -

After a srlide reference to

Pizzamano counted four reasons why

Montefiore's scheme was doomed to failure:

a) the Porte would never give

a guarantee for a 7% return on investments; b) the railway would only
serve a few pilgrims and would never pay (something that McNeill had
also feared); c) there was no commerce in Jerusalem to support the line
(a point that proved for a time only too true, after the railway had

•

been built in 1892); d) the Jaffa-Jerusalem line could not--Pizzamano
did not specify--be extended to Damascus, or even Baghdad.

This last

possibility has already been referr ed to before, in evaluating McNeill s
1

and Chesney's motives.

It proved from an unimpeachable source, Consul Fi ~

that somebody, whoever it was, had already spoken loudly enough for
Pizzamano to try to refute, of a railway to Syria or even Mesopotamia.

81 For this and the following details 1 regarding Pizzamano's remarks,
c. the source listed in twte 79 .

Here, in the middle of 1857 was proof that Palestine was at long last
comfog into its own again, as a Land of Tran ~ t, not for caravans, but
for railways (82).
M0NTEFIORE S 1862 RAILWAY SCHEME FOR JERUSALEM
1

Following Montefiore s fifth visit to Palestine,, his railway
1

scheme seems to have been donnant, for a few years.

•

It came to be

resurrected 1 perhaps about l861 1 and certainly in 1862, when, in the words
of the Diaries,

11 • • •

a revival of the scheme for the construction of a

railway from Jaffa to Jerusalem prompted him (i.e., Montefiore) to take
a prominent part in the exertions of a committee appointed for the
purpose .. . 11 (83).

McNei 11 too and Chesney had by now joined forces with

Montefiore (84), and

his old associate of 1856/57, Sir Culling Eardley

was still with him (85), the earlier incident regarding the use of the
line for missionary purposes notwithstanding.
activities in 1862 are not quite clear.

•

Details of Montefiore's

He became either patron, or

director1 or chairman, of a company (or a committee) for the building of

82 Pizzamano 1 s opposition to Montefiore 1 s railway scheme was fed
by the fact that he had his own plan for obtaining a firman for
Austria, to build a carriage road (not a railway!) from Jaffa to
Jerusalem. Cp. Loewe, II, p. 69, and also p. 110. Also c . Avitsur,
{ 11 70 Years 11 ,
Rebrew) pp. 4-5! c. alsotlk)te 37.
83 Loewe, II, p. 125.
84 Loewe, II, pp. 131,133; Lane-Poole, pp. 453-454; Grunwald,
pp. 248-249; Elath, pp. 142-143.
85 The last reference in the Diaries to the Jerusalem railway is
in ·. connection with Montefiore s visit to Sir Culling, who was
sick (he died next year, in 1863) to tell him of hopeful
developments regarding the line. C . Loewe, II, 134; Grunwald, p.249.
1

\\

,r

I
a railway between Jaffa and Jerusalem (86).

What is quite clear is

that at the age of 77, he must have made immense efforts to find
supporters for his scheme, and indeed the list of his associates in

1862 is. much.. more impressive than the one of five years earlier.
Amongst th.e personalities he mobilized either as supporters or
directors. were, apart from Chesney, Culling and McNeill, General Sir
Edward Sabine (1788-1833), soldier renowned scientist and President
of th.e Royal Society; and Lord Dufferin (1862-1902), a rising statesman
des.tined to 5ecome Governor-General of Canada.

He also enlisted former

Ca5.inet members, bankers and landed proprietors, apparently some with

-

Wh..ig and s.on:e with Tory affiliations, such as Lord Clanii carde, Lord
Mounteagle, Sir Tfl..omas. Fremantle, Cyril Graham and Thomas A. Hankey (87).
Another figure, fleetingly mentfoned in the sources as having been
interested in tfl..e Jerusalem scheme in 1862, was the railway contractor
John Watson, who wanted to invest moneys in the construction of the
railway and in th.e improvement of the port of Jaffa (88).

-

Nothing

detailed is known of him, llut at least he deserves credit .for- having been
th.e first entrepeneur to li.nk. tne imp~ vement of the r~
with the building of th.e railway to Jerusalem.

stead of Jaffa

He certainly was not

the las.t man to propagate this idea.

86

for sources, cp. note 84.

87 Cp. Elath, Grunwald, and Loewe . Most of these personalities
will also be found in the Dictionary of Nati onal Biography.
88 t p. Lane-Poole, p. 456; also Elath, p .. 145 and Grunwald, p. 249.

The vicissitudes of Montefiore 1 s efforts for his scheme, such
a his failure to gain the support of Lord Clarendon, of Lord John

Russel, and of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe (the 11 Great Elchi 11 --the late
ambassador at Constantinople), have been described by Elath and Grunwald .
What counts is that his intensive work failed, in 1862 as previously in
1856/57.

Though he was later once quoted in connection with another

railway plan for Palestine--not his--his own idea for the Jaffa-Jerusalem

•

railway was dead, after havin~
on::,ward.

histo.ry of some 25 years, from 1838/39

Montefiore was to die in 1885, seven years before the railway

to Jerusalem became a reality.
All that was left were two questions.

What made Montefiore revive

his 1856/57 plan in 1861/62? And why did his plan miscarry? There is
no definite answer to the first question but an interesting coincidence
should be noted.

Both in 1856/$ 7 and also five years later, Montefiore's

efforts coincided with the equally abortive Euphrates Railway SchemesI set
in motion, the first by William Patrick Andrew, and the second by
Henry Blosse Lynch, with both of whom Chesney (and at least with Andrew,
also McNeill) had been closely connected (89).

Since London had been

the centre of the developments regarding the various stages of the
Euphrates scheme, Montefiore must have known about them every time, and
quite conceivably they may have served to spur him on.

As for Montefiore's

89 Lynch's efforts, 1862-1872, on behalf of the Euphrates scheme,
have been exhaustively dealt with by Elath, especially from
p. 141 onwards. Lynch had been a member of Chesney s ill-fated
Euphrates expedition in the 1830 s. For his colourful life,
D.N.B. C
f. also Grunwald, p. 249.
1

cp.

1

ultimate failure:

nowhere after his 1856 meeting with Palmerston (who

did nothing in a practical way) is there any indication that the British
Government in any form, or at any level, showed the slightest interest
in the Jerusalem railway.

And nowhere, in the sources, is there any

indication that after meeting Palmerston, did Montefiore try any more
to gain official backing.

Indeed, he never seriously claimed that his

scheme would be of benefit to Britain, as distinct from British investors.
It should be noted that the British government did not, in fact, support
the Euphrates scheme either.

However, it might be assumed that the main

reason for the miscarriage of Montefiore's plans should be found in the
absolute unwillingness of the Turkish government to further any plans
that would have enabled foreign factors, or bodies, to obtain any foothold
whatsoever in its territory.

This may have applied with particular

force to Palestine, thecockpitof warring faiths and international intrigues.
The stranglehold of Turkish xenophobia on the life of the Ottoman Empire
is an

-

unending theme of all observers at that period and right up to

World War I, and is too recurrent even to merit specific quotations from
sources.

Elath says that the Turkish refusal to grant the Jerusalem

line any significant concessions, was also due to French antagonism to
British activities in Southern Syria (i.e., Palestine), an area which
they regarded as their own special preserve (90}.

Sevem] more examples

of French attempts to sabotage railway projects, British, German-Turkish
and Turkish, will be noted in the following chapter.

Incident ~ lly, it

90 Elath, p. 146. He quotes Heskins (c~. .l ibliography), p. 429.
Hoskins has a great deal to say about the French determination
to preserve their interests.

might be noted that 1862, the year Montefiore gave up his railway
scheme for Jerusalem, was also the year Lady Judith, his wife, died.
Just one more instance should be mentioned, linking Sir Moses,
in a very minor way, with a railway in Palestine.

A Hebrew book having

Montefiore's links with Palestine for a subject, and published in
Warsaw in the mid 1870 s, states that he, on some unspecified occasion,
1

expressed the opinion that it ~Qu ld be desirable to have in due course
a company that would build a railway between Jaffa and Port Said (91).
Nothing more than this passing reference is known about the scheme.

By

the time it appeared, Khayat, the British Vice-Consul, the man who first
suggested a r:-ail link between the continents and between Egypt and Palestine,
in 1848, had been dead for several years.
OTHER RAILWAY SCHEMES BETWEEN 1862 and 1880: SANDWITH, ZIMP~L SCHICK,
LUDWIG SALVATOR; ERLANGER, CONDER, AND OTHERS
During the 30 years that were to pass between the demise of
Montefiore's scheme of 1862 and the actual opening of the first railway
to Jerusalem in 1892, there was quite a surprising number of other
plans to build railways in Palestine, apart from the ones noted above.
The memory of some survives just as a short accidental note somewhere.
Some of them cannot even be exactly dated chronologically.
amounted to more than an idea.

Some never

Some almost progressed to the beginnings

of fruition, only to collapse for relatively paltry reasons, or just
because the time and circumstances were not ripe.

Details are rare and

91 c~. Moshe Ve'Yerushalayim (Hebrew : listed in the
p. ~6.

ibliograph~,

scattered, as abortive schemes to construct railways in area

ively

remote corner of the Ottoman Empire were of interest usually on l y to
the initiators.

And these mostly did not trouble to detail their plans

for posterity--once they had miscarried.
Between 1861 and 1865 there served in Haifa as British-Vice-Consul
(a post abolished shortly thereafter) Thomas B(\Ckhouse Sandwith (92).

-

In

a memorandum of 1871, Sandwith stated that while he was serving in Haifa
the idea cropped up to build a railway from Haifa--according to him the
best harbour on the Syrian coast--to Mesopotamia.

Very unfortunately he

did not state who the originator of the idea had been (93).

The proposed

track was to have run along the northern slopes of the Carmel range, through
the Jezreel Valley and into the Jordan Valley to a point south of Lake
Tiberias.

Then it would have climbed the heights of the Hautan and

would have crossed the Syrian Desert approximately along latitude 33°,
north 1to end at Baghdad.

A branch line from the Hauyan northward to

Damascus was also envisaged (94).

Sandwith's memorandum was prepared for

a British Parliamentary Select Committee that inquired, once more, in
1871, into the Euphrates Railway Scheme (95).
The plan, or idea, outlined by Sb1\dwith never materialized.
Nevertheless, it was noteworthy on a number of counts.

92 Hyamson, I,

p. XVIII.

93 Parliamentary Papers, 1872, No. 534, p. 28.
94 Details as quoted by Elath, p. 173.
95 Elath, p. 164.

1) it was the

first instance of a railway being explicitly proposed for northern
Palestine 1having Haifa as its terminus; 2) it was one of the first
railways proposed for Palestine that had been deliberately planned
with a view to its international utility, and based on the concept
of Palestine as a 'bridge" for traffic (96), 3) as far as the stretch
Haifa-Jezreel Valley-Hauran-Damascus was concerned, the proposed line
was to have been the modern counterpart of the age-old Via Maris;
4) the proposed line already foreshadowed the branch of the future
Heja Railway, of which more in the following chapter; 5) the proposed
line also foreshadowed several more projects to build a railway from
the Mediterranean to Mesopotamia (and possibly India) that were to be
raised during the 70 years following the mid-1860 1 s.

It might be added

that - considering the technical means that were available at that
time--there were as yet no diesel engines that need no water--the building
of a line across the arid Syrian Desert would probably not have been
feasible.

-

Unfortunately no exact date can be assigned to the project mentioned
by Sandwith, and there is no way of knowing whether the railway scheme of
of Dr. Zimpel, which also dates in the early 1860 s, was earlier or later.
1

( 95 )Khayat s proposal of 1848 for the railway Jaffa-Suez,
quite undoubtedly had its international aspects, as has been pointed
out. On the whole, however, its importance would have been predominantly local. Regarding length, convenience, and prospective
customers, it would have been inferior as a means of international
communications to the Alexandria-Cairo-Suez railway then being
planned.
1

Very little is known about Charles F. Zimpel (97).

He was born in

1801 and claimed--on one of his title-pages--to be a doctor of medicine
and of philosophy.

He also called himself a railway engineer.

a German-American, and the date of his death is not known (98).

He was
In a

very late American source, Zimpel is described as an American civil
engineer who came to Palestine "peddling Sunshine Pills"--whatever they
were (99).

As far as can be judged from a list of his writings, he was

a religious enthusiast of sorts, who wanted the Jews to return to their

•

homeland.

Vilnay, who states that Zimpel had been engaged in building

railways in America and in Europe, furnishes the titles of some of
Zimp~ 's publications about traffic projects in Palestine {100).

They

were not available to the writer.
97 zimpel 's name, or biography, could not be found in any available German
sources. There are only a couple of his minor writings, not very relevant
to the problem in hand, to be found in the National Library in Jerusalem,
and attempts of the writer to locate his other writings elsewhere were
unsuccessful

•

98 Regarding Zimpel, ct . Hecker, p. 785; also c-p. the following notes. It is
an interesting fact t~at Grunwald, in his monograph on the Jerusalem railway
does not mention Zimpel.
'
99 Frank G. Carpenter (c . f ibliography), p. 26, writing about 1910-1920 .
lOOVilnay, in "Jerushalayim" (Hebrew, c . .l ibliogr~ hy), p. 352, lists
the following writings by Zimpel:
,,
A. Strasse~verbindung des Mittellandischen mit dem Todten Meer und
Damaskus, Uber Jerusalem, mit Heranziehung von Bethlehem, Hebron, Tiberias,
etc., 1865. This booklet may have been translated into English.
B. Plan d un chemin de fer de Jaffa~ Jerusalem, l :100,000, 1864. This
plan seems to have been appended as a supplement to the foregoing booklet.
The first of these publications dealt with the construction of roads, the
other with a railway to Jerusalem. Zimpel 's pseudo-religious, and proJewish writings (without any references to a railway) that were viewed
by the writer in Jerusalem, were:
a) Die Israel iten in Jerusalem, 1852;
b) Wel '5tadt Jerusalem, 1853.
1

However, some details of Zimpel 's intentions can be gleaned fro m
a slim booklet that he published in 1865 (101).

In this he said that

he had proi:aed in a separate booklet the building of a po.rt in Jaffa and
also of a railway to Jerusalem (rather like the British contractor, Watson,
.\ tl:- ,y,l'..a..v.._
some time before Zimpel). He claimed that he had prepared ' & a ~
some 400 feet long, of the railway to Jerusalem with a branch, a first
proposal in this direction, to Bethlehem.

•

He further said that he

intended to submit his plan t to the mim;ter ies in Constantinople with
the view of obtaining a concession.

Zimpel based his plans on the fact

that 60,000 travellers a year went up from the coast to Jerusalem.

Inci-

dentally, he also mentioned the previous efforts of -Montefiore and Lord
Dufferin to obtain a like concession.

A postscript by Zimpel stated that

on January l, 1865, he received a communication from Edhem Pasha, the
Turkish Minister of the Interior, which said he was prepared to furnish
the desired concession, .if Zimpel would, within six months furnish proof
that he had the necessary financial means.

•

This1 under the circumstances,

was a palpable impossibility and probably shows that the Turks did not
take Zimpel seriously.

But, that Zimpel was not entirelY a f ly-by-night

adventurer is perhaps proved by the fact that amongst his associates was
\{

the German engineer, survey~r, and archaeologist,~ mann~ the future
successor of Schlieman in the excavations of Mycaenae (102).

An even

101 Mahnruf an die gaze Christenheit, und nicht minder an die
Juden, i.rfr Befreiung von Jerusalem ("A .Call of Admonition to all
Christendom, and not less to the Jews, for the Liberation of Jerusalem"),
Frankfurt am Main, 1865, in particular pp. 8~9 and 15.
l 02 Hecker, p. 785 .

more famous companion of Zimpel (at least in terms of the history of
Palestine) was the renowned German Conrad Schick, veteran resident of
Jerusalem, builder, · engineer, historian, biblical expert and topographer, one of the most famous figures in the country during the 19th
century ( l 03).
The trace Zimpel had so laboriously prepared is quite clearly
described by Schick as far as its hilly section is concerned (104).

•

There is little doubt that Zimpel knew about the travels of McNeill
and Montefiore up the Wadi es-Suleiman in the north1 and Chesney' s
journey up the Wad es-Sant in the south.

He chose neither possibility,

and planned his line through the Wadi Sarrar (Nahal Sorek), past Artuf,
through the hills past BiW ir (Bethll\r), to reach Jerusalem through the
Wadi-el Werd, terminating

in the Valley of Rephaim, where it was closest

to the walls of Jerusalem.

In fact"'-R was the man who traced the railway

'2l

e

to Jerusalem as it was indeed built in 1892, and as it still operates
today.

•

Schick was to have his own railway plan which will be discussed

later, and criticised the proposed layout, and rightly so, on account
of its passing through a narrow and difficult ravine, on account of its
uninspiring scenery (which was only too true), and on account of its
inordinate length, as it came into Jerusalem in a wide sweep from
the south-west.

He seems to have minimized the fact that the length

103 schi ck ( cf- Ji bl i ography), p. 126 o
l0 4Schick, pp. 125-129.

\
of the trace was compensated by its easy gradient throughout.

Incidentally,

it should be noted that Zimpel, too, chose an historical ascent to Jerusalem,
one already used by the Philistines when attacking David (105). But it had
always been one of the lesser used tracks in the hill country, probably
because of the very narrow and blockable defile,
plain.

just where it leaves the

Its inhospitality may have been the reason why it had been left alone

by previous planners of the line to Jerusalem.
There is a possibility--at present unverifiable like many of the
plans described in this chapter--that Zimpel may have been the planner of a
much more ambitious transportation scheme for Palestine.

The source for

this is the usually very correct and reliable Hecker (106).

According to

him, Zimpel wanted to have a railway line Damascus-Det3- 1 a-Jordan ValleyJericho-Jerusalem-Jaffa, plus unspecified branches.
line would have been only a small section.

Of this the Jerusalem

If true, this would make

Zimpel not only the 11 father 11 of the Jerusalem line, but also the progenitor
of an important stretch of the future Heja Railway as well.

•

However, it

should not be over~looked that there is a very puzzling parallel between
'-

this scheme reported by Hecker, and the road scheme of Zimpel listed by
Vil nay (107).

105

cf, Samuel

II, chapter 5, verses 18, 22.

106 Hecker, p. 785. It might be added that the railway enthusiast, ~
engineer, Max Hecker (1879-ca. 1965) was an early resident of
Palestine, apparently served in the Austrian railway troops lin
Palestine?) in the First World War1 and later became a famous
architect in Jerusalem.
107
twte 100, A.

cy.

Zimpel dropped from view after 1865, and also his railway projects 1
which must have started earlier.

His Epitaph will be found in the words

of Christoph Hoffmann, the leader of the German "Temple Societyir in Palestine
at that time.

11

The efforts of Dr. Zimpel regarding the laying of a railway

from Jaffa to Jerusalem failed in 1865 despite the preliminary researches
that were made with great sacrifice.

They failed on account of the

unwillingness of the Turkish government 4 (108).
There were other schemes, which mostly, like Zimpel s, cannot be
1

dated except in the widest terms.

The Jerusalem correspondent of the Jewish,

Hebrew-language newspaper Hammagid

11 ,

11

published in the East-Prussian town

of Lyck, reported quite incidentally, in the autumn of 1864, that an
engineer had arrived in Palestine in connection with a railway scheme.
The correspondent, who signed himself Adir
11

11 ,

said that the engineer, whose

name he unfortunately failed to mention, represented a company which wanted
to build a line between Jaffa and Jerusalem.

There were no other particulars,

but the same news item mentioned however that the Turkish authorities were

------1and
adamant not to let strangers open the ways of thehome-•
I/

_..

11 •

It also

linked, in its quaint language, the redemption of Israel with the building
of the railway (109).
future.

This was a sentiment that many were to share in the

Anyhow, it seems clear that the idea of a railway was still going strong.

The cooperation of Conrad Schick with Zimpel has already been mentioned
above.

Most of the relevant details regarding this were taken from an

108 Hoffmann (cf . , ibl iography), p. 11.
109 Hammagid, vol. 8, No. 41, dated 26 Tish,rey 5625, 26.10.1864.

article, published in 1867 in a German periodical, "Petermann's Geographische
Mittei~

" {which still exists today).

The article is valuable for more

than its description of Zimpel's line (110).

It refers to the fact that

various European, and even American, companies or private persons, had
planned to build a road, or "according to circumstances'\ a railway, from
Jaffa to Jerusalem.

After giving details of Zimpel s plan, Schick goes
1

on to list other possible alternatives for a trace to Jerusalem.

After

considering three wadis, including the well-known Wadi-es Suleiman (_Schick:
£

-

Wadi Sol , man), all leading down from Jerusalem to th coast, via el Jib and
,.....

via Biddu/Ku Jbeibeh (111),
✓

Schick came to the conclusion that all three

were too steep to enable a railway to be built. Instead, he proposed in his
article yet another possible trace for the railway Jaffa-Jerusalem, which
he thought feasible on account of its suitable gradients.

Schick's track

would have gone north from Jerusalem, following the contours of the main
Judaean ridge parallel to the Mediterranean-Dead Sea watershed, and slightly
west of it.

The track would have passed Tel el Ful, and at Kalandi ll..

(Atharoth) would have turned north-west beginning an easy descent into the
wadi just north of Upper Beth Hora n (Beit Ur).

It would then have continued

west, parallel, but slightly north of the Ascent of Beit Hora n.

It 1lt) uld

have reached the coastal plain about el-Burj, and would probably have
continued through Barfiliya, Jimzu and Lod, to end at Jaffa.

In other

110 schick, pp. 124-129. As for the credentials of Dr. h.c. Conrad Schick
(1822-1901), cp. Z.D.P.V. (Zeitscht,i ft des deutschen Pal l stina~verel!ms ),
1902, which ca ~ried his obituar.y
~ ~t~~
111 All these wadis will be found on any 1:100,000 map of Palestine or
Israel.

words, Schick's trace would have been a mod ifi ed and modern version
of the very ancient road through the Ascent of Beth Hore n.

Schick's

plan never materialized.
In 1869, the road from Jaffa to Jerusalem had been completed to serve
the visit of the Austrian Emperor Francis-J os~ph,who came to visit the
Holy City, on his return from the opening of the Suez Canal.

Travelling

on the new road by horse-carriage took the better part of one day, and

-

usually much longer (l 12).

Travel was very strenous at its best-travellers

had to push the carriages up steep sections-and the road deteriorated
quickly as the Turks did nothing for its upkeep.
small.

Its capacity was very

Consequently, the need for a railway had not abated, and still

more plans were put forward.

In 1872, a Jerusalem paper1 ~1 Ha 1.4tavatseleth'.1

referred to r wno s that His Exalted Majesty,the Sultan (Abdel-Aziz) had
made a "covenant" with a company to build a railway from Jaffa to Jerusalem.
The paper also stated that no particulars were known as yet (113).
as before, no details are available about this particular scheme.

Again,
But

there is just a chance that the paper referred to a railway plan initiated
by a Frenchman named Forbes(?) who in 1872, or 1873, obtained a firman
from the Porte, for the construction of a line from Jaffa to Jerusalem as
I

well as (as Zimpel had intended) a port at Jaffa . .Avitsur also mentions this plan(ll4).

112 c. the Paris journal (Hebrew),

11

Ha 1 levanon.,11 , Vol. 6, No. 39, 11.10.1869.

11311 Ha 1 havatseleth 11 , {Hebrew) Vol. 2, No. 19, of 7 Adar Beth.
114Avitsur, p. 5. As the name he gives is spelled in Hebrew, there is
difficulty in reconstructing the French name. Forbes has an English
tinge. This is the only source that could be found for the 1872/73 scheme
except for an oral confirmation by Dr . Avitsur, who also referred the
writer to a booklet by Dietrich Lange on the Temple Society in Palestine.
This booklet was not available.

~.(...

The plan should have been realized
lack of funds.

w-Jllin 18 months,

but failed through

Hecker, on his part, mentions that in 1873, a concession

was granted to a French company, and that in the following years preliminary
works were started several times, but that the firman ultimately lapsed (115) .
It is not clear if Hecker and Avitsur refer to the same undertaking, but
it is likely.

Also to 1873 belongs a very short reference to a railway in
,
an illustrated book on Palestine by the Swiss brothers Thevaz . They
just say that engineers had arrived in Palestine from Constantinople to
trace a railway (116).
Another reference to a railway suggested for Palestine in its wider
sense, i.e., including Tran~ ordania, dates from 1874.

In a book describing

Turkish military activities in .Y emen, the Ottoman Major Ahmed Rashid
advocated the building of a strategic railway, apparently from Damascus
to Mecca and "3edda.

This proposal seems to have been the first harbinger of the

overall concept of the Hejaz Railway that was destined to be buil t after
1901, down the Transjordan plateau (117).
About 1876, or shortly thereafter, there appeared in England a book,
CEstined to reach eleven editions by 1894, by an Anglican clergyman, James
Neil, who had been the incumbent at Christ Church, Jerusalem.
11

The book,

Palestine Re-Peopled 11 , was violently anti-Catholic, and contains a

confused tale of a proposal in 1855 by an Abbe Michon who advocated the
I

115 Hecker, p. 785.
116 ·Thevoz (cf . J-i bl iography), p. IX.
117 Hecker, p. 785, quoting a reliable source~
I/

o}

- q~ removal of the Papacy from Rome to Jerusalem, its links with the
outside world to be provided by a railway.

Far more credible w~s

Neil's statement 1elsewhere in the book, that in 1875 a route had
been surveyed for yet another railway, from Jaffa to Jerusalem.

Its

construction, Neil observed, would doubtelessly be immediately followed
by a coast line through Philistia, connecting Jaffa with Cairo.

-

The

survey that had actually been carried out, Neil suspected, was proof
that its Catholic promoters, acting with the blessing of the Pope,
were indeed trying to further the removal of the Papacy to Jerusalem.
Otherwise, Neil argued, the then state of the country would have made
such a railway a losing proposition.

At the end of his book, Neil

had an appendix, entitled, "A Papal Railway for Palestine."

In it he

quoted the Rome correspondent of the London Times , to the effect that
in July-August (1876) a certain Signore Pierotti had been received by
the Papal Secretary of State and the~ by the Pope, Pius IX 1 himself.
Pier 6tti already had an authorisation of the Sultan to build both a port

at Jaffa and a railway to Jerusalem.

He received the blessing of the

Pope for his undertaking, the Pontiff observing that he hoped the
undertaking would result in profit to the Catholic religion in Palestine (118).
In 1876 the Turkish reformer, Midhat Pasha, provided the Ottoman
8npire with its first constitution, and liberal winds began to blow for

118 Neil (c . . ~bliography) pp. 34, 75, 76, 174. It might be added
that Neil, p. 110, referring to Isaiah, ch. 46, 19-20, claimed that
the term "Kirkarah" used there by the prophet, actually referred
to rail ways!

\
....

a time, just as they had at the time of the Hatt-j -Humayun in the
mid-1850 s.
1

Perhaps this climate encouraged entrepreneurs and planners,

for in the following years another spate of railway plans can be
recorded, including even projects envisaged by the Turkish government
itself.

Again it should be stressed that little is known of most of

the plans and many dates are only tentative.

None of the plans came to

fruition, but their cumulative effect may ultimately have led to actual

-

building being carried out when the time was ripe.
Sometime about 1877-78, the Austrian Archduke Ludwig Salvator
travelled from Kantara in Eygpt, along the ancient northern Sinai route-the Via Maris--to Palestine.
illustrator.

He was a travelling writer, and a gifted

He also published a book (one of several he wrote) about

this journey (119).

In the text accompanying his drawings he made

several references to railway schemes for Palestine.

In his preface he

mentioned proposals for a harbour at Jaffa, and for a railway t h.rough the
valley of the Jordan.

Details cannot be ascertained.

Later in his book

he speculated about the feasibility of a railway connection along the
coast, i.e. from Egypt to Palestine.

He came to the conclusion that a

line along the coast of northern Sinai was impracticable on account of
shifting sands--a view to be amply disproved when the British built a
efficient line along this coast in the First World War.

However, the

concept of having a line from Egypt to Palestine seems to have been quite
familiar with him (as it had been to Montefiore and Neil about the same

119 Ludwig Salvator lived 1847-1915. Particulars about him can be
found in Webster's Biographical Dictionary ,

- \o\ time).

TheArchduke ended up with railway plans of his own {_120).

Beside

a railway through the Jordan Valley, he wanted a harbour at Beyrouth
instead of at Jaffa, with a railway to run down the coast to - . st1me
unspecified point in Palestine.

The Jordan Valley line he suggested,

though it appears from the context that he was not the originator of the
idea, was to crop up in the future in various guises.

He seems, though 1

to have been the first to have broached the idea of having a line along

•

the coast, from south to north, a modern version of the Via Maris, in
its northern section.

He hardly anticipated his idea to be carried out

only in 1942, as the Haifa-Beyrouth-Tripoli line.
Mean\lhile the idea of a Jaffa-Jerusalem railway (which Ludwig
Salvator apparently had not considered) was again mentioned by Yehi 2el
Mikhal Pines, one of the pioneers of modern Jewish Palestine (121).
noted about 1878,

11 • • • •

Montagu told me that he was making efforts re-

garding the building of a railway from Jaffa to Jerusalem.

•

He

He said that

12 °For Ludwig ~alvator s opinions and schemes, c. RP· VII-IX of
his book (c . .J ibliogq:1.phy). Also Altneuland 1 (c . .'6-ibliography),
1

1905, p. 56.

"

121 Y.M. Pines (1842-1913) was a "practical Zionist" long before there
was Zionism, and was also of great influence ,as the local agent of the
"Sir Moses Montefiore Memorial Fund.
He came to Palestine in 1878,
and in due course became the author of several books, one of which
is quoted below.
11

the House of Rothschild will also take part in the scheme" (122 }.
This note in the reminiscences of Pines is followed, some 20 pages
later, by another remark saying that the railway to Jerusalem will pass
the village of Jindas very soon, and ends
already came to start the work

11

(123).

11 • • •

this week the engineers

No more mention of any railway

is made by Pines in any of his writings and his short note tantalizingly
leaves open the quest,on of who had sent the engineers and why was their

•

work not proceeded with.

It might be added that the memory of Jindas,

which no longer exists, is preserved still by "Jindas Bridge", about
one kilometre north of Lod.

This handsome bridge, built in the 13th

--

century by the Mameluke Sultan Beybars and still preservi ng his coa ~tof-arms, leopards, was built in order to carry the Lad-Northern Palestine
road--i.e., the eastern branch of the Via Maris--across the
(today's Nahal Ayalon).

N=iit el

Kebir

The same wadi would have had to be crossed by

any railway proposed to go to Jerusalem along the McNeill-Montefiore
track of 1856/57 from Jaffa to Lod, and along the Beit Horan/Wadi es-

•

Suleiman alignment .

Whoever intended to build the 1878 line apparently

wanted to cross the riverbed in the vicinity of the old bridge (124).
122 Pines (c~. "bliography), p. 26. Montagu was very probably Samuel
Montagu , l J ter Lord Swaythling (1832-1911), the Anglo -Jewish financier
and philanthropist. C.p. D.N.B., Supplement, p. 118. It was the same
Montagu, apparently, who~ about a decade later offered Joseph NaVo\\,
his help when the line to Jerusalem was actually being built.
Grunwald, p. 251.

Cf,

123p-mes, p. 46 .
124 Jindas Bridge can be found on the 1:100,000 Survey of Palestine Map,
sheet 9. It still carries all the traffic from Jerusalem to Lod
Airport. It has by now served travellers for over 700 years. A few
meters to the west of it, a modern steel bridge does indeed carry a
railway, the main line f rom Jerusalem and Beer-Sheva to the north .

- loJ Whoever it was, it was certainly neither Montagu nor Rothschild, as
Pines would have been sure to have advertised the fact.

Perhaps--but

this is pure conjecture--the Jindas Line was the line for which a
11

11

French company had obtained a concession about 1878 as mentioned by
O~iphant ( 125).
Two more possible railway lines might be assigned to about 1878,

•

one of them only in a negative way.

The British traveller, V.L. Cameron,

in a book discussing British overland links with India, briefly considered
a railway from El Arish to Kuwait, or Basra, that necessarily would have
cut across southern Palestine, and southern Transjordania.

However he did

not consider the line feasible on account of the difficulties
by the Syrian Desert (126).

presented

Cameron had in person visited the Levant,

and actually listed 10 possible railway routes to the East, of which the
above-mentioned was No. 7.

The others did not include Palestine.

In a

way he revived the hazy outlines of the ca. 1835 railway scheme from

•

Ismai1ia to Kuwait, mentioned at the beginning of this chapter.

Why

he considered El Arish as a terminus (an idea never raised again), which
is notorious for its shallow unapproachable coast, and not Gaza, or
Jaffa, remained unexp1 a i ned.

125oliphant, Gilead
11

11

(cf . J; b1iography), p. 301.

126 cameron, Highway let>. -8,i bliography) Vol. II., pp. 289-301.
Verney Lovett Cameron (1~44-1894} was a very colourful character,
and a onetime companion of Sir Richard Burton. He wanted a
railway from the Mediterranean to Mesopotamia, and beyond, rather
like Chesney, Andrew and Lynch. C . D.N.B., p. 192.
11

11

- \ o~ The second railway scheme that can be tentatively assigned to
1878, is one that foresaw Haifa as a terminal, and bore a close resemblance
to the Sandwith plan mentioned earlier.

This is noted 1just in passing /

by the biographer of the Syrian Desert, Mrs. Phelps Grant, who failed
to furnish details that could be followed up.

She refers to a pro-

posed railway from Haifa (or Acre), via Salkhad (in the Hau~ n), Wadi
Sirhan, Jauf, to Kuwait or Basra (127) .

•

To 1879, a date that for once is definite, belongs another
railway plan for a line from the Mediterranean to Jerusalem, one that
had a novel, original . twist and was to have a history lasting to 1914.
In an article in the

' Palestine
11

Exploration Fund Quarterly,

11

the

future ·colonel Claude Conder, who was to achieve scholarly fame,
with the future Field-Marshall Herbert Kitchener, on account of their
11

Survey of Western Palestine advocated a railway from Haifa (via
1~

Nablus) to Jerusalem (128).

•

His proposal no doubt carried weight, as

already in the 1870 s the then Lieutenant Conder was known as an authority
1

on Palestine.

In support of his idea he stressed the fact that his

layout would have had much easier geographical conditions to contend
with than the proposed line Jaffa-Jerusalem,though the line advocated
by him was considerably longer.

He no doubt also took into account •

127Grant ~Syrian Desert~ c . .libliography), p. 266.
Hecker,
784.

f'

Also c.

128 P.E.F.Q. {Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly), I, 1879, pp. 12
et~. Claude Reignier Conder {1848-1910), started his career
in the R~ l Engineers, and became very widely known as a semitic
linguist, map maker, and student of Palestine. C . D.N.B. Concise,
Supplement, p. 39.
J

'

I""

- \o~ the fact that while the exposed roadstead at Jaffa was notorious for
its storminess in winter, disembarkation at well-sheltered Haifa was
rarely hindered by the weather.

What he intended was, obviously, to

carryhis railway from Haifa along the road to Megiddo, and thence across
Samaria to Nablus (Shehem).

From there he would have continued his trace

along the easy ridge of Palestine's mountain backbone into Jerusalem.
In other words, he would have used the ancient highways carved out for
him by history.

Incidentally, in his article Conder provided an expla-

nation why the direct and short line Jaffa-Jerusalem, through the Wadi
es-Suleiman (or Beit Horon) previously considered by McNeill and Montefiore, was not feasible at that time.

He said that it would have

involved a climb of some 500 feet (some 150 metres) within the distance
of half a mile (about 800 metres).

A glance at a map will show that

he referred to the lay at the land at Beit-Horen, or just south of it,
though he did not say so expressly.

Further proof of which layout he

referred to (and opposed), will be found in what he wrote immediately

•

afterwards:

that the only possible "other" alternative was through the

Valley of Sorek (Wadi Sarrar through which the line was ultimately built) .
But, as already noted, Conder did not want the Jaffa-Jerusalem line,
whatever its layout.

In his 1879 article Conder, by the way, mentioned

the Haifa-Euphrates Valley Railway, which he thought impracticable.

It

is a pity that fuere is no way of knowing whether he was referring to
Sandwith's proposed Haifa-Mesopotamia line of some 15 years earlier.
Possibly he referred to the scheme mentioned by Mrs. Phelps Grant.
Perhaps these two schemes were identical.
problem.

There is no solution to the

- \o~ Conder was

to return to the subject of railways in Palestine

the following year, 1880, in the same publication (129).
menti oned the

II

He again

long proposed Euphrates Va 11 ey Scheme, which he had opposf&1
II

but he voiced his support of a railway from Haifa to the Transjordanian
uplands with--as Zimpel and Sandwith had suggested--a northern branch
to Damascus and ultimately, Aleppo.

But he also had another idea.

He

wanted a "southern branch" to Moab

11 ,

by the Mecca Pilgrims from Syria.

It might be assums that Conder knew

11

whatever that meant, to be used

nothing of Ahmed Rashid's proposed Hejaz Railway, of 1874, mentioned
He probably wanted to adjust the functions of the ancient

above.
11

King's Highway" from Damascus down the Transjordanian Plateau to

modern conditions.

Whatever the truth was, he foresaw with almost

uncanny accuracy the railways that were in fact to be built years later.
namely the Turkish Hejaz Railway, and the French line connecting Damascus
\tt}~'2

and Yi-iii::Hama-Aleppo via R4Yal9. While Conder was first in mentioning
the possibility of serving the pilgrim trade, he was first also, in
his article, in advocating the building of the Haifa-Damascus/Moab line
up the Yarmuk Gorge, as was actually done in due course by the German
Meissner Pasha.

It will be noted that he was also right in advocating

a Jaffa-Jerusalem line up the Wadi Sarrar (if it was to be built at all)
as it finally was.

Conder seems to have had a better railway touch"
11

than his contemporaries, of which Lawrence Oliphant was one.

Conder

stated incidentally that he was aware of Oliphant's railway schemes, of
I

I

which more later.

129 P.E.F. Quarterly, IV, 1880, pp. 117, et~-

-\ t{ ) -

Before turning to Oliphant's railway scheme, in their way the best
documented of the late 1870 s and the early 1880 s, mention must be made
1

1

of some other railway plans 1 very few details of which have survived.
Even their exact dating is, again, uncertain.

One of them is mentioned

by Grunwald as belonging to the early 1880 1 s (130).

Grunwald bases

himself on a despatch from Constantinople to a German-Jewish periodical
in 1888 (131).

-

This said that a firman for a railway granted several

years before to Baron Erlanger and Colonel

Maud (for a line to Jerusalem)

had expired, after having been twice extended.
been forfeited.

A deposit of t 4,000 had

According to Grunwald, Erlanger represented a banking

firm that also used to finance railways and had branches in several capitals,
including Paris.

It can only be surmised who this banker was.

Possibly,

at a guess, it was Emile d'Erlanger, a financier with his seat in Paris,
who is known to have dealt with "steam tramways", i.e., very light
railways, mainly for passenger traffic, the precursors of the later electric
tramways {132).

Nothing more is known about the Erlanger plan, but it

should be mentioned that according to one reliable source, a Franco-Belgian

130Grunwa l d, p. 249
131 Die JJdische Presse, XIX, Berlin of 4 October , 1888, p. 391.
132 These, admittedly unverifiable, particulars, were glean~d from a
notorious anti-semitic German lexicon by E. Ekkehard (cp. ,&ibliography)
Nothing is known about Erlanger's associate, Maud. Per ~aps he should
be spelled Maude and was British? There had been an Anglo-Indian general
Frederick Francis Maude (1821-1897).

syndicate in 1880 considered building a ''steam tramway" between
Jaffa and Jerusalem (133).
Though the annals of those years there flits yet another railway
scheme, about which next to nothing is known, except what was said
about it in a passing reference many years later (134).
proposal for a railway between Port Said and Gaza.

-

This was a

The man who suggested

it was Sir Charles Moore Watson--not to be confused with the contractor
John Watson of Chesney's and Montefiore's days.

He was a soldier and

administrator who served in Egypt in the 1880 s (135).
1

Nothing more is

known about him, and even the date of his scheme is conjectural.

In any

case, Watson's plan was only one more elaboration--of which more were
to follow--of the idea of linking Egypt with Palestine along the ancient
Via Maris.

Khayat had suggested Suez as a terminus, Ludwig Salvator

considered Kantara, Montefiore at one time had had Port Said in mind1 and
Watson apparently had had the same idea.
Evidence, tangible for a change, regarding a Turkish firman of
August 5, 1878, containing a concession to build a port at Jaffa, and

133 E.M. Earle (cf . ki bliography), p. 30.
134 P.E.F.Q., 1915, p. 143
135 watson (1844-1914), is mentioned in the D.N.B. , Concise ,
Supplement, p. 174. He was for a time chairman of the Palestine
Exploration Fund.
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- I lo a railway from that place to Jerusalem, is contained in a f ile located
The contents of the f ile

in the National Library in Jerusalem (136).

were acquired by accident through the good offices of a member of the
Israeli Embassy in Paris, who f ound them being offered fo r sale.

What

links, if any, there are between the documents in the file, and other
railway schemes for Palestine at the time, cannot be established.

•

Amongst the documents there are three memoranda, one undated, one dated
April 15, 1880, and one bearing the year 1880.

The file contains

the names of Messers. H. de Sattl ey, E. Lavalley, A. ChampS>illon,and
A. Robin, whose identity could not be discovered.

There is in the

file also a letter by a high French naval officer--signature unreadable-advising against the proposed scheme.

Nothing came out of it anyway.

But the memoranda are interesting on account of the motives they
reveal for that particular French attempt to build a first railway in
Palestine, indeed in the Turkish Levant as a whole.

The memoranda, at

least two of the three, were addressed to the Prfs ident du Conseil des

•

Ministres, i.e. 6 the Prime Minister 1 at Paris, who was at the tim~ Jules
Ferry, famous for his expansionist policies.

They are remarkable for

their blatant chauvinist, anti-British reasoning1 and their insistence
on the benefits of the proposed railways(more were envisaged for the
future) for French prestige and tlgloire

136 File V, 1733.

11

•

The concessionaires asked

Permission to quote it is gratefully acknowledged.

for 5 million 'fancs each for building port and railway (10 million
altogether) as a subsidy, and went to great lengths to prove that
these undertakings would lead to a peaceful conquest of Palestine and
Syria.

In exchange for the subsidy, the French government was offered

a naval base--flanking the northern entrance of the Suez . Canal, it was
stressed.

In contrast with other schemes that stressed benefits for

the Turks, religious motives (in disguise), or commercial results,

•

this French initiative frankly regarded the railway land the port) as
a means for the peaceful conquest of territory.

As already noted,

the concessionaires failed in 1880, despite their appeal to nationalism.
But it was not the last time that the French were to mix nationalism
with railway schemes in Palestine.
The year 1880 was also remarkable for an attempt, the first by
the Ottoman government itself, to initiate railway building on its
own. instead of waiting for foreign concessionaires.

The Turkish

Minister of Labour, Hassan Fehmy Pasha, on June 6, 1880, submitted to

•

the Grand Visier an exhaustive report and recommendations as to the
public works that should be carried outwithin the Empire.
figured largely in the report.

Railways

Amongst the lines proposedwas one

that was to run from AleppO (with a branch from Tripoli) to Ho .s,
Damascus, Jerusalem, Jaffa and El Arish.
from Damascus to the Hejaz1 was envisaged.

A later extension, apparently
The whole system was

intended to link up with the Turkish trunk line Constantinople-Baghdad.
The scheme never even came near implementation, but the ideas behind
it proved that even the Turks began to appreciate the importance of
railways {137).
137 Hecker, p. 787.
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OLIPHANT S RAILWAY PLANS
1

Lawrence Oliphant has already been mentioned before in connection
with Sir Moses Montefiore s efforts on behalf of the Jaffa-Jerusalem
1

railway scheme in 1856.
Moses• associates.

At that time he had merely been one of Sir

Now, 24 years later, in 1880, he came to the fore

with a railway scheme of his own, that was remarkable on account of its

•

imaginativeness, its wide scope, and the ample details that are available
about it.

Its publication was accompanied by the first map of Palestine

ever to contain a (proposed) railway network (138).

Oliphant 1 s color-

ful personality has already been noted above (139).

He was a Zionist

long before a Zionist movement had been started by Theodore Herzl.

He

went to Palestine in 1879, and for a few years even settled with his
wife in the Druze village of Daliath el-Carmel near Haifa {140).

The

result of his sojourn in Palestine was two books, "The Land of Gilead"
(1880) and "Haifa" (ca. 1885).
Apart from beang a Zionist visionary and a religious mystic, to

•

judge from his biography, he seems also to have had some understanding

138oliphant's remarkable railway m~p of Palestine, dating from 1880 1
is contained in his 11 Gilead (cp. ~ bliography), facing p. 302.
11

139Cf . Note 45.
14001iphant s stay in Palestine is amply described in his two books,
listed in the text further on. For the particular Jewish aspects
of Oliphant's life, there is a good bibliography in the article on
him in the Encyclopaedia Judaica.
1

~~

- \\~ of business affairs.

Especially he seemed to have grasped very well--

as he had in 1856--the importance of railways for the development of
Palestine.

Railways, and the reasons for them, figure in both his

books, and most prominently in his first one.

In this, he fervently

advocated the establishment of a Jewish colony_ in the mountains of
Gilead (141).

The colony he indended to develop was to depend to a

great extent on its railway links.

•

complete chapter, entitled,

11

In his second book there is a

The First Palestine Railway

11 ,

apart from

numerous other references to railways (142).
Oliphant's rail schemes merit a closer look, because, while his
colonizing plans have been amply discussed, nobody so far has troubled
to examine the place of railways in the context of these plans.
has ever described Oliphant's railway plans in detail-

Nobody

Yet they deserve

attention, both on account of their initiator's overall aims in 1880,
and also in the larger framework of railway development in Palestine.

•

What Oliphant proposed were actually several railways, starting as
one line from the coast of the Mediterranean, and then branching out on

141 cp. The Land of Gilead
pp. _20, 100, 280, 301, 302, 303, 328,
329, 330, 333, 338, 339, 341, 421.
11

142

cf.

11 ,

Haifa
pp. 63-67 for the complete chapter 1 and also pp. 60,
204, 212, 244, 245, 265, 267, 342.
11

11 ,

' "" \\t on tfteir var t ous ways.

Hts proposed lines, as noted a5ove, are shown

on tfte ratlwaY' map attadted to ftjs 5ook ontfte Land of Gilead .

It should

ftowever be stronglY' stressed that not all tfte lines- he discussed in his
5ook are actually shown on his map, and where shown, they do not all
conform to h_i's proposals in the text. What Oliphant envisaged were
the fol lowing traces:

-

l} a line from the Bay of Haifa/Acre, cutting across

lower Galilee to th_e Jordan Valley.

He offered two alternative routes

for this line, (a) one northerly track going straight west-east from
Acre (Haifa) to Ti5erias; (5) one south.easterly track, crossing the
Valley of Jezreel to reach the Jordan rift at Beisan (143); 2) a
continuation of the above.mentioned line from the coast to the Jordan
Valley, from the Jordan to the north-east to reach Damascus; 3) a con- =tinuation of the trunk line from the coast, down the Jordan Valley, to
serve tne proposed Jewish colony of Gilead, overlooking the valley from
the top of the Transjordanian Plateau, and stretching down to the Dead
Sea.

This line was to continue south, along the Rift Valley, or parallel-

ing it on top of tne Mountains of Joa5, to end on the shore of the Red
Sea at Akaba; 4) a line to clim\) up to Jerusalem from the east, branching
off the Jordan Valley trunkline just north of the Dead Sea; 5) a line
branching off the above-mentioned trunkline to Akaba just south of the Dead
Sea.

This was to climb out of the Rift Valley, from the Aravah into the

southern Negev, cross it to the west, and continue through Sinai to

143 For Oliphant s two alternative routes across northern
PalesUne, cp. •1-Gilead 11 , pp. 301, 329.. Ol"tph_ant preferred
tne nortfterly- track.
1

- \\
the Suez Canal, joining the Cairo-Suez railway at Ismailia.

It will

be seen that Oliphant's proposals were nothing if not far-reaching.

As

far as northern Palestine, and northern and central Transjordania were
concerned, he personally had visited most areas he wanted his lines to
serve, and knew what he was talking about.

He apparently had little,

if any, first-hand knowledge of southern Transjordania, the Negev, and
Sinai .

•

The line Oliphant proposed from Haifa (or Acre) across the Jezreel
Valley to Beisan, was the least original of his concepts.
in the mind of planners, at least from Sandwith onward.

It had been
It was the

natural layout for a track, almost straight, with no natural obstacles,
and was to have more protagonists in the future, until it was finally
built by the Turks with German help, some 20 years later.
the line would have turned north to Tiberi(ts.

From Beisan

For some unknown reason,

perh~ s because the then Muttesarif at Acre preferred it, Oliphant
favoured the second alternative for a line from the coast to the Jordan
Valley (144).

This alternative was original, and quite his own.

It

was topographically quite feasible, but it was never again suggested,
probably because (in contrast with the Jezreel Valley layout) it led
across fairly desolate country, with little chance of ever having a
prosperous

hinterland.

Oliphant wanted to lead this line south-east

and east from the Bay of Haifa/Acre, through the flat Wadi M
f H?kh
1\11[~
(or Malik, today's Nahal Tsipori), to the Sak el Ba:tttef Emek Beit
Netofai ' 145);
\

From there he would have continued past Eilabun, down

144oliphant,

11

Gilead

11 ,

pp. 337-339.

145 01 iphant, ibid , p. 329.

\,-

- \

into the plain of Majdal (today s Migdal), and thence to Tiberias.
1

From Tiberias, either of Oliphant s proposed lines would have
1

continued due north, to climb the steep slope to about today s Rosh1

Pina.

It would then have gone north parallel to the Hule Marshes,

and then would have turned east, about Tel el-Kadi (today s Tel Dan),
1

climbed the plateau near Banias, and would then have crossed today's

•

Golan, to end at Damascus (146).

Two points should be noted.

First,

Oliphant s map does not show the layout of his track past Banias, but
1

instead shows the railway climbing the Golan, across the "Bridge of
the Daughters of Jacob,

11

south of Lake Hule (rather like today's road),

a trace he never mentioned.

Secondly, Oliphant was quite aware of the

technically very difficult climb from the Hule plain to the Banias
plateau--a problem that the ancient lateral highway going up in the
same direction also had to solve (147).

However, he maintained that

there was nothing to compare with this track for linking the capital
of Syria and the grain-rich HC(,uya n, with the coast at Haifa or Acre .

•

Oliphant seems to have fallen in love with this project of a
railway to Damascus (in the same_way he enthused about the Gilead line),
as he enlarges about the possibility of buying the Turkish governmentowned Hule marshes very cheaply.

He then saw the railway company

146 Cf . Oliphant p. 20, et~-, where he gives quite an exhaustive
description of where he wanted to lay down his line.

147 The ancient highway referred to was the one that linked (especially
in winter) Damascus with the coast, via Banias, by-passing the
snow-blocked Hermon range.

reclaiming them to pay for the lines' construction costs.

What he

envisaged was indeed to come true--minus the railway--when the Hule
Reclamation Concession was granted to the Jews some two generations
later . Another argument also runs like Ariadne's thread through all
of Oliphant ' s considerations, here and later.

This was that the

Damascus line would be instrumental in opening up both the Hauran

•

and the Jezreel Valley for the export of the grain that was grown
in great quantities in both regions .
An intri gui ng, if obscure, point is also made by Oliphant.

He

said that the proposed line "has recently been carefully surveyed
by Mr. Charles Austin, C.E., who considers it a very practicable
route for a railway."

It is a pity that nothing can be ascertained

either about the engineer Austin, or who sent him, or which of
Oliphant's two alternative lines he had surveyed.

There is also the

possibility that this is the only extant reference to yet another,

•

totally different railway scheme.
I

Perhaps Mr. Austin carried out his

survey for the often-proposed Haifa-Mesopotamia railway, already
condemned by Conder .

This question will have to r ebfi}in unan swered,

as will the problem why, in 1880, Oliphant carried his trace as f ar
north as Banias, when there were more southerly alternatives, as
he was to learn about 1885.
As noted above, Oliphant wanted to carry the southern continuation
of the trunk line from the coast down the Jordan Valley, either from
Beisan or Tiberias .

In trying to open up this desolate region, he

already had had a predecessor in the person of Zimpel i n the 1860 s .
1

His line was intended to serve as the outlet for the produce of the
Jewish colony he strove to establish on the heights of Gilead.

It

is not cl ear how he wanted goods to move up and down the slopes of
the Transjordanian plat~ a.

His scheme to utilize the relatively

level expanse of the Jordan Valley for communication purposes was

•

certainly not the last .

The plan was to crop up 1 perfunctorily, in

the first third of the 20th century.

On the other hand, what was an

ori gi nal concept of his was to build a branch railway (not a main line
as envisaged by Zimpel) from his trunk line, to climb into Jerusalem
and end there, wi th no continuation to the coast.
a feeder

11

tram

11

Alternately he wanted

(perhaps horse ~drawn, as was the rule elsewhere at

that time¼\f l49).

How he saw this feeder line climbing the 1,150

metres difference in altitude between about Jericho and Jerusalem, he
did not explain.

•

He thought the journey Haifa-Jerusalem would take

about 5-6 hours by way of the Jordan Valley .

The idea of reaching the

Holy City by a roundabout way through the broiling Jordan Valley, going
down to almost 400 metres below sealevel in the process, was indeed
most singular and must have been an after thought of his Gilead scheme.
Oliphant apparently never cared much for Jerusalem, and only had visited
the town perfunctorily.
Oliphant wanted his Jordan Valley line to continue south to Akaba-probably af ter the development of the colony justified a further building

149 Ibi d., pp. 301-302 .

stage.

His ignorance of the topography of the areas further south

now became apparent.

He considered two possibilities.

One was building

along the eastern shores of the Dead Sea--an impossible undertaking,
as there the mountains fall straight into the lake, with lengthy
stretches lacking a coastal strip altogether.

However, Oliphant seems

to have suspected these difficulties, as he suggested, as an alternative,

•

leading the line up to the top of the plateau of Moab.
to proceed south
11

Derekh Hamelekh

parallel to the ancient north-to-south highway, the
11

(the

intothe Darb el Haj
11

Then he wanted

11 ,

11

King s Highway
1

11 )

that by his day had turned

the Pilgrim's Road to Mecca.

Oliphant, aware

that his proposed railway, Damascus-Tiberias-Jordan Valley-Akaba, almost
followed the Pilgrim's Road, sensibly considered turning the Hadji's
transportation needs to good account (150).

In this he only had the

same idea Conder had had, and anticipated the basic idea that was to
lead to the building, after 1900, of the Hejaz Railway.

•

As for the necessity of carrying his railway from the Jordan rift
into the top of the plateau, Oliphant suggested using for the purpose
a wadi he knew, Wadi Kefreo (or Kufrein i l51), which marked the
southern limit of the areas he had surveyed in Transjordania.

At that

time this wadi did not serve as an important link of communications,
but Oliphant recognized its possibilities remarkably well (152).

Thus,

l 50ibid. , p. 303
151 Ibid., p. 280
152At that time the main track from the Jordan to the plateau went up
through es-Salt. But some 85 years later, Wadi Kefren was used to
carry, if not a railway, ~t least the American-built highroad from
Jordanian Jerusalem (1965) to Amman.

- \2-\ instead of building along the shores of the Dead Sea, he envisaged his
line climbing Wadi Kefren, then to turn south towards Ma'an.
Oliphant expected, perhaps as a sort of bonus, to find

11

There,

large coal
11

and iron deposits, probably to provide more export freight for his
trains {153).

From Ma 1 an the railway was expected to descent to Akaba,

presumably along the ancient branch of the King s Highway" to the
11

•

shore of the Red Sea.

1

The British, in the Second World War, were to

build a railway down this highway, but it was never completed down to
Akaba.

This alternate trace of the proposed railway down the Trans-

jordanian Plateau, is not shown on Oliphant 1 s map.

Quite incidentally

he mentioned the fact that the famous explorer and scholar, Sir Richard
Francis Burton, had already, at one time, proposed Akaba as a railway
terminus {154).

From which remark it can be learned that yet another

famous man had thought of a railway in Palestine at an early date, and
that Oliphant's scheme of having a rail-link between the Mediterranean

•

and the Red Sea at the Gulf of Akaba had also been thought of before .
Neither did he fail to stress that his own railway plan for building down ,
or parallel to, the Rift Valley, would have been much more economical,
becaust it was shorter and easier, than the vaunted Euphrates Valley

153 Ibid., p. 302 1#
154A biography of Burton (_1821-1890) will be found' in the D.N.B.
{_Concise), p. 176. C . .also Oliphant, p. 302.

-

.

Scheme, for tfle purpose of having another route to India .

Finally ,

he took care to point out the advan t ages that would accrue to all of
Syria, and to Palesti'ne, from having an independent outlet of tfteir
own to the Far East for exports and imports, quite independent of
tfie Suez Canal passage.

Oliphant's idea of a ratlway through Ma •an

to ARa6a was destined yet to nave a colourful history.

rt was to lead

to an international crisis in 1906, and came to 6e 6uilt only in 1975.
There reofilins the extension of Olipflant•s ratl system•-for such
it was--to Egypt.

As already noted, this line would have branched off

the rift valley trunk Hne just south of the Dead Sea.

Its indispens-

able prerequisite would have been the--almost impossi6le--continuation
of the trunk line down tfte Jordan valley along the impassable eastern shore
of the Dead Sea (155}.

This line, according to Oliphant's map, would

have climbed out of th.e Arava rift to ·:.the west through today*s Nahal
Tsin to about today's Sde.Boker in the Central Negev.

It would then

have led in a wide sweep westward, across northern Sinai, passing
somewhere soutfl of El Arish, to end on the Suez Canal at Ismailia.
There it would have linked up with the Egyptian railway network linking
Alexandria, Cairo and Suez.

rt might Be reasona61 e to assume that, l iRe his back door line to
Jerusalem, tfle plan of a railway to rsmailia in Egypt must have been
only an afterthought, not clouded by actual knowledge of tfle areas
155 Havtng th.e line to Egypt branch off Oltphant•s alternate track on
top of tlie Transjordanian Plateau would liave 6een qui'te impossible,
owing to th_e steep 6roR.en slope of the plateau towards· the Arava rift .

It must have been sort of an appendix to the l i ne that

involved.

was obvtously uppermost in Oliphant 1 s mi'nd, namely the railway that
was to have been the mainstay of hi s proposed Jewt sfL colony in the
Gi lead .

It wo uld quite obviously have been prepos terous to build a

railway fn a huge semi'- circl e from Haifa (or Syria) to Egypt, most of
it through empty country, and difficult of construction to boot,
when a much shorter direct line, consideraole stretches of it through

e

inhabited areas , could ha ve been built along the coast with no natural
obstacles on its way. What Oliphant cared chiefly about was a line
to support his proto~Zionist dream . He himself said: "I believe that
the successful creation of a colony to the east of the Jordan, connected
with the sea coast by a railway •.• would bring a stream of immigrants ...
and capital

11

(156} .

At the risk of some possible redundancy, it might be of use to sum
up the reasons advanced by Oliphant to prove the usefulness of the railway
proposed by him.

A few of them have already been mentioned in passing .

According to OHphant , apart from its contribution to drawing immigrants
and capital to Palestine , a claim curiously reminiscent of later
Zionist propaganda , the railway linking the Mediterranean and the Red
Sea would-J;v enefitted the commerce of his proposed colony.
foresaw the line opening up

11

He

the heart of the country" as a whole, and

being instrumental in provid i ng an open i ng for the produce of the
Hauran and the Valley of Jezreel • -chiefly wheat , but also sheep and

156 Oliphant , p. 341 .

-\ 2.~
cattle.

He ctted Conder as to Haifa being the best harbour on the

Syrian coas·t, and foresaw the railway making
depot in the country.

tt

the Biggest trade

He Based his prophecy on the fact that even

at the time he was writi'ng (Before there was a railway in the country) 1
4- 5,000 camel-loads of grain arrived daily on the coast from the Hauran
during the harvest season (157).

To Oliphant, Haifa, not Beyrouth,

was the natural outlet of the lands across the Jordan.

-

This conviction

led him to inveigh against what was apparently a contemporary project,
to build a "tramway" from Meserib in the Hauran to Damascus, there to
link up with a French road to Beyrouth and its new harbour (158).

As

already noted, a by-product of Oliphant•s line from Haifa to Damascus
would have been the reclamation of the Hule marsh~s.

As likewise

already noted, Oliphant's trunk line to the j outh would also have
served the pilgrim traffic to Mecca, making it an obvious forerunner
of the Hejaz ranway.

In this connection 01 iphant did not even forget

to stress the security aspect of his line to the south, as a factor

-

contri5uting to the pactfication of the turbulent border areas of
the Syrian Desert,

Nor di'd this aspect escape the eyes of the Truks

when they actually built the Hejaz line two decades later.

Mention

has al ready been made of the fact (wflich Bears repeating}_ that 01 iphant saw the line to Akaba as a gateway of Palestine and Syria, as a

l 57 0liphant, p.338.
158 01 i•pftant, p. 100. His remarks; t ~ w: an i nte.resting light on
French buil di.ng pl ans in Syria . lt i,s not cl ear \'lh,.eth.er the "tramway"
was to h_aye been twrse-drawn or a 1 ight steam 1 i ne. The proposal
menttoned b_y Oliphant ~ctually, mate.rialized_so~e ten ye~rs later,
wfien a ·french.. cot]]pany i..n ttte early 1890 1 s d1._d 1,.ndeed bu\ld a narrow...
· gauge raiJV{ay"'.'.'•~te., o.igger tfian just a traruway"'.;•~.frorn ]:1eserib to
· Damascus. Thj~s 1«,as; to be tfie first ra i lw:ay ij) Syria proper and its
expre~s purpose was to tap the wtteat of tlie l:lauran. Th.is· l tne, and
tfle timing of its constructi.on-to ki'll a Briti,sh railway from l::lai,fa-wi.11 be discussed later.

L...
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whole, to the trade of the East.

He therefore also conceived his Akaba line as

a commercially and technicall y more competitive alternative to the lon g-discussed
Euphrates Railway Route from Euro pe to India (159).
po inted out in his book,

11

Gilead

11

,

Finally, Oliphant also

the great benefits of having a railway linking

the great centers of Islam--Damascus, Jerusalem, and Cairo.

This, besides the

exchange of trade between Syria and Egy pt, enabl ~ Syria to export sheep and
horses, fruit and cereals, to the Valley of the Nile (160).
Oliphant's proposed railway network never materialized.
Jewish colony in th e Land of Gilead.

Neither did his

Yet it cannot be denied that he made a

convincing case for his plans, except for his roundabout lines to Jerusal em and
to Egypt.

The railways from Haifa to Damascus and down the Transjordan i an

Plateau, came to be built in due course, thoug h not always exactly as he had
planned.

Oliphant's misfortune seems to have been that he was too far ahead

of hi s time.

Considering the failure, for financial or political reasons,

of Montefiore, Chesney, ~d all other railway entrepreneurs after 1856, it
might well be said that Oli phant never had a chance.
did he have backers.

Nor, as far as is known,

The fact that the Turkish government, in the guise of Hassan

Fehmy-Pasha, also at the same time had railway plans, as mentioned above,
159 All details concerning Oliphant's arguments in favour of his railways will be
found in the pages listed in Note 141. For the sake of completeness, it must be
mentioned that Oli phant's activities were also mentioned by A.A. Druyanov
(Ketavim le'toldoth Hibbath Zion, etc. [ Writings Regarding the History of Hibbath
Zion] , 1919) and N. Sokolov (History of Zionism, 1919; Hibbath Zion, 1935),
but both did not mention Oliphant's railway plans specifically (ct . indexes in
each book). From what both writers say, it is clear that the Turks had no
interest in Oliphant's schemes in toto. Stein (cf . bibliography) also mentions
Oliphant's schemes (p. 14).
160 oliphant, p. 304.

... \
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also militated agatnst Oltpliant in 1880.

H.owever, he dtd not lose his

interest tn the s-uoject of ratlways i,n Pale~:tine, and wtll 5e mentioned
again in connection wi'tn_ yet anotfter scheme.
The fact th.at ratlways were still a current topic aoout 1882--83 is
attested by Dr . Selan Merrill, at that time American Consul in Jerusalem.
Accordi'ng to ftim tftere was "quite a rai'lway land-.-sales Boom" i'n the
Holy City, that led to what h.e called "increased Jewish immigration" (161} .

•

It cannot now f>e as:certained what railway scheme Dr. Merrill was referring
to.

Perhaps tfte reference was to the schemes of Erlanger-Maud, or of

de Saulcy, botft mentioned already, and dateable about in the early
188o•s.

The increase i'n Jewish immigration reported by Merrill, was

probably the influx of Jews after the Russian pogroms of 1881.

But

it is curious anyway to see it linked with a railway building plan.
SURSOCK'S DAMASCUS RAILWAY SCHEME IN THE 1880 1 s
In h.is book, 11 Th.e Land of Gil ead 11 , so copiously quoted above,
Oliphant mentioned in passing a Mr, Sursock, a Greek Banker, who had

•

bought in 1872 th.e greater part of the Valley of Esdraelon (i.e., the
Valley of Jezreel;

1621.

In fact, he was referri'ng to Messers. Sursock,

Greeks, reputedly, the richest bankers in Syria at tfte time, with

161 Quotation from Marion Harland, "Under the Flags of the Orient",
1891, p. 293 -, Tfie Rev, Dr. Selah Merrill (J83J-1909l was a Congregational
min ister, archaeologist, and at tnree different periods American
Consul tn Jerus-alem . Cp. We5ster is Biographtcal Dictionary.
As- far as is known, considerable difficulties attended the
acquisition of the lands for th_e Jewish s-u6urb Ohel Moshe (or Maskereth
Moshe 1 near today's- Mahane Yehuda Quarter)_ in Jerusa 1em, founded i.n
1883. Exorbttant prices were asked for the 1and, on account of
rumours that the station for a proposed railway was to f>e located in the
vicinity. After c&h -i le the rumours subsi'ded, and so did the prices.
162oliphant, "Gilead 11 , pp. 328,330.

1-lt
headquarters in Beyrouth (163).

These people were, in 1882-83, the

initiators of one of the most serious railway 6utlding schemes yet
set in motion in Palestine.

Ma~ , though not all, the details known

of the Sursock line can be found in
on Palestine (164}.

11

Hatfa 11 , Oliphant's second book

Oliphant himself was, according to Hecker, a fervent

supporter of the new scheme, namely a railway from Acre, with a branch
from Haifa, to the Jordan, with a later extension to Damascus (165) .

•

In "Haifa", as already noted, there is a full chapter entitled
!'Tfte First Railway in Palestine 11 (166}.

In it Oliphant described the

holders of the new railway concession as 10-12 men of means, both
Moslems and Cftrtstians, all residents of Syria, and--an important fact-a 11 of them Ottoman subjects.

The most influential amongst them were

the Sursocks, who were particularly interested in the line as a means
of exporting tfte grain grown on their Jezreel holdings.

Continuing,

01 iphant described the layout of the l ine1 substantially the same track
he himself had proposed before in 1880, with a possible refinement, a
short spur to the foot of the Nazareth hills.
•

He stated that the line

had already Been surveyed past Beisan--which he saw as a prospective
commercrial and indus·trial centre--down into the Jordan Valley and past

·•
164 01 iphant's 11 Haifa 11 is not a continuous story·, but consists
rather of a collection of a series of reports for the delectation
of American newspaper readers .
165 Hecker, p. 788.
166 01iphant, "Haifa", pp. 63--57; the date the en.apter was written was
June 13, most proba5ly 1883.

-

163 01 fphant, 11 Haffa 11 Ccp. 5i6ltograpfiy and note 142 a5ove}, pp . 42,60. The
Sursocks (al so spelled Sursuk. and Soursoukl _were a5se.ntee l andowne~s, a l a~er
generation of whom was destined 1 after the first World ~ar1 to sell ,ts n.old1,ngs
in the Valley of Jezreel i,nto Zionist hands, th.us. p~oy1d1~g one of th~ cornerstones of Jewtsh Palestine, The family still flounsb..ed ,n Beyrouth in 1975,
where there ts a Sursock Quarter .

-\ ~ ~--the old Majami Bridge , to a point just south of the Sea of Galilee ..,
In fact, what 01 iphant des-cribed was tfte trace of tfte Turkish line
from Haifa, as it was actually 5uilt some 15 years after his death .
As for tfte continuation of the line up onto Ute Transjordanian Plateau ,
01 iphant said that there were two alternatives •.-5oth, it sftould be

noted, w:ere markedly-- different from hts own 1880. scfteme.

One was to

clim5 up along tfte sh.oulder of th..e ridge overlook.fog the Yarmuk
River (i.e., follow the Yannuk Gorge as was- ul ttmately-- done); tfte
other one proposed cl tmBinq up along tile eas-tern sh.ore of the Sea of
Gaililee, and then turning north-east to clamber the plateau through
the Wadi SA!Jlakh (1671.

Both alternative tracks were to have crossed

the Jaulan (i ~e., the Golan, which in his earlier book Oliphant, not
quite correctly- named Haura1, described as magnificent pasture and
wheat land.

Oliphant conspicuously favoured the second alternative.

He also foresaw a short branch line to Mezeri5, the great wheat
emporium, and - he did not forget to mention• one of the most important
resting places on the pilgrim ' s road to Mecca (168}.

•

The line, was,

of course, to end at Damascus •
Perusal of the chapter will show that, besides ignoring his original
idea of leading the railway past Banias, Oliphant also no longer
referred to his proposed line down the Jordan Valley-, in support of his
Jewish Colony.

But, then, he was describing a scheme not his own,

167 wadi' SCJnakfl, also called ~ akh, tenninates: on tfie shore of the Sea

of Galilee (Lake Ti6eriasl just north of today's Etn Gev . Through
part ~fit passes th..e main road to the Golan completed about 1910,
168

Mesertb has al ready 6een mentfoned_as tfie termtnus of a proposed
French 11 tramway-11 from Damascus. It was to oecome the tenninus of a
French railway-. Cp. note 158.

tnitiated 6y people who were moved by comnercial and not quasi - Messianic
motives.

However, in hts chapter he did not forget to reiterate his

convi'ctton tfiat now a 11 the Damascus trade tliat went to Beyrouth could
Be diverted to Acre or Hatfa .

Oliphant •s chapter, especially devoted

to the first railway t n Palestine , ended with_ a plaintive footnote
telling his readers that since he had wrttten tlie chapter the Sursock
concession had l apsed.

But he added that he expected it to be

renewed (169) •
Whether or not the S1:1 rsock .:concession was ever renewed--Erlanger 1 s
was renewed twice--- is not clear.

Proba6ly it was not, since the whole

scneme came to notliing--as had others before it.

In any case, its 1aps ft~

was not the end of the references to the proposed Mediterranean ... Damascus
railway 1"n Olipliant •-s 11Haifa 11 •

Quite apart from the special chapter on

it, he referred to the line time and again .

Amongst other things, it

can 5e learnt that1 although the survey of the line had been completed
lialfway to Damascus, the money for financing it could not be obtained
tn London
11

11

owing to intrtgues 11 •

He al so blamed interference by.,,t he

Ha if a- Red Sea Canal 11'""-wh.atever thaj: migftt naV;e been · Cfio).

· Anyhow,

an attempt, unsuccessful, seems: to have Been made to o6tain English,
as well as local 1 financtng.

Perhaps Oliphant had tried to interest

ht s own o1d connections in Engl and .,

A f ev.t page.s later 01 i phant noted

_5itterly that tt1e concession had 1apsed tnrougn 11 the com5foed greed

169 01 i_ph.ant ,

11

H.ai_fa 11 , . p, 67 .

170 rnid . , p. 204 ,

As for the Canal: In 1855 , a Captatn (apparently
th_e later Rear- Admiral} WilHam Alle.n (-1793--18641 published tn London,
11 The De.ad Sea, a ne\'l_ Route to Indta 11 ,
in wlifcft fie advocated a shfpping
canal from Haifa to the Red Sea, 6y lt!aY' of the Dead Sea. If the
a6ove tdentification ts- correct , Allen dted some 20 years Before
Oliphant mentioned the Canal scheme, and its interference must
remain obscure . Cp. also D.N ., B., Vol . r. , p. 320.

and apathy of the f'trst grantees, 11 presumably the Sursocks and their
associates, though. th.e meaning of the word

11

first 11 is not clear (171) .

The proposed rail way seems to have factnated 01 iphant so much that
he set out from Haifa to personally reconnoitre the area around the Sea,1
of Gal tlee.

Tlie date ts not known.

He expected the region round the

lake to flourish again, as in old times, on account of the railway,
and especially mentioned th.at the concession permitted the holders to

•

wor k steam5oats on the lake, an improvement of which he expected much ( 172) • .
He also personally rode up the Wadi' Samakft, from the lake to Ute plateau,
a trace, as noted, th.at he preferred (173}.

Incidentally, he also

suggested a road being built from the railway to Nablus, making Haifa
its port.

However, the idea of a road was curious, as Conder , several

years earlier, had suggested a railway to Nablus, which indeed was later

.-

z

built by the Turks.

Perhaps Oliphant feared the hilly terrain of Samaria .

One of the most interesting references to the line is th.e one mentioning
Go tt] ieb Schumacher t s survey of a Roman road up to the plateau, in order
to find a feasible trace for the line to Damascus (174}.

Schumacher,

who was thus linked with the proposed railway, was an architect and an
engineer, American - born ; of Gennan extraction, who had grown up in Haifa,
and later became a renowned expert on Palestine, and more especially on

111

Oltphant, 11 Haifa 11 , p. 212; Hecker, p. 188. The above.mentioned
de.velopment, and oth.e~s '!1ln!ioned by -0,tph.ant, may 6elong t~ 1884:85.
The chapter on 1'Hte f1rs-qFa1lway 11 , as alread,y noted, was written in
the summer of 1883.
172 roid., p. 66. A list of the references· 1 i'ke the a6ove, to the railwa,y
1
not contained in the special chapte~ will be found in hote 1842.
173 Ibid., pp. 245, 265.
174 Ibid.,, p. 267; Hecker, p. 788.
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th.elands acr oss tfte Jordan, a5out which he published many researches (175).
In fact, h1~s interest in Transjordania arose out of ht s railway surveys .

The

Roman road he fo 11 owed is presuma5 ly th.e one sti 11 s·hown on today •s maps
as starting right at tne north- eastern end of the Wadi Samakh to conti nue
straight north-.e ast across the Golan . This anc i ent road was undoubtedly
one of the tracks of th.e Via Maris that cli m\'d out of the Jordan Valley ,
from th.e shore of the Sea of Galilee to the plateau , ultimately

a

joining

the even more ancient King '- s Hi ghway in its progress to Damascus (176) .
That stretch of the Roman road which l inked the head of the Wadi Samakh
with the shore of the ·lake , has not been found , but as the road necessar i ly had a continuation down from the plateau, it probably ran right down
the wadi , where it may have been ooliterated by the rainfloods during the
past 1900 years . Alternately, it followed the ridge overlooking the wadi
on its way to the shore.

In any case , Schumacherls attempt to plan a

trace of the railway along th.e Roman road, ts proof of the unchanging
communication patterns in Palestine fran ancient times to the present
century.
Th.e parti culars aoout the Sursock line provided 5y Oliphant, and
later supported by Hecker , are oorne out By quite a detailed description of
the same proposed line in a German technical journal devoted to railways
that was published in 1884 (177} .

It surely must have been the first

reference ever to a railway in Palestine in this journal .

Some of the

175scnumacfte; s""6t ograpny appeared after hi_s death_ in the Z.D . P.V. ,

(Zeitscnrift des Deu t schen Pal as tinft;:Vereinis), Vol , 49 , 1926 , pp . 218
et seg. He 1 ived 1857- 1925.
...
176

The Roman ~oad is cJ~?rly shown on Sn~et 4, Teverya , of the
·

1:100 , 000 Survey of t s·r·ael map, 1975:

177 cp. Arch.iv f 3r Eisenbahnwesen , Leipz i g, 1884, pp . 287-288.
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details provtded by tttt s trade publ i cation follow .

I nci dentally , the

j our nal di d not t denttfy the Su r socks 6,r name, out mer ely, ca lled t hem
4

" tlie concessiona i r e s 1~.

As for the deta i 1 s :

the concession fo r the

ra i.l way was s ig ned on December 28 , 1882 ; the conces,s ion prov i ded for a
s t ngle-track ltne lto 6e dou6le ...tracked if r esults warrant , gauge ,
wnether normal or narrow, not stated). 85 kms . long , to be started six
months, at th.e latest , after the approval of tfle Building plans; the

-

line to oe completed wi thin two years .

It was further stated that the

survey of tne 1 ine had been completed by· 11 a young German engineer 11 in
the summer of 1883 .

Tnis was undoubtedly Schumacher, who accord i ng to

this, had surv~yed tfle whole line, from the coast into the Jordan Valley ,
and not only the ascent from the Jordan to the Golan , as Oliphant
seemed to imply .
Damascus .

Further , the line was ultimately· to be prolonged to

As• f or ·the layout of the line:

it was to start at Acre

(Akko1, and continue across tne River Kishon (at km 14), pass Haifa
( Rm 17 ; a spur line i s not men t ioned separatelyl, pass Ha¼ tiye
Ckm 25); Tel - esh- Sflammam (km 32 ; today' s· Kfar Yehosflua); Afule
(km 45 ; a brancn to nearby· Nazaretn is· not mentioned); Bei san (km 67) ;
Jisr el-Majami (Jm 801; to end near the Yarmuk at km 85 .

Also,

the concession for tne 1 ine was to run 99 years Cto 1981 ! ) ; building
material was to be imported duty- free ; tfle deposit prior to the granting
of the concession amounted to 'i T. 2, 000 lErl anger had to deposit
1 4 , 000--whtch were lost); the yearly payment for the completed line
was to amount of

l

T. 2 per km Can i_ncred i 6ly 1ow· sum !} the Turkish

,,,

tlm.

J:{anun
'idb·ch8
1Jscl11uicde

l,,mi
•mar
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•

-.
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- l3Lfgovernment was to have the option of buying the line after the lapse
of 30 years.
The German journal did not fail to comment on the unusually
favo urable terms granted to the concessionaires.

It also remarked

on the commercial importance of the line, as facilitating the export
of wheat from the country.

This export, through Acre and Haifa, was

stated by the journal to have amounted after 1882 to the equivalent of
more than 10 million German Marks (
•

about 500,000 Pounds Sterling).

=

69 million Piastres, probably

Nevertheless, in the journals opinion,

the line would probably have begun to pay only after it had been
continued through the Hauran to Damascus.

The probable benefit of the

new railway to the German (Templar) colony of Haifa, was also
mentioned.
Some further details on the line of "Sursock Cousins", on the
deposit paid by them to the Porte (the equivalent of approximately 40,000
German Marks--probably the 2,000 Turkish Pounds mentioned above), and

-

on Oliphant's interest in the line, will also be found in the columns
Ii
' --of the Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palastina-:.Vere~
s (178) •
../

THE EARLY 1890's: THE ELIAS-PILLING HAIFA-DAMASCUS SCHEME,
AND ITS FRENCH COMPETITORS
As already noted, the Sursock line came to nothing.

But only

some eight years later a very similar plan was proposed for a railway
to Damascus, wHh Haifa and Acre again as its terminals.

However,

before this 1891 line is described, and in order to preserve some sort

178 z.D.P.v., 1894, p. s1,

- \l o of chronological s-equence, it should be mentioned that in the years
Between thE fatlure of t~e Sursoc~s and tne tnttiation of the following
schemes in northern Palestine, there cropped up two more schemes for
railways in the south of the country.

The inttiators were again, at

least nominally, Ottoman su5jects, Lutfi Effendt (_to 5e exact, he was
an Egyptian) and a Jerusalem Jew, Yoss-ef (Josephl Navon (later Navon Bey).
The schemes they advanced were a) a railway from Palestine to Egypt, and
b) a railway from Jaffa to Jerusalem.

•

Lutfi wanted to have a line from

Khan~ es to Port-Said, and Navon was interested, originally, in a railway between Syria and Egyp;t Vta "' Pa l estine. For a time there seems to
have been some li'nRs Between the two men, but Lufti's idea miscarried-presuma5ly because, as before, neith.er the Turks nor the Egyptians, or
ratfter tne Brttish occupation authorities, were interested in a railway
across Stnai. (1791. · In the end Navon carrted on alone and limited
himself to a Jaff~-Jerusalem line.

The story of his long, and ultimately

successful, la5ours, that resulted in the construction of the first
railway to Jerusalem, will be detailed in the following chapter, that

•

will at long last, deal not with abortive sch.emes in Palestine, but
with projects that came to fruition in 1892 and after.

179 The question of wfi.Y' neither the Turks, nor the Egyptians or the
British, apparently wanted to pierce by a railway the ''cordon sanitaire"
across-. Sinai, is a fascinating one, and deserves closer study. The
fact is that there never seems to have Been enough support for such
a line to be really Built, •until its construction was forced by the
exigencies of the Ftrst••fWorld War. Communication 6etween Palestine
and Egypt was provided 5y sea, ever stnce the introduction of steam
made ships more attractive than camel caravans.
As for l utft'·s scheme and his temporary collaboration with Navon,
cp. Hecker, 797; Hartmann lcp. 5i5lio~raphy), p, 6.1; rlyamson II, pp,
480-481; Altneuland lcp. bi5liography), 1905, p. 56.

-\3 ~
Returning to 1891--on SeptemBer 30th of that year, the Syrian,
probably more correctly--Lebanese1 Christian businessman, Youssouf
Effendi Elias obtained a concession for Building a railway from Haifa/
Acre to Damas-cus, i.e., fte intended to revive the defunct Sursock scheme.
He possibly was a 11 strawman 11 , who, as an Ottoman su5ject, would have
had less trouBle in o5taining a concession than a 11 foreigner 11 •

His

partner was the BrHish entrepeneur Ro5ert Pilling, who was to look
after the financial aspects of construction.

•

The concession also

included permission to construct har5our works at Haifa and Acre, and
apparently also to run a boat service on the Lake of Galilee, to feed
the railway (180}.

180

•

Tfte Elias-Pilltng line is fleetingly mentioned fiy several sources:
Karkar, p. 113; Issawi, p. 251; Hecker, p. J98; Altneuland, 1905, p. 56;
and P.E.F. Quarterly, 1914, p. 190. The following details have been
taken from Hartmann - (cp. bi5liography) pp. 56-,64, who has a very good
map of tfle area through which the ltne to Damascus was to be built;
Cuivet (cp. 6i51tography1, pp. 42-43; and Altnueland, 1904, p. 23.
The impression is that Professor Hartmann1 though writing in 1894, was
more reliable than Cuivet, who wrote in 1896,but whose account contains
some obscurities, as for instance a Branch line from Nedjha to Haifa
35 kms long, that just cannot Be tracked down, as there is no place
called Nedjha. On the other hand, Hartmann makes a slip in dating t he
Elias.Pilling concession in 1890. Cuivet gives the correct year, 1891.
It should Be menti'oned in passing that Hartmann pointedly referred
both to the Sursock and the El ias-.Pil 1ing schemes as "British", as
opposed to s:everal "French" schemes, also referred in his article,
which dealt with ratlways in "Middle Sy·r ia as a whole.
1'

-\1--1 ~
Building tfte new line actually started on Decembe.r 12, 1892--some
3 months after Navon 1·s Jerusalem li:ne had been opened (as will be detailed
in the following cftapterl.

Some 5,000 people. attended the ceremony at

Wadi Rushmiya, outside Haifa, when Sadik Pasha, governor of the
mutessariflik of Acre laid the first stone (or turned tfte first sod · f l81).
According to Hartmann, in his description of the line, it was to have
been 232.65 kms long, from Haifa to Damascus (182).

The firman stipulated

that it had to be completed by September 1895, within some 33 months--

•

a considerable task under the primitive conditions prevailing in Palestine .
It was to have had normal gauge, 1,435 mm, as against the narrow gauges
of the com~leted line to Jerusalem (1,000 mm) and the French lines
designed for Syria (1,050 mm {183).
\

The cost of the line was envisaged

as l millioni;st., plus an additional 2-300,000 Pounds Sterling for
harbour works at Haifa and Acre. The track of the new line, along its
first section to the Jordan river, seems to have conformed exactly to the
one already surveyed by Schumacher for the Sursocks (184). Tfte ascent
onto the Golan plateau, h.owever, was· not to follow Scftumacher•s choice of

•

the Wadi Samakh.

Instead the trace was to rise gradually, from about

Samakh ( today• s Tsemah, a pl ace not to be confused with Wadi Samakh,
not too far from it), along the ridge bordering the Sea of Galilee on
the east.

It would have gone north, passing in a wide curve east of

today's Sussita (Hip~, and then passing Bir esh-Shakum, to turn

181 cuivet, p. 43; Hartmann, p. 64; P.E.F.Q., 1914, p. 190.
182cuivet, p. 43, counting from Acre to Damascus, puts the length
of the ltne wrongly at 185 kms. His many details will be cited later.
183 Altneuland, 1904, p. 23. Width of the gauge is the only detail
Hartmann and Cuivet forgot to mention. Most of the other following
details are taken from Hartmann.
l84Th.e map attached to Hartmann s article shows the trace of the
Elias-PiJli,ng li,ne exactly,
1

sharply east1 north. of Skofiye, to gain the plateau past El - A~ at Khis in .
From there it would h.ave gone east to Sheikh Se 11ad, and tnen north and
north.east to Damascus 085).

Hartmann provides an exact list of the

stations the line would have had.

A good many, from Haifa down to the

Jordan, are identical with those of the future Turkish. l tne, whose remains
are still ·:extant {__186).
The Elias-Pill tng railway, though initiated By British-teBanese
interests, also had its

11

Jewish 11 aspects.

As noted already, its track

would have passed Bir esh-Shakum, on the slopes of the plateau down to
the Sea of Galilee, north of Sussitta.

This place was a site of the--at

that time, 1892, already aoandoned-...Jewish. colonly of Bnei ..Yehuda, which
had Been founded in 1887 oy settlers from Safed (Tsfath).

The settlers

had oeen supported in their endeavors by Lawrence Oliphant, out after his
death in 1888, and after holding out precariously for 10 months, they
had oeen forced to leave.

In a memorandum dated 1895, they spoke hopefully

of their anticipation th.at "within two years" the railway would pass

185sheet 4 of the Survey of Israel 1:100,000 map will oe useful
in tracing the Elias.Ptlling .. line in the context of today.
186Th.e proposed s·tations of the El ias ...Pil ling Railway were:

Acre
(Station planned near the east gate of the fortress, and not near the
south gate, where it was ultimately Built after 19021; Haifa (tenta--•
tively at the eastern end of the town); Beled esh.Sheikh; Haratiye
(at the eastern end of the Kishon Bridge); Tel esh-Shammanl a station
for Nazareth (6 kms south of El Majdal, today's Migdal Ha'emek); a
station midway between the villages of El Afule and El Fule; Shatta
(Beith Hashitta); Beisan (south of Khan Ahmar}; Jisy.el-Majami;
a station f(i)r Tiberias (250 meters east of Samakh/Tsemah); Bir eshShakum; El-Al; Khis·ftn; Ein Dakar; Tsil; Sheikh Sa 'ad; Nawa; Jazim;
Inchil; Es-Sanamein; Gh.aoaghio; El Hadj; Ki sweh; Damascus (near
Bawa- beth Allah gat~). Hartmann, pp. 63-64, is the source of the
list. Details of the layout are also confirmed oy the map attached
to his article.

tfteir village, and tflat perhaps a station las really had been i_ntendedl
would 6e built on tfleir lands (187).

A direct link to Hatfa and Damascus

might indeed have saved their settlement, 5ut it was not to be .
An interesting feature of the proposed 1ine would have been its
branches . According to Hartmann ((Iu ivet had different details that will
-6@ discuss·ed later}, there was to have Been a branch Afule-Jenin, as

yet . not surveyed in 1894, that would have 6een sure to have been con-

-

tinued at some later date south.

It would have linked with the, By

then 1functioning , line Jerusalem-Jaffa, with a possible extension to
Gaza (188) . This line would have been a revival of the Conder plan of
1879 (and of Oliphant's road proposal).

Another branch would have run,

according to Hartmann, from Nawa, on the trunk line to Damascus, to Hasbeya,
in the valley of Coele-Syria, under the western slope of Mount Hermon.
The possiole uses of this branch are not clear, and its layout, necessarily
passing Banias, can only be guessed at.

It was never suggested again.

However, an eventual link-up of the proposed line, via Nablus, with the
south can be taken for granted, and was even atteTlpted, more than twenty
years later by the Turks.
Cuivet, in his description of the Elias-Pilling railway, gives
slightly different details, about its layout . According to him the
line was to have passed either round the southe~ or the northern ( !)
end of the Sea of Galilee ; a branch from the Hauran (i . e., Nawa) to
Banias (40 kms long) would have been obligatory; the continuation
Bantas-Has5eya (_30 Rms:) ....-optional; an untraceable branch Haifa-Nedjha
(35 kms} was to have been optional .

187 vtlnay,

11

Finally, there would have been an

Golan 11 (cp. Bibliography), pp. 86-87 .

188 Hartmann, pp. 61, 64.

optional branch Nawa-Bosra eski-Sham (60 kms), which indeed was later
ourl t 6y tfLe T\)Ol<s-, to further grain transport.

Most contemporarly sources--Hartmann, Cuivet, Issawi and Karkar-agree unanimously that the new line ran into financial trou5le about
from tts inception. At a certain date1 the concession of Elias-Pilling
was apparently taken over by a Mr. Hills, the proprietor of the t hen
well .... known "Thames Iron Works" near London, whose company was to

-

have invested 't6oO,OOO in the scheme (189).

In the end, after the

concession had apparently been renewed once or twice, and work had been
done sporadically, the Syrian.Ottoman Railway (or Syrian1or Haifa, Railway,
to distinguish it from Sursocks'
ghost.

11

Hamidiye 11 Railway of 1883) gave up the

What distinguished it from other, more ephemeral plans was,

that some 8 kms of the line, Haifa to Yajur (Yagur of today) had actually
been built, with some 5 kms more of earthworks to the Kishon river,
ready for rail-laying (1 90} ~ This according to later reports .

Though

it was knowR , .on account of Pilling and Hills, as a British company,

it apparently could not raise enough funds in London to continue its
activities (191).

The line and its works were abandoned, and its

desolate state was corrunented upon by a contemporary German-Zionist
traveller in 1898 C,92).

Part of the line s financial troubles may
1

have been due to its having been conceived as a normal gauge railway,
wmch, thougfi_mo re efftci:ent, would have 5een much more expens"tve to

189Altneuland, 19.04, p. 23,
190 I'5td.
191 c~, sources l 1s
· t e d 1n
· No t e 180 • Also, Grothe (Gp. 5i5liography),
p. 4 •
192 B~ s (cp. bibliography) , p. 143.

build tf1an tts narrow:--gauge sisters at that time planned, or operated ,
in Palestine and Syrta .

However , th_e matn reason for its fatlure was

undoubtedly.,, tfte fact that whtl e preparations were being made at Haifa,
the French Hauran-Damascus line (to be prolonged to Beyrouth) was
al ready being Bui'l t.
Before it gave up the ghost, the Elias ptll ing-Hill s line had had
an imnediate, and curious, effect th.at threw an interesting light on
relations between the commercial and financial ventures of the European
powers--in this particular case, England and France--with.in the Turkish
Levant territories. This subject will be dealt with. more fully in the
following chapter. Meantime, it suffices to note that the attempt of the
fyrian Ottoman Railway to draw the commerce of Damascus and the agricultural

produce of the Hauran to the ports of Haifa and Acre, aroused considerable
uneasiness at Beyrouth, where the French, having built a port, had a
great stake in developing the export and import trade of Damascus and
all Syri:a (193}.
About 1889, the date is not quite definite, one Youssouf Effendi

•

Motran--another Christian, like Elias, by his name, and another
11

straw-man --obtained a concession for a railway or a (steam-tram)
11

from Damascus to Mezerib, the grain centre of the Hauran. He speedily

. ,,,.

transferred his concession to a Belgian company 11 Soc1ete ettomane des

-

tramways de Damas, et voies economiques en Syri'e", which in turn
passed on its rights to the French compa ily that held the concession
for transportation works (road and railway} between Beyrouth and Damascus,
/

and afterwards became known as the ''Societe des ch.erni ns.de-fer (not tramways?)

193 on this subject, Hartmann, pp. 57 ....59; also Issawi p. 248 et seq;
Karkar p. 113. There are other references elsewhere.

8ttoman¥ onemiques de Beyrouth-Damas-Hauran en Syrie (194).

The line, for -, .

which Motran obtatned his concession, seems to have been a successor of the
one on which Oliphant, some years before, vented his ire, as it would have
competed wtth his own scheme of drawing the Hauran grain trade to Haifa.
So great Became the anxiety of the French canpany over the possibility that .
the El ias ...Pill ing line would draw~ tself the Hauran wheat traffic, that it
started construction of the Damascus-MeSerib railway (1,050 mm gauge; 103.25 km
long) late in 1891, a full year before the competing line was begun from

•

Haifa, and only weeks after the concession for the Haifa line had been
granted (195}.

The illuminating fact should be noted that the British
11

Haifa-Damascus railway, and the

11

11

French 11 Beyrouth-Damascus railway were

both started almost simultaneously -•late in 1892.
stated above, Bogged down speedily.

The Haifa line, as

But the French line from Beyrouth

was to be opened for traffic on August 3, 1895 (and still operates
today tl96).

However, the Damascus-Megerib line had already been complet-

ed in a great hurry exactly one year earlier on August 3, 1894, after
less than three years• work (197).

•

Thus, by a fait accompli (which logi-

cally must be mentioned here, though chronologically it belongs to the
next chapter), it did indeed succeed in canalizing the Hauran wheat trade
away from Haifa and its unfinished line.

It also provided the curious

spectacle of a railway hanging in the air for a full year, having no
11

11

continuation either in the south, at MeSerib, or in the north at Damascus.

'

It is a pity that no details are available as to how rails, and especially
tl,y

194 cf). Ha)'.'tmann p. 59 et seq; Issawi, p. 248 et seq.; ¥ ar, ,

-::
p. 1~9. It should be noted that this line, or canpany, ultimately
was to enter history under the name 11 Societe( ottomane du chemi ~
de-fer Damas, Hama, et prolongements (D.H.P.) The company bore an
unholy medley of names at various times.
195 rssawt, p. 251; Cutvet, pp. 42.43.
11

196 rbid. Hecker, p. 798. Cuivet, p. 42, gives 1.3.1894, which is most unlikely
as bujlding time would have been 16 months.
197Ilfd Ct ivet., .42, aives th~ da,t.P as 22.]i.1894, which conflicts both with
•
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-144rolling stock, were flaul ed into tne inter tor of Syr t a ,

Th.e road Beyrouth-

Damascus, over th_e hign passes, Both across the LeBanon and Hermon ranges, ··
ust ~alVe provided tft.e only means of trans portation.

The line Damascus -

Me$eri5 was a 1so notewortny for another curious·, and reveal ing1 fact.

For

about three-fiftlis of tts lengtft. it ran parallel to tfte proposed track of
the competing Britisft Hne.

Only a few hundred metres-- if that--would at

some places nave divided the two railways· (J98).
The successful French fi j ht to kill the British railway from Haifa
in a way was only a preview of what was to happen a few years later, when
the Turks, under German technical direction, were in fact forced to build
th.eir own Hejaz Railway parallel to--but east.. -of the Mezerib 1 ine.
Mezeri6 (also known as the

11

The

Hauran 11 } railway was the second line, after

Navon ' s Jerusalem line, to operate anywhere in Palestine/Syria .
these undertakings were French financed.

Both

The Mezerib line was yet to have

an interesting Ftistory as a French instrument to snatch business from
competitors.

It will be mentioned again repeatedly as the history of

railways in Palestine unfolds .

•

It is hoped that the nume11ous building schemes listed and detailed
above will serve as proof that the~ were quite variegated activities
pertaining to ratlways i'n Palestine during th.e period 1838-1892 .

198 For th.e parallel tracks, cp. the map attached to Hartmann's
article. Seme of the Hauran villa ges on the way to Damascus would
have boasted simultaneously of two stations, ftad tfte Elias-Pilling
line been 5uil t. The list of the stations on the Damascus-MeJerib line,
tftat were actually Built, reads as follows: Damascus .. B@ramte ;
Dareya; Sahnay-a; Kisweh; Dennun; Es-Suraikiye; Ghabaghi5; Es-Sanamein ;
El Kouneye; El
Sheikh Miskin; Dail; Meserib. At least
three of t h e s e ~ would also have had parallel stations of
the line from Haifa.

K~~eh;

Notes on Maps

Bibliographic details regarding the maps used in preparing the foregoing
chapter are contained in the notes accompanying the text.

Nevertheless, it

might be useful to summarize these maps in a handy list, together with some
maps and atl a~ s that wi 11 be found useful as background materi·al.
ii

l.

Baedeker, K., Palastina und Syrien,
Handbuch fUr Reiseyide, Leipzig, 1891. Contain f• very exact l :700,000
maps of Northern and Southern Palestine in pre-railway times.

2.

Great Britain, Military Operations: Egypt and Palestine (er. 4 ibliography)
Has good maps of Palestine, based on General Staff surveys, attached to
Vol. II, Part I, and in separate map case.

3.

Hartmann, M., Das Bah ~ tz Mittelsyriens (C . .f'ibliography) t
Accompanied by a very detailed map of the proposed Elias-Pilling -i:i IJ,~e
and the French Damascus-Me 'erib line.

4.

Oliphant, L., The Land of Gilead (C . j,; bliography)
Contains map of Oliphant s proposed railways in Palestine o -~ p. 302.

o

1

5.

Survey of Israel. Publishes continuously updated sets of the 1:100,000
maps of Israel 1based chiefly on 1958-1960 surveys.

6.

Survey of Palestine. Published set of sixteen 1:100,000 maps of
Palestine. Set used is 2nd edition, based on 1924-34 surveys, revised 1942,
and reprinted 1945.

The Atlas of Israel
11

has 1 historically not always correct1 maps, showing

11

railway development in Palestine. The Times Atlas of the World and the
11

11

National Geographic Atlas

Palestine/Israel.

11

11

have detailed, exact, and useful general maps of

-

III,

RAILWAYS IN PALESTINE

18!2 - 1914

RAILWAYS BUILT OR PLANNED IN PALESTINE

==============1892-1914===============

•

Not e to Map •

The attached map is NOT a key map
for chapter III .
For technical reasons ,such as lack
of space,a great number of details were
omitted from the map .
Thus the map is intended solely to
provide an OUTLINE of railway developments

in Palestine ,1892-1914 .
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- \l-tq Background and Se urces
The year 1892 was a seminal year in the history
•f

railways in the Holy Land.

In this year the first

railway in the c e untry - the meter-gauge line Jaffa-Jerusalem was inaugurated.

Thus, 54 years after Moses Montefiore

had first thought of building a railway in Palestine, the
sound • fa locome tive's whistle was indeed heard in the

•

land.

Apart from its intrinsic importance, the opening

of the new line had two notable aspects.

The building

of the line had been initiated owing t e the perseverance
of a Jerusalem Jew, Yossef (Youssef) Navon;

and it was

owing to Navon's activities that ne t the progressive
Lebanon, but one • f the more backward regions of Syria,
namely Palestine , had become first in having a regularly
operating railway (1).
In c entrast with the decades since 18J8,
described in the foregoing chapter, that were full of
ephemeral railway building schemes, which could be often
reconstructed • nly through a single reference, the period

1892-1914 came to be progressively well documented
as far as actual railway building in Palestine was concerned.
There were to be more hard facts to go upon, since Palestine

(1) On the unexpected fact that in all of wide-flung
Syria, it was backward Palestine that had its first working
railway, cp. Hartmann (see bibliography), P• 561 ~

- \s--o ~)

after 1892 gradually ceased to be a total backwater.
Railways came in for an eve~ growing deal of contemporary
attention 1 that expressed itself not, as previously, in
incidental news items, and in the fanciful flights of
enthusiasts, but took shape in serious surveys, by qualified
observers, in reputable publications (2).

However, it

should also be mentioned that beside the railway projects

•

actually carried out during the two decades preceding the
Great War, there were also quite a number of utopian
schemes for the construction of railways that were never
carried out.

Compared with the dozens of fanciful. plans

that cropped up in the years to 1892, their number was
not at all smaller1 and they will also be noted in the
following pages.
Special mention amongst the sources must be made of
German-Jewish Zionist publications, that, from the turn
of the 20th century onward, showed quite a surprising

•

and continuous interest in the development of railways
in Palestine , and which will be frequently quoted.

The

(2) Palestine•s railways were dealt with, after 1892,
by the Palestine Exploration F'und Quarterly, the Geographical
Journal of the Royal Geographic Society, by at least one
British Parliamentary Report, the Asiatic Quarterly Review,
the Proceedings of the Central Asian Society, the"19th
Century and After.i (all British ), by the National Geographic
Magazine (American;, the Eisenbahn Archiv, Petermann•s
Geographische Mitte ilungen, and by the Zeitschrift des
Deutschen Palistin~ Vereins {all German), most of which
were checked and utilized for the purposes of this chapter,
as far as they were available. A few issues Qf the above
could not be viewed, though it is known that they carried
items referring to railways in Palestine . All the abovelisted sources were contemporary, except for a few that
summarized pre-1914 developments in the years 1915-1917.

\5\
~)

remarkable interest sh~wn by early Zionist reviews in the
railway affairs of the Holy Land (a fact never previously
commented upon) may have been based on the importance
of railways~ in Zionist eyes - as symbols of progress
in the ancient homeland.

In the absence of interesting

industrial developments in Palestine under Turkish rule,
news about the planning and building of railways seems

-

to have served as a substitute.
During the period that will be reviewed, 1692-1914,
four major railway projects were started in cis - and transJordanian Palestine, within the boundaries defined in
chapter

1)

r.

These were the following lines,

Yossef Navon's meter-gauge Jaffa-Jerusalem
railway, financed by French interests;

2)

The "British" Elias-Pilling-Hill standard-gauge
Haifa-Damascus railway;

J)

The French 1,050 mm. gauge "Hauran" line,
Damascus-Meierib;

4)

The Turkish, German-built, Hejaz Railway, DamascusDera•a-Ma'an-Mudawara ,t-Medinaj, with its four
branches:
a)

Dera•a-Samakh-Afule-Beled esh-Sheikh- Haifa;

b)

Afule-Jenin-Sileth ed-Dahr;

c)

Dera•a-Bosra eski-Sham;

d)

Beled esh-Sheikh-Acre (Akko).

- \ S-L
Of these four lines, three were actually completed,
namely nos. 1, J, 4.,

One, no. 2, the British-initiated

line Haifa-Damascus, ran into financial trouble immediately
after it started construction, and was abandoned.
• f the above lines, nos. 2 and

Two

J, have already been dealt

with~in the foregoing chapter, as their antecedents belong
to the years prior to 1892,

-

They will not be mentioned in

the following chapter, except when necessity arises.
The remaining two lines, the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway,
and the ' Hejaz Railway, will be dealt with in two stages,
First, in the general context of railway development and
planning in Palestine after 1892, and thereafter - in detail.
The many building schemes envisaged for Palestine between

1892 and 1914, but never executed, will also be reviewed
in the general context • f railway development in the
country up to the First World War,

-

Actual Railway Developments
Sometime in the middle 1880,' s Yossef Navon, the
young scion of a distinguished Jewish-Sepharadi family
in Jerusalem, conceived the idea of building a railway
from Jaffa to Jerusalem.

His name has already been

•l

fleetingly mentioned in the foregoing chapter. (J)

It

cannot now be established how far he was aware of earlier
schemes for a Jaffa-Jerusalem line, but since his business
partner for a time had been his relation, Haim Amzalag,
it might be assumed that he was.

This on account of the

fact that Amzalag had become British-Vice-Consul at Jaffa,
as successor of Assad Khayat, who, as set out in chapter I,
in 1848 had had a railway scheme of his own, and also had
dealings with Montefiore, at the time when the latter
had been involved with his own railway schemes. (4)

Navon

himself was full of grand schemes for the improvement of
Palestine's economy, and ~

a time also pondered a

harbor for Jaffa, just as had Zimpel some 20 y~ars before
him, who had envisaged combining such a harbor with a
railway to Jerusalem.
In order to further his railway scheme, Navon moved
to Constantinople and, after pulling the appropriate strings,
I

managed, in 1888, 1,- '.btaining a "Firman" (roughly - concession)
from the government, permitting him to build a line from
Jaffa to Jerusalem.
(J) Interesting details about Navon, his life and
ventures, will be found in Grunwald (cp. bibliography),
p . 249 passim. Grunwald also lists a considerable number
of sources regarding Navan, and apparently is the only writer
who has ever compiled an accurate biography of this interesting
son of Jerusalem. Additional details about Navon, and his
accomplishments, will be found further on in this chapter,
in the section devoted to the Jaffa-Jetiusalem Railway .

(4)

p. 381.

Cp. Grunwald, P• 250, and Ben Zwi (see bibliography)
Khayat was discussed in chapter II.

1)

His concession was to run for 71 years, and provided
for rail extensions to Gaza on the coast to the south-west,
and to Nablus in the north (5).

Aece rding to a reliable

contemporary German railway publication, Navon•s concession
included the right to build a branch line via"Ascalon"
(Majdal) to Gaza, and then to El Arish (6).
The papers of the British Consulate in Jerusalem

•

contain an elaboration of Navon's activities, and, incidentally,
provide a glimpse 0f yet another railway scheme, otherwise
unknown.

According t • a despatch from the then consul,

John Dickson, of late 1892, to the then Foreign ~ecretary
Lord Roseberry, Navon•s concession "originated with an
Egyptian, Lufty (should read~ Lutfyt) Bey, who wanted
to build a railway between Egypt and Palestine."

Navon

took up the idea, and ge t in touch with Lutfy1 and between
them they worked out the idea of Lutfy building a line,
along the coast, to El Arish, while Navon was to build

•

from there to Jaffa and Jerusalem (via Gaza).

Dickson

ended his despatch by noting that the original scheme
fell through, but that Navon secured a concession for
the Jaffa-Jerusalem line, with possible extensions -

(5) According to Avitsur (cp. bibliography), p. 86,
the late Mr. Y. Fogelson of Haifa, about 1963, still
kept a French translation of Navon's Firman. Owing to
Mr. Fogelson's death a few years ago, the writer was
unable to aseertain the present whereabouts of the translation. All details in the text are therefore based on
Grunwald.
(6)

Eisenba~n Archiv, 1893, P• 932.

lj

be it noted - not to Gaza and Nablus, but to Damascus and
Aleppo (7).

Here, then, was a revival of Zimpel's and

Oliphant•s direct north-to~south railway schemes, that
were to be raised yet again and again also in the future.
It is not quite clear whether, or when, Lutfy Bey gave
up his own plan entirely.

There is a reference to his

being active for a railway Ismailia-Katia (east of Kantara
on the Suez Ganal)-El Arish-Palestine, that dates frim

•

as late as 1891 (8).

*

h.o,..f

There is some room for speculation

Navon obtained his own concession for his internal

east to west line, destined to serve local Turkish
interests only, while, on the other hand, Lutfy's international, or even intercontinental, railway, north-to-west,
was left in abeyanc e.

Egypt had just a few years pre-

viously, in 1882, passed under British domination, and
it might be quite possible that the Turks at that particular
time were not anxious to grant a concession which would,
in war-time, provide their mighty neighbor with a facile
means of crossing the no-man's-land of the Sinai peninsula.
Other building plans, similar to Lutfy's, were to crop up

(7) See Hyamson (cp. bibliography), vol. II,
PP• 480-481, quoting despatch no. J61, dated November 11, 1892.
This was apparently written in connection with the inauguration
of the line to Jerusalem, late in September. Navon's
railway, and Lutfy Bey are also mentioned by Hartmann in
Z.D.P.V . , by Hecker, about 1913, and by Karkar in the
1960 1 s (cp. details in the bibliography).
(8) Prof. Dr. w. Guastalla in "Altneuland" (henceforth
she rtened to Alt.; cp. bibliography) 1905, }'•56. He
based himself on the "Bulletin de la Societe Khediviale
de Geographie du Caire," of 1891, which is not now available
for checking.

~)

in the future.

In the meantime, however, Navon's Jaffa-

Jerusalem railway was opened for traffic on September 26, 1892.
It will be described in detail later on.
Without attempting to repeat what has already been
described at the end of the foregoing chapter, it might
yet be usefully recapitulated here that 1 while Navon~s
line started operating late in 1892, construction of the
French Hauran railway, Damascus-Meserib was already
underway, having started in 1891.

Some three months

after Navon's line was opened, construction of the
"British" standard gauge line Haifa-Damascus also began.
Thus in 189J Palestine had one working line, with another
two building.

As already ne ted, the British-financed

line soon ran into financial trouble, to give up the
ghost entirely in 1898, after lengthy death throes.
But the Hauran line was actually completed, and by the
summer of 1894 Palestine, in its wider sense, had two
working railways.
Less than six years later, on May 1st, 1900, the
Sultan, Abdul Hamid II, published an "IradJ" (Imperial
Rescript), announcing his intention to build an all-Moslem
railway from Damascus to the Holy Cities in the Hejaz,
Medina and Mecca.

The new pilgrims-railway was to be

built entirely by Moslems (an aim speedily abandoned)
and financed entirely by Moslems (an object indeed ultimately
achieved).

The Sultan, in his capacity as the all-Moslem

-- 1 5"1-
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From Jaffa to Jerusalem
T he journey to J erusale':1 may be made eit her by train, in a carriage,
or on horseback. By tram 11 ta kes 3 hours and 50 minutes. b th
~arnage road 7 to _ 8 hours driving, and II to 12 hours riding. YBot~
Journeys are exceedingly interesting, by reason of the biblical associa tions
attached to the country through which one passes. We sh~IJ ·therefore
describe them both. Those who go from Jaffa to Jeru salem by the railroad w,_11 find they lose nothing by returning from Jerusalem to Jaffa
•
by carriage..

JOURNEY I
From Jaffa to Jerusalem by Rall
·54 miles. I tra in daily. L eaves Jaffa , from the 1st October 10 the
10th March_. ~I 1.20 P. M. ; from the 10th of March to the 7 th Oc,tober, a t
2 P.M. Rail\\a_y fare-1st Class, 70 piastres 20 paras=i5 francs : 2nd and
last Class, 25 piastres= 5 fra ncs 32 centimes. I
' ·

•

RAILWAY T!ME-TADLE.'

Dist.
Miles.

STATJONS.

- - - - - --- - - - - From
Jaffa.

From 1st Oct. to From 10th March
10th March.
to 1st Oct.

,...- ~ ~
Arrival. Depart. Arrival. Depart.

--Aft.

JAFFA•

Lydda .
Ramleh ~
Sedjed
Deir Aban •
Bittir .

Aft.
I 20
2
I

I 58
7

13
2 52

2

47 1·_

32 17

4 35

JERU SAL E M

5 10

--Aft.

Aft.

37

22 40

2

47

2

2

3 23
4 38

3 26
4 I
5 16 ·

-

5 50

Mng.

Af11g.

L --

2 53
3 36
4 5

5

18

Fro/!,
Jerusalem.
Ah,g.
-

JER US ALEM

7
22

30
40
42
54

Bi tt ir . . .
Dei r Aban . .
Sedjed
Ra mleh • . .
Lydda
j A FFA

8 25
9 30
9 59
10 36
10 49
II JO

88 28
9 36

Afng.
. 9

42

IO 18

!p

JO 52

IO 30
II 10

JO

10

2

j

7 40

8 5
9 9
9 42

8 7

f

IO

.9 44
23

;o~2

- - ---- ------ ~---- -'---~~--

On a n emergency one c;m go by the lui;g.11;e train-ge nerally mixedwhich leaves J affa from 6 to 7 o'clock in the morning.
.
.

.

I

p

.

·....
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..

Timetable of Navon ' s Jaffa- Jerusalem Railway , for about 1907 .
The attached map shows the original , 1892 , layout of t h e tra ck .
The section o f the line re- laid by the British in 1918 , and still
working to-day , is shown in red .
(Source:Meistermann , Guide , 1907) .

Pi ck , chapter III .
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Khalif aalled•. • ~ -, his co-religionists all over the world from Indonesia through India and Egypt to North Africa to contribute to the sacred enterprise.

His proposed

scheme met with considerable ridicule in the outside
world that - in view of the notorious Turkish sloth,
graft, and technological impotence - rightly doubted
the Ottoman Empire•s capabilities of undertaking a project
of such magnitude (9).

•

In fact, however, the line came

to be built,and at an extraordinary speed, considering
organizational and topographical difficulties, to reach
Medina in the autumn of 1908.

It came to be the only

tangible expression the Pan-Islamic idea ever achieved,
though the motives for its construction were mainly
the wish to further purely Turkish interests, and its
religious connotations were probably balanced (if not
e vershadowed) by its military, and to limited exte._t -

commercial, advantages for the Ottoman Empire.

The man

who actually carried out the vast undertaking in the field
was the German Heinrich August Meissner, who will be
frequently mentioned later on in this chapter.

(9) Hecker (cp. bibliography), P• 106J; Pa enicke,
p. 6. Also Ruppin, who gave the date of the Sultan's
Irad6 as January 1st, 1900. For a concise history of
the Hejaz Railway and its background, cp. the article
"Hijaz Railway" in the Encyclopaedia of Islam (see
bibliography).

\S-q
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The Turkish Hejaz Railway, and the various branches
it sprouted, ultimately came to be of great importance
for Palestine in the early 20th century, and also later.
The often-proposed Haifa-Damascus railway was eventually
incorpe rated in it.

The Hejaz line and its construction

will be exhaustively described later on.

In the general

context of the railway history of Palestine to 1914 it
came to overshadow significantly all other developments.

•

I ts gradual completion, its branches ., its achievements,
its setbacks, and its influence on the life of the country,
came to be of interest far beyond the boundaries Qf
Palestine pre per.

Proposed Railway Developments Never Carried Out
Apart from the major railway undertakings outlined
above, Palestine after 1892 also continued to have its
share of railway schemes, some ephemeral, some serious,

•

that were never carried out, or came to fruition only
after 1914.

Most, though not all, were the more or less

direct descendants of earlier schemes that had flitxed
through the annals of the country.

Most, though not all,

shared a common characteristic with earlier schemes since
1838.

Except for the few that utterly ignored the

physical configuration of the country, they proposed
layouts similar to the ones envisaged for their predecessors,
i.e. layouts roughly conforming to the country's ancient
system of roads, tracks and trails.

i)

Railway affairs and planning in Palestine about the
turn of the century were extensively referred to in a
reputable German Zionist publication dated 1902 (10).
JI

This periodical, "Palastina.'', after describing the pre bable
advantages that would accrue to northern Palestine from
the - as yet unbuilt - Haifa-Damascus line, mentioned the
necessity of prolonging, across central Palestine, the

-

already working Jaffa-Jerusalem railway via .. the oasis"
• f Jericho, unto the Transjordanian plateau, to Kerak.
Amman, at that time was still a village, and Kerak, one
of the biggest settlements in the lands across the Jordan.
At Kerak, according to this Zionist review ., the line
would have joined the envisaged Hejaz Railway, thus
providing a direct link with the Mediterranean.

This

proposed extension would have been sort of counterpart
to the more northerly Haifa-Dera'a branch of the Heja.z line.
In addition, the periodical also advocated another, third,
railway

b

across southern Palestine .

This would have led

from Gaza, on the coast, through Ma'an, to Kerak (invariably
spelled Korak or Horak), there to join the Hejaz Railway,
as yet only in its early stages.

In view of the forbidding

geographical features of the areas involved, these were
quite extraordinary speculations that probably were based
N

(10) Palastina (cp. bibliography; henceforth
shortened to Pal.), 1902, PP• 84-85. The details described,
as evidenced by the context, probably referred to 1901.

l,t_, ~ I
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only on abstract speculations in the mind of the writer,
whoever he was, who seems to have been ignorant of any
actual knowledge of the geography of Palestine, except
from what he could have learnt from a map.

No such

layouti'.' had ever been proposed before, or were ever suggested
after.

In case the Hejaz Railway was not to materialize,

a not unlikely possibility, the Zionist journal proposed
to prolong the line from Gaza, via Kerak, Medabah, and
es-Salt, to Meserib, there to link up with the already
existing French Hauran line to Damascus.

It was also

proposed to have a rail track from the Gaza terminus to
the seashore, or,failing this, a mono-rail between
town and shore.

This mono-rail proposal .was to remain

unique in the history of railway schemes in Palestine.
It almost certainly owed its conception to quite a famous
mono-rail line that had been put into operation in Germany
just about that time. (11)

Quite incidentally, the same

Zionist journal also mentioned a) a Gaza-Jerusalem
railway "planned by the Turkish government," and b) a
(Haifa-) Nablus~ (Jerusalem-) Hebron-Ismailia railway,
planned, allegedly, by "the British," whose building
however it was stated was still quite uncertain. (12)
(11) The reference is to the Wuppertal Monorail that
was still operating in Germany in 197A between Elber.feld
and Barmen. This line was originally opened on March 1st, 1901,
only a short time before the Gaza proposal came to be aired.
Cp. Hamilton Ellis (see bibliography), PP• 522-52J.
(12) For sources, see note 10. A railway across Sinai
was also mentioned by the Royal Geographical Journal, 1902, p. 506.

...

\'t)

Clearly, the journal's correspondent's imagination had
had a field day, but the very fact that all these fanciful
schemes were thought worthy of publication at that time
is of interest.

Possibly they even had some basis, as

they were printed about the time when another railway
scheme, of more reputable parentage, was abroad.
About 1901-1902, as far as could be established,

-

though details are uncertain, the famous British irrigation
expert, Sir William Willcocks, advocated a railway across
the Syrian Desert, from Baghdad to Damaseus, to link up
with any proposed lines in SyriawPalestine, and with a
terminus at Haifa.

Willcocks was a renowned engineer,

and though his scheme was not at all @riginal, having
been preceded by almost 40 years by the Sandwith scheme
mentioned in the foregoing chapter of this survey, his
very name may have given a fillip to Zionist railway speculations, such as the ones mentioned above, and others that
werf et to come (lJ).
(lJ) Willcogks was the builder of the original Assuan
Dam in Egypt;
cp. Webster (see bibli'->graphy) col. 1575.
Herzl mentioned him in his "Diaries" for March 1903. He
was also a friend of the Zionist agricultural expert,
Professer Otto Warburg; op. Entsiklopedia Ivrith (see
bibliography), vol. 16 1 col. 474. Wi.llcock~s scheme for a
railway from Mesapotamia to the Mediterranean is mentioned
in the Entsiklopedia Ivrith, vol. 6, col. 522, where it is
stated that the terminus was to have been Haifa. Here it is
also noted that his scheme was based on a plan ... otherwise
unknown - of Sir Moses Mentefiore, and his contemporary
H.B. Lynch (both of whom were mentioned in chapter II of
this survey). The approxil:)e.te date of Willcock•s plan,
and a reference to its allltsed intention to "outflank"
from the south the German-financed Baghdad Railway 1 initiated
about that time, will be f ound in Rohrbach (cp. bibliography),
pp. 23 ... 24. Willaock' s lin,e will be found also in the book
of Carpenter {cp. bibliography) ., published 1922, but written
before the First world War .

The year 190) saw the Zionist expedition to Sinai.
that set out from Kantara, and proceeded to El Arish along
the coastal track that the Austrian Archduke Leopold Salvata r
had already inspected from a railway point of view 24 years
earlier, as noted in the previous '1lapter (14).

About the

time the Zionist expedition was on its way 1 there seems
also to have been some British interest in a line from

-

Egypt to Palestine, as evidenced by an article in the
important journal "Engineering," that also published
an appropriate map (15).

In any case, in view of the

lack of goQd eommunications along the coast of northern
Sinai, it is quite certain that any Zionist plans for the
area of El-Arish, which was the only one suitable for
possible settlement, would never have been feasible
without a railway from Kantara, British or Jewish-financed.
Herzl, when visiting Egypt, mentioned his railway plans

(14) For Th. Herzl's Sinai project, and the investi~
gative expedition, see Patai {cp. bibliography), especially
p. 1.33.
(15) Cp. Pal., 1903/04, P• 218. Unfortunately the
relevant edition of "Engineering" could not be traced.
The same source, Pal., also mentioned an article by an
English Major Rycroft (also quoted elsewhere by Zionist
sources) who about that time advocated a railway from
Egypt to Palestine via El-Arish. Unfortunately, Rycroft•s
original article could not be traced either, as its origin
was not mentioned. Pal. itself saw a eonnection between
a British interest in a railway leading north from Egypt,
and the British agreement of 1899 with the Sheikh Gf Kuweit,
inferring from this that Britain wanted to have a means of
linking its sphere of influence around the Suez Canal
with its sphere of influenee at the head of the Persian
Gulf.

G-l. '\\\
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to Lord Gramer who, however, reacted cautiously. (16)
Zionist preoccupation with railways - practicable or not at this very early stage of the Herzlian movement was
very obvious.

El Arish, and the harbor they envisaged

there, were seen in Zionist eyes as a focal point of
rail-carried trade between Russia, Persia, Asia Minor,
Syria and Palestine, on the one hand, and Egypt, East
Africa, and South Africa (just occupied in toto by the
British following the Boer War) - on the other. (17)
Of course, making El Arish an international, rail-fed,
trade depot would hEVe postulated a railway from Syria
and Palestine on the one hand, and also a railway running
up the whole length of Africa, on the other (i.e. the
much-touted, but never completed, Gape-to-Cairo line).
But practical considerations do not seem to have much
inhibited the Zionist railway enthusiasts, as evidenced
fl

the statement in the journal, "Palastina," regarding a
railway to El Arish:

"The unlikely to-day no longer belongs

to the realm of the impossible&" (18)

A variation on the

theme of the railway from Palestine to Egypt carried a
line Jaffa-Gaza- El Arish not to a terminus at Kantara,
but to Ismailia. (19)

Nor did Jerusalem fail to be

(16) Herzl, at the meeting with Cre.mir, mentioned
"railways," in the plural. Cp. his "Tagebucher" ~PLLt i~ J
listed in the bibliography, vol. III, p. J84.
Jt~~
(17) Pal., 190J-04, P• 219. As early as September 21, 1898
Herzl, in his "Diaries" envisaged the building of a railway,
by Jews, from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf.
(18) Ibid; In the original German version, "Und zu
den unmo'glichkeiten za'.hlt das Unwahrscheinliche hettte nicht mehr!"
(19) Pal., 1903-04, P• 11.

,/
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included in yet other railway schemes.

The fledgling

Hejaz Railway was credited once more, as in 1901-02, with
an east-to-west branch, leading to the Holy City (20).
Also, a note on the completion of the French-Syrian
standard gauge Rayak-Hems-Hama railway (21), quite correctly
foresaw its extension to Aleppo ;

i t likewise envisioned

the further extension of this line te the south, a possibility that already had been meoted before, and was to

-

crop up many times more.

This southerly, standard gauge,

extension should have led from Rayak, via Rasheya, Hasbeya,
Nazareth 1 and Nablus 1 to Jerusalem (22).
In 1904 the Rayak-Jerusalem line, linking up at
Aleppo with the German-financed Baghdad Railway then under
construction, cropped up again {23)•

This was a scheme

that made seme sense, both geographically - as it led down
the construction-wise easy Rift Valley .. and also economically,
as it passed relatively populated and fertile country.

-

C.,...\-~~~. . . ~

However, unlike the Hejaz Railway, that J t I z::i?nrostly
wasteland, it would not have touched the politically
important chief town of Syria, Damascus, for which a
terminus at Jerusalem was no substitute.
(20}

In any case,

Ibid.

(21) Rayak, from which the standard line started in
1902, was a station of the 1,050 mm. gauge French railway
Beyrouth•Damascus, opened in 1895.
{22)

Fal., 1903~04, P• 239.

(23)

Alt., 1904, P• 25.

\ t)

nothing more was heard of the Rayak-Jerusalem scheme for
some years, though it was by no means dead.

The year

1904 as a whole seems to have been fairly barren of new
railway plans, probably because so much actual construction
work was going on in the eountry, from Haifa to Damascus,
and from Damascus to Ma•an and further on, that conditions
were not propitious for further insubstantial visions.
The sale, insignificant, exception was the idea of a
branch line, only a few kms. long, from the Jaffa-.Jerusalem
line at Ramle, to the grape-rich Jewish settlement of
Rishon le Tsion {24).

From the context of the note

mentioning this proposed line, it appears that the idea
did no,t originate with the railway cempany., but must have
been the brainchild of settlers who wanted an easy way
(there were no decent roads) to move export wines to the
port of Jaffa.

Geographlcally the idea was absurd, as it

would have involved a needlessly roundabout way to the

•

coast.

But, in a way, this branch was the forerunner

of the later Sarafand Camp line that was built by the
British in the 1920's and practically terminated on the
outskirts of Rishon.

The idea behind the proposal,

namely to facilitate Jewish agricultural exports, found
tangible expression 21 years later in the Jewish-initiated
"citrus railway" from Petah Tikvah to Rasr.1tel-.Ain.
(24)

Alt., 1904, P• 90.

Both

,,}

those branches, that were actually built, will be mentioned
in chapter

v.

The year 1904 may also have seen the first

proposal to build a branch line in Transjerdania from
I\A \u~

Ma• an to Akaba, •

ee,_~,£ ~
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but this scheme will be

further discussed in the section devoted to the building
of the Hejaz Railway.
In 1905, a Professor Dr.

•

w.

Guastalla summarized

railway developments in Palestine and adjoining areas
about that year for the readers of a Zionist journal~ (25).
Besides tracing then current developments, the author
referred to Lutfy Bey's efforts of about 1891 • already
·mentioned above - to have a railway Ismailia-Katia-El ArishPalestine, and expressed his conviction that a railway
fromnPort Said (be it noted, not from Ismailia or Kantara)
would be built in the not too distant future.

He then

referred to a railway scheme that, it seems 1 he assumed
his readers to be familiar with.

•

He noted that he saw

no chance of an early realization of a line from Akaba,

•

through the Et-Tih Desert of Central Sinai, to Egypt.
However, at the same time he said that he did not entirely
discount the possibility of such a railway being laid
down eventually, to join the Hejaz Mecca Railway across
Sinai with Egypt for the benefit of Moslem pilgrims .
Indeed, it should be noted that, had it ever been built,
this line would have had to be laid down practically right

(25)

Alt., 1905, P• 57•

on top of the age-old Derb el Haj, the Pilgrims• HighwaY,
that led across Sinai from Suez to the Hejaz.

Guastalla

said in his review that the two railways he discussed,
Egypt-Palestine, andA;k.aba-Egypt, had been mentioned
already in 1902 in the British "Statesman•s YearboG>k"426}.
The possible building of an Akaba-Suez line, which would
have implied a threat to the British hegemony in Egypt,

-

was to lead in 1906 to the Akaba Crisis between Britain
and Turkey, a development that will be referred to again.
In discussing railway possibilities in Sinai, Guasta1la
cited the noted French geographer Jean-Jacques Reolus,
who about 1885 had already predicted the importance of
rail transportation in the area.
Apart from the Akaba Crisis, the year 1906 was notable
for the revival of a railway building scheme first proposed
by Conder in the late 187o~s - as set forth in chapter II,
and also mentioned by Hartmann in 1894 (27).

This was

the line (Haifa-) Jenin-Nablus-Jerusalem, mentioned in
1906 as being the object of widespread "daily discussions'' (28).
This line would have branched off the - meanwhile aompleted -

(26) Unfortunately, the 1902 edition of the "Statesman's
Yearbook'' was not available to the writer for checking.
Another scholar who expressed his opinion that the building
of a trans-Central-Sinai railway was "inevitable," was
Prof. Martin. Ha~tmann, in his book "Die Mekka Bahn. •~
P• 29 (cp. bibliography).
(27)

Hartmann in z.n.P.v. (ep. bibliography), 1894, P• 64.

(28)

Alt., 1906, P• 51•

l~9
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Haifa-Damascus track at Afule.

However, while the

Haifa-Damascus link had been built by the Turkish government
itself, it was not at all clear whose idea the Jerusalem
extension was.

The news item that referred to this new

scheme also said that the proposal did not find favor in
"high places."

This on account of the fact that while the

Hejaz Railway,to which this new line would have belonged,
had been financed by world-wide MGslem dqnations, to
further the transport of pilgrims, the new line would
merely have eased the travels of Christian pilgrims
from the coast to Jerusalem.

There were two more references

to the proposed Jerusalem branch in 1906.

One was by

the outstanding scientist and "practical Zionist".(so called
because he did not belong to the visionary enthusiasts
with which the movement abounded), Prof. 0tto Warburg.
who deemed the proposed line of great importance (29).

The

other reference cropped up later in the year as a news

-

item, that was qualified by the remark, that though
important enough for the internal trade of Palestine, the
Jerusalem line was being fought "for religious reasons." (;3()) •

(29) Cp. Warburg in Alt., 1906, P• 112, where he
discussed Syria(£) as an area for economic development
and settlement ("Syrien als Wirtschafts ... und Kolonisationsgebiet" }.•
(JO)

Alt., 1906, P• 240.

.. \1 0 ...
This was not by any means the end of the line.

It was

finally started a few years later, to end up, however,
not in Jerusalem, but in Sinai during the first World War.
To 1906 also belonged an interesting general summary
of railway developments in the Levant area, including
Palestine, which appeared in "Altneuland," the Zionist
periodical that has already been copiously quoted, together
with its sister-publication "Pallstinaa •✓ in the notes
aeeompanying this survey (31).

From the context it appears

that the author was more than others familiar with his
subject.

This summary mentioned, once more, the possi-

bility of building an east~to-west line linking the French
rail terminus at Jerusalem, via Jericho, with the Turkish
Hejaz Railway at Amman.

However, the writer stressed the

great technical difficulties of building a track across
the deep Jerdan Rift Valley, and concluded that for the
time being such a project would not be feasible on account
• f the very heavy cost that12..might be involved.

This same

writer als• mentioned a contemporary scheme for a coastal
line, from Gaza to Iskanderun (Alexandretta in Gilicia,
and adjoining Anatolian Turkey proper), or "at least from
Gaza to Haifa, or BeyrCi>uth respectively" (J2A).

However,

(Jl) Alt., 1906, P• 112. There is reason to believe
that there was some connection between "Pallstina" and
"Altneuland," seeing that they appeared alternately for
various periods, but never at the same time. From the point
of view of centents and aims there was no difference
between them, and contributors seem to have been substantially identical.
(J2A)

Ibid.

j
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he regarded the building of the coastal railway, at that time
at least, as hopeless, on account of the opposition of the
Sultan~ who probably did not care to offer any prospective
invaders from the sea the benefits of a means for the
large scale transport of troops.

It might be assumed

that the memory of the French naval descent en the Levant
coast in 1860 was still fresh in Turkish memory (32B).

-

The off-hand remark of the writer, re&arding the refusal
• f the Turks to have a railway along the coast, may well
explain why such a railway (or railways) was never built
in the period 1892-1914, or after, to 19l8•

This, despite

the many proposals that were made, and despite the
reported authorization• at least twice• of such lines.
The a0tual facts however were that all the lines built
during the Turkish period, either ran inland like the
Hejaz Railway, Qr led frem the coast to the interior,
like the Jaffa-Jerusalem line, and the Haifa-Damascus
line (and in Syria the lines Beyrouth•Damascus, and
Tripoli~Mps).

Finally, it should be added that the

writer of the 1906 survey thought the scheme of the HaifaJerusalem extension, ment!oned earlier, both useful and
capable of early execution.

(J2B) Cp. Hitti, P• 695; Langer, P• 75s
P• 116 (all listed in the bibliography).

Glubb,

Despite the objections of the Turks to a line along
the coast - which anyhow never seem t0 have found public
expression~ the idea of a link between Palestine and
Egypt again seems to have been in the air, perhaps in
1907, perhaps the year .before.

This is evidenced in a

description of Palestine by an American traveller

(JJ).

He env~saged a harbGr at Haifa, where a breakwater-cum•

-

wharf had indeed already been built by Meissner Pasha for
the Hejaz line.

The American visitor also anticipated

the building of a line fr•m Haifa to Jaffa, or to a point
further inland on the French Jaffa-Jerusalem railway.
He also expected a coastal railway to be built to link
Gairo via Port Said with Jaffa, to c@ntinue from there to
Jerusalem and Damascus.

Unfortunately, it cannot now be

ascertained how far the schemes he mentioned were mere
repetitions of older plans, or whether they represented
original proposals.

-

But what he wrote was significant

as .to general trends.
1908 was notable for m0re railway plans.

Amongst

thjse were Meissner Pasha•s efforts to have the line

(Haifa-) Afule-Nablus-Jerusalem built.

These were abortive,

and will be further noted in connection with the Hejaz
Railway.

About the same time, Professor Martin Hartmann,

whose 1894 Z.D.P.v. survey of railways in "Middle Syria"

(JJ)

Dunning {cp. bibliography), PP• 8, 9, 265-266.

l.

Top:Probably one of the oldest surviving photos of Jerusalem station,
showing Navon's rolling stock . The locomotive on the turn-table,with
its kerosene-lit headlight,was built by Baldwin,Philadelphia.The
covered windows of the carriages probably denote compartments that
were reserved for ladies .The station building shown still stands
substantially to-day The Photo dates to about 1893.
(S01J.rce:Jerusalem r,:unicipal Archive)
Right:A goods train of the
meter gauge Navon railway to
Jerusalem winds its way up
through the Wadi Sarrar gorge
east of Deir Aban(Artuf).
Note telegraph poles,and
heavy stonework round culvert
Date-unknown.The locomotive
is one of the original 1892
Baldwins.

(Source:Imp.War Museum,London)

Pick,chapter III.
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has already been quoted, in a book on the "Mecea Railway"
incidentally stated his opini~n that the building of a
track from Palestine to Egypt was merely a question of
time (34).

There were other reports that probably referred

to developments in 1908, though owing to the delay in the
publication of periodicals, some were printed only in
early 1909.

One of them mentioned that a French-Turkish

consortium was trying to get a concession - which, the

•

report said, would deubtlessly be given - for a JOO kms •
long line Jaffa-Gaza-El Arish~Port Said

(JS). Another

item, also published ih early 1909, said that government
approval had already been given (presumably in 1908},
for a link Haifa-Saida (Sidon) - Beyrouth (J6).
item also noted that the project o~

The same

ine Haifa-Jaffa-

Alexandria (the last representing a departure from the
usual list of termini in Egypt), was "ready for approval."
Considering that nothing more was ever heard of all these

•

schemes, they can be safely consigned to the limbo that
had engulfed previous utopian plans.

In passing, it should

just be recorded that the last-mentioned item also included
the tidings that an Arab company was forming to provide
the tCJliln of Jaffa with electricity and also a tramway net (37).

(J4) Hartmann, "Die Mekka-Bahn," P• 29, already
quoted in note 26.
(35)

Pal., 1.909, P• 29.

(J6)

Pal., 1909, P• 14J.

(37)

Ibid. The writer responsible signed himself
lakeb Trachtenberg, Zurich.

- \7S- The line Haifa-Beyrouth, mentioned above, as belonging
either to 1908 or 1909, had :definitely already been
\.
~

remarked upon 'liiil 1908, in the same source, the journal
"PalJstina" (38).

At that time this journal carried the

news from Haifa that the Beyroutb Tramway company had
requested a concession for a "light railway" to be built
between Haifa and Beyrouth.

The intention was, the report

said, to carry passengers only.

•

A line like this - possibly

an electric trolley - would have made little economic
sense, but would have been cheaper to build than a conventional railway.

This particular report was perhaps .

more credible than others, seeing the Beyrouth tram company
had indeed been running~ rolley serviee, 19 kms. long,
towards the north 1via Jo~yeh to Ma•amiltein, ever since
line towards the south, via II l ( T )
H y-t'\~v
llilld Sidon (Said ,
uld not have been unthinkable,
1
1898 (39A}.

A

L~ ~

(and was indeed later concessioned (39B}.

•

A

scheme that can be, more or less definitely, dated

to 1908, was that of yet another railway across the desert

c.

to Mesopotamia.

Its originator was an Englishman,

E.

Drummond-Black.

He suggested, as had been done before, a

track from Port Said, across the Sinai Desert, to Ak.aba.

{38)

Pal., 1908, P• 222

(J9A)

Ruppin (cp. bibliography), P• 298.

(39B)

lmhoff, P• 266.

~-,..)

From there he wanted to continue. through Jauf, to Basra
on the Persian Gulf.

In view of the fact that this scheme

emerged just two years after the Sinai Boundary Dispute,
i.e. the Akaba Crisis, that erupted because the British
wanted to forestall building just such a trans-Sinai
railway by the Turks, it might be imagined that DrummondB~ack•s plan had few chances of realization.

•

No details

are known about this plan or its sponsor, except a note
in a study about the Syrian Desert, that could not be
followed up owing to circumstances (40).
The year 1909 could boast of a railway plan for
Palestine that 1for onee,originated with the Turks themselves, i.e. the government in Stambul.

The initiator

of the plan was the Ministry of Public Works, and its
roots went back to 1908.

Its background was the Young

Turkf"revolution 1 and their wish to carry out improvements

•

throughout the Ottoman Empire.

The main source for this

plan is the invaluable monograph of the Engineer Max Hecker,
a long-time and well-known resident of Palestine, who was an
expert on railways. and wrote only a very few years after

(40)

Phelps Grant (cp. bib.lk>graphy), P• 267.

• , ~ I t, i ·
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the event. (41)
While the Young Turks, after their rise to power in
1908, evinced little interest in the Hejaz Railway, which
had been the Sultan's pet scheme (as will be detailed further
on in this chapter), they developed quite grandiose railway
schemes for the rest of Turkey.

These schemes included one

railway in Palestine that was pa ~entially important indeed.
The reference is to a line from the rail junction at
Rayak in Syria (Lebanon), through Palestine 1 to El Arish,
at that time administered by the Anglo-Egyptian government.
It would have been some J85 kms. long.

According to

Hecker, this line was a top priority for the Turks in
early 1909, and was especially remarkable for the fact
that it was to have been of normal (1,4J5 mm. and not
1,050 mm. )gauge.

This was the gauge of the railway the

(41) Hecker (cp. bibliography), pp. 1067-1070.
Hecker is a prime source on railway developments in
Turkey in general prior to the First World War. He was
extraordinarily meticulous and detailed in his observations,
a good many of which were based on personal knowledge.
In Mandatory times, Hecker became a renowned architect in
Jerusalem. He died in a kibbutz in the 1960s.
Apart from Hecker and Woods, mentioned elsewhere
(cp. bibliography), there may be at least two other
sources as to the pre-war period. One is the dissertation
of Hermann Schmidt, "Das Eisenbagnwesen in der asiat111schen
TJ'rkei," of 1914. This was lost by the Jewish National
Library in Jerusalem, which had it. The other possible
source is Lean Dominian "Railroads in Turkey.,! which
was published in the Bulletin of the American Geographical
Society, vol. XLVII, now. 11-12 of 1915, and may have
contained relevant particulars, but was not available to
the writer.

./
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French had built from Aleppo via Homs to Rayak, whose
ce ntinuation to the south the proposed Turkish line would
have been.

The choice of the normal gauge by the Turks

would have been the exception in Palestine and clearly
showed up its potential military importance.

It would

have enabled troops to be transported direotly,, without
transshipment at Rayak, from Aleppo - linked by the German
Baghdad Railway with Anatolia - down to the borders of
Egypt.

Indeed this line, including the French-owned

section in Syria, would in fact have constituted a southerly
extension of the Baghdad Railway from Constantinople (42).
The strategic importanee of the line was stressed by the
fact that it ·was intended to build a great part of it
through the Jordan Rift Valley, to keep it as far away
as possible from the coast.

Tha military aspects of this

prop• sed line were so obvious as to be commented upon
by Rohrbach, a German nationalist writer, as late as 1911 (43}.
He pointed out that building the Rayak-El Arish line would
result in British"self-examination," (Selbstbesinnung),
in view of the possibility that the proposed line might
turn into a strategic factor ., in case "German-AustrianTurkish eooperation" might become necessary "in the
direction of Egypt."

T• · avoid any possible misunderstandings,

(42) Lynch (cp. bibliography) in the Asiatic Quarterly
Review, vol. 31, 1911, P• 232. Lynch said the line had
been marked "in red" on Turkish official maps, to stress
the urgency attached to its construction.
(43)

Rohrbach (cp. bibliography), PP• 26-27.

- \'L~ the author added that Germany was interested in the
existence of railways for two reasons,

one, to assure the

Turks "peace with honor," and the other, to have

•n-

(}.., ~W!.,

of

communications by means of which troops could be despatched
//

to Egypt "to ward off an English attack on Germany (l). •
The Rayak-Jerusalem-Egypt railway, which was in
several ways the successor of the lines proposed some
three decades earlier by Ludwig Salvator and Oliphant,
was never built, but the scheme itself was to crop up
again, before 1914, was ~

to be mentioned with slight

variations in the middle of the First World War, (44), and
even came to be revived in a way in the British mandatory
period. ( 45)
The years after 1908-09 also had their rail schemes,
which will be discussed below, but their numbers were few,
perhaps because of the unsettled state of the Ottoman
Empire that suffered from internal revolts, massacres,
and insurrections (also in Arabia) I and foreign war (in
Libya and the Balkans).

Also the actual construction of

lines, mostly branches of the government-spensored Hejaz

(44)

Cp. Woods, p. 54, and Ruppin, p. 309.

(45)

Cp. chapter V of this survey.

Railway, went on apace, a development that may have led
private entrepreneurs to become cautious for fear that the
authorities might not be anxious to grant concessions
to prospective competitors (such as the French Hauran
line 1 that in those years systematically tri&d to undercut
the vital Hejaz line).

Also, by 1908 the Qttoman Govern-

ment, by building the line to Medina, had proved to the

-

world, and to itself, that it was indeed capable of undertaking
railway construction on its own, and was thus less open
to grant concessions to foreign nationals, whose undertakings may have led to foreign• especially French pressures.

However, a few of the plans mooted in earlier

years may not have been entirely dead, and further versions
kept emerging up to the outbreak of the Great War.
One of the entirely new railway schemes that emerged
in Palestine prior to 1914 was that of a, some 40 kms.
long, line from Amman on the Hejaz trunk line to the
French phosphate cGncession area at es-Salt.

The con-

cession actually was never worked 1 and the rail track never
builtl 1 but the line continued to have a spooky existence
for several years.

Its existence was assumed by quite

serious observers, and it figured at least on two contemp0rary
maps (46).

This line was also the successor of the many,

(46) Imhoff, P• 266 (cp. bibliography), who wrote
on the German side, actually believed the ;;-;a1t line to be
extant in 1914. So did Woods, P• 53, on the British side.
He even showed an Amman-es Salt railway on one of his very
good and detailed maps, opposite P• 52, as did Imhoff,
opp. P• 266.

- \'1\ ..
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equally utopian, plans for a railway from Jerusalem to
Amman, and was even expressly described as being "the first
leg" of it.

However, the always reliable , Hecker, about

1913, already stated that the difficult line had not been
built, owing to doubts about its ability to pay for itself (47).
There was another pre-war scheme that deserves mention
on account of its quaintness, and because1 though it

-

concerned not a fully fledged railway, at least it involved
a local and suburban network.

In 1911 it was reported

from Jerusalem that a French company had asked to be
given a concession for building and operating electri•
tramways in Jerusalem {48).

Six lines were proposed,

1)

Jaffa Gate - Beth Lehem, an obviously suburban line;

2)

Jaffa Gate - to the municipal boundary, along Jaffa

Road to about the village of L~fta, on the Holy City's
western outskirts;

J)

Jaffa Gate~Mea Shearim quarter -

Sehneller's German Orphanage, in the north-western outskirts;

4)

Damaseus Gate - to the northern 0utskirts along Nablus

Road;

5)

The German Colony (on Beth Lehem Road) to the

Greek quarter at Katamon;
Rock.

6)

Uaffa Gate - Dome of the

The last line, it was noted in the report, would

(47) About the line being the first section of a
track to Jerusalem, cp. Woods, P• 53• On the line having
been given up, cp. Hecker, P• 107J.
(48)

Pal., 1911, P• 116.

have been sure to have encountered technical difficulties,
as it would have had to cross the Old Gity.

The fate of

this concession was that of the concession reported a
few years earlier for building a tramway at Jaffa nothing was heard of it again.
For 1912 the very reliable Hecker reported an agreement
between the Turkish Government and the Khedive of Egypt,
on the construction of a rail-link between Palestine and
Egypt, preliminary surveys for which had been entrusted to
a British company (49).

Very unfortunately, nothing more

seems to have become known about this scheme, which, in
any case, came to nothing.

Hecker also noted that the

French were "once agaih" (neuerdings wi.eder) agitating
in favor of a railway Rayak-Egypt, that had been proposed
by them earlier.

How far this French proposal may have

been identical with earlier proposals (recorded above as
French, Turkish, or with no known uparentage

11 )

to link the

Syrian network with the Nile, could not be established (49A).
Anyway, the general concept was not new, and nothing came
of it.

Here it might be added, anticipating somewhat, that

if the French could not have their own railway to the
south, they could at least sabotage another.

By May 191•

they had at least succeeded in pressuring the Turks into
(49) Hecker, P• 1075.
(49A) Gooch and Temperley (cp. bibliography) provide
interesting background details regarding French schemes,
and scheming, concerning railways in pre-1914 Palestine.
See vol. X, part 2, PP• 135, 136, 171, 182 and also index,
PP• 911, 914-16. Cp. also Stein, P• 49.

_,,

giving up construction of their own, long~anticipated,
railway, Haifa~Afule-Nablus-Jerusalem, of which more in
the section devoted to the Hejaz Railway (50).
One more nebulous scheme for a railway turned up in
a survey, for 1913, in the columns of the"Luah Ere-tsYisrael" of A.M. Luncz (.51).

Here it was reported that

"England"intended to build a railway

-

11

from the Harbour of

Said to Beer Sheba, and from there to India.

This railway

would have a branch to Hebron and to Jerusalem ~"• It is,
of course, impossible to verify what plan LUncz referred to,
but the fact that he mentioned the line at all may serve
as a pointer to the fact that railways at that time were
not outside the scope of public interest (52)
Finally, the German Lieutenant-General

c.

Imhoff,

in an article in 19151 summarized the Turkish rail network
as it was prior to the outbreak of the First World War.

-

He n<s>ted - apart from existing lines, substantially as they
were already listed at the beginning of this chapter three items referring to Palestine,

(50) Regarding the French hatchet work on the line
to Jerusalem, cp. Hecker, P• 1073-74.
(51)

~!z~u~e¾;.j~9~ ,~~!~ . ~'·

(52) Luncz, in his yearbook for 1914, P• 4, also
referred to the usefulness of railways to tourists in Palestine.
;:-;•-!T.:; j?' ~.--tt'):

1)

A French concession for a tramway to be built
in Jerusalem;

2)

A concession expressly designed to link Jerusalem
with the (French) railway network in Syria.
This covered the censtruetion of a track, 175 kms.
long as the crow flies, Jerusalem~Nablus-Nazareth
(En Nassira)--Mes erib;

-

J)

A concession intended to link Rayak, in Syria,
with either Ramleh or Lod on the (French} JaffaJerusalem line , with a possible extension to
El Arish and a later junction with the Egyptian
network about rsmailia.

Unfortunately, owing t • Imhoff's rather haphazard
formulation, it was not at all elear whether these concessions referred to 1914, or wh•ther they constituted
a re-hash of earlier reports of earlier developments which may be likely.

The Jerusalem tram concession was

mentioned by him with the 1892 Jaffa-Jerusalem line,
and may have been a garbled version of Yossef Navon•s
• riginal concession.

The Jerusalem-Mes erib seheme , bore

an uncanny resemblance to the, by then working or planned,
Turkish Jerusalem~Nablus~Afule-Beisan-Samakh-Mezerib line.
And the Rayak•Egypt preposal bore an obvious similarity
to earlier schemes, including the one mentioned by Hecker.
On the other hand, the details listed by Imhoff regarding
railways in other parts of the Ottoman Empire were remarkably

...
~~

exact, and thus the possibility still remains that he
did refer to new developments that took place in 1914.
Incidentally, lm his article , which ·appeared in the very
authoritative "Petermann• s Geographische Mi tteill.ngen.,- 1
0

Imhoff vouchsaY'ed the interesting item that just before
the War, on April 15,1914, France had reached an agreement
with the Ottoman Empire,, an agreement later, in June,

-

acceeded to by Britain and Germany, that settled the
question of railway construction within the Turkish dominions.
According to this agreement, France was to relinquish
its interests in the Baghdad Railway, in exchange for
Germany's consent not to claim railway concessions in
Syria (including, it may be assumed,
i.e. Palestine).

11

Southern Syria,"

The outbreak of war was to make this

agreement, which might bear further investigation, academic (SJ).
This concludes the 1 necessarily short preliminary
overall review of railways operating in Palestine 1892... 1914,
and of the abortive railways schemes in the same period.

(SJ} For all the above details see Imhoff, PP• 264-266.
The article was accompanied by an illuminating map.
Among his sources Imhoff included Schmidt (cp. note 41),
and an article on the military importance of the Turkish
railways by a Major K~bel, of the Royal Bavarian General
Staff, published 1913 in a German military periodical.
The writer tried in vain to obtain a copy of the article
through interlibrary exchange. No copies seem to have
survived in Germany.

The following pages will be devoted to a more detailed
description of the building , and significanee, of the
two most important lines in the country in that period,
namely, the Jaffa-Jerusalem line and the Hejaz Ra+lway
and its branches.
\

Both these lines have never before

been described in depth, though monographs dealing with
some of their aspeets have been published (54).

-

(54)

The original draft of this chapter also included
a detailed survey of two more railway lines, started and
respectively completed in Palestine in the period under
review. These were the Elias-Pilling•Hill Haifa-Damascus
line, and the French "Hauran Railway," Damaseus-Mecerib.
Both these lines were dealt with in general outlines
in chapter II. Qwing to limitations of time and space,
the details given there will have to suffiee. Some little
of the material excised from the present chapter will,
however, as far as relevant, be included when the building
of the Hejaz Railway is described.

- l ~1

"

The Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway
Background and Sources
As described in chapter II, the antecedents of the
Jaffa-Jerusalem railway ~ent back to 1838, or thereabouts,
to the time when the possibility of building the line
occurred to Sir Moses Montefiore.

In the five following

decades there were a good many additional schemes, most
of which never came alive, or died in their infancy.
Looking back, it becomes fairly clear why the time for
such a line had not been ripe.

As was noted in the previous

chapter, the line would not have enjoyed Turkish support,
as the Ottoman authorities were not anxious to see foreign
influences, particularly in Jerusalem, enhaneed by means
of a railway that would have facilitated easy communications,
secular and olerieal, with Europe.

Concessionaires would

have been foreign subjects, . apt to call on their governments
for support, a possibility that the Turks could not
contemplate with pleasure.
There were other reasons,too, for the fact that the
line was not built, amongst them that financial sup~t
in adequate amounts was not, when the test oame, available
either from British or French sources.

The Russians,

in any case, had other things to worry about in their
relations with the Turks in the decades following the
Crimean War of 1853.

Financial support from interests

-i..~J

representing the two western powers was presumably not
forthcoming because the Turks, unlike their later habi ts11
regarding railway projects elsewhere in their Empire,
«

refused to provide the proposed line with k• lometric
guarantees, or any similar incentives (55)•

They even

balked when Montefiore asked for some other gesture of
financial goodwill, as was detailed above.

Under the

circumstances, any railway to the Holy City would have
been a sure money-loser, as it could have depended for
its revenues only on pllgrims, and to a very limited
extent on transporting imports fQr a not very populous
area, and on no exports at all.

It was also not at all

clear how far a railway, whose outlays for construction
and upkeep would have been formidable, we uld have been
able to compete successfully with the mueh cheaper tradi"
tional means of transportation in the country~ camels for
goods, donkeys, mules, and horses (and later - after

-

1869 - carriages).

Owing to all these problems the line

Jaffa-Jerusalem remained a pipe-dream for many years, and
as late as 1894, two years after the line had been inaugurated,
a qualified observer noted that it had been the leastlikely-to-be-built railway in Syria C56).

(55) On Turkish financial privileges to foreign
railway undertakings in Anatolia and the Balkans, cp.
Karkar, PP• 136, 138, 139, 141.
(56)

Hartmann, in Z.D.P.v., 1894, p. 56.

Deir Aban(Artuf) station,with the train Jerusalem-Jaffa coming in.
Waiting for it are participants in a botanical excursion , headed by the
agronom Aron Aronson . Date , about 1910 )
(Source:Ha ' arets)

Right:Section of the , since
1918 , abandoned track of the
original 1892 line from Jaffa
to Jerusalem . The trees in the
background belong to the Ramle
(British)military cemetery . The
track is now a path . A 1892
culvert is still showing .
(Source: Pi ck)

Pick , chapter III .

The Jaffa.Jerusalem line was probably one of the
most-written-about railways in the world, its diminutive
length notwithstanding, and small wonder.

Pilgrims,

tourists and scholars - probably most overseas visitors
to Palestine, and not least amongst them Theodor Herzl used it, and described it, some in passing, and some more
fully (57).

-

To Jews, es,pecially, it symbolized progress

and closer links of the diaspora with the sacred sites.
Travellers, however, were by no means the only sources.
Most visitors used ! uidebooks on their journey, and no
guidebook, English, French er German, from the 189o•s
onward, lacked details, including descriptions, lists of
stations, timetables and prices, pertaining to the train
ride to Jerusalem (58).

Thus contemporary guidebooks

are most useful when trying to visualize the line.

The

Jerusalem railway was also mentioned in periodicals,
Zionist or specializing in orientalia, which, on their

-

part, often quoted news items published in the general
press.

At least one British Parliamentary Paper also

dealt with the line (59).

Relatively numerous references

(57) No effort will be made here to list all the
travellers who went by rail to Jerusalem. Apart from the
founder • f Zionism, Th. Herzl, the Kaiser, Wilhelm II,
in 1898, was the most distinguished amongst them. Listing
them all would require a separate, extensive, bibliography.
(58) Cp. Baedekets guides, in both German and
,
English editions, Cook's --(ravel i uides, ... Meistermanl,s
excellent French handboo~, etc.
(59) Parliamentary Paper no. 288, of May 1893 (cp.
bibliography). A aopy of this paper was catalogued by
the library of the "Technion" in Haifa, and was seen
perfunctorily by the writer in 1972. When he tried to
xerox it on anotherf occasion it had disappeared.

\~\ to the line can also be culled from the contemporary
general Jewish press, both local and European.

There

likewise must have been mention of the line in geographical
publications of that time, and in technical journals,
though, with one exception, none were available for
checking.

Monographs, arti-=1.es 1 and books dealing with

the economy of Palestine )} invariably mentioned the line 1
and so did some reminiscences of local residents.

•

The

line was also documented by contempoary photographs ,
that can be found, usually quite incidentally,in travelogues,
reminiscences, and even on postcards.

Maps, in guidebooks,

and specialized publications, and also aeneral maps,
provide valuable pointers as to the layout of the line
in the field, and as to the changes that occurred in the
track as time passed (60).

•

All in all, it might be said that quite a surprising
//

.

.

.

number of II genera1 descriptions are available of the
Jaffa-Jerusalem line, this despite the fact that, in terms
of European or American railways, it was, after all, a
most insignificant venture, E>wing its importance only to
the context in which it was built and operated.

(60) For instance, a map by Conrad Schick (mentioned
as an expert on Palestine in the previous chapter) in the
Z.B.P.V. for 189J, and one in the 1907 guide by AbbeMeisterman.,1
provided clues as to the original track of the J.ine ., Gl,bout
Ramle and Lod, and also as to the, still existing 11892
Lod station, before changes were made in the rail trace
by the British in 1918.

I

On the other hand, really thorough and detailed
descriptions of the line, or of some of its aspects, have
been remarkably few.

An early account of it, of 1896,

was published by Guivet.

Many particulars were given by

Hecker shortly before the First World War, but unfortunately
he did not write a continuous narrative, his valuable
observations being interwoven in the framework of a
general description of Turkish railways.

In recent times,

Avitsur also dealt extensively with! the subject (in Hebrew),
but again only within a general survey of railways in the
Holy Land, and unfortunately not quoting sources.

Far and

wide the best researched recent monograph on the Jerusalem
line is the one written by Grunwald.

However, he saw this

first railway in Palestine mainly in terms of the personality
of its initiator, Yossef Navon, omitting practically all
geographical and technical details.

In the following

pages an attempt will be made to assemble a .Ll l the known
facts about the Jerusalem line, including data that have
not been utilized before.
Navon:

His Background and his Goncession

As has already been recorded above, the name of the
man who was to enter history as the innovator who built
the first railway in the Holy Land was Yossef (Yousso u"6 Navon.
Some perfunctory details about Navon•s life have been
noted at the beginning of this chapter.

At the risk of

...

"i)

some repetition, his antecedents will now be outlintd
more fully.

Fortunately, Navon's story is pretty well

documented, and even his photo survives (61).
Navon belonged to a distinguished Jewish-Sepharadi
(Spanish) family that settled after 1492 {the year of the
expulsion of the Jews from Spain), in Turkey, at Adrianople 1
and in Constantinople.

The family became very rich.

It produced many scholars and important rabbis, both in
Turkey, and in Palestine, where a branch of the family
had later settled.

Navon•s maternal uncle was Haim Amzalag

who, as British Vice-Consul in Jaffa, played an important
role in the Jewish community in Palestine and also - as
noted above - came in close contact with Sir Moses Montefiore
when he visited the country.

Yossef Navon himself, born

in Jerusalem in 1858 (62), was educated in France.

On

returning home he became, at a very early age, a partner
in the, at the time s very well-known, Jerusalem banking firm
of the Swiss, Jakob Frutiger.

Being possessed, apparently,

of considerable drive and business asumen, and having
good connections with both the Ottoman authorities and
with all sections of the local population, he quickly

{61) Grunwald (cp. bibliograph7) 1 p. 249 passim,
has a very good biography of Navon which has been drawn
upon here. Grunwald also has a very good bibliography.
A photo of Navon in full regalia as a Turkish .. Beytt,
Wea~ing a fez, a sword, and some five assorted decorations,
appeared in September 1968 in an article on the 76th
anniversary of the Jerusalem line in the Israeli "Ha'' arets."
The writer was s. Shvah, who is an expert on Palestine
of the 19th century (cp. bibliography).
(62) Navon died in Paris in 19J4. He left Jerusalem
in 1894, and never returned. Gp, also note 146.

~~)

amassed means of his own.
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..

He also became active in

communal affairs together with his uncle, Amzalag, and
is said to have been instrumental in the purchase of lands
for the first Jewish settlements in Palestine, Petah~Tikvah
and Rishon le Tsion.

He was reported to have shown

considerable diplomatic agility in his negotiations.
Navon also bought lands around Jerusalem in order to
establish Jewish suburbs, and at some time or other
seems to have eonsidered plans for water supply and electricity
installations, plantations, and also a harbor at Jaffa.
It is reasonable to assume that a man of this calibre and
vision must have been familiar with Montefiore•s railway
plans (that surely drew attention in the country1 seeing
that they extended through many years), and also with
other abortive sehemes, such as Chesney•s and Zimpel's.
Sometime after 1885 he decided to pursue railway plans of
his own, and began to work towards obtaining a concession

-

for a railway.

The fact that, unlike his predecessors,

he was an Ottoman subject, gave him an advantage the
others had not possessed.

In due course he m~ved to what

may be termed the "fount;' of concessions,.." the capital,
I

Gonstantinople, to further his plans (63).

After efforts

lasting some three years.,, and,, no d• u'bi;, considerable
expense, Navon finally received his ''Firman," on October 28, 1888.

(6J)

Grunwald, P• 251.

\. ~c(' ..
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It was the latest of several earlier concessions for a line
Jaffa-Jerusalem1 following the ones granted to Forbes,
the French, Erlanger, and possibly others, all of which
were discussed in chapter II.

All the others had lapsed

on account of lack of support and money.
be seen if the

It remained to

JO years old entrepreneur would do better (64).

a-

c..,~~~~~

The details of Navon• s Jisz;

-

are known in general

outlines, and, as mentioned (in a note), a copy in French
was available until recently.

It was to run for 71 years,

i.e. to 1959, and, according to the most reliable sources,
gave Navon the option to build branch lines to Gaza
(probably by way of Bethlehem) and to Nablus 1 within four
years.

According to another source, British, and normally

impeccable, Navon received the option of building a line
through Damascus as far as Aleppo.

This second version

is however highly unlikely, in view of the French presence
in Syria~ but it should be mentioned (65).

The line to

Nablus would have run on top of the ancient highway
along the main Judaean-Ephraimite mountain ridge.

But

there is no indication of the prospective track to Gaza,
(64)

Avitsur CTevah Va'arets) P• 86;

Grunwald, p. 249.

(65)

The sources mentioning the Gaza/Nablus options
Avitsur, "70 Years" (Hebrew) P• 6, and id. (Tevah
va•arets) p. 86; Eisenbahn Archiv, 1893, P• 9Ja;
Grunwald, p. 251; Hecker (who was an expert local resident
and closest to events in terms of time) P• 797; Issawi
(cp. bibliography; he quoted Hecker) P• 251; and Karkar,
PP• 117, 137•
~I.<--
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The source mentioning Navon•s Damascus/Aleppo option
Hyamson (quoting British consular despatches from
Jerusalem), II, pp. 480- 81.

wasz

though a German source claimed that it would have run
through Ascalon (i.e. Majdal) (66).

The branches to

Gaza and Nablus never came near implementation (67).
Whatever intentions Navon ever had of integrating his
concession with the then current plans for a PalestineEgypt Railway (mentioned at the end of chapter II, and
at the beginiing of this chapter), also came to naught.

-

He had paid the sum of 5,000 Turkish Pounds to the
Ottoman authorities, as a deposit towards the building
of the Jaffa-Jerusalem line.

He now had to succeed where

all others, including Montefiore, had failed, namely in
building his railway.

Navon•s Financial Manoeuvres, and his Company's Final Shape
It was clearly beyond the power of a single concessionaire
to finance the building of a railway line in a primitive

-

country, into which everything had to be imported from
overseas at high cost, from engineers to the last rail bolt.
Therefore Navon set out to find financiers.

Indeed, there

is no reason to assume that he ever wanted to build the
line solely by himself, or even that he wanted te keep
control over it.

(66)
(67)

There are several different accounts

Eisenbahn Archiv, 1893, P• 932.
Professor Karkar who, as a native of Jerusalem ,
should have known better, in his book (cp. bibliography)
wrongly assumes that the two branches were built to 1892.
Cp. PP• 117, 137• He also gives the duration of the
concession, on P• 137, as 79, instead ofJ 71 years.

as to how he proceeded.

However, the main trends of

events are clear, though details may be open to corrections.
According to the most reliable source on this particular
stage of developments, Navon, having been unable to
raise enough local resources (which was not
tried his fortune in Europe (68).

surprising),

The Jewish banker

• hroder,
u
•
Gerson B1 eic
acting
on behal f of the Deutsche

•

Bank in Berlin, which later financed the Baghdad Railway

(69), according to Grunwald , offered to buy the concession •
An English group is said to have offered 80,000 Pounds
Sterlin8 for it, and Messers Samuel Montagu and Arthur Cohen, ·~
ba1nkers ~ (70)1 are said to have promised Navon to advance
all the funds necessary for construction, at S%, to
enable him to remain in sole control of the concession.
In this connection it should be recalled that in chapter II
it was noted that the same Montagu had visited Palestine
in the 1880's and at that time had evinced some interest

•

in a railway to Jerusalem (71).

However, all this came to

nothing, and Navon ended up by r.nmlisting French.... gentileibterests in building his line.

This development, which

resulted in giving the French a - relatively - important

(68) Grunwald, p. 251. The following details
in the text have been taken from here.
(69) Karkar, P• 120.
(70) Op. Dictionary of {British) National Biography,
supplementary, 19J0, PP• J8 and 118.
(71)
P• 5•

Apart from chapter II, cp. also Avitsur ("70 Years"),

additional foothold in Palestine, was not without its
good reasons.~

rench, about the end of the 19th century,

were more than ever interested in extending their influenee
in the Ottoman Empire, and railways were~ goodly and
tried means for this purpose (72).

~

Also, Navon had French

education and a French cultural background, apparently
admired everything French, and probably just wanted to

•

reserve the business for France.

At some stage of pro-

ceedings he was also promised the L~gion d'Honneur, which
he was later granted, for services to Erance in the Levant (73).
From one of the various available, and often contradictory,
accounts it appears - though details may be subjeet"i>
revision - that in 1889, one year after being granted his
concession, Navon formed the "Societe Ottomane de chemin;'
de-fer de Jaffa 'a Jerusalem
et prolongements," with a
registered share capital of 4 million Francs {= 160,000
Pounds Sterling) (74).

•

The shareholders of the company,

according to the same source, were Navon himself, his

(72) Karkar, P• 113 passim, on French railway
acti-cities in Turkey.
(73) Grunwald, P• 250~251. As already mentioned in
note 62, Navon went to live in Paris. As a resident of
Paris, he was mentioned twice in Herzl's "Diaries," for
1901; once on March . 21, where Navon is characterized as
the "seller of shares" in the Jerusalem railway, and
once on June 13, where he is mercilessly described as an
"oriental Jew with the face of a bird of prey," and a
"slinking rascal."
(74) Grunwald, P• 251-252; Karkar, P• 137, gives
the foundation date as 29.12.1889. The company may later
have changed its name to "Sooiete Ottomane des cheminsde-fer de la Palestine" - an interesting name, possibly
indicating plans for expansion. Issawi, Hecker, and
Ruppin knew it as the "SocieteOttomane de chemin-de-fer
de Jaffa~ Jerusalem," i.e. without the reference to
"prolongements•"

previously mentioned banking partner in Jerusalem, the
Swiss Frutiger, and Messers Thomas Berger and Gaston
Auloyneau of the Banque Ottomane, who were representing
the French interests in the company that were to become
dominant in it to the apparent eventual exclusion of all
others (75).

,

According to Hecker, who wrote about 1912/13,

the "Societe" was founded in December 1889, in Paris, by a
M. Collas.

It might be noted that the same Gollas had

tried1 as early as about 1880 1 to obtain a concession from
the Turks for building a railway to Baghdad (76).

Leaving

aside the moot point of whether the original company had
been founded by Navon himself with French participation,
or whether it had been founded by M. Collas as a purely
French enterprise, the fact was that Navon sold his
concession to the company - that is, possibly, to himself.
The amount he was paid by the company was one million
Francs (•40,000 Pounds Sterling), which probably was not
excessive recompense for all the expenses, probably
including bribes, he had incurred during the years spent
at Constantinople, trying to obtain his firman (77).

(75) Ruppin, p. J08, who was an expert observer
on the spot, though some years later, said the company
was founded by French capitalists in Paris. Hecker,
p. 1081, who had the same qualifications as had Ruppin,
and was also writing some years after the events, claimed
that the directorate of the company was located at Jaffa,
but that the seat of the company was Paris. This may, of
course, have reflected later developments. In any case,
French influence seems to have been very strong from the
beginning.
(76) Wolf (cp. bibliography), P• 12.
(77)

Eisenbahn Archiv, 1893, P• 931;

Grunwald, P• 251.
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Carrying out the construction work was entrusted to the
French ''Societe' des travaux," against payment of 10 million
Francs, of which direct building costs were to amount to
8.5 million Francs, the remainder, presumably to be spent
on rolling stock, equipment and incidentals.

The same

company that was to build the line, simultaneously or later,
also acquired the right to run it, against a yearly lease

-

of 600,000 Francs (78).

I

The railway company•s share

capital, which was, as noted above, 4 million Francs,
did not, of course, suffice to cover construction costs.
Therefore debenture bonds to the amount of 9 million
Francs were issued (79).

According to another source,

debentures, originally planned to the amount of 20 million
Francs, were later reduced to ·an issue of 10 millions.
The idea was to allot

5% of the anticipated net earnings

towards the payment of the shares, with 95% of earnings

-

(78) Eisenbahn Archiv, 189J,pp. 9Jt~J2. Grunwald,
p. 251, quotes the name of the company as "Societe des
travaqx~j>ublics." Hecker , P• 797, has the name as
"Societe des travaux publics et constructions," under
the direction of the Swiss Eberhard. However, as one can
learn from the Encyclopedie Larousse (1960 edition),
/
another important engineer was the French-Alsatian Rene
Koechlin (cp. entry under his name). Cuivet, P• 605,passim,
described the work of construction and stressed that it was
carried out by a French company, mentioning no names.
(79)

Eisenbahn Archiv, 189J, P• 9J2.

- "Lo
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earmarked for the payment of debentures (80).

In connection

with the debenture::d ssue it should be remarked that according
to a reliable source, namely Grunwald, they were issued
at an advanced stage of the construction work, when cash
was becoming scarce (81).

French eatholic circles had

meanwhile become interested in the line - another intrusion
of religion into railway activities, the likes of which
have already been dealt with in the previous chapter.
These circles~

e remarked on the fact that the line,

then under construction, had no Turkish kilometric guarantee,
which would have made the buying of debentures an unattractive
proposition to the general public.

Since these Catholic

circles were interested in furthering Catholic pilgrimages
to the Holy Land, and in increasing French influence
generally, they therefore invested ,.75 million Francs
in the line's debentures, in order to enable it to be
completed (82).

-

Despite the slight discrepancy in the

amounts mentioned, the debentures bought by the - unfortunately
not further identified Catholics - seem to have been the
9 or 10 million Francs debentures mentioned earlier.

The

(80) Ruppin, p. JOB. Hecker, p. 1311, gives the
initial total capital invested as 9.85 million :francs.
Karkar, p. lJJ, for 1911, some twenty years after the line
had been built, gave the following figures in Turkish
Pounds, Shares - 160,000; debentures - J94,000, total554,ooo. This would be the equivalent of some 14 million
Francs. For his figures he cites Mears (cp. bibliography),
For comparison: Hecker, p. 1084, gave total investments
in the line about 1912-lJ, as 14,850,000 Francs.
(81)

Grunwald, P• 252.

(82)

Ibid • •

~~)

purchase of these debentures probably finally put control
of the Jerusalem railway into Franch - and clerical hands.

Avitsur, in discussing the line, also mentions

that the contemporary Jewish Jerusalem press remarked
that the local French clergy had invested their private
savings in Navon•s venture (8J).

However, Jews were

apparently not forgotten, at least on the local financial
,-,

level, as the veteran banking hout9 es of Chelouche and
Valero acted as the agents of the line on the Jaffa end,
and the Jerusalem end, respectively (84).

The Line to Jerusalem in Outlines

The Choice of Routes

Work on the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway started in
the spring of 1890, the first spadeful of earth being
cut with great ceremony, though in driving rain, at a
spot somewhere near Mikveh Yisrael and Yazour, a few
kms. outside Jaffa.
April 1st (85).

(8J)
P• 86.
(84)

The date was either March Jlst or

Work proceeded fairly rapidly, at first.

Avitsur ("70 Years") P• 6;

id. (Tevah ·va•arets),
I

Shvah, P• 16.

(85) Grunwald, p. 251, states that work was begun
in August 1889, an unlikely date as the railway holding
company itself was only organized towards the end of the
year. Most other sources mentioned March Jl, 1890.
Hecker, P• 797, gave the date as April 1st, probably
because he was a stickler for details, of German origin,
and work may have actually begun the day after the ceremony.
Practically all sources agree as to the spot where work
was started, near Mikveh Yisrael and Yazour (today's Azar).
Some sources stated the spot was 4 kms. distant from
Jaffa, which is an error by 2-J kms.

'~)

Twenty-three kms. of the line, to Ramle, were completed
by April 1891, one year after wor,k had been initiated.
By December 4th, 1891, the line had reached Km. 46,
a short distance we&t of Artuf.

After the railway company

had received the above-mentioned monetary infusion,
building was resumed.

The line was offieially opened

at Jerusalem station on September 26, 1892, after a
building time of some
•f

JO months.

The building stages

the line have been summarized by Hecker (86).
The line had seven stations (87)1

Name of Station,

Distance,
(Kms.)

Hei~ht above Sea-Level,
(Meters)

-

1)

Jaffa

2)

Lod

19.1

54

J)

Ramle

22.6

95

4)

Sejed

39.5

183

5)

Deir Aban (Artuf)

50.3

270

75.9

576

86.6

747

,.,,

6) ·Bittir
7)

Jerusalem
✓

4

ll

The #Societe des travaux publics and its heads, the
Swiss Eberhard and the Frenchman Koeehlin (88) had before
them at least three possible 't racks by which they could
(86)

Hecker, P• 1077.

(87)

Cp. Guivet, P• 606, and Hecker, P• 1311.

{88)

See above, note 78.
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reach Jerusalem from Jaffa.

While there is no documentary

evidence to illuminate the reasons that led the planners
of the line to build along the route they eventually
chose, their motives ( were fairly clear, and will be
discussed below.

As for the line itself, as actually

built, details will also be summarized below.
The three possible routes the builders could choose
from weres

a)

The northernmost track 1 from Jaffa to Lod ,

and thence towards the south-east, up the "Ascent of
Beth Haran" ,Beit Ur in Arabic), and then into Jerusalem
from the north.

This was the shortest route that had

been explored in the 1850's by McNeill, Montefiore an~
Galloway;

b)

The central traok 1starting out, again,

from Jaffa to Lod, then turning south-south-east to Ramle,
and from there going into the hills through the Wadi
Sarrar (Nahal Sorek) and its tributaries, past Bittir,
to reach Jerusalem from the south-west.
layout advocated by &impel in the 1860's;

This was the
c)

The

southernmost track, again,·,~', leading from Jaffa to Lod,
and then past Ramle, to gain the western entry to the
Wadi es-Sant (Emek Ha 1 elah), then to climb east into the
hills towards Bethlehem, finally to reach Jerusalem from
the south.

This was the route explored in the 1850's

by Chesney (89).
Judging from what is known of Navon's (or Colas's)
company, and the financial difficulties that accompanied it
•

The three routes to Jerusalem, and their
sponsors, were discussed at length in chapter II, above.
(89)

- 1-o -;--

•~
Top:General view of Jaffa,with Navon's station and rail yard in
the bottom right hand corner . The photo was taken during World far I,
when the line to Lod had been taken up . Hence the desolate aspect of
the station(and of the roadstead) .
(Source:Dalmann,100 Flieeerbilder)

Right:
Jaffa station and
train to Lod and
Jerusalem.Photo
dating to 1893.

(Source:Vilnay/
Album du Terre
Sainte)

Pick,chapter III .

/

throughout, cheapness in the construction of the proposed
line must have been of paramount interest.

Thus the

route through the Wadi Sant must have ruled itself out
trom the beginning, on account of the considerable southerly
detour it would have involved.
other routes.

There remained the two

Of these, the northerly one, though the

shortest by far, probably less than 70 ims., involved
climbing the vary short, but very steep, ascent of

•

Beth Haran, or a parallel, but equally difficult, trace •
This wol.¼d have necessitated a great deal of artificial
structures to carry the line by means of loops, bridges,
and possibly tunnels, tmp the sudden difference in height
between the plain and the top of the Judaean hills (90).
Building these structures probably would have exceeded the,
in any case. 1 limitect. means of the company.

Also, seeing

that building a cheap, narrow gauge, colonial-type, railway
had probably been decided upon - no standard-gauge railway

•

was ever mentioned in the sources even as a possibility there must have been grave doubts whether a small narrow
gauge locomotive of necessarily limited power could ever
have pulled a reasonable pay load, goods and passengers,
up the steep incline.

Also, the country east of Lod,

(90) As noted in the previous chapter, Schick, in
the 186o•s, had already commented (in Petermann•s Geo~
graphische Mitteilungen, 1867, PP• 124-129), on the many
structures that would be needed to carry a railway past
Beth Horon.

-
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which the line would have traversed, was notoriously arfdi ....
to this day practically no major settlements are to be
found in it - and the absence of water resources likewise
may have militated against the northern track.

The Final Route:

Progress of Construction

Thus, as it turned out, the route actually chosen

•

was the central one, by way of the Wadi Sarrar - a vindication
of the, in his day 1 much ridic~led, Zimpel.

This trace,

though more circuitous and longer than the Beth Horon
track, had a relatively easy climb into the hills, suitable
also for narrow-gauge traction, needed only relatively
few and simple artiticial structures, and therefore was
as cheap as .could be had.

It also had adequate water

resources all the way, and even in the hills (91).

The

distance, as the crow flies, between Jaffa and Jerusalem

•

was 65 kms. or thereabouts.

The trace of the new railway

between the two towns, on the other hand, was almost 87 kms.
long.

The long detour ~pparently paid for itself by the

cheapness of building the track.

Whether, or how far,

the company building the track used the layout prepared
by Dr. Zimpel is not known.
(91) Springs, ranging in flow from copious to
adequate, were available along the track to Jerusalem at
. Wadi Sarrar, Sejed, Artuf, Deir esh-Sheikh and Bittir,
all of them stations built during the various stages of
the line's operations after 1892.

The track of the new line was described as early as
October 1892 by Schick (92), who also had a map attached
to his survey.

From this, and also from later maps, it

can be learnt that the original layout of the line differed
in some respects from its later course.

The terminus of

the line at Jaffa - which was still in existence in a
derelict state until a few years ago, was situated some
500 meters north-east of the center of the town as it then

•

was, about halfway between the "German (Templar) Golony"
and the seashore.

There seems to have been . an intention

originally to start the line from a jetty built into the
sea, north of Jaffa, and to lead it from there, straight
east, through the village of Abµ Kebir (9J).

This plan

may have been abandoned because it was not feasible, or
too costly, to lay the track right across the village,
and the many surrounding orange groves.

The unQer~ainty

as to where it might be possible to lay the track in the

•

immediate vicinity of Jaffa may have been the reason
for the start of the work, in the spring of 1890, further
east, about Mikveh Yisrael/Yazour - as noted.

In the end,

the line was carried, in a big semi-circle, round the
orange plantations, and only a short distance away from
(92) Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly, 1893,
pp. 20-23. Meistermani s Palestine Guide of 1907 also has
a good map of the Jerusalem railway.
0.,\-!.,
A
.
.
The proposed 1 ine,
and t h e Jetty,
lllill shown n o..,~
Baedeker's guide, 1891 edition, facing P• 13.

(9 J )

I
~

Montefiore's greve, that some 35 years earlier had been
considered the site of a potential railway station.
The trace followed by the railway since 1890 remained
substantially unaltered until 1948, when the track between
Jaffa and Tel Aviv, that had meanwhile grown up, was
taken up.

Infant Tel Aviv grew up, after 1909, right

next to the rails of the Jerusalem line.

Its first street,

Herzl Street, crossed the railway1 and the daily passage

•

of the trains provided one of the few entertainments
vouchsafed the inhabitants of the first all~Jewish city.
Ruppin, in his memoirs, said that a special train once,
in 1912, stopped beside his home ., near the German Colony,
in order to carry his desperately sick wife to Jerusalem (94).
The old right-of-way of the line inside Tel Aviv, including
a deep cutting and a bridge next to the former German
Colony, is still shown on all maps.
The biggest changes in the original layout of the
Jerusalem line were made by the British early in 1918,
between the approaches to Lod and those to Ramle.

They

will be described in chapter IV, and will be remarked
upon here only fleetingly.

They have not been described

before and though apparent on map~ 1 and quite traceable in the
field, have never come in for attention.

Thus, on

approaching Lod, which ·in 1890 was still quite a small
place, the line turned south-east (and not south, as -1 relaid
(94)

Ruppin, Memoirs (cp. bibliography), P• 144.

by the British), and passed west of the village, the small
station (still standing today) being located near the
southernmost buildings, not very far from the mosque
and St. George's church.

The line then crossed the

Lod-Ramle road, and continued south, its progress still
marked to this day by a double-row of cactus hedges.
The present Lod Junction station, in its present shape,

•

was built only in the 1920's, and is situated west of
Navon's original station.

The object of the later

British changes was to prevent the line to Jerusalem
from crossing their own war-built line from Egypt to the
north at right angles, and .to lead it instead into the
railway yard they had built, leaving it again in an
easy curve to the south-east and Ramle.

Navon•s original

track continued south from Lod, then to turn east in a
sharp curve into Ramle station.

The traces of the

original track from Lod to Ramle, including some stone
culverts, are still visible today, and one stretch
the old track still serves as the approach road to the
local British war cemetery {95).

(95) The above details are based on a personal
reconnaissance of the writer who incurred much curiosity
from the police, owing to the fact that Ramle prison is
located near the old rail track. The old track is also
shown on one of the aerial photos, dated 1918, in Dalman
(cp. bibliography).

- L ll
From Ramle onward Navon•s track was identical with
today• s main line to Jerusalem,., with the possible exception
of some re-aligned sections where the line entered the
Judaean hills, and possibly also some kms. further east,
where the line crossed the Wadi Sarrar twice.

Thus, from

Ramle the track turned south to the village of Na'aneh
(today's Na'an), and from there turned south-east to cross

-

the lower course of the Wadi Sarrar (today's Nahal Sorek)
to reach the station of (Ain) Sejed.
to have been chosen for a ~
spring.

This place seems

t, an account of its big

Toiay, one solitary eucalyptus tree, unnoticed

by passing travellers, marks the site of the long-vanished
station.

The whole stretch of the wadi seems to have

been malarial, and building it reportedly cost the lives
of many construction workers, Palestinian f &llahs,
Egyptians and possibly also Algerians (96).

The station

at Sejed was to be abandoned probably about 1915 1 when

-

Meissner Pasha began to build the Turkish wartime railway
to Beer Sheba and Sinai.

His line branched off to the

south, just east of where the Jerusalem trac~s bridge
crossed the Wadi Sarrar.

This branch led to the building

of what came to be known by the British as "Junction Station"

(96) Avitsur, pp. 6/86, who seems to rely on
contemporary publications. Cuivet, P• 606, definitely
states the workers to have been Palestinians, Egyptians ,
and Algerians. A great many of the above data were
taken from Guivet.

(the later mandatory Wadi Sarrar station, today's Nahal
Sorek).

With the building of Junction Station, the

stop at Sejed, some 2.5 kms. down the line, became
redundant.
From Sejed, Navon•s line continued south-east for
some six kms., to Km. 46, t0 stop there, owing to financial
difficulties.

When these had been resolved, as told above (97),

work on the line was resumed, probably early in 1892,
continuing towards the east to Deir Aban (or Artuf, today's
HartuY).

From there the line started its very winding

ascent into the hills, the average gradient being a
negotiable J4 in 500, on the average, making use of the
f • rst gorge-like, and later wider, valley of the Wadi
Sarrar.

About halfway up, the line branched off into one

of Wadi Sarrar's tributaries, the Wadi Bittir, to pass
Bittir itself, where a station was built (whose ruins
still stand).

Owing to the clever layout of the track,

no tunnels were required (a considerable saving) all along
the ascent into the hills.

There was no stop between

Deir Aban (Artuf) and Bittir. i'oday•s station at Bar-Giora
apparently came into use, under the name Deir esh-Sheikh,
only about the First World War.

From Bittir the line

continued up its curvaceous way through the Wadi el-Werd,

t~ the Jerusalem plateau, on the main ridge of the Judaean

(97)

Grunwald, P• 252;

also Hecker, P• 1081.
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hills.

The station at Jerusalem was located at the

northern end of the Valley of Rephaim, which deba uches
from the Wadi el-Werd.

The end of the track was some

15-20 meters distant from the main watershed in the hills,
dividing the coastal plain from the Jordan Rift Valley.
The section Deir Aban (270 meters above sea-level) to
Jerusalem stati• n (at 747 meters) involved a climb of

-

477 meters over a distance of some .36 kms.

The terminus

of the railway in Jerusalem, between the "German Colony"
and the road to Bethlehem, was about 500 meters distant,
across the Hinnom Valley, from Jaffa Gate, that provided
the link between the Old City and the suburbs then growing
up.

The total length of the line, completed owing to the

drive of the by then J4 years old Yossef Navon, was

87 kms., as noted before (pr 86.6 kms., to be exact) (98).
Technical Details

The new railway was built as . a narrow-gauge line
for reasons of economy.

Its e act gauge (there were many

types of narrow gauges to choose from) was presumably

(98) The foregoing description of the geographical
features of the line is based, apart from on Avitsur,
Cuivet and Schick, mainly, but not exclusively1 on Hecker,
PP• 768-69, 797, 1077, 1.310-11. Qther sources, used
occasionally, will be found in the bibliography, for instance
the Eisenbahn Archiv.

determined by the availability of rolling stock, most,
or part, of which was purchased second-hand.

The gauge

used was l meter (1,000 mm.), in terms of width between
the rails (99).
for that time.

The gauge was not extraordinarily narrow
To this day even narrower lines operate

all over the world (100), and have done so for almost a
century.

-

Apart from cheapness and ease of construction,

a narrow"'gauge was chosen for Navonts mountain line because
no high running speed was envisaged and traffic volume
was not expected to be great.

The roadbed could be made

narrower than on normal gauge, eurves could be made
sharper - an advantage in hilly country - bridges and
cuttings would be relatively inexpensive to build.

Most

(99) Eisenbahn Arehiv, 1893, P• 931, quite erroneously
claimed the line to Jerusalem had been built on the
1,040 mm. gauge . Karkar, p. 137, even says the line had
been built on the 1,050 mm. (French-Syrian) gauge, which
is totally wrong.
(100) Cp. current editions of "World Railways"
and of the "Railway Directory" (see bibliography). World
Railways' tables summarizing gauges for each continent
are especially enlightening on this subject. Most of
Africa is to this day being served by narrow-gauge lines,
as are Japan, Indonesia1 and parts of South America. This
on account of their cheapness and ease of construction.
There are many meter-g~ ge lines in mountainous areas
all over the world, including Europe . Narrow-gauge
railways, running quite important regular services, use
tracks of 600, 610, 670, 750, 950, 1,067 mm. etc. The
only extraordinary narrow-gauge network that ran, and
still runs, in Syria and Jordan (and nowhere else) was
the network of 1,050 mm., built by the French, and
after them by Meissner Pasha in the Levant after about 1891.

- ?_\ ':) "colonial" railways at that time had been built, especially
by the French, on the narrow-gauge (101).
Rails for the new line were apparently purchased
from the cheapest sources.

They were supplied from France

and Belg~ m, and were very light, each 7 meters long,
and supported each by 10 wooden ties (102).
of the narrowest curve was 100 meters.

The radius

The strongest

gradient (not the average climb, already noted) was

•

20°/000, just where the line led into Jerusalem station •

This short and very steep section was to give trouble to
locomotives (even modern diesels) ever since.
noted, the line had no tunnels.

As already

It did have 176 bridges

and culverts, mostly small and stone-built.

The few (6)

large bridges, with one exception all in the hill section,
had 10-JO meters spans , 1'h eir iron superstructure was
supplied by the firm of Eiffel in Paris.

There is no

evidence of there having been a signalling system, but

•

to judge from the tales of later locomotive breakdownS
and minor derailments, there must have been a telegraph
line running alongside the tracks that was used to summon
(101) Here might be the place to note that the "British"
railway envisaged by Elias-Pilling-Hill from Haifa to
Damascus after 1892, had been planned as a normal gaugeand expensive - line. As described in the previous chapter,
this line was killed by the French - narrow - Hauran railway,
that was built at a ~nch faster rate, and completed at lesser
expense. The British line was undoubtedly forced to give
up on account of its heavier expenses. The episode might
serve to demonstrate the greater feasibility of narrow-gauge
lines in undeveloped colonial areas.

(102) Most of the technical details regarding the line
will be found in Cuivet, pp. 6Q5-609, though Hecker, on
various pages, supplied useful bits of information. Also
see Eisenbahn Archiv, 189J, PP• 9J1-J2.

help in case of need.

Stations were simple two-storey

structures, as can be judged from surviving drawings and
photos (l0J).

Of the seven stations, only the two

termini seem to have had shunting facilities, and several
tracks.

The smaller stations, like Bittir, seem to have

had only crossing tracks for trains and 1-2 switches
(points).

Jerusalem, and probably also Jaffa, -

..... had turntables for the locomotives.

•

prominent water-towers.

w

They also had

Perhaps the smaller stations had

them also (104).

The Jaffa Harbour Extension

One curio.us,} and almost totally unkown, addition to
Navon•s railway must be mentioned.
'
l
running from the harbour
(actually

This was a short spur
landing place) at

Jaffa to the town's railway station, several hundred

•

meters away.

This ran along what was then the road to

Petah Tikvah, Kalkiliye, and Nablus (later B~ trous Street ,

(10J) The stations that had survived to 1972 were,
Jaffa (derelict); Lod (complete with platform, serving now
as headquarters of Magen David Adorn, the First Aid Society .
It survived the mandatory period - according to small-scale
maps, as an Arab boys schoolJ ; Bittir (roofless and
derelict since 1948}; and Jerusalem Gwith mandatory
wings). Ramle's original station was blown up about 1947
by the Jewish Resistance;
Sejed has totally disappeared;
and Deir Aban (Artuf) was demolished at an unknown date,
perhaps after the 1927 earthquake. Cp. also following note.
(104) There are some interesting photos (and drawings)
of the line. Cp. Shva , Dalmann (aerial photos dating to
the Great War), and Vilnay ("Tel Aviv-Yaffe"), p. 117.
Some extant photos of the Navon line will be found in
the Archive of the Jerusalem municipality, and in the
collection of the Imperial War Museum, London. There are
pr&vably other photos that have survived elsewhere.

- L\ ·1 ~,)

and today•s Rehov Eilath).

The branch had its beginning

on a jetty that was built into the sea and had .a crane
at its end.

This short line almost certainly was used

to move the rolling stock of Navon•s line from the shore
(where it had arrived by sea) to Jaffa station.

From

Its solid appearance - shown on a photo - and the lifting
device at its end, it must have been intended also -as a
permanent structure for unloading goods destined for
Jerusalem.

From the rigging of the ship in the background

of the same photo, it is apparent that the picture was
taken in the 189e•s.
1 meter.

The gauge of the track was certainly

There also survives a photo - of date unknown -

that showed a pair of rails running down :so"ttrous Street,
when it was Ja~fa' s main thoroughfare. and though the.:_tphoto
is old, it cannot be dated.

Also, the gauge of the rails

appears narrower than one meter.

However, the one-time

existence of this spur cannot be doubted.

-

It may have

been taken up at an unknown date, in the early 1900's,
as Hecker, just before the First World War complained
that there was no rail link between harbour and station.
It was certainly relaid by the British, first as a
600 mm., and then as a normal gauge track, after their

~'\.-)
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capture of Jaffa in 1917 (105).

Rolling Stock and other Details

As for the rolling stock of the Jaffa-Jerusalem line,
The locomotives had been built by the - still existing Baldwin Locomotive Works of Philadelphia, U. S .A.

The

carriages had been manufactured by .Messers Dyle and
Bacalan, about which firm nothing is known, but it may
have been Belgian.

The total rolling stock seems to have

included five locomotives, 15 passenger carriages, and 42
goods wagons.

These details - taken from a German-Zionist

periodical - have never been listed before.

The passenger

carriages, of a type suitable for the tropics, had open
platforms at each end to permit movement between them.
They were 2.50 meters broad, a respectable width, considering
that the track itself was only of one meter gauge.

Some

of them made up the Kaiser's special train when he returned
from Jerusalem to Jaffa in 1898 (106).

There were two

(105) The Jaffa railway jetty is shown in Vilnay
("Tel A~ v"), p. 117. Ide dates the photo to 1893. The line
down Bostrous Street is shown on a photo kept by the Zionist
Archives in Jerusalem. The pic~~re has certainly been
tampered with, as it shows an out-of-scale car, and the
shadows of passers-by point in different directions. The
rail track shown, however, seems genuine enough, and
whoever worked the picture over surely had no reason
whatsoever to add a railway track. However the track
seems to be of 600 mm., and the photo may date to after the
British occupation, and before the track was taken up in the
1920's. The same picture is included in Ruppin's "Memoirs."
Cp. also Hecker, pp. 768, 1540, on the absence of a rail link.
(106) There is a photo of the Kaiser•s special train
in the archives of the American Colony Photo Service, now
in the possession of Mr. Horace Spafford Vester of Jerusalem.
For details of the rolling stock, cp. note 108, below.

....

tat)

classes - first and second - to which a third class may

(1;)

have been added later, to fight the Jaffa-Jerusalem
horse-carriages , that provided cheaper transportation than
the two original classes.

From contemporary accounts, it

appears that the first class carriages had separate compartments, some of them reserved for the benefit of
Turkish and Arab ladies.

-

The second class carriages

merely had benches, running along the sides.

Lavatories

seem to have been conspicuous by their absence, at least
during the first years of the line's operations, sometimes~
it appears, with awful results (107).

The rolling stock,

according to all observers, was ~elatively old and not in
good condition, as attested by its many breakdownf, having
been bought (partly or entirely) and probably very cheaply,
from the one meter Panama-Colon railway. }:_.:;-,, ;, fhe original
owner of the rolling stock (or parts of it) had been the
French-financed Panama Canal Gompany of F. de Lesseps,

-

that had failed in 1889 (108).
Contemporary sources agree that Navon's line had
been not only cheaply, but also shoddily, built, the
stock was ill kept, and travelling on it, at least in its
(107)

Shvah, P• 118.

(108) Details about the rolling stock, and its
origin, were taken from Eisenbahn Arohiv, 1893, P• 931.
The most interesting details, however, were found in
Altneuland, 1904, p. 53. These were correlated with the
photos collected by the writer. There are also details
in Dunning (cp. bibliography), p. 10; Avitsur, PP• 6/86;
Hecker, P• 1)10; and Shvah.

first years of operations, was sometimes downright
dmger&us.

The staff of the line in 1904 included

103 persons.

The locomotive drivers 1 and probably also

all the other employees in responsible positions1 were
French and Italians.
was a M. Picquart.

The station master in Jerusalem
The treatment of passengers gave

reason for complaint (109).

Though conditions of travel

may have improved as time passed, Herzl, as his Diaries
show, still seems to have regarded going up to Jerusalem
by train as exquisite torture,
Little as there seems to have been invested in the
line, its construction swallowed considerable amounts,
(

but sources remain divided as to what the actual sums
had been (110).

The various views as to the cost of the

line were summarized by Hecker (111),

According to his

own evaluation, building costs per km, came to 110,000

-

Francs approx.

Other estimates quoted by him ranged from

97,000 to 121,JOO Francs per km. ,

(109) For the sorry travelling conditions, cp.
Avitsur; Grunwald, p. 252; Hartman, Z.D.P.v., 1894,
PP• 56-57; Hecker, PP• 797, 1310; Schick, Z,D,P.V.,
1893, P• 23; Shvah, 116, passim,
(110) For the financial background of the undertaking that built the line, see above p . u:.to-~I I and ,
note S 'l~t 1--q I i-i.,
(111) Hecker, PP• 1058 and 1310-11, On this also
op. Grunwald, p. 252, who made an apparent error in his
conclusion, building costs per km, . - 5,900 Francs!

Right:Photo of 1893
showing railway jetty,
with crane at its end,
built into the sea at
Jaffa.On the left the
long-since demolished
city wall.The spur from
the jetty led to Jaffa
station.

(Source:Vilnay/Album
du Terre Sainte)

Boustrous Street in Jaffa,with track linking
landing place on shore . Date is unknown,but may be as late as 1918 .
The much-doctored photo(note outsize car,and different slant of
shad• of persons , bottom left)clearly shows the rail track.The
wide ties may denote a meter gauge line relaid to 600 mm width.
(Source:Zionist Archives)
Pick,chapter III.

(
)

Completion of the Line and Reactions to it

The first working train seems to have reached Jerusalem
on August 21, 1892.

On s-»tember 26, 18921 the 5th of

Tishrey 565J by Jewish reckoning, between the Jewish
holidays of Rosh•Hashana and Yorn Kippur, there dawned
the day on which the first railway in Palestine, and indeed
in all of Syria, was inaugurated.

The event was attended by

much pomp and circumstance, and took place in the presence
of Turkish dignitaries, some of whom had arrived in
the country only for this occasion (112).

The hero

of the festivities seems to have been- Yiry rightly - the
"father" of the whole scheme, Yossef Navon, who in due
course was decorated by the Sultan with the order of the
"Mejidiyeh," and was later raised to the rank of "Bey" henceforth to be addressed as "your excellency" (11J).
He seems to have received foreign decorations as well, and
also was later made a "Chevalier," of the French Legion
(112) There survived plenty of descriptions surrounding
the inauguration ceremony. Cp. Grunwald, P• 252, and
Schie~, Z.D.P.V., 189J, PP• 22-2J. The London Jewish
Chronicle also noted the forthcoming event, on September 9,
1892, p. 9. What seems to be an authentic photo of the
first train in Jerusalem on inauguration day will be found
in Carpenter (cp. bibliography). Also cp. note!'> 117/118.
(113) Cp. Navon•s biography in the Entsiklopedia
Ivrith (Encyclopaedia Hebraica) vol. 24, col. 816.

' -.
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i f Honour (_as noted before) for his services to France (114).
Rejoicing amongst the Jewish community, especiall y in
Jerusalem, was, of course, great.

Progress of the work

had been watched - probably anxiously - by the local
Hebrew-Jewish press, the "Hatsvi," and the "Ha\t Havatseleth,"
since its inception (115).

The expected arrival of the

first train, led the father of modern Hebrew, Eliezer BenYehuda, to ,write an enthusiastic poem in honour

•

•f

the

occasion, though he laboured mightily under the handicap
of having no word for "railway."

However, he soon remedied

the matter by inventing an appr0priate term that is still
being used today (116).

Unfortunately, the archaic style

of Ben-Yehuda's ~uaint poem bears no translation.

However,

his poem made it quite clear that to him (and others)
the sight of the first train signified one more link with
......._

.

the outside world and the arrival of en. lightenment in the
'--"'

Holy City.
The completion of the new railway and its first
working weeks were watched1 and commented upon/ by the
Jewish press, both local and overseas.

The event was

(114) Cp. Grunwald, P• 252, who, P• 249 passim,
lists a considerable number of sources dealing with Navon.

(115)

Op. Shvah, P• 116 passim.

(116) Ibid. Having no biblical term available,
he first used the word "Kitta r, .. meaning simply "steam."
He later settled on the term "Rakeveth,, " from "Rehev"
(vehicle), which is still used today.

""\~)

also marked by the gentile world (117).

Most interesting

were, of course, Jewish reactions, which, owing to the
limitations of time and space, can be noted here only
perfunctorily, though they certainly deserve more than
superficial treatment (118).

Particularly obvious was

(117) Eisenbahn Archiv and z.o.P.v. in Germany,
Annual Register, P.E.F. Quarterly and Statesman•s Yearbook
in .Britain. Beyond doubt there were references to the
line's completion in the daily press, at least in England
and France. Regrettably1 E:\n'opean dailies of that period
are not available in Israel for checking.
f1?

-
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"'\i.J \..

f ·,, :.,. ,_:.:( ;-~,.(t}

t~

~.Tt.

: ;-3::~:2t.(:.J

,,

(118) A perfunctory, and certainly not exhaustive,
list of Jewish publications that dealt with the JaffaJerusalem railway in its earliest operational stages would
look as followss
a) The Jewish Chronicle, London, September 9, 1892, P• 9;
b) id., October 28, 1892, P• 6, note;
e) Ha'Havatseleth, Jerusalem, no. 1, P• 1, 8 Tishrey, 5653;
d) id., no. 2, p. 9, 1 Marheshvan, 5653;
e) id., no. 3, P• 21, 7 Marheshvan, 5653;
f) id • ., no. 4, P• 25, 14 Marheshvan, 5653;
g) id., no. 6, p. 42, 28 Marbeshvan, 5653;
h) Hi Melits, St. Petersburg, 28 Av, 5652;
i) id., 22 Ellul, 5652;
j) id., 16 Heshvan (6.11.1892), 5653;
k) Ha' Or (supplement to "Ha'fsvil!), Jerusalem, 6 Ellul, 5652.
This issue contained Ben-Yehuda's above-mentioned poem,
that was written in anticipation, one month before the
arrival of the first train,
1) Ha'Tsfirah, Warsaw, no. 192, p. 828, 16 Ellul, 5652;
m) id., no. 208,
894, 8 Tishrey, 5653.

P•

The Jewish Chronicle wrote, of course, in English.
All the other publications were in Hebrew.
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the pride of most correspondents in the fact that Progress
had been brought to Palestine by a son of the Jewish
people, and a native of Jerusalem to boot.

Nor were

rumours lacking - the various writers probably knew little
• f the line•s financial straits - that the new railway
was going to be extended to Jericho, and from there to the
Golan, and towards the Haifa-Damascus railway (the Elias-

•

Pilling-Hill project), that just at that time was getting
into its stride (as described in the foregoing chapter) •
The extension of Navon's railway from Jerusalem, it was
hoped, was going to benefit the Jewish holdings on the
Golan - meaning the colony of Bnei Yehuda, mentioned
earlier, that was just then i ~ its death throes~ and
especially the settlements that , "God willing," would. be
established on the lands that the Baron Rothschild, the
famous benefactor, held on the other side of the Jordan river.
However, comments on matters of lesser importance
were not lacking either.

Almost from the first, the

Jerusalem periodical Ha'Havatseleth, after discussing the
uses of the line for the transport of passengers, mail
and goods, mentioned the necessity of having also a cheap
third classV on the trains.

This wish was voiced, almost

simultaneously, and independently, by the non-Jew,
Conrad Schick, in the P.E .F. Quarterly in London.
deplored the high fares (119)•

He also

However, the operating

(119) Ha'Havatseleth, no. 2, cp. above list.
Schick in the P.E.F.Q,, 1893, P• 2J.

Also

,-~)

company was out to make as much money as fast as possible.
Since there were few goods to be transported from the
coast, and none at all from Jerusalem, passengers were
almost the only source of revenue.

t"'t-,

.

- • • • • it should be

noted that the line also had the exclusive right, or duty,
to carry the Turkish mail to the coast.

All the various

foreign postal agencies operating in Jerusalem, e.nr;- the
other hand, still had to send their mail to Jaffa by
road.

From 1897, the trains even had a "Bureau ambulant

Jaffa-Jerusawem," a travelling post office in a special
compartment on the trains, whose cancelled stamps were
to become of considerable curiosity value in the future (120).

'
The Line to Jerusalem in Operation
Some five weeks after the new line had been opened,
there was a report - the first but by no means the last -

-

of a train being late, on account of a locomotive breaking
down.

Some two weeks later a train was derailed at Ramle

less than two months after services started.

This could,

of course, have been caused by any big stone that may have
strayed in between the light rails.

Altogether it seems

(120) "Holyland Judaica Philatelist" (published in
Redwood City, Cal.), September-October, 1975. The Turkish
railway cancellations were also described, on various
occasions, by the Israel Philatelist."
0

~
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that accidents, derailments and collisions with fellahs,
and their beasts, that were not used to the modes of
modern locomotion, were not uncommon, but lessened as
time went by.

Once a goods wagon - it was
reported ...
tore loose at Jerusalem, and careened brakeless for 11 kms.
down the line to Bittir, where it went off the rails (121).
During the first winter, 1892-93, services were suspended

-

for five days, owing to the tracks being blocked by landslides caused by the rains (122).
Frequencies of service apparently changed, as schedules
were adjusted to the needs of traffic.
from extant photos, were made up of
and one goods, or luggage/ wagon.

Trains, to judge

J-5 passenger carriages,

When service started in

1892, there was one train a day in each direction, leaving
Jerusalem at 06.JO in the morning and arriving (theoretically~
going downhill was faster) at Jaffa about 09.00.

It then

returned from Jaffa at 15.00 (J p.m.) and was due to
arrive in Jerusalem at 18.00 hours (12J).

However, to judge

from all accounts, trains were invariably late, covering
the distance of 87 kms. in anything up to six hours.

This

led the Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi in Jerusalem, the venerable
(121) This bit of information was found in one of the
contemporary Jewish periodicals, but regrettably the writer
mislaid details.
(122)

Avitsur, PP• 6/86.

(123)

Schick, P.E.F. Quarterly, 1893, P• 23.

-,..~)

Shmuel Salant, to publish a public warning in the press,
only a few weeks after service started, not to use the
Friday afternoon train from Jaffa, for fear of desecrating
the Sabbath (124).

Perhaps people thought that, since

observant Jews were permitted to travel on ships on
Sabbath (as there was no possibility of disembarking),
the same rule applied to trains.

-

Train schedules were

obviously designed to enable travellers to leave Jerusalem
in the morning and return the same day.

This, of course,

was an unheard-of advance in a country where getting to the
coast by carriage, riding, or on foot, traditionally
required 1-2 days.

In passing,it might be mentioned

the line's clocks, very important adjuncts to operations,
according to Hecker, were set once a fortnight by the
chronometre of the FrenchII Messageries Maritmmes" mail
steamer 1when it arrived at Jaffa from Marseilles .
Service Schedules

The new line was, as far as can be ascertained,
operated by the company that built it, the "Societe des
travaux publics" (125).

(124)

In order to make as much money as

Ha'Havatseleth, 5 Marheshvan, 5653, P• 21.

(125) Grunwald, p. 252. A.s already noted in passing,
above, the Eisenbahn Archiv, 1893, p. 932, said that the
line was leased for its first five years against a yearly
payment ofi, 600,000 Francs.

"1+)

possible, trains were run every day, regardless of religious
holidays, Moslem Fridays, Jewish Saturdays and Christian
Sundays (126).

Since not all trains, at all times, took

six hours to climb to Jerusalem, the mean travelling time up
seems to have been 3½-4 hours.

Some 20 years after the

line started operations, the average speed of trains was
given by Hecker as 23 k.p.h. (127) ., this no doubt owing

-

to the shoddy track and the decrepit rolling stock.

At

that time the number of daily trains was given as two,
in each direction, probably because the number of travellers
had increased.

There was also by that time a nightly

goods train, indicating more imports and commercial
activities.

Shick, in 1893, knew of no goods service,

but did mention an "excursion train," leaving each Sunday
from Jerusalem for Bittir, where people "took the air" (128).
But a reliable contemporary railway publication, also of .
1893, claimed that there were two daily goods trains (129).
\

In 1907, Meistermani s French guide informed travellers
that lhere was only one train daily, in each direction,
and leaving Jerusalem at 08.00iJ o'clock in the morning

(126) Not one of the contemporary sources, including
guidebooks, like Baedeker, and later, Meisterman--, failed
to mention that trains were worked daily.
(127)

Hecker, P• 1311.

(128) For source, cp. note 123. The writer distinctly
remembers a World War II successor to Schick's 1893
"excursion train." This was ont regular daily milk-andvegetable 4-axled goods wagon, a SJJt:1JJ~e111n
cpm~ng
into Jerusalem from Bi ttir every morning,
· l'f 9'. nUW'Jwt

:w:1••.

lc-u,.-~f~v.e,

u'l.t\) •<!:,.u., l)Ve~{.

'-'

. _,

- 12_30 ,_,)

(07.40 in the winter), to reach Jaffa at 11.40 (11.10 in
winter), and one departing from Jaffa at 14.00 (2 p.m.,

13.20 in winter), to arrive in Jerusalem at 17.so (5.50 p.m.;
17.10 in winter~.

Regarding 1lilll goods transport, the

guide struck a happy mean, noting that a goods train
left Jaffa every morning between 6 and 7 o'clock, in an
emergency also taking passengers who could not wait for the
regular afternoon train (130).

However, Baedeker's guide,

probably referring to about 1909-10, expressly referred to
two trains daily 1 that took three hours and J5 minutes to
get to Jerusalem (131). From all of which it can only be
. .,,,
inferred that the Societe des travaux,was adept at changing
its time-tables.

Presumably, whenever necessary,, special

trains were run for pilgrims of all sorts, as was done
for the Kaiser in ljjj.

There was at least one recorded

instance, in early 1909, of a trainful of soldiers being
despatched from Jerusalem to Jaffa because of demonstrations
(of unidentified aims, Young Turk? Anti-Austrian?) that
took place there (132).

L'fo \ ~ v~

fL~),

(129)

Eisenbahn Arohiv, 189J, p. 931.

( lJO)

Meisterman11,1 1907, p. JO.

(lJl)

Baedeker, Mediterranean (cp. bibliography), P• 493.

0

(132) Pal,, 1909, P• 28, The note in Pal, so early
in the year, may have referred to events in 1908. Bosnia
and Herzegovina were annexed by Austria from Turkey on

6.10.1908.

Fares Policy,

Passengers.

As already noted, from the beginning of operations,
and for quite a number of years, trains had only two
classes.

Indeed it is not entirely clear whether there

ever was a 3rd class.

In any case, the available 2nd class

was equivalent to European 3rd, and not recommended for
ladies (133),

Prices, 15 Francs in the first class (one
~~12m,/

way) and five Francs in the second (one way), were unanimously regarded by most observers as exorbitant, and
did not appreciably change, at least for the first 15 years
(1J4).

Special trains cost a minimum of 700 Francs (135)•

These prices, coupled with the notorious unpunctuality
of the trains and the uncomfortable ride (1J6), did not

gain the railway many admirers - except when they compared
train travel with journeying on top of a camel.

Apparently

many, if not most, oeverseas visitors only took a one-way

•

trip on the railway (there were for a long time no cheap
return tickets either), and preferred to return by road,
which also had the advantage of going through a different
scenery, rather than by way of the not very exciting haul ~f
(lJJ)

Baedeker, P• 493.

(1J4) Cp. Baedeker, Eisenbahn Archiv, Meisterman ~ ,
Schick, etc.

(135)

Alt., 1904, P• 54.

(1J6)

Hartmann, Z.D.P,V., 1894, P• 57;

Hecker, P• 797.

i~

(through the dreary Wadi Sarrar).

Initially, the daily

number of passengers seems to have been some 150-200
Later statistics could not be found (137).

per train.

Goods Rates:

Road Competition

While receipts from passenger fares were the line's

-

mainstay, it did also hope to earn money by the forwarding
of goods - a hope exemplified by the presence of 42 goods
wagons.

However, in this field the line faced difficulties -

as mentioned before - owing to the fact that while some
important imports like foodstuffs, building materials,
and kerosene, though in limited quantities, were available
for transportation from the coast, goods wagons had to
return empty in the absence of exports from the hill
country.

As late as 1904, moreover, 12 years after the

start of the service, prices for the mo~ ----ing of goods were

-

'---"'

regarded as inflated, especially for the types of bulky
commodities that could not be transportedhby camels,
whose weight limit was about JOO kgs. each (1J8).

Trans-

portation rates, however, seem to have been lower for goods
that could be handled by the competitive road transport.

(138) Alt., 1904, P• 54;
for the following details.

this source also holds good

As Jerusalem grew, goods transport by rail seems to have
increased gradually, and in 1904 the average goods train
carried 40 tons at 90 Piastres each, at a time when 94
Piastres were worth 20 Gold Francs.

In any case, during

the first years of its existence the railway to Jerusalem
did indeed run into fierce competition. both from horsecoach drivers, who underbid the line for passengers, and
.r

from camel owners, who underbid4it
for the transport of
,.,,
goods, and moreover could offer delivery "from door to
door."

tlJ9)

Just the same,. competition arose about the

same time in Syria, with the railway generally winning.
In Palestine, on the other hand, coach and camel were
helped in their fight by the bad service and high prices
of their competition.

Financial Difficulties
According to a contemporary technical journal, in
order to break even, the operating company would have
had to raise J,932 Francs a day, or some 1,435,200 yearly.

(140)

Owing probably, to a great extent , to the competition

of road transport, the company failed to do so, and in early

1894, after only l½ years of operations, it was forced to
(1J9)

Avitsur, PP• 7/87;

Grunwald, P• 252;

(140) Eisenbahn Archiv, 189J, P• 9J2.
figure should read 1,434,680.

also Shvah.

The yearly

\'1-)

suspend services (141).

A contributory reason for the

failure was, no doubt, the fact that unlike other lines
elsewhere in Turkey, in which the government had been
actively interested, and which - possiblyr had the backing
of foreign powers, the Jerusalem line had {as already
stressed) no kilometric guarantee/ which, no matter what
financial results were, would have guaranteed it a fixed
annual income (142).

Building the line, according to the

usually very accurate Grunwald, had cost nine million
Francs, with another five millions going for the purchase
of land (the company did not have a land grant either),
rolling stock, and incidentals, a total of some 14 million
Francs.

Seeing that the owning company had raised between

something less than 14 millions, to something under

15 million Francs - accounts differ - it is obvious that
it could not stand operational losses for any length of
time, and as its failure in 1894 showed - it did not (14J).
Nonetheless, some accommodation was reached with the
debenture '~ holders and in May 1894 the line resumed its
operations (144) .

(141) Avitsur, pp. 7/87; Grunwald, P• 252;
PP• 797, 1546; Ruppin, P • JOS.

Hecker,

(142) As to the beneficent results of kilometric
guarantees, cp. Karkar, pp. 110, 114, 116-121, and 1J2.
A kilometric guarantee, once granted, meant that the
Turkish government was going to pay a fixed yearly sum for
each km. operated by a company, no matter what financial
results were.
(14J) For the line's total capital, cp. note 80,
above, also Grunwald, p. 252, and Hecker, P• 1084.
(144 )

Grunwald, P• 252;

Hecker, PP• 797, 1546-47.

The Line Getting into its Stride

Business seems to have improved somewhat in the
,,....
following years, perhaps because of a general amellioration
of conditions in Palestine, and an increase in the traffic
in the harbour of Jaffa.

The efficiency of the line may

have grown as time passed, and there probably were
stringent savings.

In the long run its staying power was

undoubtedly greater than that of its unorganized competitors.
A table compiled about 1912-13 showed that the total
income of the Jerusalem Railway increased from 519,409
Francs (ca. 5,970 Francs per km.) in 1895, to 1,388,755
Francs (cp. 15,963 Francs per km.) in 1911, though yearly
dividends never reached 1%• (145)

But in the twenty years

between its collapse in 1894 and the outbreak of the
Great War in 1914, the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway never again
ceased running, and thus the vision of Yossef Navon seemed
to have justifiedi itself.
As for Navon himself, about 1894, when his railway got
into difficulties, he left Jerusalem for France, ostentatiously
to raise funds for his undertaking.

(145)

Hecker, P• 1564.

He left a wife and

- <L3 ~ children, a partnership in a bank, as well as honorary
consulships for Belgium, Holland and Portugal.

He never

returned to- Jerusalem before his death in Paris 40 years
later, in 19J4. (146)

(146) Grunwald, p. 253. Th. Herzl's characterization
of Navon after he had settled .in Paris will be found in
note 73, above.

Title page of an Arabic manuscript praising the project of the
Hejaz Railway . The manuscript was composed , about 1900,by Muhammed Arif
ibn Ahmad al-Munir ali Husayni'l Dimashqi , a Turkish official in
Damascus . The name of the work was"Al-Sa'ada al-namiya al-abadiya :fi'lsikka al-hadidiya al-Hijaziya"("The Book of the Increasing and
Eternal Happiness-the Hejaz Railway") .
The manuscript-never published-contains 157 hand-written paees in
literary Arabic prose , with a table of contents in Turkish . It is
being kept in Istanbul .
Pick,chapter III .

(Source: Landau)

THE HEJAZ RAILWAY
The Concept of the Hejaz Railway and its Back9round
Of the railway lines that came to operate in Palestine,
Cis- and Transjordanian, during the period 1892-1914, by
far the most important, historically and from the point of
view of extent, was the Turkish-owned Hejaz Railway
the following pages).
\.

(HR in

This linked Damascus and Syria as a

whole, with the Hejaz and Medina in particular, though it
never reached Mecca,

as had originally been envisaged.

The HR also linked Damascus with Haifa, and the Mediterranean,
by means of a branch, that joined its trunk line at Dera'a
(the Biblical Edrei).

The HR came to be the only state-

owned lint the Ottoman Empire had in the period under discussion.

Its financial basis was certainly Turkish,

concept was almost certainly Turkish,

its

its execution was to

a . great extent German 1 and personified in the figure of its
chief-engineer and planner, the Saxoni ~ n Heinrich-August

•

Meissner (1).

As will be seen in the following pages, the

German share in the construction of the HR1 as represented by

(1) The person of Meissner (later Meissner Pasha),
will be described in due course.
He will also figure very
prominently in Chapter . IV, deal~ng with his World War I
activities in Palestine.

- 2
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Meissner was not much less than the much more publicized
German share in the building of the Baghdad Railway (2).
The ideas underlying the concept of the HR can only
be · guessed at,
German help may

as the motives for building this line with
or may not)

lie buried in the archives

of the defunct Ottoman Empire.

But it can be regarded as

a reasonable working hypothesis that the " father" of the
HR was His Majesty, the Sultan Abdul Hamid II
reigned 1876-1909).
~

"Irade"

(1842-1918 f

On May 1st, 1900, he issued an

(Imperial Rescript),

announcing the proposed con-

struction of the railway, to celebrate the forthcoming
25th anniversary of his accession to the throne (~, The man
to whom fell the main task of furthering the affairs of
the new line in Constantinople, and at court, was Izzet
Pasha,

a native of Damascus, who had grown up in Syria.

He functioned as the Sultan's second secretary, and was to
share his fall some years later.

-

Izzet Pasha was then, and

(2)
The Baghdad Railway was intended to be for the
easterly 1 Mesopotamian 1 reaches of the Ottoman Empire, what the
HR was intended to be for its south-westerly possessions, namely
the Hejaz, and, in a general way, Arabia as a whole
The
Baghdad Railway, and the German share in its constructio ~ have
been the subject of very numerous articles and books.
Their
listing would go beyond the requirements of this survey .
Its
most salient features can be found in Kankar, p. 120 passim,
and pp. 136, 141, also in Woods p. 36 passim, also in
Hecker, Issawi, and Jastrow (cp. bibliography).
( 3)
There are many ~ e~ er,ences to Abdul Hamid's
paternity of the HR.
See Auler, p. 24; Blanckenhorn, p.
Hecker pp. 789, 1063 (cp. bibliog~aphy) ; and elsewhere.

8 ,,
I

later,

credited by many with having been the man who had

suggested to the Sultan the building of the line in the
first place

(4).

However, in view of Abdul Hamid's well-

documented autocratic tendencies, it is somewhat unlikely
that he would have taken over, in toto, anybody's ideas-even those of his second secretary--if he had not been willing
to do so.

•

It must be remembered that railway development

had already been relatively lively in _the early , years of
his reign,

i.e., since 1876

(5).

From this fact it might

be learnt that Abdul Hamid was alive to the possibilities
that the building of railways would open up for his empire.
Also, as noted unanimously by observers who wrote as much
as fifty years apart,
to German influence

the Sultan was increasingly susceptible

(6).

This found expression in the

appointment of General Colmar v &n der Goltz,
the reorganiz t r of the Turkish Army.

in 1883, as

In 1888 there began

the German onslaught on the railway building field in Turkey,

(4)
Auler, pp. 24-25; Blanckenhorn, p. 8.
Hecker, p. 1065,
flatly states (possibly following Blanckenhorn) that the
concept of the HR originated with Izzet.
Alt. 1904, p. 2201
also said that Izzet Pasha was the originator of the line,
quoting "Annals de Geographie" (15.5.1904), as source.
Alt., 1905, p. 278, quoted the German "K8llnische Zeitung"
as to Izzet Pasha's vital contribution to the building
of the line.
(5)
For details of the railway kilometrage built in
Turkey after 1876, cp. Hecker, pp . 1076-1078.
(6)
Cp. Hecker, p. 789, who wrote about 1912-13, and
Karkar, pp. 120 - 122, who wrote about 1963.

and by 1893 a line had been built--some 580 kms.
from Constantinople, via Eskishehir to Angora

long--

(Ankara).

By 1896 the branch Eskishehir-Konia had been completed by
the i-ermans, later to become part of the Baghdad Railway

(7).

These schemes, that actually came to fruitien, were . probably
enough to convince the Sultan of German capabilities in
the field of railway construction.

In 1899, one year

before the initiation of the HR, a preliminary convention

•

was signed by the Porte and the Deutsche : Bank for the
building of the . Baghdad Railway (8).

This was followed

,

in 1900, as noted above, by the Irade announcing the project
of the HR.

A year later a German was appointed to build

the line.
The conc~pt of the new line was ostensibly very simple,
as initially published.

Intended to run,more or less,

alongside ~rans-Jordanian Palestine's old caravan route
leading, roughly north-to-south from Damascus to Arabia,
the new railway was billed to be chiefly of religious importance.

It was to link Syria with the Holy Cities of

Medina and Mecca in the Hejaz.

Incidentaliy, it was also

to provide more secular access to them from the rest of

(7)
Ger~an railway activities in Turkey were
described in extenso by Hecker and also by Karkar.
Issawi and Ppenicke also dealt with the subject, and
al so Woods.
(8)

Karkar, p. 122 .

the outside world.

But its declared main aim was to ease

travel for all the devout Moslems from Syria--5-6,000 of
them(9)-- from Anatolia, Northern Mesopotamia, Asiatic
Russia and the Balkans, who annually faced the rigours of a
40 - day march, and the threat of Bedouin attack

(when not

bought off), over a route some 1,500 or more kms. long,
in order to carry out their obligatory devotions at the
sacred shrines.

It was also quite possibly expected that

the new line would increase the number of prospective
pilgrims and also draw people who would otherwise have
gone by boat to Jidda and thence to Mecca.

The new rail-

way was quite certainly expected to increase the religious
standing of the Turkish Sultan, in his capacity as the
Khalif of the Moslem world as a whole

(10).

The HR, having been touted as a religious undertaking, was to be financed purely by Islamic means,
by voluntary contributions of the Moslem world.

(9)

Auler, p.

i.e.

In view of

23

( 10.)
The average over al 1 number of pilgrims engaged
in the Haj was give by Auler p. 23, as 30-60,000 annually.
There were also different estimates, as the number of "Hajis"
in various years was probably never definitely established.
Contrary to Auler's low figures, the number of the Syrian
pilgrims alone was at time estimated as between 10,000 and
20,000
There are references galore (apart from those in
Auler) to the religious aspects of the HR. Cp. Alt., 1905,
p. 350; Blanckenhorn,_...P .4; H~ ke f[ p. 771; Ruppin, p. 299;
also Guthe, and Pick. ':\-t,'\' \.k,.
~~
~
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the lengths to which Abdul Hamid had to go to finance his
earlier Anatolian lines and also the proposed Baghdad
Railway--looking for foreign backers, distributing liberal
concessions that might have had political strings tacked
on to them,

and acquiescing in kilometric guarantees for his

foreign-owned lines--this proposed new mode of financing the
HR by means of religious contributions was nothing less
than a stroke of genius.

It was to liberate the new line

from foreign financial tutelage

(and political dependence),

and was to assure it--as indeed it turned out--of a steady
flow of money.

It was also to save the Turks from the

necessity of paying a high rate of interest on the funds
used for

construction

(11).

However, it probably soon became evident to observers
that the HR was to have some more uses, besides being a means
to facilitate pilgrimages.
aspects.

It had at least so~e economic

Once built, it could serve to transport the pro-

duce of the Hauran, and of the more southerly Ajlun-namely wheat.

It could serve as a means to develop Trans-

jordania's economic life, rather as the transcontinental
railways in North American had done,

and as the Trans-

Siberian Railway precisely at that time was intended to do,

(11)
Details regarding the financing of the HR
will be found further on in this chapter.

though the area affec t,fA. was of course smaller
I

I

(12). Far

more important than the economic aspects were the potential
military uses of the proposed line and they were to come to
the fore gradually, when the line was actually being built.
The military aspects were inextricably mixed up with
political ones.

No attempt will be made here to separate

them, and they will be described as a unit in the following
pages.
It has already been noted in the foregoing chapter that
the original concept of a railway to link Syria with the
Hejaz seems to have originated with the Turkish Major Ahmed
Rashid in the early 1870's.

He had had purely military

benefits in mind, namely the suppression of rebellion in
Yemen.

These potential benefits were, of course, as

obvious in 1900 as they had been some 30 years earlier, but
it was an interesting fact 1 though not much commented upon,
that in its early years, while the line was being planned,

-

and afterwards, initated, its military value was a subject
practically unmentionable.

There were good, and mainly

financial and political reasons, for not mentiong the
military uses of the HR.

Financial contributions towards

(12)
For the potential, and afterwards actual,
economic aspects of the HR, cp. Alt., 1906, p. 83; Auler,
pp. 63-64; Blanckenhorn, p. 5; Poenicke, p ~ 12; and Ruppin
p. 354.

~i)

the construction of the line were going to be solicited
from all over the Moslem world, also including countries
under British, French, and Dutch rule.

Asking European

colonial powers to permit their subjects to contribute
funds to a project that would have furthered lurkishmilitary power, would not have been a clever thing to do.
But, as time passed, and the line grew, references to
its military as p ects went on increasing.

In 1906, the

German officer in the Turkish service, Auler Pasha, who
wrote the most important description of the HR in its
early stages, innocently, but significantly, described
its transport capacity in terms of troop-trains and military
movements

(13).

As already stated above, military and political
considerations were inextricably mingled in the concept
of the HR.

As for its political background--a very short

survey of Turkey's international status at the beginning
of the 20th cent~ry, will serve to stress the potential
importance of the new line.
The decline of the Ottoman Empire had become apparent,
in the 18th century, if not earlier, and had been continuing

(13)
Auler, pp. 54-55, 63.
Further references to the
military aspects and value of the HR, ranging in date from
1906 to 1914-15, will be found in the following sources:
Alt., 1906, p. 84; Hartmann (Mekka-Bahn), p. 13; Hecker,
pp . 7 8 5 , 10 7 3 , 15 S, 2 -:- 5 3 ; Pa 1 . , 19 0 7 , p . 3 9 ; Rohrbac k. (Bag dad
Bahn), pp. 13, 14, 29; Ruppin, c p. 299; Woods, p. 52 •
Many other references will be found elsewhere.

~)
ever since.

The progressive dissolution of the "Sick

Man of Europe" had become even more apparent after Abdul
Hamid's accession in 1876, and had assumed catastrophic
proportions after 1878 (14).

The personal status of the

Sultan, both as the sovereign ruler of the Ottoman Empire,
and as the Khalif of the Moslem World, had suffered almost
fatal diminution.

A review of railway developments in

Turkey will however show that while the Empire was in
the process of dissolution towards the end of the 19th
century, Abdul Hamid seems to have been quite alive to
the importance of rail links

It is reasonable to

(15).

suppose that he was also aware of the importance of railways as a means towards diminishing the centrifugal forces
that were working inside the Empire.

There is very little

room for doubt that the intention to stem the break-up
of the Empire

(plus other factors)

led to the building of

Turkey's most famous rail tracks, the Baghdad Railway and

-

the Hejaz Railway.

(14)
Cp. Gilbert, map. 7, "The Decline of the Ottoman
Empire", and also map 13 1 "The Growth of Balkan Independence".
Areas lost to Turkey after 1878 included:
Ardahan and Kars
in Eastern Anatolia, 1878; Besnia and Her2egoy'ina, 1878;
Bulgaria, 1878/85; Cyprus 1878; Egypt, 1882; Northern Greece,
1881/97; Serbia, 1878, Rumania 1878; Tunisia 1881, etc.
(15)
Abdul Hamid's willingness to have railways built
has already been noted at the beginning of this section.
Cp. note 5, and also Karkar.
Cp. also K. Grunwald's piece
of research on "Tttrkenhirsch", the story of the Jewish
financier Baron M. de Hirsch, who linked Constantinople
by rail with the rest of Europe.
His trunk line was completed
in 1888.

- ~tf1-A glance at the map will show that after the loss of
most of the Balkans and of most of the southern littoral
of the Mediterranean (the loss of Tunisia in 1881 and of
Egypt in 1882 was merely a continuation of the process that
started in Algeriaa in 1830)

there were two areas the

Turks would have wanted to hold on to.

One was Mesopotamia

and the other--Syria/Palestine and their continuatio~
along the shores of the Red Sea,

e

the Holy Cities in the Hejaz.
that time was,

towards the Yemen, including

The center of Arabia at

for all practical

purposes ✓ a

no-man's land

into which the Turks did not care to venture.

But i t

could have been held in check and subjugation of sorts, by
the two branches of an Anatolian Trunk line.

One of

these two branches would encompass Arabia from the north and
east, going in the process, towards the Persian Gulf.
The other would envelop Arabia roughly from the west and
south going towards Aden.

-

One of these branches was to

become the famous Baghdad Railway that by 1900 had already
been talked about for a number of years and about which

~~~

many 11 • lllil!,lf' were to be written

(16).

This branch of the,

( 16)
As already noted, articles and books about the
Baghdad Railway are far too numerous to be listed.
The following
is only a selection.
Details will be found in the bibliography.
Articles:
Hec :l(er; Wolf; Woods.
Books:
Bode; Chapman;
Earle; Hfiber; Jastrow; Poenicke, Rohrbac ~ ; Rothmann.
Cp.
also note 2.

Turkish soldiers laying the track of the Hejaz Rail,vay somewhere
in Transjordania . Note total absence of mechanical equipment . Party
on right is carrying rail on shoulders . Also on rir;ht:Officers on
horseback , and sentry at attention .
( Source :Auler)

•

Right:The entrance to the
only tunnel on the Hejaz
Railway main line , at Kasr ,
south of Amman .
!'Jot e small locomotive with
side-tanks of work train •
It is hauling behind it
a flat-car with two largB
water-containers . Man on
top of first one holds
water-hose .

(Source :Auler)

Pick , chapter III .

at that time already partially built Anatolian Trunk line,
was to lead to the Persian Gulf, and had a capability of
being extended through Persia and Baluchistan to India.
From its inception it had great political, strategical
and commercial implications, that destined i t to become
a serious source of dissension amongst the great powers.
The problem of financing it was not a matter of consequence.
The only problem was who was to pay for its construction.

•

As it happened, the Germans were to win out.

The second

of the two branches of the Anatolian trunk line was to
become the HR, which,

from a commercial point of view, led

exactly into the wilds of nowhere,

and which, therefore,

none of the great powers was anxious to finance.
weighty books

( apart fr_om short descriptions)

No

were to be

written about i t either.
The Wider Background
It might be noted that, unlike the Baghdad Railway,

•

<Uiat was to become a direct continuation of the Anatolian

trunk line, the HR could not be built as a continuation of
the Anatolian main line from Constantinople.
point would have had to be Damascus.

Its starting

The link between it

and the Anatol~an main line would have had to be provided
by

the French rail network Ln Syria, that by the terms of

its exclusive concessions had the sole right of providing
a connection (at that t~me not even built)

between Damascus

and the North.

Though the French had every reason to

extend their rails in Centra l

and Northern Syria, they

had no incentive to build towards the desolate south that
promised no returns, and which would ultimately have led any
line built by them into areas in which Christians were not
at all we 1 come.

Though the French 1 for a variety of

historical reasons,

to 1914 were to have a monopoly on

railways in Syria, the very idea of their building a French
line into Arabia never cropped up.

Even after they had

built their Hauran line in 1894, they never had any intention whatsoever that could be documented of building any
further south than Meserib.

Thus from the very dawn of

its concept, it was clear that- the . HR had to b e built by
the Turks alone.
Howeve ~ , financial considerations apart, the project
of a HR held political and strategic advantages for the
Turks that rivalled, and possibly overshadowed those of

•

the Baghdad Railway.

Mesopotamia under Turkish rule had

become a quiescent backwater, with no local political
movements, or local dynasties, for that matter, to disturb
its tranquility.

Syria, on the other hand, had become

affected by foreign influences, like the Egyptian occupation
of 1832-184-0, that had resulted in the forced grant of
autonomy to the Christian, western-oriented, Lebanon.
These events, and other less apparent forces,

had ied to

an Arab political a wakening that threatened the fabric of

Turkish domination

(17).

The building of the HR--and

of its French links to Anatolia proper--would undoubtedly
contribute in emergencies towards keeping Syria well garrisoned and submissive, as the envisaged railway would enable
troops to reach without delays trouble spots like volatile
Damascus.
But keeping Syria and its

-

Moslem majority, and its

minorities like the Druzes, docile, was only one of the
problems that the building of the new railway could have
solved.

Possibly of even greater concern to the Turks

was the task of keeping the Hejaz and its independent-minded
Sherifian-Hashemite Dynasty loyal~

While the Hashemites

were merely suspect, the Hejaz itself, in a more tangible
way, was in a permanent state of uproar

(18).

This was a

state of affairs the Sµltan in his capacity as Khalif, and
responsible for the Holy Cities, could not possibly afford
to overlook.

-

This was where the prospective HR came in, as

a means of strengthening the links between Constantinople
and Medina and Mecca,

for the benefit of Abdul Hamid as

(17)
There are many descriptions of the Arab
renaissance, the classic one amongst them being G. Antonius'
"The Arab Awakening f
of 1938.
Cp. also Glubb, p. 117 passim.
(18)
Reference to the permanently disturbed state of
Arabia abounded in contemporary sources, such as Auler,
p. 62, who mentions '"almost yearly disturbances", and
Hecker, p. 1552, and also in Zionist publications.
There
were also relevant references in the British "Annual Register."
Cp. also the article "Hijaz Railway" in the Encyclopaedia
of Islam; also Poenicke,
etc.
See also following note.
I

-~ the spiritual head of Islam.

Incidentally, the proposed

railway _would also serve to keep in check the1 practically
independen~ tribes of North-Central Arabia in the Nejd,
whose puritan Wahabis regarded the Turks as ~nbelievers"
any way, and as a legitimate object of attacks.

Apart

from the necessity of imposing order in Syria, the Hejaz and
Nejd, the Ottoman Empire also had to cope with almost

-

permanent trouble in the Yemen, where a large permanent
garrison had to be maintained

(19)

pacified the local Zaidi dynasty.

in order to keep
This was politically

practically independent, and from the religious aspect
belonged to the Shia branch of Islam, while the Turks were
mainly Suunis.

All these facts, while not strictly re-

ferring to the areas being surveyed, should yet be borne in
mind when dealing with the background of the HR in general.
While at various times there were to crop up plans--unrealizable, and never realized--to extend the HR from

-

Mecca to Sana'a the capital of the Yemen, and thence to
Aden

(20), the line, even if only completed to the Hejaz,

was sure

to become an important factor in khdtting Western

(19)
Cp. Ops., I, pp. 20$ -09.
Here there is a concise
des~.! t&t ~ ono-t' ~ ~!he l . , f ~c,r-,y..,&nr& s~ j;) Arabia, including the
Ye~
,w~ sffi?fe" ev a luat ion o"f the importance of the HR
on p. 211.
Also cp. Auler p. 62-63.
(20)
Ops. I, p. 211. ~ d te.
More especially, Hartmann
(Mekka-Bahn), pp. 7-8.
Other references to a possible
rail link with the Yemen, might be found elsewhere in contemporary sources.

and Southern Arabia, to the main body of the Empire--as
it indeed later did.

After the HR had been built down

through Transjordania to the Hejaz, Turkish troops could,
in an emergency ~ be marched south from Me ~ ina 1 or could be
transported by sea from°lidda to the Yemeni coast.

No

doubt, all these political and strategic duplications of the
line were not lost on the Sultan, and contributed mightily

,,,

to his decision when he issued his "Irade" in May 1900.

•

As it turned out, the proposed line to the Hejaz
within a few years came to fulfill some of the hopes the
Sultan may have had regarding it.

It did not come up to

the most sanguine expectations General Auler Pasha--already
mentioned above--may have had about it.

It did not, as he

had expected, enable the Turks to transport three infantry
battallions, 2,400 men and their equipment, from Damascus
to Ma'an in southern Transjordania in one day over some
450 kms.

•

(21)

~

nor did it shorten the travelling time from

Constantinople to the Hejaz to 6 days
was to achieve in fact,

(22).

What it

in 1905, five years after the

Sultan's Irade", was to move no less than 28 infantry
battallions from Damascus, at previously unheard of

speed ✓

to quell one of the periodical insurrec:t:iens in the· Yemen.
As the line at the time was only partially ready, each

( 21)

Auler, p.

5 4.

( 2 2)

Auler, p.

63.

, ol

battalion rode by train in 1-2 days from Damascus to Ma'an.
From there it marched in 4 days to Akaba.

There it embarked,

to reach to part of Ho deida, in the Yemen, after a sea
journey of 5 days.

The whole journey from Syria to Southern

Arabia lasted 11 days--by-passing on the way the Britishcontrolled Suez Canal

There were to be other instances

(23).

in later years of the military-political uses of the HR
that migh~

•

ress the assumption that the line was not

conceived for the use of pilgrims only .
Finally, mention should be made of a threatening factor
that may, or may not, have influenced the Sultan in 1900
when he decided to build the line.

It certainly was

forcibly brought to his attention in 1906, at the time of
the Akaba Crisis, of which more later on.

This factor was

the latent British threat to the integrity of the Ottoman
Empire.

This threat had expressed itself in the British

occupation of Cyprus and of Egypt, in a creeping encroach-

•

ment in the Sinai peninsula east of the Suez Canal, in the
British foothold around Aden,
head of the Persian Gulf.

and in pressure

around the

The British threat was usually

quiescent, and came to the fore mostly through the pressure
of circumstances, but it existed.

It found its most

tangible expression in the de-facto protectorate over the
Suez Canal, that was in no practical way mitigated - , , . .

(23r

Auler, p.

55.

l6Q

by the Canal Convention of 1888, assuring everybody unimpeded passage.

The British control of the Canal • could

theoretically turn into a stranglehold any time Turkey
wanted to move forces from the Mediterranean into the Red
Sea without tacit approval from London.

Thus the HR,

in 1900

or later, would have appealed to the Turks as a dry-land
by-pass of the Suez Canal, and an instrument of robbing
Britiin of the possibility of pressuring the Porte into

•

submission•

if occasion arose.

Conversely, should Turkey

in a remote contingency have to face Britain, the HR
would be of use to transport tro e ps from Anatolia and
Syria by way of Akaba towards the Sinai Peninsula, with
all the implications for the defence of the Suez Canal.
Furthermore, the line, wherever its terminus came to be,
could be used (as was done)

to bolster up the Turkish

garrison in the Yemen, thus possibly enabling it to carry
out an attack on British-held Aden.

-

In other words,

the building of the HR would make it a potential threat
......_

to Britain at both exits of the Re......,
4 d Sea.

This even -

tuality was indeed to come to the fore in the First
World War, when there was indeed a Turkish attack on
British outposts at Aden

(2 4) •

Ops.,

I, p.

(24).

221, passim

,,~

As already noted, no mention of the political and
strategic implications of the HR was made by the Turks,
who presented the line as a purely religious undertaking.
Outside observers--as far as can be made out--seem to
have accepted such a d e scription of the line, perhaps because
they did not bother to inquir~ into the project more
closely.

•

They did not think the Turks capable of building

such a line--a view that will be touched on later.

Only

when the line actually came to be built, its implications
became clear with a vengeance, and were--only then--widely
commented upon

(25).

Concluding this review of some of the background for
the Sultan's decision to build the HR, it should be pointed
out that the lines'

background has been painted with some

wider strokes than were warranted by the boundaries set
for this inquiry in Chapter I.

-

This was done because - -

(25)
As for the emergence, after 1900, of the political
and military aspects of the HR, cp. notes 18-23, in which the
statements of Auler figure prominently.
Further sources that
should be mentioned:
Blanckenhorn pp 4-7, (who stressed the
importance of the line as competing in all respects with the
Suez Canal); Hartmann, pp. 13, 23 (in addition to pages 7,8
already mentioned); Hecker, pp. 128-129; Rohrbac l\;, p. 27.
Issawi and Karkar also referred to these aspects, though many
years later.
As light relief, of sorts, it must however
be noted that as late as 1906, Alt., p. 238, contrasted
the strategic and commercial importance of the Baghdad
Railway, with the "purely religious" (!!) purposes of
the . HR.
However, here too, the writer mention ~ the usefulness of the line for the suppression of rebellion in the
Yemen.
He also referred to British nibbling at the edges
of the Ottoman Empire.

the HR was the first amongst the railways actually built
in Palestine that had truly international implications.
It perhaps would never have been built--and by the Turks
themselves, an event without precedent--and it certainly
would not have been pushed forward with the determination
actually devoted to it, had the line been intended for
local use only.

-

Thus, some space had to be spared--for

once--for a description of the line's concepts that overstepped the confines of Palestine proper.

Failing this, the

line and its building could not be seen in their proper
focus.

Finally, it must be added that the HR as envisaged

in 1900, and as later built, was a latter-day successor,
almost step-by-step, of the biblical "King's Highway"
(Derec ~ Harnelekh)
Haj"

and of its successor the Moslem "Darb el

(Pilgrim's Road).

local roads,

as pointed out in Chapter I; they were

international highways,

•

These ancient highways were not

and part of the system of communi-

cations that made Palestine a "Bridge".

Their importance

could not be gauged except by a reference to their terminals
in Syria (and possibly Asia Minor)
done in C~

ter I.

and in Arabia--as was

Much in the same way, the concept

underlying the HR could not be properly outlined without
referring to its implications outside Palestine, as was done
above.
Doubts and their Refutation
The very idea of the Ottoman Empire •

building and

operating a state-owned railway 1 met only disbelief, or

\t~)

downright ridicule,

People were

from outside observers (26).

not inclined to believe that the notor~ously inefficient,
slatternly 1 and technically backward 1 Turks, would be able
to carry through, or even start building, a 1,700 kms . long
railway from Damascus to Mecca, and t h at in a geographical

~*4;

context that ranged from neglected and partially depopulated
areas to downright

-

waterless desert.

Disbelief

in the capacity of the Turks seems to have been so abysmal,
that the proposed means of financing the line--not by means
of the usual concessions and kilometric guarantees, but
through all-Moslem donations

(as noted abov e)--did not

seem to have even formed the subject of discussions.

It

was obvious to observers that in view of the ingrained
predilection of the Turks for graft and peculations
that had beceme a tradition, any donations that came in
would inevitably disappear before being put to the use for

-

which they were intended.

There was no reason to expect

••-•••·-~t

that what probably was the greatest state-initated

project ever undertaken by the Ottoman Empire would ever
come to a successful conclusion.
In the event1 all observers were confounded.
HR was ~egun, it was financed,
least as far as Medina)

The

it was completed (at

and it was put into operation with

(26)
As for the outside world's disbelief in Turkish
capabilities:
Cp. General von der Goltz Pasha's introduction to Auler; Blanckenhorn, p. 3; Guthe, p. 28;
Hecker, p. 1063; Issawi, p. 252; Pal. 1908, p. 128.

The railway
network of Palestine
about 1907 .

Ii
11

()

Note the rail-gap
between north and .._
south , and the proposed I
Afule-Nablus-Jerusalem
branch of the Hejaz
Railway , that was never 'j ,.
completed between
Nablus and Jerusalem.
In the top , righthand, corner of the map :1
The French Damascus'
Meserib line , and ,
ralleling it , the
mpeting Damascusera ' a section of the
•1
Hejaz Railway .
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great speed.

Having been finished,

i t probably was the

only railway in the world that had no loans to pay off,
no interest payments to consider, and no debt at all.
It became probably the biggest, and perhaps the only 1
Turkish state-initiated undertaking ever successfully
concluded.

Incidentally, the HR became the only tangible

expression the idea of "Pan-Islamism" ever had

•

Building the Hejaz Railway -

(27).

A General Survey

As far as can be ascertained, the Turk's lost no
time in implementing the Sultan's Irade' of May 1900.

In

the autumn of that year, on September 1st, to be exact,
work was started.
accession

The date was that of Abdul Hamid's

(28), and in the following years was to mark

the opening of the various sections of the line, ending with
the inauguration of the last section of the railway to
Medina on September 1st, 1908.

•

A "General Board" for the

construction of the HR, acting under supervision, or
patronage 1 of the Sultin , came to hold sittings at the Yildiz
~

...c...../

Kiosk kt'" Constantinople.

The Chairman of the Board, actually

or possibly nominally, on account of his other tasks,
was the Grand Vizier.

Members included Izzet Pasha (the \

(27)
Cp. the articles, "Hijaz Railway" and "PanIslamism" in the Encyclopaedia of Islam.
(28)
Cp. Hecker, · p.
1907, p. 278.

1064; and

especially, Pal.,

driving force of the whole undertaking), the Minister of
Public Works,

and other dignitaries

(29).

The General Board

seems to have been active until about the fall of Abdul
Hamid in 1909, and supervised the building of all the HR, I I
I

t"

except for its branches built after the Sultan's deposition
( 3 0) .

Obviously, the General Board could hardly direct day-

to-day activities on the line from Constantinople,

and there-

fore a local board was appointed with its seat in Damascus
to supervise actual building.

The head of the local board,

apparently with the title "Director-General", became
Marshal Kiazim Patfl a,

a professional soldier, and the

commanding officer of the 5th Army Corps stationed in
Syria.

This curious two-hatted appointment that went to

Kiazim throws some light on the links that existed between
military considerations and the HR, even at that very early
stage.

•

Kiazim Pasha, whatever his military merits,

(29)
Cp. Poenicke, p. 2, quoting the "Frankfurter
Zei tung" of December 1 O, 190 O.
For this, and additional
details, see also Hecker, p. 1064; Alt. 1904, p. 220; and
Alt. 1905, p. 278 and also pp. 350-351.
(30)
It seems that some time after the Young Turk
Revolution, instead of the Grand Vizier, or the Ministry of
Public Works, the Ministry of War 'became responsible for the
HR.
It is quite certain that after 1911 the Evkaf (Wakf)
Ministry, that controlled the administration of religious
holdings, took over the line, in order to mark it as religious
property.
This was probably done in order to keep it out ·
of the clutches of unbelievers--presumably the French.
The
French, as will be detailed later, shortly before the
Great War, tried to take over at least the profitable
Haifa-Damascus line of the HR.
Exact details, however,
remain obscure.
Cp. Hecker, p. 1073; Poenicke, p. 13;
Ruppin, p. 300.

certainly did not have the organizing capabilit i es for
building a railway (31).
There is reason to believe that the sanguine intention
of the Turks was to use for their very own railway, not only
local equipment exclusively--except for locomotives--but also
to use only local manpower, exclusively Mo s 1 em ( 3 2 ) •
the event i t seem~ t ~

-

ome very clear at the outset that

Turkish-made rails were unuseable,

and wagon production

was limited to a few special vehicles, of which the most
note-worthy was a "mosque-wagon", fitted for ritual ablutions
and,

according to one source, provided with a collapsible

minaret, 6 feet high (33).

-

In

As for the all-Moslem work force,

(31)
Kiazim is mentioned by Poenicke, p. 3, and also
figured in reports of the Jewish Zionist Press.
Auler, p. 26,
characterized him as a forceful organizer, but from his photos
he seems to have been an old man.
Cp. also Blanckenhorn, p. 9.
Kiazim was replaced about 1902--perhaps temporarily--as he
still figured in the opening in the rail section to Ma'an,
acting as driver of the locomotive hauling Auler's train.
According to Poenicke, p. 4, he was replaced by Nazim Pasha.
Alt., 1905, p. 278, mentioned an ''executive commission", headed
by Reshid Bey, Vali (governor) of Beyrouth, and including
Nizam ed-Din Bey, Kaimaka lt\, (lower-rank governor) of Haifa.
Perhaps this committee, also engaged in building the HR, was
sort of ~I!>
for lower-ranking officials.
It was never
mentioned again.
(32)
For the Turkish intention to manufacture rails and
wagons, cp. Hecker, p. 1064.
For the intention to use only
local manpower, Alt., 1904, p. 220.
(33)
For the inability of the Turks to produce rail equipment
cp. Hecker 1064.
For the "sumptuously outfitted" mosque- v.(l,gon,
see Alt., 1905, p. 307; Auler ( 1906) p. 43 1 and Auler (1908), p. 63.
The minaret was mentioned by Carpenter, p. 242.
There is some
reason to believe, that the mobile mosque was, in British mandatory
times, turned into the state-wagon of the Emir (King) Abdallah
of Transjordan.
Abdallah's state-wagon still exists (minus wheels)
on the grounds of the Israel Railways workshops in Haifa BaY•
It was there seen by the writer in 1975, serving as the synagogue
of the workers in the workshops.

\b\)

this seems to have been divided into two categories:
For the problem of ob-

professional and non-professional.

taining unqualified workers, an ingenious solution was
found.

This was the employment of army troops, on a large

scale, a procedure that will be discussed later on.

But

as for the professional manpower needed--the ' entire lack of
engineers with railway-construction experience in Turkey,

•

threatened to put an early end to the whole HR scheme .
This state of affairs was forcefully characterized by a
despatch to the German "Frankfutter Zeitung" of December 10th,
1900.

The despatch described the utter

helplessness of

the Turks in the face of the necessity of taking practical
s ~ s to start building their line--as decided on by the
Sultan

(34).

Thus, the Turks, willy-nilly, had to turn

to foreign technical consultants.

One of them was the German

expert, Kapp von GUltstein, who in 190l 1 following a direct
request of Abdul Hamid,

and after a field trip, prepared a

memo for the Sultan, outlining a proposed track of the HR,
in its first sections

(34)

Also,

(35).

In the same year, 1901, -

cp. Poenicke, p.

i,.

(35).
Pal., 1907, p. 278.
Kapp prepared another memo
in 1905 and seems to have given important counsel while the
HR was being built.
When called on for advice by the Sultan,
in 1901, he was engaged in building the Rayak-Hama railway
for the French, though he was German.
He is variously
described as "Ge}iei-rat" (Secret Counsellor) and "Geheimer
Baurat" (Secret Construction Counsellor), which was a high
rank.
He was also mentioned by Hecker,, p. 1062, and Auler,
pp. 47, 66.
His name was variously given as Kapp, von Kapp
and Kapp von GUltstein.

\t

an Italian engineer, by the name of La Bella, was hired,
apparently as chief construction engineer.

He fell down on

the job and was replaced by the German Meissner

(36).

Details and dates regarding La Bella are lacking and there
are indications that his successor had been decided upon
already late in 1900.
On December 6th, 1900, the German Ambassador at Con-

-

stantinople informed his Foreign Office in Berlin that the
German engineer, Heinrich August Meissner, had accepted the
Turkish government's offer to act as chief engineer in charge
of the construction of the HR (37).

As will be detailed in

this, and in the following chapter ( dealing with railway
construction in the First Wolrd War) 1 the appointment came
to be of considerable significance in the fortunes of the
Near East.

At the time

it occurred, in 1900, it marked

the extension of German influence--though personified by one

-

man only--into a part of Turkey where it had not been obvious
be fore.

Until comparatively recently, very little indeed

was known about Meisser, far less than about the JaffaJerusalem line's Yossef Na vo n.

His biography, and this a

spare one, was only publised in 1958.

In view of the many

references to his activities in this, and in the following

(36)
Cp. the article "Hijaz Railway" (p.
Encyc,l opaedia of Is.lam ; v ~. Tu 1 \\,(l,,,,\)'" ~6-i,'o.-..,
(37)

Poenicke, p.

3.

364)

in the

chapter

(IV), the recording of some details about bhis

remarkable man, will not be out of place

(38).

Heinrich August Meissner was born 1862 in Leipzig,
Saxony, and died 1940 at Constantinople.

He grew up in

Dresden and finished high school at 19, in 1881.

In

1885, he graduated as Bau-Ingenieur (building engineer)
the Technische Hochschule

(Technical College)

from

in Dresden.

He first went to Turkey in 1885, at the suggestion of an

•

uncle, who worked in the Turkish capital.

He definitely

returned to Turkey in 1887, having in the meantime taken
courses in Turkish,
in Germany.

and amassed some ~

al experience

Railway construction in the Ottoman Empire

at that time was in a process , of expansion and many new lines
were envisaged

(39).

Meissner, on returning to Turkey,

became engaged in building railways chiefly in the Balkans,
under the supervision of the expert, von Kapp--already
mentioned above as the man who lent his expertise to the

•

(38)
Biographical details about Meissner have been
taken mostly from Poenicke's short study of the man and his
work (cp. bibliography) published in 1958.
It might be noted
that no details whatever about Meissner, or even his name,
could be found in any German encyclopaedia, contemporary or later,
or in any technical publication or biographical handbook.
Meissner himself does not appear to have published anything, as,
dest@te diligent searches, his name could not be found in
the catalogues of German libraries.
(39)
About railway construction in Turkey in the 1880's,
cp. Karkar, Grunwald 'Tftrkenhirsch") and Issawi, pp. 91-93.
All these sources are \ isted in the bibliography.
Issawi
mentions the impetus given to railway construction in Turkey
at that time by the German (he may actually have been Austrian)
Wilhelm von Pressel.
Also, cp. Poenicke, p. 2.

Sul tan

(40).

Meissner gradually worked his way up to

senior engineer, chiefly apparently, because he displayed
iron will power, acquired fluency in the Turkish language,
adjusted himself to conditions in the country, and got along
well with his superiors and subordinates.

At the end of

1896, Meissner was posted to Constantinciple as "sc i entific
chief for railway construction"
Leif er fU.r Eisenbahn-Bauwesen").

•

-ii...

("wissenschaft ~
..,,,.licher
Thus, when he was offered

the post of chief constructor , of the HR, he had some 15
years of practical experience in railway building in Turkey
to draw upon and he accepted
run for three years,
fact,

and i t

(41).

His contr~ct was to

was extended later.

In

when he had finished his task in 1908, after the

HR had reached Medina, his contract had to run for more than
one year .

What influence on Meissner~ appointment his

former chief, von Kapp may have had cannot now be verified.
,
,
I
.
As a high-ranking engineer, with considerable experience

•

in Turkey and {unlike the middle - class Meissner) with a "von"
to his name, he must have been a very prestigious personality,
and he was probably inclined to push the interests of a

(40)
For Meissner's training under von Kapp, cp.
Pal. 1907, p. 279.
Meissner worked at various times on
the lines:
Bellowa-Vakarel, Izmit-Angora, Thessoloniki-Monastir,
Thessaloniki-Dedeagatch.
Cp. also Poenicke, p. 3.
(41)
Cp. Poenicke, pp. 2, 34.
References to Meissner's
appointment, its implications and consequences, are so
numerous in the available sources that they cannot be listed.

fellow-German whom he had come to know from his work.
Once appointed, Meissner fixed his headquarters at
Damascus,

so as to be in touch with the local commission,

headed by Kiazim Pasha.

He later seems to have had a house

at Ma'an, too, when the building of the HR had progressed
towards the Hejaz.

Meissner had a huge organizational

problem that faced him.

•

But first he had to plan the layout

of the line, probably basing himself on the preparatory work
done by von Kapp.

In this he was helped by the work of the /

frequently mentioned1 Turkish engineer Haj Mukhtar Bey, who
became one of his chief assistants.

Mukhtar Bey had done

the preliminary tracing of the new line possibly even
before the appointment of Meissner

(42), and he certainly

continued it in cooperation with him.

However that may

have been, most of the decisions and a great part of the
work in the field fell to the more experienced Meissner, who

•

also bore the final responsibility

(43).

In any case,

Meissner was able to lay out himself only the Transjordanian
section of the track with which this survey is concerned,
and the section to the south of it, to El Ula, i.e., the

(42)
Auler, p. 27, said that Mukhtar Bey had set out
on his
way
"shortly after the publication of the Sultan's
,
Irade" (on May 1st, 1900).
Cp. Also Pal., 1907, p. 37.
(43)

Poenicke, P.

4.

more difficult stretches of the line from the point of
geography.

Further south he was not- - even as chief engineer--

permitted to go, as Christians were not allowed to enter
the confines of the" S acred" land of Hejaz.

This fact is

mentioned here because of its curiosity value

(44).

Mukhtar Bey's procedure for laying down the preliminary tracing of the HR was as ingenious -as it was
indicative of the influence of history on the building of

•

railways in a country crossed by ancient highways.
railway builders elsewhere, who normally

Unlike

(though not always)

had a wide choice of possible routes, Mukhtar had his
trace planned for him by the geography of Transjordanian
Palestine, and by the dictates of past experience.
Mukhtar faced the task of planning a railway from Syria
to Arabia.

Consequently, he joined in 1900

latest; dates are not certain)

the "Haj", the yearly

pilgrim's caravan from Damascus to Mecca.

•

(or 1901 at the

He jotted

down his observations while the pilgrim's caravan
bavelled down the ancient "King's Highway" that led south ,
along the border between the Transjordanian plateau ~ and

(44)
For Meissner's inability to enter the " sacred"
Hejaz, cp. hecker, p. 1065, and also Poenicke, P. 4.
Also, Alt., 1905, p. 279.

\\f)

the Syrian Desert to the east of it (45).

Meissner, besides
),

persona ll y surveying the northern sections of the proposed
line, based his final layout of the track on the notes of
Mukhtar Bey, and on the maps sent to him by his Moslem
assistant.
While Meissner had to consider climatic and geogr~ hic-environment a l

difficulties rarely faced by similar

undertakings, he at least had one advantage.

•

Apart from

his terminals, Damascus at the one end and Mecca (or
Medina as i t turned out)

at the other, he had no other

fixed points to worry about, no intermediate towns of
sign~ficance had to be touched and served.

As far as was

practicable, he could build his railway in a straight line
and this he did,

as reference to maps will prove.

One

immediate by-product of the line--of importance also from
the general view of the welfare and security of the areas
traversed--was the building of a telegraph-line, that

•

apparently considerably preceded the laying d0wn of the
rails themselves

(46).

The final shape of the track, as it

crystallized after some alterations necessitated by French

(45)
Auler, p.

+k,

l,6-w»l6-,,

For Mukhtar Bey's joining the Haj ca r avan,
27, 1a_nd/'_Blanckenhorn, p. 34. ~61, «.i~cAt, UAd

l,\P, ~ . ,

j ~·

"l

(46)
Cp. Auler, p. 27; Blanckenhorn, p. 35.
The railway telegraph was laid down for the special benefit of the
builders, but there seem a to have been state-owned
telegraph lines in parts of Transjordania, not connected
with the HR, cp. Alt., 1906, p. 155, and Pal., 1907, p. 37.

- 'Cl Qopposition a in the Hauran while the line was being btiilt,

The layout of the HR south of

will be discussed further on.

Ma'an/Mudawara, that in any case was only of relative interest,

.~

will not be discussed • l47).

However,

for the sake of corn-

pleteness it should be mentioned that the total length of
the HR 1as proposed in 19oo1 was some 1700-1800 krns, the exact
kilornetrage would have depended on the, at t h at time, not yet
finalized trace.

Of this 1 the stretch Darnascus-Mudawara,

on the border of the Hejaz, with which alone the present
study is concerned, was some 572 krns long

(48).

from Mudawara to Medina was some 730 krns long.

The section
The section

from Medina, via the port of Jidda, to Mecca, planned but
never built, would have been some 510 krns long

(49).

(47)
Detailed descriptions of the track of the HR will
be found in Hecker and also in Auler's monographs of 1906 and
1908.
There is also a description, though only of part of
the line (to Batn el-Ghul) in Blanckenhorn.
Talbot (cp.
bibliogra,-rihy h ,...oJl-l _~<:_ _ de sc;:- ib¥d the _0HR and hct!=l .i,.P. teresting photos.

\\u.~~~.lY· ~·11,) a.l!.a&- ~

•

Ow v'---6-y~

,.,._Ke.-~.

(48)
There is no distinct geographical line dividing
Transjordania and the Hejaz; but Mudawara (more exactly the
scarp at Batn El-Ghul, not too far away) is usually taken to
mark the border between the two areas.
There, too, the political border between Saudi Arabia and Transjordan has passed
since the middle 1920's .
(49)
The figures regarding the length of the HR were
taken from Blanckenhorn, pp. 38-39, and Hecker, pp. 1316-18.
Other sources may give slightly different distances.
Blanckenhorn and Hecker referred to the line as actually
built.
If the line had included the French Hauran railway
via Meserib,as had originally been planned, instead of the
Darnascus-Dera'a stretch, total length would have been some
12 krns shorter.

\H,)

As already mentioned, construction of the HR began
in the autumn of 1900, even before Meissner joined th~
project.

It is not generally known that building the line

did not start at Damascus.

Th e f irst stretch of the

track was laid from the terminu s ef the French Ha u ran 1 line
at Meserib towards Dera'a

(50).

The HR had, naturally, been planned to run south from
Damascus, along the top of the Transjordanian plateau

•

towards the borders of the Hejaz.

The first area it would

have had to cross was the grain-rich Hauran.

However, since

1894, the French-built railway Damascus-Meserib had already

been running south, across the Hauran, closely following
the old Pilg~im's Highway to Mecca.

The logical intention

of the Turks was to buy the French railway (a southerly continuation of the Beyrouth-Damascus line), and to convert
it into the first section of the HR ( 51).

Indeed, the spec-

tacle of the Turks building their own separate railway across

•

the Hauran, right
preposterous.

alongside the French one, would have been

The French thought so too 1 and therefore

started raising their selling price

.

(52).

Haggling seems to

have gone on for some time and meanwhile the Turks started

(50)
The French line Damascus-Meserib, opened in 1894,
was dealt with at the end of chapter II.
(51)
Incorporating the French Hauran railway in the HR
would have saved the Turks building some 12 3 kms of track.
For their original intention:
Alt., 1906, pp. 239-240;
Auler, pp. 27-28; Hecker, p. 1065; Pal., 1902, pp. 46-44 ;
Ruppin, p. 299.
(52)
For the rapacity of the French, cp. sources listed
in note 51.
Cp. also Alt., 1904, p. 220, and Pal. 1907, p. 38.

building the first 14 kms of their line towards Dera'a.1
with the intention of turning south from there, towards Zerka,
Amman and Ma'an (as they eventually did).

Their intention

also was--they had no choice--to bring in their rolling-stock,
rails and equipment via the French Beyrouth-Damascus railway,

across the Lebanon and Hermon ranges, to Meserib (53).

This they did, to the . great financial benefit of the French
Hauran line

•

(which they tried to buy).

All of a sudden

the normally dormant French line, that had been built in
the 1890's to kill the British Elias-Pilling-Hill line from
Haifa,
ment

and after succeeding had not proved a good invest-

(54),

showed growing and unexpe c ted profits.

The

profits made by the French owing to their exorbitant
prices--they had the monopoly on heavy transports--again drove
up their selling price

(55).

Indeed, the French seem to

have assumed that they could blackmail the Turkish

•

(53)
For the Turkish dependence on the French railway regarding transport of material from the harbour of Beyrouth,
see Auler, p. 32; Carpenter, p. 32, Poenicke, p. 6; and Woods, p. 53.
(54)
For the fight of the French against the proposed
British Haifa-Damascus railway, cp. the end of the previous chapter.
(55)
For the benefits gathered by the French by their
price-gouging, see Alt., 1904, p. 24, where an increase in
French net earnings of some 116,000 Francs in 1901 (the year
transports started) as against 1900, is noted.
The same
source also noted that earnings went on increasing to 1904
(when the Turkish branch to Haifa--to be described later-came into operation).
Cp. also Poenicke, p. 6, note, who
quotes the German Consulate General in Cairo regarding the
Hauran lin~s inflated prices.
Cp. also Poenicke, p. 10•
Alt, 1904, p. 260, also mentioned French earnings from the
transport of Turkish material.

government, because without the use, or qcquisition, of their
Hauran line, the construction of the HR could not be proceeded
with.

Dickering over the purchase price seems to have gone

on for a year

(perhaps more,

there are no exact details).

Anyhow,.. meanwhile on September 1, 1901, the first section o-f
the HR, Meserib-Dera'a had been completed, and Meissner and
the Turks could now think of continuing the track from Dera'a
to zerka

(56).

A reference to the map will show that the

first 14 kms section to Dera'a, ran west-east, in order to
permit an unimpeded continuation to the south. The line from
Meserib could not have been carried on straight towards the
south as i t would have been blocked by the upper gorge of
the Yarmuk river.

Even if it would have been feasible to

cross the gorge, the further progress of the line south
would have been stymied by the Ajlun Hills.

The more easterly

track, actually followed down from Dera'a, promised a continuation unimpeded by natural obstacles.

-

•

(56)
According to Auler, p. 28, it was the Turks
in particular who wanted to buy the Hauran line, while
Meissner himself on May 1st, 1901, started building not
only the Meserib-Dera'a section, but also (!) the DamascusDera'a main line.
According to this source, Meissner
stopped building south from Damascus only because the
Turks kept on haggling with the French.
Perhaps, Meissner-the German--£rom the beginning wanted to kill the. French
line.
The data furnished by Auler for the start of the
work, May 1st, 1901, is more · .: a ·c ceptable than·. the normally
given date, September 1st, 1900, as it -is hardly possible
th~t Meissner ne~ded a full year to September 1st, 1901, to
build 14 kms •

An incidental result of the utilization of the Hauran
railway during the first stages of the building of the HR /
and a result whose consequences last• to this day, was
Meissner's decision to fix the gauge of the new line at
This was a most unusual gauge,

1,050 mm.

even considering

that the Turks at the outset had decided on a narrow gauge
railway, as this was cheaper in every respect than the
normal: width tracks used in Anatolia and also easier to
build (57).
precedent

A 1,050 mm gauge at that time was without

(and still is), but it was chosen by Meissner

because it happened to be the gauge of the French BeyrouthDamascus-Meserib line.

It thus would enable him to move

the HR rolling stock directly from Beyrouth Harbour and on
to the new track without troubling over gauge breaks

(58).

Thus, when shortly afterwards the French changed over to
building their lines in Syria on the normal gauge, 1,435 mm,
the HR was left without through-running capability between

-

Anatolia and Damascus and with a gauge-break at Rayak.

This

was to have fateful consequences during the First World
War,

as will be described in chapter IV.

Meissner could

(57)
For the gauge of the HR, and its adoption:
Alt., 1904, p. 220; Auler, pp. 32,36; Hecker, pp. 756,
1312; Ruppin, p. 297.
A check of professional publications
of various years like the "Railway Directory" and "World
Railways" will show, that the 1050 mm gauge was in the past,
and still is, unique.
(58)
It should be noted that the French themselves
discontinued building 1,06'0 mm tracks within months after
they had caused the HR to build on that gauge.
Their
Syrian line Rayak-Hama, finished 1902, and Hama-Aleppo.,
of 1906, were built on the normal gauge, 1,435 mm,
apparently because they wanted to link their Syrian network
with the German Baghdad Railway, then being pushed
towards Northern Syria.

•

•

The Haifa terminus of the Hejaz Railway ' s branch to :::lera ' a and
Damascus . Aerial photo taken b;-,r German aviators late in forld 'Jar I ,
hence the empty rail-yard .
Bottom right-hand corner:Jetty with two rail spurs extending into
the sea . This jetty , built by Meissner approxinately 1903-05 , and later
widened by fil1ing , played a vital role in the unloading of rolling
stock , rails , equipment , and coal , from ships unto the new railway . Top
of picture looking south- west .

( Sourc e:Dalmann , 100 Flieeerbilder )

Pic~ ,chapter III .

l'l-o)

not foresee this in 1901.

What made the French ' in the

l890's choose the 1,050 gauge i n the first place is
entirely unknown.

It may possibly have been the wish to

isolate the 1,000 mm Jaffa-Jerusalem railway.

More

likely, it may have been the necessity to widen the normal
meter gauge favoured by the French in colonial areas, in
order to fit locomotives with the mechanism of the Abt rackand-pinion system that was indispensable for climbing the
steep sections of the ascent over the Lebanon range f .
The system is still in use today.

Whatever the reason,

the 1,050 mm gauge was to survive in the Middle East for
75 years.
By 1902 Meissner had been in charge of building
operation
the HR,

for almost two years, and another section of

80 kms long,

from Dera'a to Zerka was duly

opened on September 1st of that year

(59).

Meanwhile, the

Turks, i.e. , 'the General Construction Board, headed by

•

the Grand Yizier in Constantinople, and the Local Building
Board at Damascus, had had ample time to become exasperated
with the attempts at blackmail of the owners of the Hauran
line.

It was,

as far as can be made out, in 1902, that two

rather momentous decisions were taken to break the French
strangleh~ rd over the fledgling HR.

These two steps

were either suggested by Meissner, or strongly supported
by him.

How far the fact that Meissner was a German,

(59)
Opening dates, throughout, · are based on
Hecker, pp. 1076 - 78.
Auler also had dates, also Poenicke.

- 2-,rl -and his opponents French, influenced his attitude,
remains a moot point.
One decision was to build a line Damascus-Dera'a,
as the first section of the HR.

This was to parallel

the Hau ran line Damascus-Me ser ib, which the French
refused to sell at a reasonable price.

The second

decision was to start building a branch railway from

•

Haifa to Dera'a .

This was designed to move stock and

building materials from the Mediterranean to Transjordania over a purely Turkish line, thus neutralizing
the French-run harbour at Beyrouth, and the French line
to Meserib

(60).

As for the reasons for the first decision--it seems
that the French, confident of their strong bargaining
position, insisted on selling only for 7 million Gold
Francs,while

the Turks after prolonged negotiations, were

prepared to go as high as 6 . 5 million Gold Francs, but no

•

more .

The French, i.e., the DHP

ments Company)

(the Damas-Hama et prolonge-

would not budge owing to their

(mistaken)

assumption that the Turks would never build a second line
through the Hauran.

What clinched ' the argument in favour

of the Turkish parallel railway was Meissner's offer to
build the 123 kms section Damascus-Dera'a a t

the cost of

30-40,000 Francs per km, which, at the most would have
run to 4,920,000 Francs

as against the French price of

(60)
Blanckenhorn, p. 4, said expressly that the Turks
did not want the "sac red" HR to be controlled by a feeder
line operated by unbelievers.

~>

7 millions

(61).

As a result, the Turks, actually Me~ssner,

started building their very own Damascus-Dera'a section,
concurrently with the continuation of the trunk line from
Dera'a to Zerka, in the south.

It seems that1 in fact 1

they did not start construction at Damascus

(except per-

haps for earth works), but began to lay their track from
Dera'a to the north,

•

as at Damascus there was no link

with the French railway from Beyrouth over which materials
were broug h t.

For a time tracks seem to have been pushed

forward from Dera'a simultaneously towards north
and south

(Zerka).

(Damascus)

Material for the HR was for a time

carried from north to south over the French Hauran line
via Meserib to Dera'a.

From there it was moved north

again to build the section to Damascus that was to compete
with the Hauran line, over which the material had been
brought in the first place.

That is, the Hauran line,

which the French had refused to sell, was instrumental in

•

assisting in its own downfall .

The world, at large, and

(61).
Cp. Pal. 1902, pp. 46-47.
Also Alt., 1904,
p. 220, and Alt, 1906, pp. 239-240.
Also see Blanckenhorn, p.
Further to this subject:
Hecker, p. 1065, stated that
failing to get their 7 million Francs, the French in 1904
were awaro.ed -., in compensation, 3.4 million Francs, and the
concession for the Hama .,- A.li:ea,o railway.
Ruff in, p. 300 /
said the same in effect, on ly he mentioned Lt °'. 150,000
in compensation.

4.

the, probably fuming, French, were in due course treated
to the unlikely spectacle of the sparsely inhabited, and
relatively desolate1 Hauran being served by two railway
lines running alongside each other, sometimes at a distance
of only a few hundred meters, with some god-forsaken Syrian
villages actually being served by two stations

(62).

The

French Hauran line that had been built--as noted before-to kill the proposed British Haifa-Damascus railway of 1892,
had now been hoisted by its own petard, being destined to
be undermined by the Turkish HR.

In due course, there

was to develop a price-cutting war between the two lines

(63).

Meissner was able to put the Damascus-Dera'a stretch,
123 kms long,

into operation on September 1st, 1903

(64).

The French promptly sued and were uitimately awarded less
than half of the 7 million they had asked for their line
originally, and also got a building concession in the north

(62)

Cp.

chapter II, note 198.

(63)
Hecker, p. 1545, said expressly that after its
completion, the HR deliberately lowered tariffs, in order
to fight the French competition.
Poenicke, p. 7, says quite
explicitly that Meissner decided in 1902 to build the HaifaDera'a branch (of which more in the following text) in order
to hurt the F,rench, "for commercial reasons."
(64)

Hecker, pp. 1066, 1078.

(65)

Cp.

note 61, above.

(65).

- ?;3o Meissner had become an instrument of poetic justice, and
the French Hauran line passed out of history.
known if,

and when,

it ceased operations.

had not quite done with it.

It is mt

But Meissner

At the beginning of the

First World War, the rails of the French line were ordered
by Meissner to be taken up,

to be re-used on the Turkish

military railways he was building (66).
As for the second decision of the Turkish authorities
namely, to build a branch of the HR trunkline from Haifa
t o Dera'a, this had the effect of introducing the HR into
Palestine proper.

The first step towards the building

of the new branch, was the purchase 1 by the governmen ~ of
the remaining effectives of the defunct Elias-Pilling-Hill
railway, whose concession had lapsed about 1898
purchasing price was Lt ~ . 155,000.

(67). The

At the tim ~ the event

may have seemed to have been an event of local importance
only 1 but in fact it was a step fraught with very weighty

-

consequences, both in peace and war, leaving its imprint on
all the remaining years of Turkish rule in Palestine to
1918.

It might well be argued that to have called this

section of Meissner's overall project, merely a branch of

(66)

Cp.

the first part of chapter IV.

(67)
Cp. Pal. 1903/04, p. 240, quoting the German
Consulate in Beyrouth.
Also Blanckenhorn, p. 14; Hecker,
p. 1065; Ruppin, p. 300.
The Elias-Pilling-Hill line was
described towards the end of chapter II.

the HR was a gross misnomer.

In fact i t was nothing less

than a latter-day revival of the often-proposed HaifaDamascus line, hailing back to the days of SursOck, Oliphant1
and even earlier, and quite an independent Palestine Railway
in its own right, that for historical and technical reasons
utilized for part of its run the tracks of the Pilgrim's
Line to the Hejaz.

-

If further proof was needed of the

tentative links of the Haifa-Dera'a-Damascus track with the
Hejaz project, it might be found in the fact that never,
in almost 50 years of operation, scheduled trains ran
cluding special occasions)

(ex-

from Haifa to the Hejaz, or

even to Transjordania south of Dera'a Junction.

They

invariably ran from Haifa to Damascus, and vice-versa
(and in fact continued doing so for about 30 years after
1918, while the Hejaz main track was derelict).
All the Turks inherited from the British-sponsored
Haifa-Damascus

-

emains
embankment (68).

in

Just as Meissner had been working simultaneously on two
Transjordanian sections of his railway

V"'"

(Dera'a-Zerka, and

Dera'aDamascus), he now repeated the process.

While the

HR trunk line progressed south from Zerka to reach Katrani
(124 kms in all, via Amman)

on September 1st, 1903

(the

I

same day the line also reached Damascus), work was started

(68)
Cp. Auler, p. 2r7,; Blanckenhorn, pp. 13-14;
Pal., 1903/04, p. 240.

0 9 the Haifa branch on 11 April 1903, to reach Beisan

t1,u,,

.t .~ WdA14:~1lfA641,i,g,""-~1 ~~,~~~€...,..\.er-~~

(at 59 kms) on January 14, 1904. Y"on May 24, 1904, the
line reached Jisr el-Maja lli:i

(today's Geshe r ), on the

Jordan, 17 kms from Beisan.
with

An indication of the urgency

which the line was now being driven forward, will

be furnished by the opening dates 1 that for once, unlike
on the main line,

-

did not at all conform to the day of

Abdul Hamid's accession

(69).

Perhaps the broiling climate

in the Jordan Rift Valley had also something to do with
the opening dates,

as Meissner probably tried to have the

section in the valley ready before the onset of the summer
heat.

Jisr el-Maja• i

halt, whose location below sea-level

was variously given as -246.5 or -247 meters 1 was the lowest
point on earth ever reached by a railway.
The next stretch of the line, Jisr el-Majall,i,

Samakh

(today's Tsemah), to its junction with the track Meserib-

(69)
Dates taken from Hecker, pp. 1076-78.
A glance
at the dates will show that only the Haifa-Dera'a branch
was opened piecemeal, as sections were being finished.
There
were reports that trains on this bran~h were run before
tracks and bridges had been entirely finished.
The
Haifa-Beisan stretch, opened officially in mid-winter of
1903/04 seems to have run trains sometime in the auttimn of
1903, cp. Blanckenhorn, p. 15.
The Jisr el-Majalill,i-Dera'a
section, as Blanckenhorn, pp. 26-27 1 told it, operated while
bridges were still unfinished, necessitating gransfers from
one train to another, waiting on both sides of an unfinished
bridge.
The main line sections, on the other hand,were
invariably opened on September 1st, Abdul Hamid's day of
accession.

Dera'a, was declared open on October 15th, 1905.
was,

This

far and wide 1 the most difficult to build, and expensive,

section of t h e HR as a whole.

It led up the steep Yarmuk

Gorge, from the Jordan Valley to the Trans ' ordanian Plateau
about Dera'a.

It was apparently declared open while

some bridges there were still unfinished,

and the track

unsettled enough to be carried away by winter flash-floods
(which aspects will be referred to again).

•

But the

cardinal fact was that by late 1905, the Haifa-Damascus line
at long last had become a reality . ..

This section of the line,

to where it joined the very first stretch of the HR,
2 kms south of Meserib, was altogether 73 kms long

(70).

This building feat had been accomplished in the astoundingly
short time of 18 months, as work in the Yarmuk Gorge had
presumably been carried on from both ends,
and from Dera'a.

from Samakh

In due course, after the line had been run

i~ the 2 kms , of track linking the French terminus at Meserib

•

with the new section were taken up

(71).

The French Hauran

(70)
The section through the Yarmuk Gorge was opened
on 10.15.1905 as correctJ..y stated by Hecker, ·p. 1078.
On
p. 1066, he mistakenly dated the line to 1904.
Auler, p. 28,
dated the opening, erroneously1 as Sef>tember 1st, 1905.
Sickness amongst the workers moved the date by 6 weeks, cp. Alt.,
1905, p. 279. Poenicke, p. 11, also erred in giving the dat ~ '
as 9.1.1905.
(71)
As for the length of the link line to the
French Meserib station-- 2 kms in all--cp. Alt., 190jJ
p. 348.
Blanckenhorn, p. 28, about 1905 stated that~
kms )+w.i-J...
was still there.
Hecker, p. 1066, writinef about 1912/13,said
the link line had been taken up.
This was only natural, since
with the completion of the Haifa-Dera~
branch, the French
Hauran line was no longer needed by the Turks, after 1905.

line to M~rserib, now became once more a dead-end, and
Me i ssner's stubborness and determination had won out over

--

Hence_.f orth, Haifa replaced

the rapacity of his opponents.

Beyrouth as the Mediterranean outlet of the HR.

Through

its harbour installations, improved by Meissner

(as will

be described further on), supplies for building the HR trunk
line were moved, until it had reached Medina late in 1908.
Thanks to Meissner, Turkish rolling stock, equipment, and

•

also fuel, were no longer held to ransom and the "sacred"
Pilgrim's railway became free of foreign tutelage.
While the Mediterranean branch of the HR was being
pushed forward,

the building of the main line itself

proceeded at no mean pace.

The section Katrani-Ma'an, 132

kms . long, was completed with great festivity on September
1st, 1904.

The - special train Damascus-Ma'an, bearing

dignitaries from Constantinople, and at their head Turkhan
Pasha,

•

the Minister of Evkaf

(religious properties), had

,

Kiazim Pasha and Meissner by now

also Pasha

throttle of the locomotive

Thus, the HR had now

(73).

(72), at the

reached the southern limits of the inhabited areas of
Tr an sj ordan ia.

On September 1st, 1905 the section Ma'an-

Mudawara, 113 kms long, was ina~gurated.

Mudawara is

(72)
Cp. Poenicke, p. 9.
Meissner had been made a
Pasha, an extraordinary distinction, in March 1904.
(73)
For the opening ceremony, cp. especially Auler,
p. 69, passim, but also Poenicke, p. 4.
All dates have
been taken from Hecker, pp. 1066 and 1076-78.

approximately the southern lim i t
survey,

of the area covered by this

and thus the further progress of the HR into the Hejaz

will not be dealt with,

except for a few dates to round off

Tebuk, 120 kms , from the Mudawara, was

the general picture.

reached on 9.1. 1906, El Ula, 287 kms from Tebuk was reached
The last section of the HR,

on 9.1.1907 .

323 kms 0 long, to

Medina, was opened on September 1st, 1908, shortly before

•

The final stretches of the line,

Abdul Hamid's ouster .

inside the Hejaz, were built "telepathically" by Meissner,
who was barre"d. from the sacred - Hejaz on account of being a
On-the-spot supervision was carried out by

Christian.

Mukhtar Bey and probably other Moslem engineers Meissner
.

had trained.

' ~~

Yearly construction average ~

Damascus to Medin ~

<~ ~

~llCl..-.

2 kms l from

eight years, had been very high, 163

~~~. . /

kms yearly ;'<"by any standards, even for civilized and
climatically easy countries.

South of El Ula, though1 the

line's tracks had been finished very roughly, perhaps

•

owing to the need for speed, perhaps because Abdul Hamid
wanted to see his prestige : project completed.

The last

323 kms ~ of the line were more in the nature of a field -

+i.ut served

railway, but ~
In Medina,

anyway,

well enough for a decade,

an imposing station was built

to 1918.
(74) .

This closes the general description of the building of the

(74)
Cp. Hecker, p. 1067.
For the f0rtunes of the
HR south of Ma'an, in the First World War, cp. chapter IV.
For the rehabilitation of part of it after 1960, cp. chapter V.
According to Blanckenhorn, Abdul Hamid was too he si,ila nt
to inspect the HR in person, while it was being bui'It , but
kinematographic pictures of it we~e shown to him.
The imposing
rail terminal at Med i{#) is shown·· on two rare photos in the
travelogue by Moritz • (cp. bibliography).

The following section

HR trunk line and its Haifa branch.

will be devoted to details pertaining to the project.

Building the Hejaz Railway - Details:
The Financial Base of the Line
When Abdul Hamid decided on building the HR in 1900,
the Turks faced three,
lems:

•

A.

at that time seemingl.y

Financing the line; B.

Actual building .

insoluble, prob-

Technical planning;

c.

As set forth above, they succeeded in

solving all three problems, with the help of Meissner.
It should be noted that Meissner's · success added to ~ he
stature of Germany in the eyes of the Turks--he at least
finished his project while the Baghdad Railway was not
completed until 1940.

He also raised the prestige of

Germany in the world as a whole

(75).

But it must be

stressed, that no evidence could be found that Meissner
ever had official Imperial German backing.
Financing and building railways in the Ottoman Empire
had always been an involved operation (76).

It became,

therefore, quite a surprising fact that the only state-owned
railway in corrupt Turkey1 built and operated through
desolate areas, that promised no early, or even any,
returns, became the only railway in the world that had
no trouble whatever in financing its construction, that

(75)
Cp. Talbot, Woods, Ops. (see bibliography), who
are but a few amongst the many who praised the building of
the HR.

-·2snnever came to be in financial difficulties of any conseque n ce 1
that had no debts,

no loans to repay, no interest due,

no stock holders clamouring for dividends.
competition,

and

It did not fear

its budget was evey balanced, and i t usually

had some surplus of income over expenses.

This remarkable

state the HR owed to the fact that from its beginning it
had been billed as a "sacred" undertaking--probably the on~y

•

railway in history on which such a designation had ever
been bestowed.

Its fixed income was based on two sources,

funds coming in from inside the Ottoman Empire,
coming in from outside sources.

and monies

Donations that came in from

now-Turkish areas, ranging from French North Africa, through
Egypt, to British-India, the Dutch East Indies and even
China, were truly voluntary gifts

(77), &ffered to the

Sultan-Khalif as the head of Islam.

However, outside

donations were overshadowed 1in terms of money, by contributions from inside the Empire, some obtained by more or

•

less gentle prodding.

To these were added sums funnelled

into the HR by the Turkish government itself.

All these

funds came to be regarded as hallowed to the Cause of
Islam,

and,

according to Meissner himself, were the only

funds in all the Empire untouched by graft and peculation

(78).

( 7 7) Cp. Blanckenhorn, p. 7,
who already about 1906
estimated donations from outside the Ottoman Empire to have
reached the equivalent of 15-17 million Francs, while still
continuing to come in.
(78)
Cp. Poenicke, p. 3, who quotes Meissner as cited
by the German Consulate General in Cairo - (6 . 22.1904). Poenicke
also states that when Meissner took over about 1901, funds
for the construction of the HR totalled 13.5 million Francs,
while by 1908, donations had passed the 74 million Francs mark.

~~)

Apart from outright donations, the HR was to have, and
had, the use of monies and other tangible assets, as follows:
1.

Regular income from government taxes, customs and excise

dues, stamp taxes,
2.

and deductions from the income of officials;

J rregular income 1 from levies on titles and decorations 1

and receip Bs from the sale of skins of beasts slaughtered
during the Koorban Bairam Fest i val;

-

3.

Proceeds from the

production of coal mines in northern Anatolia(probably
Ere g li)

and from the exploitation of natural resources in

Transjordania, around · the Dead Sea (salt? phosphates?)
and in the Yarmuk Gorge

(shales?).

no details became known;

Regarding the l a tte r revenues

4. The right of acquisition,

free

of charges, of unlimited stretches of land, needed for the
construction of the HR track;

5. Free use of gravel £or

ballasting, and of building stones for stations and bridges;
6. Probably free delivery of wood, where available, from
private sources
these funds,

(79).

The entire cost of the line, built by

both according to Hecker and Ruppin, was 95

million Francs (80).

(79)
Details from Blanckenhorn, p. 7; Auler, p. 25-who put the average yearly income of the sacred railway at
7.5 million Francs; Ruppin, p. 300. Pal., 1903/04, p. 112,
published a quaint list of forced contributions from dignitaries in exchange for honours:
1,000 Piastres for the
Grand Cordon of an order, with diamonds, 500 Piastres--without
diamonds.
Passport dues were also funnelled into the line.
Also, on the subject see Hecker, pp. 1064, 1084, 1315.
(80)
Cp. Hecker, p. 1315; Ruppin, p. 300.
In Alt.,
1905, p. 306, there will be found a detailed financial
report of the HR for an average building year, probably 1904.
The report showed a considerable credit balance of 36.2
million Piastres, on a total yearly income of 205.5 million
Piastres.
Unfortunately no means could be found to convert
Piastres into Francs 1 but the proportion between credit balance
and total income is significant.

Manpower and Construction Speed
The helplessness of the Turks when facing the necessity
of converting the grand design of the HR into ~ctual fact
has already been alluded to.

So

\a.as

also the appointment

of Meissner 1 who converted Abdul Hamid's project into reality (81),
in appreciation of which fact he was raised--as also already

-

noted--to the rank of Pasha in March 1904
became the "soul"

(82).

Meissner

("Seele") of the HR (83), but even he

needed helpers, and thus assembled round him a team of engineers,

though a remarkable small one.

According to one

source, Meissner's helpers in 1904 totalled 25 Turks and 10
foreigners.

The Turks seem to have been trained on the job.

According to another source, Meissner's assistances, sometime
in 1905, numbered 43 altogether, amongst them 17 Turks, 12

(81)
Cp. Poenic k& pp. 2-3; also Woods, p. 53S.
Meissner in the beginning seems to have been signed on for
a period of 3 years.
This was sr•
11 I 7&
later extended by
another 6 years.
His appointment would have lapsed only 1.1,-IS
months after the actual completion of the HR to Medina in
1908.
Cp. Poenicke, p . 10, quoting the German Consulate in
Beyrouth (9.21.1908).
In 1910 Meissner book up a topranking engineering post . with the Baghdad Railway, only
to return to Palestine in World War I, for further railway
construction.
Of this1 more in Chapter 4.
( 82)
( 8 3) •

Poenicke, p.

9.

Alt., 1905, pp.

307, 351.

Germans,

5 Italians, 5 Frenchmen, 2 Austrians, 1 Belgian

and 1 Greek (84) .
mainstay;

Germans seem to have been Meissners

at least one of them seems to have died while

building was underway (85).

It should be mentioned here

that another German beside Meissner, or rather after Meissner,
held an important post with the HR.

~

This was Paul Dieckmann,

~ vf"~~) j

who fro'rr~":r 908 onward seems to have acted as traffic manager.

-

He reorganized the railway after Meissner's departure
be dealt :

(to

with later)/ and after the young Turks came to

neglect the line following Abdul Hamid's fall
mann was to become a key figure,

{86). Dieck-

at the side of Meissner

in World War I as will be noted in the following chapter.
He also published some articles on the development of railways in Palestine c in the 1920's 1 as will be mentioned in
Chapter V.

Anyway, while the Germans were on the job, the

Turks did not lack capable men for top level planning and
management.
As for the actual day-to-day construction of the new
line,

that led through sparsely populated, sun-baked country,

and later on through downright arid wildern~s~ the Turks in

(84)
Cp. Auler, p. 25, and Blanckenhorn, p. 9.
There
were other references to Meissner and his team:
Alt., 1904,
pp. 218, 261; Alt., 1905, p. 278; Pal., 1907, _pp. 204-205
(where the Sultan's order to Meissner to look into the
question of constructing a harbour at Haifa is mentioned
incidentally); Pal., 1907, p. 279; Pal., 1908, p. 128.
(85)
Blanckenhorn, p. 15, referred to the death of the
engineer Keller while building the Jordan-Meserib section
of the HR Haifa branch.
(86)

Hecker, p. 1073; Poenicke, p.

15.

-'2..,C(<,

Right:Time- table of the French
Rai lway Damascus- Meserib . Note the
a dditional information , and t he
reference to t he fact t hat Kisweh
village also had a station of the
rival He j az Railway .
( Source:Mei stermann ,
Guide ,1 907 )

lo Mizirib
1

. KESSOUE

J ourney· XIX.

48'5

Fares .-1s t class , 75 piastres 30 pa ras, equal 15s. (about ) ; 2nd class,

50 piastres

20

pa ras, eq ual 9s. 6d.

The~e are also y d class carriages.

Tim e -Table of Trains
STATIONS.

l

--

Damascus-Beramke, .
Damascus-Midiin . .
Dar,lya
:
Sahnava .
Kessoue
Khan Denoun .
\.·
Zerakie
Ghabaghib.

-

-

\: !
I
I

I

A.M.

I

STATIONS.
Sunamein
K eneia
Qouteibeh
Scheikh-Meskin
Dael
Taffas
Mezerib

6.o
·6 .30
6.45
6.57
7.32
7.36
8.1
8.18

I

A.M.

1--·-

--1

!

8.50
9.9
9.25
10.5
' 10. 29
10. 46

I

11.0 '

r

The train returns the same day at noon, and arrives at Damascus-rviidan
at 5 P.M. and a t Damascus-Beramke at 5.25 P.M. •

•

Bot tom: Post- 1918 phot o of
Meissn er ' s original iron bridge
ove r the river Yarmuk , in the
Jordan valley . Note Roman bri dge
showing under i ron span .The
proximity of the old r oad , and new
rail , bridge , tends t o show that
l ines of communicatio n did no t
appreciably change their l ayout
over the centuries .
(Source :Br i tish Naval
I ntel ligence Handbook , ca .1 919 )

Damascus-Beramke Station.-The railway skirts the western
side of the town, crqssing the gardens.
Damascus-Mida:ri. Station. - This is the central station at
the end of the Midan. The line continues alongside the Pilg_rims' Road, L!e1;b. el Hadd.f, and runs in a southerly dire ction
right up to Mezenb It crosses the smiling plain of Ghouta
covered with gardens and orc hards.
'
Daraya Station (about 3½ m iles) .-This is a large village
~.here t~e basements of an ancient Roman temple, rectangular
m form, are yet to be found .
Sahnaya Station (about 6 miles).-A village situate on the
Black Hills, D.febel-Asouad.
·
Nearly 3 miles to the west of the station stands the village of
K aukab and the Mar Boulos- (see p. 480), where the crusaders
encamped o_n the occasion of the first ill-fated expedition against
Damascus m rr22 . Then we traverse the fertile valley of el
Adfem and ·arrive at
·
~ e_ssoue (nearly 12 miles).-This large village is inhabited
pnnc1pally by Druses. \ I t is also a station on the Hedjaz rail~ay. The Nahr el A_ouad.f, _which passes by Kessoue, is the
n ver P harphar mentioned m the Bible in connection with
N aamar1's being cu_rec\ of -leprosy (see
463). It runs into a
. . . p. .••______.-'"
~

Pick ,
chapt er III .

STEEL GIRDE R BRIDGE OVER THE n. YARMUK JUST ABOVE ITS JUNCTION W ITH THE JORDA: N,
Km. 7\J OF THE HAIFA-DER'A RAILWAY. J JSR EL-11:\.NHUS, AN OLD ROMAN BRI))GE, ABOU'

::;oo YARDS UPSTREAM.

They

the beginning faced a serious manpower problem.
solved i t in an ingenious--and money-saving w~y.
used conscripted soldiers as their work force.

They
These

included specifically raised and trained railway-construction
battalions, pioneers and communication troops for specialized work, and plain infantry regiments for unskilled
labour.

At first the soldiers worked side-by-side with

civilian labourers,

raised by local contractors.

track moved into ever more desolate areas,

As the

subject to

Bedouin attacks, both hired labourers and contractors
became balky, and the importance of the soldier-workers
under military discipline grew, until they practically
took over construction work.

Their numbers rose from

about 2,600 men at the beginning, to about 5,600 sometime
later (about 1903), to some 7,500 men about 1907, plus
1,800 men working at the southern end of the track in the
Hejaz 1 reaching a final total of over 9,000 men (87).

-

These men received their regular army pay, plus additional
sums out of the funds of the railways.

The additional

pay was calculated according to the work done,
pitifully small.

and was

However, the men seem to have worked

with religious fervour throughout, on their "holy"
railway, despite the attacks of Bedouins, the lack of water,
that had to be carried to the railhead by train, the

(87)
Auler, p. 26; Blanckenhorn, p. 8; Poenicke, p. 5.
There were other references as well, for instanc~
Hecker,
p. 1065.

harsh climate,

and sickness, like an early cholera epidemic (88).

It was only thanks to the patient, uncomplaining, work of
its uniformed slaves that the Turkish government was able to
carry out its undertaking, at insignificant expense, with
which no other railway construction project in Turkey could
compete.

The fervent dedication of the Turkish conscripts--

many of whom seem to have been kept under the colours even
after their 3 year term of service was over (89)--and the

•

apparently faultless organization of work procedures carried
out by Meissner

(90), resulted in work being pushed forward

at a phenomenal pace--already commented upon above.

Rail-

laying may have been carried out occasionally at the top-rate
of 2-3 kms a day.

Depending on whether the construction of

of the Haifa branch is included in the averages, yearly
construction rates have been variously given as between 150
and 183 kms yearly, with 163 kms per year1 as noted above,

•

(88)
Cp. Auler, pp. 48-52, who provided harrowing
statistics.
The digging of 1 cubic foot of earth brought
1 Piastre, a mini_scule sum.
Digging up rocks paid slightly
more.
The daily earnings of a soldier did not seem to have
exceeded some 3 Piastres.
Officers received an unspecified
amount of extra pay.
Auler also provided interesting details
and photos, as to how the work of the soldiers was organized
and carried out, apparently with no mechanical equipment
at all and only by means of shovels, pick-axes and sheer
brawn.
Cp. also Blanckenhorn, pp. 8-10, and Hecker, p. 1315.
(89)

Auler, p.

( 9 0)

Auler, pp.

51
48-50; Blanckenhorn, pp. 9-10.

In the last year of construction

the most

1907-1908, a construction rate of 323 kms was reached, as

also noted before, though this was in the Hejaz outside the
area dealt with in this survey

(91).

As has also already been noted earlier 1 in another context, while the new line was still being built in more or
less settled areaB,

•

civilian contractors and their labourers

had been hired--and available--to work beside the soldiers .
The civilian work force was used mainly to build more
intricate edifices,

like stations and bridges over wadis,

while the soldiers amassed some experience in laying rails,
and stringing telegraph wires.

But the further the track

moved into the desert, the less were the civilian contractors,

and their workers, prepared to risk their earnings,

or their lives.

In the end most of the work on the line was

done by Kiazim Pasha's conscripts

(92).

As the soldiers

were less adept at building bridges than their civilian

••

counterparts, it seems to have been a frequent occurrence
that rail laying went on faster than the completion of
bridges,, with the curious result that, so as not to s l o w . -

(91)
Details on construction rates can be gleaned from
many sources.
Most important amongst them:
Auler, p. 53;
Blanckenhorn, p. 10; Hecker, p. 1067.
(92)
Auler, p.
Poenicke, p. 7.

49; Blanckenhorn, p.

10; Hecker, p. 1065;

construction, rails were temporarily laid down into dry
wadi beds, and out again on the other side, until the
bridges were completed.

This was to have dire results

when the flash-floods of winter arrived (93) ,.

The Layout of the Track
Some details should be added about the track layout

•

of the HR, which,
over 70 years,

incidentally, remained unchanged for

excepting the stretches of the Haifa branch

that ~eased operating altogether.

Only the trunk line

from Damascus to Mudawara will be dealt with, and the
branch to Haifa, and their extensions.
the track,

The remainder of

from Mudawara to Medina, approximately 730 kms

long out of a total of 1302 kms, will be ignored as not
falling within the limits of this survey.
Then

~\.\,,

3

line of the HR from Damascus to Mudawara,

was some 572 kms long and was declared open on September 1st,

I

1905 (94).

A reference to one of the many available maps ~

that show the track of the HR 1 will prove that its layout
was adopted

with three chief considerations in mind:

track was to be led,

A.

as far as possible, parallel to the

Pilgrim's Highroad from Syria to Medina and Mecca, that is
in as straight a line as was feasible,

(93)
Alt., 1906, p.
pp. 10, 26, 35, 49.
( 9 4)

52; Auler, p.

Hecker, pp. 1066, 1316-17.

from north to south,

49; Blanckenhorn,

The

and later, towards the south-east; B.
were to be avoided as far as po-sible.

Natural obstacles
Therefore, at least

in Transjordania, the track was to be lead along the top
of the plateau, not far enough east to encroach on the
confines of the Syrian Desert, and not far enough to the
west to oblige the line to be built across the . headwaters
of the big wadis that flow from the plateau into the Jordan

•

Ri ft Va 11 e y •

In fact,

crossing the important wadis of

Transjordania was successfully avoided everywhere.

The

wadis were the Sheria el-Menadire/Yarmuk, the Wadi Zerka/
Yabbok (except in its flat easternmost reaches) 1 the Wadi
zerka Main

(Arnon)

I

and the wadis Mojib, Kerak and el-Hesy.

In fact the only sizeable river actually crossed by the HR
after it had been built, was the Nah el-Awaj,
of Damascus; C.

Existing water resources were to be util-

ized, as far as possible,

-

just south

Le., thg#, track was to pass,

if

at all feasible, past the wells and artificial rain-water
pools of ancient vintage that were dotted along the Pilgrim's
Road ( 9 5) •
The northern terminus of the HR in its first years,
was Kadem Station

(696 meters above sea-level), in the

Meidan suburb on the southern outskirts of Damascus.

On

(95)
Amongst the many maps showing the track of the
HR, the best ones are those attached to Blankenhorn and
Guthe.
Ruppin and Woods also have adequate maps.
The
maps contained in publications dealing with the HR in the
First World War, for instance, Ops., are also very detailed.
The layout of the HR, at least to Mudawara, will be found
on most modern maps.

12.31.1911 the line was extended 3 kms north into town, to
the imposing new Hejaz Station

(96) •

Later, the state-

owned main station was linked by a short spur with the
French-owned Beramkeh stations, to the west of it, the
terminus of the railway to Rayak and Beyrouth (97).

From

Damascus the HR track ran in graceful curves--to avoid
local hills--generally parallel to the Derb el-Haj,
crossing on its way the Nahr el-Awaj

•

(the ancient Parpar).

It left to the east the impassable basaltic are 4 of the Lejja,

(9 6)

Hecker, p.

1078.

(97)
The history of the railway stations serving
Damascus, though only indirectly pertaining to this survey,
is not uninteresting, and perhaps deserves rescue from
oblivion.
A background to i t is provided by the map of the
environs of Damascus in Meistermann's Guide (cp. bibliography)
of 1907.
As noted in the text, the original terminus of the
Turkish HR was Kadem Station, in the Damascus suburb , of Meidan.
The t~ack of the HR was later extended 3 kms parallel to and
very near the French Hauran railways track, into Damascus,
tothe Turkish Hejaz Station.
According to Luke's Guide (cp.
bibliography) of 1925, Kadem Station seems to have been called
Kanawat Station for a time, later to revert to the name Kadem.
The French Beyrouth-Hauran Railway had its
main terminus at Beramkek, Station in the western part of the
town, and from there turned south in a wide curve to Meidan
Station, in the suburb of Meidan, whence it continued south
to end at Meserib.
The French Meidan Station is not to be
confused with the HR's Kadem Station, situated very near it,
also in the suburb of Meidan.
As noted above, the Turkish
extension Kadem-Hejaz Station ran parallel to the French section
Beramkeh-Meidan, but apparently was not linked with it for
some ten years.
For the missing link, cp. Hecker, p. 769.
It seems, though there are no proofs in documents, that only
when the French line to Meserib was taken up by the Turks
at the beginning of the First World War, the French section from
Beramkeh to the south was finally linked with the HR at Kadem
Station, the French Meidan Station being left derelict.
The
section Beramkeh-Kadem, linking the French and Turkish tracks,
became of vital military importance in the
Great War, as it
joined the HR ( to Sinai and the Hejaz ) with the French-built
railway leading to Rayak and north, to Aleppo and Anatolia.

and crossed the Hauran plain, to reach Dera•~ 123 kms from
Damascus

(529 meters above sea-level), on the Wadi Zedi,

the headwaters of the Yarmuk.

From Dera'a the track of the

line turned east in a wide sweep, to bypass the Hills of
Ajlun,

and then continued south

(east of the Pilgrim's

Road, but parallel to it), passing Zerka, to climb a tributary of the Wade Zerka/Yabbok, up to Amman, at km 222,

-

737 meters high.

Amman at that time was but a small Circassian

village, and did not figure largely in the descriptions
of the railway.
Just south of Amman the track hit its most difficult
section.

It had to overcome a NE to SW ridge that could not

be avoided.

In the process the line had to climb in hair-

pin bends, over a distance of 12 kms, to a height of 941
This involved an unusually steep gradient, 20:1,000

meters.

(i.e., a climb of 2 centimeters over a distance of 10 meters),
as against a gradient of 18:1000 that was normal on the
line.

This particular section also involved the building

of extraordinarily narrow curves of 100 meters radius,
as against the 125 metre radius curves built elsewhere on
the line.

The section south of Amman necessitated building

a bridge containing 10 arches, each 12 meters wide.

To

this section also belonged the biggest edifice on the whole
HR.

This was a double-tiered viaduct, 20 meters high,

containing 14 arches, each 6 meters wide

(98).

Just south

of this viaduct it also became necessary to bore a tunnel,
140 meters long, the only one on the HR main line.
various places

(Ziza, Katrani, Kala'at Aneizeh)

Passing

the line then

climbed gradually, always paralleling the Pilgrim's Road,
to Ma'an, at km 459, 1,074 meters above sea-level.

It was

on this stretch of the line that lack of water began to
trouble building operations.

Some of the water was supplied

by artesian wells, but most of i t had to be taken from
ancient and reconditioned cisterns and pools

(i.e., tanks

of the Indian type), that depended for their contents on
winter rains,

if any.

near such sources.

Most of the stations were located

While Meissner could,

and did, later

provide for the water needs of normal service by ordering
locomotives with extraordinarily large water-tenders, during
the period the line was built, water troubles multiplied the

-

farther the railhead crept into more arid country, and workers
as well as building operations had to be provided for.
their . relief Meissner nu ~ ed water trains , ~
\.oo,~

~
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sou th of Ma'an the track of the HR turned south-east
to climb the highest point it was to reach, 1,168 meters at
km 515.

From here the line descended down the esca~ pment

that is generally taken to form the boundary between the
Transjordanian plateau and the northern Hejaz.

The

(98)
A photo of the viaduct, which played a role
in World war I, w·ill be found attached to chapter IV.

descent was accomplished, ~

what was then regarded as

a considerable technical feat- - in a series of double-hairpin
curves, necessitating very extensive cutting operations.
The descent, 5 kms long, led into the poetically named Batn
el-Ghul

(Belly of the Monster), at 994 meters, and from

there the track continued to Mudawara, at km , 572, on the
border of the Hejaz.

-

The whole 113 kms long section from

Ma'an to Mudawara led through practically waterless; 1 ,
3a .

g desert

(99) .

Thus differences in height on the HR

as a whole ranged from - 247 meters in the Jordan valley to
1,168 meters in southemTransjordania.

Technical Details:

Trunk Line

On the trunk line between Damascus and Medina
are no details as to the stretch to Mudawara only)

(there
Meissner

and his aides built 462 bridges ~ d 1,070 culverts, 1,532
... P~~eo,U~
edifices in all,'t""'all constructed of stone, with arches 3-12
meters wide.

There was also one iron bridge, 15 meters

(99)
The details listed in the text regarding the
layout of the HR were assembled from Auler, Blanckenhorn,
Guthe, Hecker and Poenicke (cf. bibliography), who all
had plenty to say on the subject. _ Blanckenhorn and Poenicke
also had relevant photos.
Many references to the HR and its
layout will be found in the German Zionist publications,
that have already been quoted liberally.
See especially Alt.,
1904, pp. 347-349.
An interesting contemporary account of
the line, including photos, will be found in Talbot (see
bibliography), pp. 117-127.
A recent descrippion of the
HR and its history, including map and interesting photos ✓
was published by K. Becker in the German periodical "Orie~t",
1963, pp. 193-195.
The author apparently had visited j~~ (),t,,,.,!
Saudi-Arabia in the 1960's.

long, over the Nahr Awaj.

Constructions were exceptionally

solid, and unless deliberately destroyed, lasted to this
day.

The lin~s rails, most apparently made in Germany at

Meissner's orders, weighed 21.5 kgs . per meter.
(cross-ties)

were 1 over most of the line, made of steel,

and not wood,

to avoid warping, owing to the extreme

temperature changes in the desert climate.

•

Sleepers

Curves of 100

meter radius were the exception, as - already noted, 125 or
even 150 meter radii being the rule.

Gradients, as noted,

were 18:l,000 1 those of 20:1,000 being the exception.

The

track was built to sustain speeds of 25-40 kms.p.h., which
was relatively high, considering the narrow gauge of 1,050
mm

(100).

Out of some 75 stations 1 altogethe~between Syria

and the Hejaz,

38 were located on the stretch Damascus-

Mudawara, in about 1906.

Later there were 39, one having

been opened, one close~ and the Hejaz terminus at Damascus

•

added

(101).

Most stations seem to have served as crossing-

~~4

points only--at least on the trunk line--as there wa~

ttle

(100)
The technical details assembled in the above
text represent a summary of dozens of references in many
sources.
Lack of space makes listing the individual sources
impossible.
However, they were checked and double-checked.
Details regarding the bridges will be found, for instance in
Auler, p. 33; Blanckenho~n, p. 14 passim; Hecker, pp. 1312-13;
Poenicke, pp. 9-11.
Likewise in Alt. 1905, p. 301, and also
elsewhere.
(101)
The stations of the HR, both trunk line and
Haifa branch, will be found in a separate appendix.

- :>v (passenger traffic, except for pilgrims going all the way to
Medina, and almost no goods traffic.
the minor ones,

Stations, at least

s~em to have had only two sets of rails,

with two switches

(points).

A few seem to have had goods

sheds, and loading ramps, usually unused, but useful for
military stores in certain eventualities.
of Which photos have survived (102)
built, of stones.

•

Station buildings,

were simply but strongly

They were two-storied, had some rooms for

staff, and sometimes for soldiers, and were fitted for defence against Bedouin attack.

The fact that the HR stations

were simultaneously fitted as strongpoints, thanks to
Meissner, was to cause T.E. Lawrence considerable trouble
in ~the Great War.

Stations were linked by telegrapha , but

apparently there were no signalling arrangements, and none
were needed, as the incidence of traffic was not expected
to be dense.

Trains were despatched

graph reported the line to be clear.

as soon as the teleSome stations,
•.

•

however, were imposing buildings, such as the Hejaz Terminal
in Damascus, that was built for show, and still stands.
(There was also a hands0me station at Medina).

Other big

stations were Damascus-Kadem, Dera'a, Amman and Ma'an

(103).

As evidenced by rem~ining photos, and maps, these biggish
stations had multi-storied administration and staff buildings

(102)
Photos will be found in Auler,
Philly, Poenicke, Steuben, etc.

Be~ er, Moritz,

(103)
For details about the stations, cp.
p. 1314, also Auler, Blankenhorn, and Poenicke.

Hecker,

I

\%)

goods-sheds and f aci li ties

(sleeping quarters)

for tr ave 1-

Each had several sets of tracks for shunting ,

lers.

most

had engine-sheds and turntables, or reversing triang ~ es.
There were, ultimately, big and well - equipped workshops
(run by their own electricity supply)
seem•

also to have been extensive servicing facilities at

Dera'a and lesser ones at N a'an.
I

•

at Damascus. There

Ma'an also had extensive

barracks for the troops protecting the line.

A hallmark

of the bigger stations 1 and of many of the smaller ones,
were their characteristic water towers, supple mented in
most cases by wind-driven pumps, that drew water from the
wells bored by Meissner, where geological conditions were
favourable.

So much for the trunk line of the HR (104).

Technical Details:

T-he Haifa Branch

As for the main branch of the HR--the Haifa Dera'a

-

line--its rather chequered history beginning with the Sursock
and Oliphant projects of the 1880's has been dealt with
I
elsewhere in this survey.

Tne following pages will deal

with this line in its more down-to-earth aspects, its
layout, stations, and t&chnical details.

Above all, i t

should be noted, b y way of introduction, that this line--

(104)The t echnical descrip ~ ion of the HR main line
has been much shortened fro if: he original draft of this
chapter.

Westerf

alestine's second railway after Navon's Jaffa-

Jerusalem line, was destined to be of considerable importance for the country, commercially in peace time,

and

militarily (thanks to the Sinai extension i t was to sprout)
in wartime.

The building of this branch of the HR was

also Meissner's responsibility (105).
The terminus of the Haifa railway came to be located
just east~ of what used to be the eastern wall of the old

•

town .

There 1 a handsome station building was put up,

probably about 1903 -05

(there is no date) 1 that for a time

was to serve as the headquarters of the new branch.
Next to the station, a stone memorial-column, that still
stands, was to mark the building of the line.

Actually,

the track of the new line continued some distance north-west
\.. ( 6v

of the station, onto a solid stone-built p~
into the sea.

i.c."'-J..J
at jutted

The pierj also built by Meissner,(though

again the date cannot be fixed)
and passenger traffic.

served commercial lighters

But its main purpose became to

assist in the construction of the new line, equipment and
coal being discharged over it.

Over it were unloaded not

only rails and sleepers, but also locomotives, passenger
carriages and goods wagons, that enabled the Haifa branch

(105)
For sources for the following details,
the ones listed in notes 99-100 above.

cp.

\\\t)

to dispose of quite considerable rolling stock,

long before

it joined the HR trunk line at Dera'a and became--as had been
intended in the first place--a supplier of the trunk line
too

(displacing the French Hau~an railway).

In fact,

the

Haifa-Dera'a line c ould not have been built at all without
the handling of all its equipment over Haifa pier.

This

pier was furnished in due course with adequate mechanical

-

handling equipment, that enabled it, under Turkish auspices 1
to render the same services , the French harbour at Beyrouth
had given the HR main line in its first stages.

Some 30

years later, Meissner's pier was incorporated in the Britishbuilt Haifa harbour.

There is little doubt that Meissner,

by building his unloading facilities 1 in a way laid the basis
for Haifa's later prosperity as a port (106).
From Haifa fue new branch led south-east, on top of
the defunct Elias-Pilling-Hill line that had been bought

(106)
Pal., 1907, p. 205, described Haifa's harbour
facilities in detail:
A stone pier 420 meters long (?? from
photos it might be assumed that it was perhaps 42 m long)
and 18 meters wide, with three cranes, of 18, 15 and 12 tons
lifting capacity.
It was stressed that the cranes were capable
of lifting locomotive boilers, from which it might be assumed
that disassembled locomotives were put together at Haifa.
Other railway stock was transported from ship to shore by
lighters.
Yearly imports through Haifa of coal from Britain
(for 1906) were given as 25-30,000 tons.
Equipment brought
in at that time 1 after the use of Beyrouth harbour by the
Turks was discontinued, included, apart from rolling stock,
rails in great quantities (20,000 tons for 1906) and wooden
and steel sleepers (5,000 tons).
Cp. also Pal., 1907, p. 38,
where it was stated that "everything is now being landed in
Haifa".

- ) bS(as previously noted) from the concessionaires .

It con-

tinued parallel to the Carmel range, and close to it, so
as not to get near the dange~ous bogs and quicksands that
skirted the Nahr el-Mukattah, the Kishon river 0 Here, as
during most of its course

(except in the Yarmuk Gorge) the

new railway adjusted to the dictates of geography, and
incidentally followed what used to be the ancient Shikmona
(Haifa)-Megiddo highway.

-

Some 4.5 kms out of Haifa there

was to be built a few years later, the s:ation of Beled
esh-Sheikh

(now Tel Hanan), the junction of the future

branch to Acre.

However, while the line was being built,

its first halt was at Shorrariy'\h, at km 11, within the
narrow pass between the Carmel range and the hills of
Sheikh Abrek (Beth She'arMif .

This pass had served from

times immemorial as the western gate of the Valley of
Jezre'el.

The railways used this gateway too, after

crossing the Kishon river on a handsome five-arched stone
bridge, a typi cal stone design developed by Meissner for
most of his river crossings.

Shomariy ~ h halt seems to

have marked the branching off of a short spur to a quarry,
from which ballast was taken for the track.
abolished after the necessity for it ceased.

The halt was
Shortly after,

the track parted company with the ancient track to Yokne'am
and Megiddo,

that turned east-south-east, following the

Carmel, and keeping to its floodless slopes.

The railway

kept going east,

straight across the swampy and, in winter,

flood-prone 1 Valley of Jezre'el.

But it enjoyed immunity

from floods owing to its elevated embankment.

Its first

station in the Valley was Tel-esh-Shammam (Kfar Yehoshua).
From there it continu~d, as the bird flies,
the Valley, to Afule.

This place was, in 1903, when the

line was being built, no more than a

-

straight across

couple of hovels, but

it was intended as a station for Nazareth up in the hills
of Galilee, some dozen kms~ to the north.

A few years later,

A~ ule was to become a most important railway junction on
the HR, after the extension of the railway to the south
(Jenin, Nablus and Sinai)

was taken in hand.

From Afule the rail track continued on a south - easterly
course, past Zarin

(ancient Jezre'el), where it joined

the old highway from Megiddo, the famous Via Maris, so often
mentioned in chapter I.

-

From past Zarin the rail trace

started dipping deeply into the Beisan

(Beth Shean) Valley.

On its way from Afule, at some 62 meters elevation, to
Shatta halt,

at -77 meters, the line descended 139 meters

within the distance of 14 kms, going below sea-level in
the process.

About Beisan station, at km 59 from Haifa,

121 meters below sea-level,the track reached the threshold

of the Jordan Rift Valley

(107).

From here the line turned

(107)
The layout of the Haif~ era'a branch, unchanged
since Meissner's days, can be checked on any reasonably-scaled
map.
The above description of the Palestine section is based
on Mandatory and Israeli 1:100,000 maps of various dates.

- 70'7-

--

What appears to be a s pecial Haifa Branch train for dignitaries ,
or staff , standing on the Ji sr el- Taj ami bridge over the Jor<1.an , ca.
1904.The bridge marked the lo vest spot on earth ever reached by a
railway, - 247 meters . Note light , and well-ventilated rolling stock.
Transjordanian Plateau in the background .
(Source:Auler)

One of Meissner 's imposing iron brid g es over the Yarmuk Gorge .
Another bridr-;e , all stone , shO\VS under t h e iron span . The work train
on the bridre included a flat-car with the two obligatory watertanks on it(at right end of central span) .
(Source:Auler)

Pick ,chapter III .

north into the Valley, descending ever deeper.

The track

proceeded in wide curves, winding around the sources of
the various wadis .

descending to the Jordan .

At km 76,

only 17 kms out of Beisan, but 126 meters deeper, the line
rea.ched Jisr el-Maj a ~

(today's Gesher), there crossing

the Jordan on a solid stone bridge

(108).

This was at

the time, and still remains the deepest po~nt on earth ever
reached by a railway, i.e., -247 meters.

•

Only 3 kms

further on, the line crossed the Yarmuk river, very near
its confluence with the Jordan, on another bridge.

Here1 for

some time after the line was built, there was a halt, Jisr
el-Saghir.

The name was taken from an old, at that time still

useable, Roman

(?)

bridge nearby.

The proximity of old

bridge and modern railway may have served as proof of the
fact that ' traffic lanes, whatever the period, are subject
to the dictates of natural features . that govern their layout.
From there the track started climbing, slightly at first,

•

on its way out of the Jordan Valley, to reach Samakh

-

(Tsemah), at the southern extrem• ity of the Sea of Galilee.
Samakh station served as the stop for Tiberias, with whiclt
for some time at least, there came to be a steamboat
service.

Samakh was 87 kms distant from Haifa, 186 meters

below sea level.

So far the new railway had encountered no

insurmountable natural or technical obstacles

(109).

(108)
A view of this bridge with a train on it1 and
taken from Auler, p. 5, is attached to this chapter ~
(109)
For the progress of the line, cp. Alt., 1904,
p. 23, 1905, p. 279, 1906, p. 240; and Hecker, p. 1316.
Other
sources might be found.

At the time the line was being built there was at least
one contemporary report that at one juncture it had been intended to continue the railway north, past Samakh, and then
round the northern shore of the lake, to pass Tiberias,
Majdal

(Magdala, Migdal)

and Capernaum

(Kfar Nahum), to

cross the Jordan near its debouchment into the lake

(110).

However, nothing further was heard of this plan, which might
have provided the town of Safed

•

distant rail connection .
of this layout,
not far to seek.

(Tsfath), with a not-too-

The reasons for the abandonment

if it was ever seriously contemplated, were
A line round the northern shore of the

lake would have had to pass the extensive swamps of the
B'teiha plain, after crossing the Jordan near its mouth
(near today's Almag~r).

From here it would have had to

~ontinue south-east along the shore of the lake,

finally

to turn east, to climb the Golan through the Wadi Samakh
(not to be confused with the townlet of Samakh, mentioned

•

above, not too far from it towards the south).

As mentioned

in the foregoing chapter, the possible ascent ~hrough the
Wadi Samakh, had already intrigued Oliphant. and Schumacher
in the 1880's.

But the ascent through this wadi would, most

likely, have been too short and steep for a railway to
climb.

It was also waterless.

Meissner had another plan.

As actually built, the new railway turned sharply,
almost due east,

(110)

from Samakh, and climbed to the Trans-

Alt., 1904, p.

23.

- '3tOjordanian plateau through the steep, very narrow, but wellwatered Yarmuk Gorge.

The availability of plentiful water

was crucial to the operation of the steam-locomotives
that were to haul the trains on the some 74 kms long incline
from Samakh to Dera'a, from -186 meters to 529 meters
elevation, a difference of 715 meters in all.

Here it should

be mentioned that the supply of water was so plentifur,

-

that within a short time after the line had been completed,
about 1908, plans were mooted to convert the railway to
electric traction, using the waters of the Yarmuk and of
its tributaries

(and utilizing probably, local waterfalls)

to drive the generating turbines

(111).

Nothing came out

of these proposals, though a generation later the Ruthenberg Electricity Project did indeed harness the Yarmuk
waters to produce power, but that was done outside the
gorge.

If the Yarmuk gorge ever did produce fuel,

it was

in the shape of oil bearing shales, that were burnt by
locomotives - in - the Great War- ~of which more in the following
chapter.
The section of the railway leading through the Yarmuk
Gorge from Samakh to Dera' a provea the most expensive, and
most , difficult to build on the Haifa Branch, and indeed on

( 111)

Hecker, p. 1314; Ruppin, p.

355.

the HR as a whole.

It was on this section that the line

struck out along a route that--an almost unique instance
in the history of railway building in Palestine--had never
before served as a route for travellers.
by far,

While most,

of the lines in Palestine had followed,

in their history, were to follow,

and later

tracks that had been

almost literally carved out by the feet of men and beasts

•

over the ages, Meissner made his track climb up where
no road of any importance had ever passed before, since
the Gorge had been practically impassable until opened up
by man-made improvements.
The railway ramp from the Jordan Valley to the Transjordanian Plateau contained originall r,- an'd after the
closing of Tel el-Shihab halt, only 6 stations, most
of which were designed only (in the absence of a dense
population)

•

for replenishing the water tanks of locomotives.

In some places the track of the rails was literally
carved out of the hillsides.
gorge,

The line , had to cross the

from one slope to the other, on some very elaborate

bridges, most built of stone, the very high ones of iron(l12).
In one place, a long detour had to be made into a sidevalley, in order to gain height.

Completion of some of the

(112)
Blanckenhorn (cp. bibliogrpahy) in his description
of the HR had some very striking views of the engineering
works in the Yarmuk Gorge.
His photos showed bridges completed'
and under construction and also tunnels.
Auler also had photos,
and also Talbot.
Photos will also be found in British Intelligence Handbooks of post World War I vintage.

- ~\ 2:..-

of the longer bridges lagged,

so while they were being

completed, auxiliary tracks were built in various places,
leading down to temporary st r uctures over the Yarmuk,
which the locomotives could cross only with much effort.
The number of bridges and culverts between Haifa and Dera'a
was 443, most of them in the Yarmuk Gorge.

Amongst the bridges

there were 6 iron viaducts, two with a single 50 meter span,

-

and 4 with three spans, of 30-50-30 meters, that would have
been considered imposing structures even by European
standards.

One of these viaducts, minus rails, still

stands today near El Hammeh, 26 meters high.

Iron

on stone

supports was used by Meissner in some cases, as the
extreme height of some of the bridges would have made an
all-stone structure prohibitively expensive.

However, there

~

were also numerous all-stone bridges, some very graceful,
with 6-12 arches, up to 12 meters wide each.

-

Some of these

bridges were destined to be attacked by Lawrence in 1918, and
at least one--by the Jewish "Haganah" in 1946.
The climb through the Gorge forced Meissner to
pierce also 8 tunnels through hills and spurs.

They

ranged in length from 40 to 227 meters, totalling
altogether.

kms

A.m0ngst them was even a hair-pin tunnel, on

the Swiss model,
meters ( 113).

1,1

containing a curve with a radius of 125

The steepest gradient was 18:1,000

(less

(113)
Most of the above details were taken from Auler,
p. 35 passim.
But valuable information will be found also
in Blanckenhorn and Hecker.

than on the main line south of Amman); the narrowest
curves had a radius of 100 meters.

Rails were of the

same type as on the main line, sleepers of steel.
of at least 30 kms p.h.
against 15 kms p.h.

Speeds

average, were antici ~

on the trunk line sectio ~

th of Amman) .

The total number of stations, after the line had been
completed, i.e., about 1910, was 15 (114).

•

While the

total rolling stock of the HR as a whole will be listed
later, it might be mentioned that in 1905, when the Haifa
branch was about to be linked to the main line at Dera'a,
its rolling stock comprised the following units:

6 tender-

locomotives, 8 passenger carriages, 2nd and 3rd class, all
German-made; 28 open and 34 covered goods wagons, made
in Belgium (115).
branch of the HR

So much for the history of the Haifa
(116).

Planned Branches Never Built
The Haifa~oera'a railway was by no means the only

(114)

The list of stations will be found in a separate appendix

(115)
A tender-locomotive, apparently one of Meissner's
early units, survives to this day in the "Ha'aret•" Museum, Tel-Aviv.
Another photo of very early date (1903) will be found in the
Entsiklopedia Ivrith, vol. 6.
The source of the details in the
text is Alt., 1905, p. 364.
(116)
As in the case of the section describing the HR trunk
line, considerations of space have made i t impossible to quote
sources for each and every detail listed in the text.
Auler,
Blanckenhorn, Gurhe, Hecker and Poenicke, were used as sources, as
well as the Zionist German periodicals Alt. and Pal. for the
years 1902-1912 approximately.

,~)

branch- of the HR envisaged during the period of Meissner's
activities in Palestine.

Some further branch-railway pro-

jects can be documented and were already fleetingly mentioned
earlier in this chapter. One, the line Amman-EsSalt, was never
built.

Another, the line Ma'an-Akaba, was a project that

led to an international cris i s in 1906, was briefly resurrected
in 1914, and came to fruition only in 1975, some 35 years

•

after Meissner's death .

One was a proposed line El HKsse n-

Meserib, never built, about which very little is known.
Finally, there was the railway Afule-Jerusalem, that Meissner
proposed, following much earlier suggestions, but was not
allowed to build.

This line was started some years after

his departure from Palestine in 1908.

It never got to its

destination, Jerusalem; and after a short stretch of it had
been built by 1914, was diverted by Meissner, after his
return to Palestine in the First World War, to Beer Sheba
and Sinai, as will be

•

chapter .

described fully in the following

These still-born projects of the century's first

decade will be dealt with--very concisely--in the following
pages. ~

ometime in 1894, the German geologist, Professor

Max Blanckenhorn, whose later monograph on the HR has been
liberally quoted in this survey, discovered a considerable
field of natural phosphates in the neighbourhood of Es-Salt,
in the central part of the Transjordanian plateau, not far
from the slope into the Jordan Rift Valley.

Though it later

became apparent,

following several spot-checks by British,

French and German experts that the quil.ity of the local layers
did not warrant their exploitation ~or export, the building
of a feeder-line Es-Salt-Amman, on the HR trunk line,
was mo ~

early.

It k a ~

It would have been 38-40 kms long.

eady mentioned earlier,

that the Turkish govern-

ment intended to exploit the Transjordanian rBsour~es in raw

-

materials for t he purpose of financing the HR.

The

Frenchman, Gaudin, about whom very little is known except
that from 1905 he acted for a time as Director - General of
the HR,

seems to have made strenous efforts to have the

phos ~ hates at Es-Salt exploited.

His intention was, no

doubt, to earn funds for the further construction of the line,
both by selling the minerals and by exporting them either
I

through Beyrouth or Haifa.
line was never built.

-

He was unsuccessful, and the

However, as already mentioned earlier

~n this chapter, i t continued to lead a sort of ephemeral
existence.

It was shown some years later as actually

extant 1 on an otherwise reliable German map, and was also
shown as late as 1917 on an equally reliable British map .
No less a man than Auler, the German Colonel and Turkish
~ eneral, who twice wrote monographs on the HR, as early
as 1904/05, regarded the prospective lin~ to Es-Salt as
the first section of a railway to link the HR at Amman,
across the Jordan Valley, with Jerusalem, and the British (sic!)

~

railway to Jffa.

He thus envisaged a second Turkish

trans-Palestine railway to the sea, apart from the one to
Haifa.

A British expert, Woods,

later had the same idea (117).

The second abortive branch of the HR, was the proposed
railway from Ma'an to the port of Akaba on the Red Sea.
Planning this line fell to Meissner.

Whether the idea was

his or the Sultan's cannot now be definitely established, but

•

according to a source in 1907 it had been Abdul Hamid's .
Meissner certainly pushed the project and was to return to
it, of his own volition, in 1914.

The exact date when the

project was first raised cannot be established either, but
i t may have been earlier than 1906

(118).

The political,

commercial 1 and especially military 1 advantages of the HR as
a whole have already been set out above.

The proposed Ma'an-

Akaba branch would have accentuated these advantages, and
would especially have increased the potential 1 though hypothetical 1military threat of the Turks opposite the British
in Egypt.

The very mention of the Akaba project led to

(117)
For the Es-Salt phosphates, cp. Blanckenhorn,
pp. 44-46.
For the proposed railwa y. ;
Auler, p. 57;
r • loff, p. 266; Woods, p. 53.
Also on the subject:
Alt.,
1906, p. 112; Pal., 1903/04, p. 11; Pal., 1910-11, pp. 149,
231.
Maps attached to Imhoff and Woods showed the Salt line
as completed.
(118)
Poenicke, p. 14, credits Meissner at least with
the technical layout of the line (details of which do not
seem to have survived).
That referred to 1906.
But in Alt.,
1905, p. 57, there was a reference to a HR-Egypt lin~ that
cropped up in the British "Statesman's Yea:rJbook" for 1902
(which could not be chec k ed).
This may have been, logically,
an early version of the Ma'an-Akaba branch.
Pal., 1907,
p. 278, stated explicitly that already in the autumn of 1904
Sultan Abdul Hamid issued an Irad/ decreeing the building
of a Ma'an - Akaba rail link.

- 31 ,.
an international crisis

(119).

The story of the Akaba Crisis of the spring of 1906
affords plenty of material for further separate research.
It has already . been inquired into, though with surprising ly little reference to its railway background that formed
an integral part of it.

How far the Turkish intention to

extend the HR to Akaba was the main reason for the
tension between Britain (and Egypt)

and Turk~y, or whether

I

it was a contributory factor only to it--will not be
discussed here

(120).

Suffice it to note that in the event

all ideas of building a spur to the Red Sea from the HR
were dropped owing to the intransigent British opposition.
For a time, during the Crisis, Egyptian troops under
British command were encamped at Taba, diag0nally opposite
Akaba.

The Crisis petered out after the Turks decided

to back down.

-

They were not prepared to clash with the

British Empire at its height over- - amongst other things - -

(119)
Cp. Poenic ~ p. 12, and Woods, p. 52, but
especially the sources 1 is ted in --. J l 7 i :.~ note ~~ l.
(120)
The Akaba Crisis, and in an indirect way,
Meissner's railway plans, certainly were to lead to the
e_stablishment of Taba-Rafa "1906 Boundary" between Sinai
and Palestine/Israel, to which the Egyptians were to cling
so tenaciously 61 years later.

I'\

I
Possibly the only surviving
t ime- tables of the early Hejaz Line .

Right:Time- table of the
Damas cus- Haifa branch line .

.

5¢ Jour.ney ~Xb.

HEJAZ RAit-WA"Y; .

The railway of Hejaz, a province of Arabia, the principal town s of
which are Medina and Mecca, i_s the work of the Ottoma n Government
but executed by European engmeers. It was laid to facilitate MussuJ!
man pilgrimages but m ore especially for the m obilisation of troops
,
The distance from Damascus to Mecca is about r , r25 miles. · The
line is finished as far as Medina (815 miles), It passes Dtfraa (76 miles)
Ammdn, the Rabbat-Ammon of the Bible and the Philadelphia of th~ "
Greeks (r40 miles), and Maan (293 miles ). This latter st a tion is only
seven hours' journey from P etra, and about 65 miles from the gulf of
Akaba on the Red Sea. 1
At Deraa a branch line leaves the H ejaz line for the valley of Yarmuk and the plain of E s draelon on to Haifa. .
TIME-TABLE.
DAMASCUS, SEMAKH,

HAIFA, SEiMAKH1 DAMASCUS.

HAIFA,

STATIONS,

•

Kanawat
Kadem
Kissue
Deir Ali
Mismiyeh
Jebab
Khabab
Mahajeh
Ezra
Ghazaleh
DERAA (Buffet)
Mezerib
Zeizun
Makarim
Jejara
..
Wady Qeleit
El Hamme
SEMAKH
Jisr Mujami
Beisan
Shut ta
Ain Harod
Afule .
Tel Shemmam

(Source:Meistermann ,
Guide , 1907)

i

HAIFA.

I

CHAPITR~ X

De

•

Maan a Amman et Deraa
en chemin de fer.

Horaire. Sur la lignc du Hedjaz, lro_i s trai ns ~e voyageurs fontc h,!lque
semain e le seni re en Ire Damas el Maa11 , el lro1s au lres en lre Maan el
Damas. Comme Jes trai ns marchenl assez lentemeol el romme l'horaire
est chan °C a mesure qu e la lign e s'ava nce vers La Mecque, ii· faul avoir
soin d e s'inform cr ct'arnnce en quels jou rs el a peu pr;, s ii quelle heu re
passenl Jes trai ns au x statio ns oi1 l'on veul mooter ou desc~nd re.
,
Pou r l'a nn ee 1008, le; tra ins partenl de Damas po_ur Maan le Ju_nd1,
mercredi et sarnedi , el de Madn pou r Damas le d1manche, mard1 el
jeudi. En genfral. ii n'y a pa, de depar t le_ .-eodredi.
Tari!. Le prix elabli pour chaque kil ometre esl :
I" classe. ........... 20 paras, soil 12 cen ti mes.
II' cl asse.. .... ...... 15 paras, soil 9 centimes.
Ill ' classe... ...... ... 10 ·paras, soil 6 centim es.
Ju squ'a nouvel arrangement, on devra se cont enter de wago ns ce
Ill ' classe.
Sta tions et di stances de Dama s a Maan :
STA ll 0 :S S

Damas .... ..... .. .....
D eraa.. .... ...... ..... .
l'\assih .... .. .... ... .. ....
l\l el-rak...... .. ...........
Senn a.. .. ........ .. . ... ..
Zerqa... .. .......... ... .. .
Amman ...... .........
Qasr ... .. ... .... .. ........
Louhen.. ....... ....... .. .
D_ize h .. .. .. .... .. . .... .
Deba. .. .... ... .. .. ........
Khan ez Zebib .. .. .. ..
- Halle ., .. ., ... .. .. .... ....
Qatraneh ............

Ferleh, halle..........
El Hesa .... ..... .. ..... ..
Djouro(Il Derouisch.
Aneze.. .. ........... ......
~~!~~ 0.~.~:.. ~~.1.'.~::

STATIONS.
6.55

HAIFA

7.5

Tel Shemman
Afule
Ain Harod
Shntta
Beisan
Jisr Mnjami
{
SEMAKH
El Hamme
Wady Qelcit
Jejara
Makarim
Zeizun
Mezerib
DERAA (Buffet) {
Ghazaleh
.•
Ezra
Mahajeh
·•
Khabab
Jebab
Mismiyeh
Deir Ali
Kissue
Kadem
Kanawat
'! ~ .

7.51
8.8
8.48
9.r3
9.26
9,42
I0.6
I0.34
{ II,IO
II.40
r2.3
I2,45
I3,2I
I3.37
I4.IO
r4.44
{ 15.5
r5 .30 8.15
8.34
r5.50
I6 .2I
9.5
9.25
r6.40
I6,55
9.38
I7,I2
9.57
I7,40 I0.25
r8.I5 II.IO

13.~

Pi ck , chapter III .

(Gare de Petra).

La Ji one du chemin de ler court a peu pres parall elemenl an derb
Hadj o~ route des Pelerins, sur la Jisiere du desert.

el

7.4I
8.u
8.3I
8 ,44
9,I ·
9.34
9.55
I0.8
I0,26
rn.,55
II.28
II,43
12.25
13,4
13.30
I4,0
r,(.32
I5,I
I5.25
15.44
I5,57
r6.r5
I7-3
I7,2I
18.0
18.15

(Source:Meistermann ,
Du Nil au Jourdain , 1909 )

(Bifurca ti on de la ligne de Beyronth;.
123 (Bifurca tion de la li gne de Caifla •.
162
185
203
222
235
2i9
260 (Gare de ~Iad aba).
279
29:;
309
326 (Gare de Kerak).
367
378
397
i23

7.0

~ e f t :Time- table of the HeJaz
trunk- line , Damas cus- 11Ia. ' an .
Note:Only days of operation
are list $d, passengers being
advised t o i nquire ,about hours
of departure and arrival of
t rains .

KILOM .

~J

'

(B) FROM DAMASCUS TO DERAA AND THE
LAKE OF TIBERIAS BY RAIL
The Hejaz Railway

I3,I5
I3,56
r4.26
14.46
I4 ,59
I5.r6
I5.49
r6.ro

·i

·1

I;
I

- ) \~a stretch of desert railway (121).

Meissner's Akaba line

scheme, having failed to materialize in 1906i and also
in 1914, was taken up by the British in the Second World War,
and carried through in 1942, from Ma'an to Naqb Ashtar.
Its most difficult stretch, from the plateau down to sea-level 1
was never built.

As, very unfortunately, no details seem

to have survived about the trace along which Meissner had

•

wanted to build, it is not known whether the British had
followed his plans.

The Ma'an-Akaba railways as finally

completed in 1975, seems to be close in its layout to Auler's
1906 suggestion,
(1'22).

to branch off the HR trunk line at Mudawara

It starts not from Ma 1 an, but a considerable dis-

tance further down the main line to Mudawara,

and branches

off to Akaba near Batn el-Ghul.

•

(121)
Material on "The Sinai Boundary Dispute", i.e.,
the Akaba Crisis, will be found in Gooch and Temperly (cp.
bibliogr~phy), vol. v, pp. 189-194.
On P. 194, there is a
reference to the Turks "running a branch of the Hejaz Railway
down to Akaba and having a port there".
Otherwise this British
standard work blithely ignored " the railway aspect of the
crisis.
Contemporary observers did not ignore it.

Auler, p. 56, mentioned the torpedoing of the
proposed line by the British, but, rather naively 1 suggested
that building a more southerly track, Mudawara-Akaba,
would not equally displease them.
Also cp. Blanckenhorn,
pp. 5-6; Hecker, pp. 1066-67; Poenicke, p. 14.
Hartmann
(in: Mekka-Bahn; cp. bibliography) saw in the "Taba Quarrel"
of May 1906 a British move to counter the proposed Turkish
-railway.
He, incidentally, regarded a link between the HR
and Egypt only as "a matter of time."
Cp. Hartmann, pp. 13-14,
23, 29.
Also see Alt., 1906, pp. 55, 118-119, 153-154.
The
Entsiklopedia Ivrith, vol. 6, col. 526, has a good map showing
the area involved.
(122)

Auler, p.

56

Prior to leaving Palestine in a blaze of achievement
after 1908, having built the HR to Medina, Meissner
proposed two more branches

for the HR (123).

Perhaps he

did so because he regarded the chances of continuing under
the Young Turks, the development of what had come to be
cal led "Dj ahshet e s·-sul tan"

His two additional plans also fell

to Mecca 1 as slim.

•

down,

(" the Sul tan's Riding Donkey")

and perhaps--there is no evidence- - their failure may

have contributed to his decision to leave the country.
His contract, as noted above, still ha~ some time to run.
One of . the add itional railway branches proposed by
Meissner before his departure was a line from Meserib to
El H~ssen (124).

This project never appeared again in

any source, after being referred to but once.
open up a fertile area.
El H~sn

(ancient Sussita)

the Sea of Galilee.

•

Per ~

It was to

Perhaps the reference was to
on the plateau overlooking
s the reference was to Hassem,

--

east of Dera'a, a village in the wheat-rich sou . t hern
Golan, which will be mentioned again in connection with
another railway line later on.
project was not carried out.

In any case, Meissner's
The second branch proposed

by Meissner, was o ne leading from
to Jerusalem (125).

(Haifa)

Afule, via Nablus

This line was a revival of the Conder

scheme of the 1870's mentioned in the previous chapter.

pp.

(123)
For Meissner's movement after 1908, cp. Poenicke,
15, 34.
( 12 4)

Poenicke, p. 15.

(125)

Ibid.

The political climate at that time seems not to have been
propitious, and Meissner, as an appointee of Abdul Hamid
may not have been "persona grata" with the Young Turks, who
now came to hold the government's purse strings.

There is

also the possibility--alrea~noted--that there was disinclination to building a branch of Moslem-financed HR to
Jerusalem,

a branch that in the main would have f~voured

the travels of Christian pilgrims.

•

The French owners of the

Jaffa-Jerusalem railway would not have cared either to
hav.e a competing line to Jerusalem, using Haifa, a far
more convenient port of disembarkation than Jaffa.

This

project of Meissner's also came to nothing, though the
line to Jerusalem was begun a few years after his departure.
Meissner now had to contemplate three failures

(counting

from the miscarriage of the Akaba railway in 1906)
carry out projects suggested by him.

to

He left to join the

Baghdad Railway.

-

Developments after Meissner's Departure
In igog, the Sultan, Abdul Hamid~I, the fathe~ of the
HR, was tlepo se d.

With him there also disappeared his

Second Secretary, Izzet Pasha, th.e native of Damascus, who
had taken an active interest in the line.

The just com-

pleted Pilgrim's Railway, a child of the discredited regime,
seems to have fallen quickly on evil times

( 12 6)

(126)

Hecker, p. 1073; Poenicke, p. 15.

·A

Hecker,

-322:-

who constituted an impeccable, practically contemporary,
source,

and who lived in Jerusalem, near the scene of

events,

stated expressly that about 1908-09, the HR,

that had barely reached Medina under the supervision of
Mukhtar Bey,
neglect.

started disintegrating owing to government

Moreover, the mutiny that broke out in the

Yemen about 1904f 05, had in the following years spread to
the Hejaz, where it smouldered endemically.

The line to

Medina kept being attacked by the Bedouins, who had not
relished losing the benefits of protecting, or robbing,
the pilgrim caravans that used to pass through their habitats
until the railway came.

Traffic on the southern sections

of the HR probably from Ma'an onward, stopped altogether
for a time.
However, the Young Turks had not grasped power in

•

order to further the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire .
It might be a reasonable guess--supported by the railway
building activities listed - b~low--that they gradually became
aware of the military advantages of the HR in preventing
the breakaway of the western areas of Arabia.

As time

passed, the new regime in Constantinople again became
interested in the deposed Sultan's "donkey".

Details and

exact dates are lacking, but the German railway expert
Paul Dieckmann was appointed, about 1910-11, to a

·high

post on the HR, apparently as Director of Traffic, possibly
as General Manager,

in place of the Frenchman Gaudin.

Dieckmann, in due course, put the line in working shape
again (127).
War.

He was still at his post in the First World

In 1911, the HR, which had up to then worked under

the Grand Vizier

(as far as can be inferred from the sources)

was put under the Ministry of War, a clear indication of

•

the importance now attached to it, and in which field .
However,

according to a reliable source, it was supervised

by the gvkaf Ministry in 1914.

Though chronological details

remain obscure, one fact is certain; whether belonging to
the Ministry of War, or the Evkaf
religious properties),

(the administration of

the Turks took good care--as appears

from the sources--to keep the line out of the clutches of
the French,

-

a subject that will be referred to again

(128).

(127)
It was Dieckmann who described for posterity
the never-built line to Jerusalem that will be mentioned
further on. Cp. note 132.
After World War I, apparently
in retirement, he continued to write on railways in Palestine,
as will be noted in chapter v.
(128)
The sources reporting the putting of the HR under
the Ministry of War (and the reasons for this step) are
Poenicke, p. 13 (who quotes the German Consulate at Haifa
6.10.1911) and Pal., 1912, p. 224.
The transfer of the
line to the Evkaf Ministry ~arly in 1914 was reported by
Hecker, p. 1073.
The chronology of these developments tends
to be obscure.

- J2-f}
Further Expansion of the Hejaz Railway
About 1911, some three years of Meissner's departure,
the HR had overcome its stagnation, and started expanding
again.

On the last day of 1911

mentioned above)

(as has already been

a 3 kms extension was opened from Kadem

Station, on the outskirts of Damascus, to the "Hejaz Station"

-

in the town itself.

The imposing new station had been

planned by the German architect Palmer

(129).

In July

1912, an altogether new branch railway was inaugurated
that,

though temporarily taken up in the First World War,

was to be laid down again, to be still shown on maps to the
present day.

This was the 33 kms long line to Bosra eski-

Sham, an important center in the southern Hauran.

This

line branched off the HR trunk line at Gasim Junction1 some
5 kms south of Dera'a.

There were two intermediate

stations, Taibeh (at km ~O)

-

and Hassem

(at Km ~ 3).

This

was purely a wheat-exporting line, designed to carry the
produce of the southern Hauran to Damascus and Haifa, thus
competing with the French line from Meserib, that carried
wheat to the north from other parts of the Hauran

(129)

Cp.

note 97,

(130).

above.

(130)
For the Basra branch, cp. Hecker, pp. 1073, 1078,
1316.
Ruppin, p. 297, and other sources gave the length of
this branch as 39-40 kms.
They did not take into account the
distance Dera'a-Gasim, some 5 kms which the branch trains used
jointly with the ones going to Amman.
The actual branch
started at Gasim.
Ha S sem, on this branch, possibly may have
been the El Hilssen to which Meissner, about 1908, wanted
to build a spur--as noted above.

H,1-)

Some time in 1912, building was also begun of a most
important branch on the Haifa-Damascus section of the HR.
This was the line whose construction had been proposed-to no avail--by Meissner about 1908, as set forth above.
In view of its future importance, this branch deserves a
more detailed description.

It branched off the Haifa line

at Afule, and was planned to extend, via Nablus, to Jerusalem.
It was to follow the ancient north-to-south highroad down
central Palestine very closely and in its southern stretch
practically duplicating it,
from the north.

to come into the Holy City

Apart from having been advocated by

Meissner, the line seems to have been talked about as a
timely project even earlier

(131) 1 and was commonly expected

to be of great commercial benefit, linking the north of
the country with its center.

It has already been mentioned

that the concept of the line dated back some 40 years to
an idea conceived by Conder, as described in chapter II.
Construction of the new line started at Afule,
36 kms out of Haifa

(132).

acquired a biggish station

some

From Afule, which subsequently
(still standing today), and

(131)
The (Haifa-)Afule-Nablus-Jerusalem railway had
already been mentioned in 1906, by Alt., pp. 112, 240, and
even at that time seemed to have been a well-known project.
It was also mentioned by other sources prior to 1912, for
instance by Kann (cp. bibliography).
(132)
The whole story of the Afule-Nablus-Jerµsalem line, plus
a unique map, showing the track Nablus-Jerusalem that was never
built, will be found in an article by P. Dieckmann, "Die zweiglinie
Affuleh-J erusalem de r Hed schazbahn" , in the z. D. P. V. 1914, pp. 2 6 7270.
Dieckmann, whose residence was given as Haifa, was at that
time traffic manager of the HR and knew what he was writing about.
For other references to the Afule-Jerusalem line, see Hecker, pp.
1073, 1078; Imhoff, p. 266; Pal., 1912, p. 227; and Ruppin, p. 297.

'

shunting facilities, the track proceeded south, through the
flat expanse of the Valley of Jezre'el, past Mukeibilah halt
(km 11), to Jenin, at km 17.
February 17th, 1913.

This section was opened on

From Jenin the track started

climbing into the historic Pass of Yible'am

(today's Balamen),

paralleling at a distance of a few meters the easternmost
branch of the often-mentioned - -in chapter I--Via Maris.
Having attained the Plain of Dothan, and passed Arrabeh

•

halt

(km 28), the line continued ~ sway into the Hills of

Samaria.

There was a station at Sileth ed-Daher (to be

mentioned again in chapter IV, dealing with the World War I),
at km 40 from Afule.

At km 49, the Turks built the only

tunnel ever finished in cis-Jordanian Palestine, the 250
meter long Ramin tunnel.

Rails had been laid to about this

place, ending in an open field,

by about March 1914.

Their laying was continued only under the supervision of
Meissner himself 1 after his return to Palestine in 1914.

-

However, building the track itself

(though railless)

had

been continued before the outbreak of war, past Ramin
(km 51), past Sebastiyeh, into Nablus- itself,
from Afuleh.
be

at km 77

There work stopped--as it turned out, never to

res~ed again 1 for reasons explained below.

The rails to

Nablus were however laid later and the line opened for traffic
from the north

(Haifa and Damascus)

early in 1915.

It is not a generally known fact that the plans for
the continuation of the line from Nablus to Jerusalem, a
section that had been the raison d' ~ tre •of the whole project
from the beginning, seem

to had grown well into the

')

A map exists by the railway engineer

blueprint stage.

(and at that time a high official of the HR), Dieckmann,
showing the whole proposed layout of the stre t ch to Jerusalem
(133) .

According to this map,

way paralle l

the proposed line ran all the

to the Turkish Nablus-Jerusalem road

(itself

the successor of the older highway), deviating from it only
where t h e necessity of climbing geographical obstacles made
slight deviations necessary.
Ascent of Khan Lubban
the two towns.

This was the case near the

(ancient Leb o na), about halfway between

The line followed the water : shed between

the Mediterranean and the Jordan Valley, along all its
way,

and came into Jerusalem from the north, practically

on top of the wate ~ hed, which the ancient north-to-south
highway had also followed.

As far as can be learnt~ from

the map, the line followed the watershed faithfully into
the western outskirts of Jerusalem,

and would have had its

terminus somewhere around the present-day Rehavia Section.
The complete railway, Afule-Nablus-Jerusalem, would have
been 163 kms long
Dera'a line).

(practically the same length as the Haifa-

This important line 1 linking north and central

Palestine, and Jerusalem 1 with the sea and with Damascus,
and _even with Beyrouth or Aleppo or Anatolia itse.lf, wa-s
never to be built.
guessed at.

(133)

The reasons are obscure, but can be

What is definitely known is that French

Cp. note 132.

factors--so the sources--whatever their exact identity, killed
the continuation of the line from Nablus to Jerusalem.
This was sometime in May 1914, only a few months before the
outbreak of the First World War

(134).

On October 14, 1913 a third branch was added to the
Haifa-Damascus section of the HR, following the line to

•

Basra, and to Nablus .
Beled esh-Sheikh

This was the

lf

kms 1 long spur from

(4.5 kms east, outside Haifa)

to Acre

This branch was presumably built as a sop to the

(Akko).

inhabitants of Acre, who had been badly hurt by the fact
that the terminus of the line from Damascus had been placed
at Haifa.

Acre had for a long time been the capital of a

Turkish Sanjak

(province), and the seat of a Vali

(governor).

Throughout history it had been the most important town of
Northern Palestine, though its harbour had never been safe.
The building of the Hejaz lines outlet at Haifa, with its

-

safe anchorage,

tended to accelerate the decline of Acre,

and the construction of the branch line was probably expected

(erroneously as it turned out)

The new spur-line had no

to arrest this decline.

intermediate sto~as it led along

the coast, through the wastes of the Valley of Zebulun.
Construction posed no difficulties, except at two spots; one,
where the river Kishon

(Mukattah)

and its quicksands had to

(134)
For the killing of the Jerusalem line by the
French, for commercial reasons, i.e., for fear of competition,
cp. Hecker, pp. 1073-74, who almost certadnly, lived in
Jerusalem at the time.

- ~3( be crossed,

and the other where a bridge had to be built

across the Na'aman river
Acre.

(ancient Belus), just outside

As finding firm foundations for the bridges caused

considerable difficulties, there seems at one time, to have
been a plan to lead the line around the eastern borders of
the Valley of Ze~ulun, parallel to the foothills of lower
Galilee.

Thus the track would have gone past Birwa ~to turn

west and end at a station at Tel Fukhar
outside the town.
track,

(ancient Acre)

This would have involved a much longer

and nothing further was heard of the plan, but it

should be mentioned.

The Acre terminus, a handsome

building, lasted until the 1960's, when it was demolished.
It was situated just outside the town's main gate

(135).

As noted, the line was opened in October, 1913.

Cost, Returns, Rolling Sto?k, Etc.

-

In order to round off the description of the HR, the
main line, the Haifa branch,

as well as the subsidiary spurs,

a few pertinent details should be added regarding building
costs, operating returns,

rolling stock, timetables,

(135)
For the Acre branch, cp. Hecker, pp. 1073,
1078 (where its length was erroneously given as 17 kms)
and 1318 (where the correct distance, 18 kms, is noted).
Also see Pal., 1911, p. 230, and Pal., 1912, p. 227.

- ?32.travelling conditions, etc.
:Qeen referred to

(136).

Construction speeds have already

The following details constitut e only

representative excerpts from the many sources that are available.
Construct i on costs of the HR came in for close scrutiny
from various sides while the line was being built.

On

this subject it might be useful to refer again to Hecker, who
observed things from a professional point of view, on the

•

· c.J-M~~~~, ~/

spot ~ only a few years after the line had been built, and
after the dust had settled down and details had become kno wn.
Referring to figures as known about 1912-1913, Hecker put
total construction cost of the HR ,

i n cluding equipment and

rolling stock, at 95 million Francs.

The average cost per

km , 1 according to him, worked out at about 62,000 Francs.
Similar figures were also quoted by Ruppin a few years later,
who also put the total cost at approximately 95 million
Francs, and the average cost per km at 63,000 Francs (137).

•

(136)
Construction rates of the HR have already been
referred to above.
For the trunk line plus the Haifa branch,
1302 + 163 kms, but without the later branches, construction
speed worked out for eight years at about 183 kms per year
(with an average of some 150 kms yearly in the early stages).
In the last year of construction, 1907-08, 323 kms were laid,
but very roughly.
Top progress per day seemed to have reached,
as an exception, 2-3 kms daily.
Cp. Auler, p. 53; Blanckenhorn,
p. 10; Hecker, p. 1067; Pal., 1907, p. 278; Poenicke, p. 6.
(13 7)

Hecker, pp. 1089, 1315, 1321; Ruppin, p.

300.

- 333-

\+i)

Despite some discrepancies in his figures,

it is illuminating

to quote also Reeker's breakdown of the cost of the various
sections of the HR.
Dainascus-Ma'an

According to him, the trunk line

(Medina)

cost 58,100 Francs per km.

Dera'a branch, on the other hand,

The Haifa-

cost 78,500 Francs a km.

The cost of building the steep ramp from the Jordan Valley
to the Transjordanian Plateau, the most difficult section

•

of the entire HR, on accounts of its many bridges and tunnels/
amounted to no less than 175,000 Francs per km
theless,

(138).

None-

the expenses of constructing the HR were considerably

less than those of other railways built in Turkey.

This

on account of the fact that a great proportion of the work
had been carried out by troops, at trifling cost

(they had

to be paid anyway), and owing to the fact that the line, as
a "sacred'' undertaking, benefitted from donations, ~nd had
to pay nothing for its right-of - way, as the lands over which
it passed were given or exproppriated

(139).

Since the

funding of the line had been based entirely on donations, and
Laxation, the line, having no shareholders to satisfy, or
loans to repay, was entirely debt-free on its completion.
There are few particulars available as to financial
returns obtained from the HR, perhaps because the subject

( 13 8)

Hecker, p. 1315

(139)

H'e ck er, p.

13 2 1

was of little interest, as the line had not been regarded
as a viable commercial undertaking in the first place.
Such figures as were recorded by Hecker and Ruppin regarding the financial results of the line between 1910-11 and
1912-13, though they do not tally, at least agree in one
respect--namely that the line made profits on its operations,
even after costs had been deducted (140).

•

Ru_ppin, writing

about 1915, stressed that pre-war results were even better
than it appeared, because operatin~ costs, deducted from profits,

actually included improvements and new construction

items that elsewhere would have been paid out of earnings.
He also noted that the funds of the HR kept on increasing,
because donations continued flowing in.

Passengers and

troop-transports accounted for the greater percentage, by
ar, of earnings, while goods transport accounted for

... 14-y
little.

Detailed fares are listed in..._ notYh elow, also
I
goods transport rates.
It might be noted, that at least
for a time passengers on the section Dera'a-Medi{frl) , liad
to pay a special surtax for military protection against

(140)
Hecker, p. 1565; Ruppin, p. 301.
On the
financial Viability of the HR in its early stages, see also
Auler, pp. 62-66.
A most interesting breakdown of the
income and expenditure of the HR, though for an early
year, 1905, will be found in Alt., 1905, p. 306.

Bedouin raids
good enough,

(141).

Overall earnings were apparently

at least at certain periods, to be reflected

in price-cutting wars with the French, especially to
undercut their Damascus-Meserib Railways.

There were

also attempts to cut down competition by camels.
The techriical equipment of the HR also calls for
some comment.
stations

Apart from the telegraph line linking all

(142), there seem a to have been--as already

noted--no signalling installations.

Anyway, none are

mentioned anywhere, and none are shown on surviving photos.
But equipment of the track itself, must have run into many
thousands of tons in terms of weight, and many millions in
terms of money.

Rails,

sleepers

(ties) and components of

(141)
No comprehensible price lists for the HR could be
found, but Blanckenhorn, p. 10, and Hecker, p. 1544, provid~
prices on the base of kms.
According to Hecker, prices in ·
French centime~ were:
1st class-11.5 per km, 2nd class-9.5
centimes per km, 3rd class-5.7, to which were added special
charges for military protection on the southern section of
the trunk-line, .this to the tune of 2.2, 1.6 and 1.1 centimes
per km.
Auler, p. 66, stated that pilgrims about 1905-06,
when the line was as yet incomplete, were carried entirely
free of ch~rge.
In view of the fact that in la~er years the
line did have a surplus, and that pilgrims, before the line
had been built, had paid at least 50 Turkish Pounds for travelling
expenses, it seems unlikely that prospective Hajis were at all
times carried entirely free of charge, all the distance to Medina.
Goods tariffs seem to have been relatively high,
seeing that goods trains usually had to return half-empty, or
had no freight at all, while they ran on costly imported coal.
Freight rates were also divided in~o three classes, payment
amounting to 12.5, 11.5 and l{L5 centimes per ton=km.
At
certain times serious price cutting was indulged in, so as to
kill French competition (where it occurred) as well as the cheap
door-to-door transport on camel-back.
Cp. Alt., 1904, pp. 219, 348;
Hecker, p. 1545; Ruppin, p. 304 ; and also Auler, p. 43
(142)

Auler, p.

27.

the metal bridges, seem to a great extent have been of
German manufacture, though purchases were made also from
Belgian, American, Spanish and even Russian factories

(143).

As for rollin_g stock, most locomotives were German-made,
and a few Belgian.
were also acquired.

At a later stage Swiss-made locomotives
Two-thirds of the passenger-carriages

were Belgian made, the remainder, German

(144).

Rolling stock grew more numerous as t h e line progressed,

•

andits increase over the years reflected in the sources.
About 1913, the HR, including the Haifa branch, and the
spurs then open, operated the following stock
1.

Locomotives--96.

for short hauls

(145):

Of these, 26 were tank-locomotives,

(as on the Haifa branch)

seventy were tender-locomotives,

and shunting.

coupled with extra-large

water-tenders with a capacity of 18 cubic meters.

These

were intended for long-distance hauls, over waterless sections.

(143)
Auler, p. 27; Hecker, p. 1312. Alt., and Pal.,
also noted purchases· of equipment (and coal) from various supplies.
(144)
Auler (I, 1906), pp. 42-43; Auler (II, 1908),
pp. 63 - 64; Blanckenhorn, pp. 11-12; Hecker, pp. 1314-15;
Poenicke, p. 6.
(145)
The following figures regarding the HR rolling
stock were taken from Hecker, p. 1320.
Additional details
were also culled from some of the sources listed in note 144,
and some were taken from photos.
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have had a carrying capacity of 15 tons or more.

A good

many of these wagons were fitted with water containers, and
rudimentary lavatories, for the transport of pilgrims

(147).

Some short, two - axled, goods wagons, of some 10 tons capac i t ~
in the first building stages were fitted by Meissner with
large water containers.

Trailing behind the limited-capacity

tank-locomotives., they served as auxiliary tenders on work

-

trains.

These water-carriers also were used to carry water

for drinking and building purposes to the railhead, when
construction was underway.

These inconspicuous wagons were

Meissner's solution to the perennial water-shortage, and
constitute the reason for the remarkable fact that building
operations in an arid country never stopped even once on account of the lack of water.
Very little is known about the ' staff that worked the
HR in its prime.

-

Top positions were apparently filied by

foretgners, Germans, and French.

Subordinate positions were

worked by Ottoman subjects, Turks, Christian Arabs, Gr~eks
with a considerable sprinkling of Armenians whose dismissal
was to have serious consequences in the Great War of 1914
(148).

Little is also know of the lines time-tables.

Ini-

tially, the HR was worked on a " ~ urk i sh System", the hours

(147)
For loading capacities and facilities for the
transport of pilgrims, cp. Hecker, p. 1314.
Auler also
has occasional details.
(14 8)

Cp. Blanckenhorn, pp.

9-10 .

12:00-24:00 being regarded as "daylight", and the hours
00: 0l!-11: 59 as "night"!

Blanckenhorn,

in his description

of the HR, gave an interesting sample 6f this confusing
system,

Later

in which morning hours counted as "night".

the European 24 - hour system was adopted

(149) .

trains seem to have consisted of 5-7 carriages .

Passenger
Pilgrim and

goods-trains consisted of 10 wagons or th.ereabouts, but a

-

l.v"-k

good many trains may hctve I;ieen mixed pas enger/good,t . , ~ • • · •
""'"' ~~ l"2--t- ~
r~~
and the details
are also

,~,

merely based on odd bits of intelligence.

Top speed

anywhere does not seem to have reached the 30-40 kms. p. h.
for which the line was designed.

For what is known about

the frequenc¥ of trains, posterity has to be indebted mostly
to Hecker, who referred to traffic condi f ions only a short
time before the 1914-18 War

(150).

On the main line

Damascus-Ma'an-Medina, there worked, according to Hecker,
3 trains a week,

in

each direction.

The journey of 1,300 kms

was covered, on the average, in 55 hours

(50 hours being

a record), which worked out at an average speed (including
stops) of some 23 kms. p.h.

On the branch Haifa-Damasucs

there was one train daily in each direction, which relatively
high frequency conclusively proved the importance of this,

(149)
Blanckenhorn, pp . 61-63; Hecker, p. 1316.
The most info~mative time-tables will be found in Meistermann's "Guide" of 1907.
(150)
Hecker, pp. 1315 - 16, though there is some
information in scattered other sources.

to a great extent, "Palestinian" line.
25 kms p.

h.

#

Average speed was

There were 3 trains a day in each direction

between Haifa and Acre

(151).

This remarkable density of

train traffic was accounted for by the fact that about 1913
(and until British Mandatory times), there was no useable
road between the two towns.

Horse-carriages, camels, etc.

used the beach as a highway, having to ford the treacherous
Kishon river

(and the Na'ail6a.n river)

on the way.

The

line Haifa-Afule-Jenin was worked by one train daily in
each direction, taking four hours for the journey.
other hand,

On the

there were only three trains a week on the branch

(Dera'a) Gasim-Bosra, one more demonstration of the preponderance in importance of the cis-~ordanian lines over
the Transjordanian ones.

There never seem• to have been

direct trains from Haifa to Ma'an.

Goods trains were

perhaps not run on a fixed schedule, but as demand arose,
also special filgrim)and troop trains.

Hours of departure,

and certainly of arrival, were not usually adhered to,
but at least days of operation were fixed

(152).

evidenced by the various types of carriages
to)

Trains, as

(already referred

seem to have consisted mostly of 1st and 3rd class stock.

The few 2nd class carriages may have been used to carry
female pilgrims, while the men were carried in the specially

A~~e,

(151)
That was a train frequency for the section Haifascarcely exceeded by Israel Railways some 60 years later.

(152)
1315-16.

Auler, p.

43; Blanckenhorn, p.

62; Hecker, pp.
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The railways in the Turkish Levant just prior to World War I .
Map attached to a survey by the German General Imhoff . The map shows
the two competing parallel railways down t h e Hauran ; the never-built
phosphate-line Amman-es-Salt ; the never-executed French project RayakLod/Ramle , with an imagina~y French(!)spur Nablus-Jerusalem; and the
Turkish Afule-Sebastiyeh branch , with no(!)continuation to Jerusalem.
(Source:Petermann's Geo gr . tlitt ., 1915)

Pick , chapter III .

. .,

fitted goods wagons, also noted above.
No statistics could be found as to the number of
pilgrims carried by the HR during the yearly Haj
Hecker stated that while the Haj
day,

lasted, three trains a

each consisting of 10 wagons, were run.

carried 350 people.
a week.

season.

Each train

This gave a total of 2,450 pilgrims

In 1910-11, the HR (trunk and branch lines)

163,482 passengers, and 65,778 tons of goods.

carried

In 1911-12,

171,435 passengers and 77,524 tons of goods were carried (153)
No further statistics seem to have been published.
For reasons of space, a number of subjects have not
been detailed above

Gk'~ .

~ ~ tioned only fleetingly),

amongst

them the day-to-day orga~izati0n of work by Meissner--a
complicated task--while the line was under construction,
health precautions

(in the early stages of work there was a

cholera epidemic, that never recurred), water supply,
military cover, etc. ~

References to all these problems

and their solutions, might be found in many of the sources
quoted

( 154 ) ..

(153)'

Hecker, p. 1565

(154)
Some of the problems not dealt with in the
text were touched upon by the writer in his short monograph
on Meissner Pasha (cp. bibliography:
Pick).
While the above
text was~~ Lng ::~i tte 7 the w~i ter chanced. on the handbook on l ! l l f b ~ by - frietsch (cp. bibliography), which
·also contains · some notes on the HR.
·

- 3½3summing Up Developments, 1892-1914
Looking at the railway map of Palestine,

in its

widest sense, in 1914, an observer might well be struGk
by the great changes that had come about in the area
under discussion in the 22 years that had passed since the
opening of its first line in 1892.

The country beyond the

Jordan, undeveloped as it was, had become quite well served
by rail-links with Syri a, with the Mediterranean littoral,
and with Arabia.

The northern part of Palestine proper,

i.e., cis-Jordania, was also surprisingly well supplied
with rail-communications that joined it with all the
northern Levant, Transjordania, and
Canal)

with western Arabia.

(bypassing the Suez

All the important towns of

northern Palestine now had their rail stations or were
within reach of them:

Haifa, Acre, Nazareth, Jenin,

Beisan, and Tiberias.

Even Nablus

(further south), was on

the way towards getting its rail connection, the only
exception being Safad.

In view of these facts,

the more

striking was the rail gap that remained between the north
of the country,

and its populous central regions, that

were served only by the isolated Jaffa-Jerusalem railway.
Southern Palestine had been left with no : railways at all.
Even more striking was the absence of any rail link between
Palestine and Egypt, though plans for such a link had been
in evidence for more than 60 years.

A 900d many natural

and historic, highways in Northern Palestine had by the eve
I

of the First World Wa~been succeeded by railway trariks,
that had been laid alongside them.

However, the most

famous and internationally important of Palestine's
highways,
serve as a

the ancient "Via Maris'' had not yet come to
N

.
. // ( so to speak ) f o r a railway.
guideline

to change shortly,

and with s triking effect,

detailed in the following chapter.

(

This was

as will be
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A literary curiosit y that may-or may not - have owed something to the
completion of the Hejaz Railway in 1908.A Passover"Haggadah"printed
in Baghdad in 1908,showing an ancient locomotive-perhaps a symbol of
departure from Bondage into Freedom- as a fina~last page1 decoration .
Pick , chapter III .

(Source:Private Collection,
Jerusalem)
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REFERENCES TO RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION
IN PALESTINE, 1902-1912,
IN GERMAN ZIONIST PUBLICATIONS

(Selection)
II

PALASTINA
1902:
1903-4:

pp.

38,

- pp.

45,

46,

84.

9, 112, 219,

1907:

pp.

37, 204; 277.

1908:

pp.

129, 222.

1909:

pp.

2 9, 14 3.

19 f O:

p.

1911:

pp.

1912:

p.

239.

61
115, 230.
227

ALTNEULAND
1904:

pp.

23-25,

53, 117, 170, 218-219, 281,

1905:

pp.

56-57,

193, 214, 278, 281,

1906:

pp.

51-52,

55,

Note:

Not all of the above references were mentioned in
the text, since some were overlapping.

305,

346.

365.

83, 109,111-112, 118-119, 154, 237,

240.
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OPENING DATES OF THE HEJAZ RAILWAY
Length

Section

( ms..)

Date

Meserib-Dera' a

14

9/1/1901

Dera'a-Zerka

80

9/1/1902

123

9/1/1903

124

9/1/1903

Dera ' a-Damascus

(Kadem Station)

\

ze rka-Ka t~dL

w'

Haifa-Beisan

59

1/14/1904

Beisan-Jisr el-Majami

17

5/27/1904

Katrani-Ma ' an

132

9/1/1904

Ma'an-Mudawara

113

9/1/1905

Jisr el - Majami-Meserib

10/15/1905

73

Mud aw ara-Teb uk

120

9/1/1906

Tebuk - El Ula

287

9/1/1907

El Ula-Medi~

32 3

9/1/1908

Damascus

(Kadem) - Damascus

(Hejaz Stat . )

Gasim-Bosra eski - Sham

33

Afule-Jenin

17

Bele d esh-Sheikh - Acre

17

Total

12/31/1911

3

1912
2/17/1913
&l- \

9

10/14/1913

1,535 kms
= ====

Notes:
1.

2 kms of spur i Meserib (French Station)- Jisr el Majan~ Dera ' a track, taken up later.

2.

Sections M"dawara-Medina not dealt with in text.

3.

S ources:

Auler, Blanckenhorn, Guthe,

Hecker.

STATIONS OF THE HEJAZ RAILWAY
Distance:
(!(ins.)

Section:
A.

Height:
(Me ~ij;s

:,t ea~t vel)

Trunk Line
690

Damascus, Hejaz Statio~
Damascus-Kadem Station

3

696

Kisweh

20.9

7 39

Deir Ali

30.6

696

49.8

618

Jab ab

62.8

643

Shab ab

69.3

624

Mahaj eh

78.1

692

Ezra

91.4

587

(Kirbet e l- )Ghazale

106.3

576

Dera'a

123.3

529

Gasim

128

Masmiyeh

•

Tai ,beh

10

Hassem

23

Bosra eski-Sham

33

821

Nassib

136

574

Mafrak

161.9

697

(Khirbet es-)Samra

185.6

559

(Ein)

203

618

Amman

22.6

736

Kas¥

234.3

941

Luban

249.1

774

Zerka

(steepest
section!)

- Yi9l

Jize

260.l

721

Dab a

279.1

75 0

Khan ez-Zebib

2 95. 7

782

Sawakah

309.7

752

Katrani

326.6

782

Me\\,Zil

348.8

838

L~)

368.5

892

El Hassa

378.3

819

Jurf ed-Dervish

397.7

957

Kal'at Aneize

42 3

1,052

Wadi J ardun

440.8

1,059

Ma'an

459.1

1,075

Ghadir el Haj

475.7

1,000

Beer el Khatiyeh

487

Akabet e-Hejaziyeh

514.6

1,152

517

1,168

Batn el-Ghul

520.2

1,124

Wadi Retro

530.2

993

Tel el-Hammam

546.3

849

Ramle

555.3

804

Mudawara

572.4

720

Fretre

966

(Highest point!)

Notes
1.

On the 113 kms
between Ma'an and Mudawara,
no water resources wha~ver.

there were

2.

The 730 kms long section, Mudawara-Medina contained
37 stations

.,

iI

B.

Haifa Branch
1. 5

Haifa
4.5

Beled es h-S hei kh

(

17

Shomariyah

11

Tel esh-Shamma

21. 7

39

Afule

36.3

62

Mukebileh

10.8

88

Jenin

16.8

150

-

Sileth ed-Dahr

40

35 0

Shatta

51

-78

Beisan

59

-122

Jisr el-Maja\\\i

76 . 8

-247

Samakh

86.9

-187

El Hammeh

95.3

-146

Wadi Kleit

107.4

- 57

Sejera

119.5

27

Mukkarin

124.5

71

Zeizun

135.7

260

149

462

161

529

Meserib

(Abandoned)

300

Arra_beh

I.

1

Acr e

(Turkish S tation)

Dera'a

(Lowest Point!)

Notes
1.

The names of stations are spelled differently in
different sources, for instance, Wadi Kleit=Wadi Khalid.

2.

Sources :

As

above for Section A, plus Zionist Periodicals.

IV.

RAILWAYS IN PALESTINE

DURING THE WORLD WAR
1914 - 1918
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The Turkish Railways,

~5~

-

Their Task of Holding Palestine

as a Military Base
Turkey entered the First Wor ld War when its warships
bombarded Russian ports on November 29, 1914.

It thus joined

the Central Powers, and as a result, Palestine, adjoining
British-occupied Egypt and Sinai, became a potential Turkish
base for an attack on the British Empire's jugular l ine of
communicatinns - the Suez Canal (1).
Palestine's potentialities as a military base, either
offensive or defensive, were strictly limited, on account
of the extreme paucity of its resources in every respect,
It had no importance either as a source of manpower, or of
munitions, or supplies 1 in any quantityo

Its value to the

Turks, and their German allies, was limited to being an
area of t r ansit to the front for military forces that could

not be moved by sea, owing to the naval preponderance of the
Entente Powers, especially the British, in the Mediterraneano
Its sole importance, therefore, consisted in the fact that
it was a territory over which soldiers could be shifted,
and even in that respect, as will be seen, its usefulness
in 1914 was limited.

(1) On the threat to the Suez Canal - cpo Military
Operations (see Jibliography; henceforth called in shert
"Ops.")~ PPo 9-J6s cp. also Krees (cpo bibliography) P• 17
for the Turkish aspect, On the general strategic baekground
ep. Friedman (see bibliography) PP• 1-7• For the opinions
of a high-ranking British officer, t• be closely associated
with events in the Middl e East, cp. Wavell (see bibli graphy)
PP• 1-28.

The movement of military bodies in World War I on land
was a Ocomplished either by road or by rail.

Before assessing

the milftary importance of the railways that were operating
in ~alestine at the outbreak of war, and in order to bring
their importance into correct focus, the state of the roads
in the country should first be summarized (2).
Palestine's Roads in 1914
The only metalled road in Pal estine that seems to have
(

achieved more or less European standards was the Jaffa-Jerusalem
road built in 1869, on the occasion of the visit to Ealesti ne
of the Austrian Emperor, Francis Joseph.

'I'hat road had

apparently been kept since in a reasonable state of repair.
Towards the end of the 19th century, some more roads were
added with Jerusalem as their hub.

Thes e were the road

Jerusalem-Bethlehem, suitable for carriages , that was
ulti mately extended to Hebron , and the road Jerusalem-Jericho,
built for pilgrims , but never apparently in good condition.
About the turn of the century the road Jerusalem-Nablus was
started and completed by stages towards 1914.

It~_condition

(2) Details on the state of roads in ralestine will be
found in many contemporary s ource s (books and maps ), and the
following are only a selection: Brief Re cord (cp. bibliography;
henceforth just "Re cords'') p. 95, and map 2; Kress pp. 59-60,
145, 296; Ruppin (cp. bibliography), pp. 294-295; Wavell p. 8 ;
Wiegand , p . 16. Also, Ops. I , p . 27-28; ups~ II, part I, p .19,
and the maps in these volumes; and in the map-case belonging
to Ops. The important fact should be noted that the references
to Wiegand , above, and on the following pages, actually
refer tq. Kress van Kressenstein 's report "KriegsfJ hrung in der
wtiste" ('Waging ar in the Desert ") that was included in the
volume '' Sinai" , which appeared under Theodor Wiegand ' s editors hip
in 1920.
This differentiation was adopted in order to avoid a mix-up
with Kress ' own, "Iv.it den T'l1rken ~um Suez Kanal" ("with the Turks
to , the Suez I:a111al"), that appeared in 19J8.
r1ost contemporary writers invariably complained about the
state of road communications in Turkish ~alesti ne~

- ,s:;seems to have been indifferent, and the ~e seem to have been
incomplete stretches and gaps , where bridges should have been.
t\,\,

This road seems to have continued ~

s am e shape across the

hills of Samaria , to Jenin, Afule and Nazareth.
was in use on the outbreak of waro

This link

Its continuation was a

track, probably improved, by way of Tiberia-~afed/ Rosh- PinahKuneitra to Damascus.

This was the only tenuous carriage-

worthy link of Palestine with the outside world,
(

There were

no links suitable for wheeled traffic with Lebanon and the
country across the J ordan.
Nazareth and Haifa .

There was a carriage road between

In the center of the country there was

an improved track from Jaffa, by way of Kalkilia to Nabluso
There was no good road of any description along the coastal
plain - communication-wise the easiest, and militarily the
most important part of the country.

'l'ravelers preferred to

go by sea between Gaza, Jaffa, Haifa , and the neighboring
countries (J).

There were no viable tracks at all south of

the line Hebron - Gaza.

In ~inai there were merely camel

trails, between watering points on the three historic chief
routes across the peninsula, the coastal route, the central
route, and the pilgrim 's way between Akaba and 0uez ,
been noted elsewhere, ever since the

As has

of regular

steamship services between Lgypt and Palestine, about the
middle of the 19th century, internationsl traffic preferred
the sea, and the ancient highways across ~inai were left desolate.
Not one modern road had taken their place .

(J)
For land communications in Turkish ~alestine , cp.
Avitsur. (Hebrew; see bibliography) PP • JJO-JJi ,

~

- ~Land transport in ~alestine, i.e. horsedrawn carriages,
was confined in the hills to the few available roads and
improved tracks.

In the plains vehicles co uld move more easily,

but only at considerable cost in wear and tear, and beasts and only in the dry season.

In winter , according to all

sources , most low-lying areas periodically turned into
bottomless quagmire, and were cut up by overflowing wadies (4) .
Troops, could, of course, be herded cross-country, in
most parts of the Holy Land, at most timeso

But in wartime

their movements necessarily had to be governed by considerations
of time and space, and these postulated roads equal to
military traffic.

Moreover, even if troops were relatively

independent of the use of artificial highways , they were
dependent on a minimum of supplies and ammunition , which
in roadless areas had to be carried cross-country, by
literally hosts of camels, mules and donkeys (5), numbering
tends of thousands (besides oxen for dragging artillery) .

(4) Kress pp . 68, 20 8 , 212. References to the impassability of the coastal plain of Palestine during the
rainy season, in Ops . and avell are too numerous to list .
There are also graphic pictures of troops on both sides ,
during the 1916-18 campaigns practically drowning in mud .
(5) About 1915 the Turks in Palestine and their German
Allies needed J0,000 camels for military transportation
purposes . Ultimately they seem to have collected some 20,000.
Cp . Kress, p . 63;
iegand, p . 17. The British in 1917 used
some 35,000 camels and 8 , 000 donkeys. Cp . Reco rd, p . 100.
Also Ops . I, P• 2J.

-
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The relatively limited 1 slow 1 transport capacity of these beasts
of burden was further circumscribed by the fac t that they
had to carry feed for themselves in considerable quantities ,
which limited their purely military pay load still further ,
Thus the almost total absence of good roads in ~alestine ,
with only indifferent links between the northern and the
southern areas , made the country a military base of severely
limited c~

li ty .

Palestine•s Rai l ways in 1914
On the outbreak of war , ?alestine - within the limits
outlined previously - had four operative railway lines .
These will be described here in short , to be analysed more
thoroughly later .

They were: 1) The French- owned Jaffa-

Jerusalem line, going west - east , from the 1v1edi terranean ~oa<S:t
up to the Holy City ;

2)

the French- owned LJamas c us - Meselab

line , going north-to - south , from the ~yrian capital t o the
Hauran ;

J) the Turkish- owned Heja

Railway trunk line

1

going

~!!)~

north- to-south (parallel to lineY:from Damascus via Deraa
Junction through Maan, to v1edina .

There was a short branch

from Nessib (south of Der;Q.) to Basra eski - Shami
Turkish- owned Haifa branch of the Heja

4) the

Railway , going roughly

east- west , from Der~a to the ~editerranean ,

Th is line had

two short branches , one going north from ~eled esh- ~heikh
to Acre , and the other going south from Afule via Jenin .
ic.,tt~

Thi~

anch had originally been intended to run to Nablus

(and to Jerusalem, until vetoed by the French, as described
in an earlier chapter) .

But when war broke out, this branch

ended in a field at Silet ed-Daher in the mountains of ~amaria .

A glance at a map will show that Palestine in 1914
actually had two separate rail systems , one in the south
(line 1)1 and the other (lines 2, J, and 4) in the north and
east, with a gap of at least 60 kms . between them .

There

was also a gauge break between them, trains in the south
running on the 1 metre (1,000 mm.) gauge , and the others
having the 1,050 mmo gauge (6),
The bilitary Importance of the Existing Lines
The military value of the Frenc h Jaffa-Jerusalem line
was nilo

It led from the sea , that was barred to Turk~s h

shipping, to an inland-town, far from the prospective front-line,
which had no contribution to make to the conduct of the war.
Its rolling

stock,as set out in the previous chapter , was

negligible in numbers 1 and even if the isolated line had been
somehow linked to the remainder of the network, the stock
would have had to be adapted to the different gauge , and so
would the track .
The military importance of the French Hauran line was
also non-existent.

It had originally been built (apart

v-tH-,1\..

from the purpose of blocking a proposed Ii 'iu11a h line from
Haifa - as detailed in chapter II), in order to draw the
wheat export of the Hauran over the French rails to the
French-owned part of Beyrouth,

The outbreak of war closed

v--e-

down Beyrouth as an outlet, and,in any case, the wheat was,
badly needed by the Turks in ~yria themselves,
the line ceased to have a raison d'etre.

Consequently ,

The line was also

isolated in the south from the HejaS;- Hailway's Haifa branch,
as a previously existing 2 km . spur , linking the French

(6) Details about the railways described will be
found in chapter III,

~

- 359 station at Meserib,with the Turkish station of the same
name, had been taken up (7).
The Beja

Railway, on the o ther hand, which from its

very outset had been built not only for political and religious
(and to a lesser extent - commercial) reasons, but considering
mainly strategic requirements , ke pt its great military
importance, and after war broke out was to increase it
c onsiderably .

It led to Arabia , parallel to the Britis h-

controlled Red Sea , but at a safe distance from it , and
enabled the Turks to retain a considerable garrison in the
Hejafc, and to hold the sac red c ity of Medina to the very
end of the war ( 8 ) .

The Haifa branch , however , of the

Heja'%' Railway , lost all military importance on the outbreak
of war .

Its two Ivlediterranean termini , Haifa and Acre,

turned into dead ~ends after the Allied navies put an end to
the Turkish peacetime practice of sendi ng troops by sea
from metropolitan Turkey to the Levant and Arabia (9) ,

(?) When the Heja<,;t Railway was being built, the Hauran
line had been used to bring equipment and rolling stock from
Beyrouth to t he building sites . After the Hejas line had been
built , the servic es of the Frenc h line were no longer needed ,
and the Turks had taken up the short section linking the two
systems .
(8)
edina was to surrender only in January 1919 .
Cp. Ops . II, part 2 , p . 624. Mecca, on the other hand ,
which had no railway to back it up, was surrendered by t h e Turks
to the Arabs shortly after the outbreak of the Sh erifian
Rebellion in the summer of 1916 ,
(9) Kress , p . JO .

-

)~0 -

While , as noted , the Heja~ Railway trunk line was the
~

t

~ l 1.

only part of the Palestine system that was of military
importance, this importance held good only as far as the
distant Heja~ front was concerned, that came into being
only after the ~herifian Kebellion of 1916 (10) .

It was to

have no influence on Turkish activities against Egypt .
The point on the Heja~ Railway nearest to the Suez Canal was
M~an .

Between Ma ' an and Suez there intervened the deep

break of the Arava Rift Valley , and several hundred kms . of
waterless desert .

The Heja~ Railway , therefore , never had

an influence on the Egyptian front .

A planI to be discussed

later , to build in 1914 a branch from ~a 0 an down to Akabah ,
and perhaps towards Egypt , came to nothing ,
Operational Difficulties in 1914 ; vs . British Fears of the Railway.
Apart from an unfortunate layout , that made most , though
not all 1 of it militarily useless, the railway system of Palestine
as a whole suffered in 1914 from other disadvantages o

Its

narrow gauge limited carrying capacity at a time when the
absence of roads, and the impossibility of transporting bulky
goods by sea , put additional strains on whatever railways
there were operating (ll)o

~oreover , there loomed over the lines

( 10) As far as is known , the Heja Railway had no
influence on the activities of the isolated Turkish garrison
in the Yemen , that sporadically fought the British in Aden .
(ll)Cp , Kress, p . 60, on the necessity of running only
half- trains up steep gradients , as fully loaded trains were
incapable of climbing them.

a possible fuel shortage , as reserves of coal were low, and
local resources unavailable.

Coal had always been brought

by the Turks by sea, but the two colliers that had anchored
at Haifa when war broke out were to supply the last good
overseas coal that was to reach the railways in Palestine for
the duration of the war (12).

The outbreak of hostilities

also led to the dismissal of the foreign nationals that
worked the railways, Frenc h , Italians, Greeks and others,
and to the eviction, and sometimes to the slaughter , of
Turkey ' s Armenian subjects that were employed,especially on
the Heja~ Railway .

In their stead Arabs, i gnorant of mec hanical

niceties, were pressed into servi ce, and Turks were moved
into positions of responsibility, where they became a by-word
for graft , sloth, and inefficiency (lJ) .

These developments

lowered the efficiency of the lines, as time passed, to a
great degree.

Finally - up to the outbreak of war, the

railways in ~alestine had for all practical purposes been a
self-contained system that, as for rolling stock, equipment
and spares 1 had looked to the west (Germany, and to a far
lesser extent France).

The closing of the sealanes had

changed all that, making ~alestine ' s lines merely the southernmost extension of the Turkish metropolitan network, with
(12) Ops . , I, p. 27. The lack of fuel will be referred
to again.
(13) Complaints about the urkish management of the
railways in Palestine run like a red thread through the
accounts of Kress and other Germans who were to serve in the
country .

\
which - however - it was linked only precariously on account
of the different (normal) gauge of the French-built railways
in central and northern Syria, and on account of the - for a
long time - incomplete state of the Taurus and Amanus tunnels,
linking northern Syria with Anatolia proper (1 4) ,

As the

war continued, the Turkish railway network itself was to
become , to a considerable extent, a sort of s o uth-easterly
•

extension of the rail - network serving the Central Powers ,
Consequently, as time passed , the lines in Palestine turned
into the termini

of a vastly long railway l i nk that started

from the munmtimns and arms fa c tories of Germany (and
to end in the ~ear Bast (15) .

ustria)

Thus , the british c ame to

regard the Turkish railways in the Holy Land as a serious
threat to the ~uez Canal,

Indeed , at the beginning of the

war they considered reports that the Turks would soon have
100,000 troops in Palestine - concentrated and supplied by the
available railways
higher (16) ,

, a figure that was soon to rise even

The British at the time did not know how

preposterous their fears were , in view of the actual state of
(14) It should be remembered that , while the He ja~
Railway , as well as the Beyrouth-Damascus-ooeserib Railway,
were of the 1,050 mm . narrow- gauge , the French- built lines
in Central and Northern ~yria , and also the 1urkish railways ,
used the standard 1 , 435 mm . gauge .
(15) For a very excellent representation of Germany's ,
and Austria 1 s 1 railway link with Palestine via Turkey and ~yria ,
b ee biblio graphy) f cp. Gil bert ,> map 4 .
(16) Cp . Ops , I , pp . 14, 89. The threat of 'l'urkish
c oncentrations in Pales tine, and the expected share of the
railways in moving and utilising them, will be t ouched upon
again .

the railways facing them in 1914,

Nor did they appreciate

how very little - relatively speaking - even the improvements
the Turks and their German allies were going to make in the
Palestine network were to add to the operational importance
of these lines.

They, and the

urks for that matter, saw

the railways in Palestine as the business end of a vital
trunk line that was destined to concentrate supplies from
~yria , manpower and light arms from Turkey, and heavy equipment
and ammunition from the production of the Central Powers
in huropeo

As will be seen in due course, both the British

and the Turks were wrong in their assumptions ,with fateful
results as the war continued .

The railways of Palestine ,

as it turned out, could never accomplish the tasks they
were expected to fulfill because their links with Anatolia
and with Europe were so tenuous and disjointed that they
could not extend their network sufficiently, improve their
services , or even, owing to the lack of spares, maintain the
level of efficiency they had reached.
In view of the, in the long run, fatal results of this
state of affairs, both for the railways themselves in · alestine,
and for the military operations they were meant to support as
the only long-range means of communication of the Turkish
armies, a digression must be made in order to describe the
Turkish rail trunk line on which the network facing the
Bri tish depended.

The Rear Li

of the ' ailways in Palesti ne

When war broke out late i n 1914, Turkey • s co mmunic at io ns ,
as far as warl i ke stores to be supplie d by the Central

e wers

were conc erned , were c ut off , owi ng t o the neutral ity of
Bulgaria and .rlurnani a.

t that time , as not ed above , Turkey

was a sourc e of manpower , and probably produc ed small arms
and ammunitio n.

All more s ophi stic ated stores , artil lery

ammunition, and technical i tems , and suppl i es for the German
(and later - Austrian ) co nti ngents servi ng i n the Ottoman
Empi re had to be broue;ht i n by rail .,

Mar i t i me commun ic atio ns

had , of co urse , been c ut off entirely and spares f or the
lines i n Palesti ne wo ul d also have had to be brought by rail.
Rail links wi th Central Europe were re - establi shed only
through c aptured

erbi ap when Bulgari a. entered the war

on the s i de of the Central Powers i n Oc t ober 1915 ~ From that
t i me onward, mi litary stores were di spatc hed fr om Germany
and Austria via Bel grade and 'ofia t o Constanti nopleo
Here everythi ng had t o be unl oaded unto barges at ~c utayi,
to be ferr i ed a cr oss the Bosphoros to ~he termi nus of the
natolian Railway Com any at ~ai dar

asha on the As i atic shore .

All stores f or ~alesti ne now had to co ver a di stanc e
of some 2,000 kms. approxi mately on a s i ngle- trac k line
to their destinatio n .

Thi s was done i n the f ollowi ng stages (17):

(17) The Vi a Dela r osa of stores , and rai lwa spares i f any were sent - i s graphic ally des cribed i n man sourc es ,
amongst them: Kress, pp . 209-210;
ps. I, pp . 26-27;
Wavell, p. 11-12; Wiegand, pp . 16- 170

- ')6s From Haidar Pasha loads were sent on the standard 1,435 mm .
at•·- •: German-built track, via Af i a n - Kara

ssar and Konia

to Bosant.yKarapunar at the f oo t of the Taurus

ange.

Since the four long tunnels (some 17 kms., in length altogether )
through the 'Taurus mountains were not t o be com leted until
just before the end of the war (in Oc t ober 1918), all shipments
were now unl oaded to be sent by animal - drawn wagons (only
later supplemented by motor-lorries ) by road a c ross the
hills to Da rak, 50 kms. from I-Carapunar.

Here they had to

be loaded on the standard- gauge line (built oy the former
British fue Ws ina-Adana rtailway ) to be sent across the Ci l ici d~
.
,,
Plain to fuama ure, at the f oot of the AmanuE Range . As the
a c ross this range (5 kms . l ong )1 and several

Ja gc he tunne

subsidiary tunnels1 were not yet ready, goods had t o be
unloaded again t o be moved some J5 filns . by r oad a cro ss the
hills to Islahi ye .

From here the new Baehdad rlai lwa, of

standard eauge , conti nued to ~usl i mi yeh Junc t io n, j ust north
of Al ep o.

Here the line branc hed, on e extensio n goine east

to Tel Hel if and
Baghdad ended~

i s i bi n , where the proposed track to
It wi ll thus be noted that supplies, both

for the Turki sh f or c es f i ght i ng i n Iviese potami a, and for the
arm i es f i ghti ng in 1-alestine and in Arabia, used the same
muc h-broken single- trac k line from Haidar l>asha to 1v.uslimiyeh (1 8 ) •
The other branc h from Muslimiyeh went south via Alep

(18)

Cp. Kress , p. 209; Ops . r ., p. 27;

I

and

Wavell , p. 11.

- ]~\? continued on the French-built line through Hama and H ms
to Rayak in the Beka'a Valley of Coele-5yriao

Hayak was

the terminus of the standard 1,4J5 mmo line, and its junction
with the narrow-gauge, 1,050 mmo French railway beyrouthDamascus.

Here all stores were unloaded for the fifth time -

the seventh ~f the Bosphoros crossing is counted in - onto
the narrow- gauge wagons that carried them towards Damascus.
From here they were carried over the tracks of the Heja~
Hailwa

to Dera 0 a Junction, where the line branched again,

towards Hai fa on the one hand, ooaan and the Heja
other.

on the

Here it must be noted again that su plies for the

forces both in Palestine and in Transjordania and Arabi a
used the same track from ~uslimiyeh to Dera • a , wi th its
gauge - break at Kayak .

Turkish inefficiency and pilfering,

apparently to be incurable through all the war years, and
only partially remedied later on by the employment of German
and probably also Austrian troops alone the line, have been
mentioned before (19).

The eviction of all qualified non-

Turkish , especially Armenian,
referred to (20) .

ersonnel, has also already been

Even the fatal delay i n completing the

'l'aurus and Amanus tunnels may have been due to the elimination
of their Armenian workers (21).

F'rom this descri tion of the

(19) Kress, p . 210; Wiegand , p. 17, for losses
the lines . Wagons seem to have been hired out privately
by the Turks . Cp . ~teuber (see bibliogra h ) 1 p. 109 .
(20) Kress,
• 130; Wiegand, p. 17 .
(21 ) Accordine to Kress, Djemal Pasha ( of whom more
further on) even tried to go to Constantinople at a later
stage, to try and allevi ate the persecution of the Armenians.
This was in ovember 1915. Cp. Kress, P• JO.

.. .

main Turkish trunk line, at the end of which the network in
Palestine had to operate, and on which it depended for everything, both for its working and the supplies it had to
distribute, and the troops it had to move, it will be seen ~ ~
the British fears of the capacities of the railways in
Palestine were grossly exaggerated,22),

\

(22) British apprehensions of the Turkish railways
did not pall as time passed, and were to grow into something of a mania while the lines were being extended as
time passed . Cp, Kress , pp. 165~166, but especially Ops. I.,
pp. 157-158, where it is recorded that General ~ir Archibald
Murray , the General - Offi cer-Commanding in Egypt (who will be
frequently mentioned again in these pages) in an appreciation
to the Chief of the Imperial General ~taff in London, as
late as February 15, 1916, mentioned the possibility of
250,000 Turks being moved - with the help of the railways against Egypt. On the other hand, Wavell , writing some
twelve years later, about 1928 , estimated the time it took
supplies to reach the Turkish front from Constantinople after a 2,000 kms. journey and several transshipments at 4-6 weeks, and he was probably right. Gp. avell, p._ lJO.
Cp. also Wiegand , pp. 16-17, who gives the transport time
from Sileh in ~amaria, the then-railhead, to the ~uez Canal,
as 25 days. In 1917, Steuber , the chief German medical
officer, estimated transport movements from Constantinople
only to Aleppo (at that time 450 kms . from the front in
southern Palestine) to take 6-8 days. Returning by train
from ~a~areth to Constantinople , he spent lJ days, though
he was an important man with top priority. Cp . teuber,
p. 162. From which it will be seen that conditions on the
connecting lines between Palestine and Anatolia never
improved, British fears notwithstanding.

\~
I

Djemal Pasha and ·his Military Ambitions for the Railways
in Palestine.
It seems that not only the British in 1914 (and later)
were overestimating the military potential of Palestine's
railways.

Ahmed Djemal Pasha, nominal Turkish 1vinister of

Marine, and actual Governor-General of Cilicia, ~yria,
alestine, and the Heja, also overrated their operational
capabilities.

~ince November of 1914 he was also commanding

general of the 4th Turkish Army, in ~yria and Palestine,
which in fact meant that he was the uncrowned and all-powerful
ruler of the Levant area .

He seems to have had an unusual

appreciation - for a Turk - of the military value of railways,
and he was willing to develop the lines within the sphere
of his command (23).
To judge from all the many contemporary accounts,
Djemal was a man of driving energy and insatiable ambition,
and from the very outset of the war planned to attack the
~uez Canal, Britain's lifeline from Australia and India,
to the Near East and Europe.

He al s o hoped that an attack

by '.i 'urkey, an I s lamic power, would
in Joslem h gypt, against its British masters (24).

~or the

purpose of attaeking Egypt, he considered that he needed
0

(23) For Djemal Pasha (?1 872-1922), cp. his bio graphy
in Webster (see bibliogr~phy). He also wrote an autobiography (listed in the biblio graphy).
(24) For Djemal's hope for a rising in ng ypt; cp. his
Memoirs, p. 154. Also Kress, p. 76; Ops. I, PP• 34-J6;
Wavell, p . 13. For Djemal's character, and qualifications,
cp. Wavell, p. 28, and also Kress, pp. 71-75•

\
adequate lines of communications, and from this, owing to
the total 1 lack of roads in the proposed area of operations,
apparently grew his ambition to become known in history
as the first man to have built a railway across the ~inai
Desert (25).

Djemal 9 s idea was to extend ~alestine s

railways to the south, and then west.

He wanted to build

his ~inai line via Bir Hassana , at least to Bir Gafgafa

,h,

(or Jifjafa; today's Rephidim);~

/

distance of some 85 kms.

as the crow flies, from the important British base at
Ismailia on the Suez Canal (26).

In his eagerness 1 he dis-

regarded the tenuous nature of the Anatolian and Syrian
back-up lines of the ~alestine network - a fact that was
ultimately to contribute to his own downfall, and to Turkey's
losing the war.

However, little could he suspect at the

outbreak of war that a full four years were to pass before
the first direct train from Constantinople to Aleppo was
to roll through the Taurus and the Amanus tunnels, on whose
speedy completion the outcome of the life-and-death struggle
on the Palestine and Heja~ (and 1v1esopotamia) fronts was to
depend (27).

All that Djemal Pasha wanted at the end of 1914

was the man to build the railways in Palestine that were to
supply the proposed Egyptian front.

(25)

This man he found in

Kress, p$ 157. Also Ops. I, p. 85.
Rupp in (cp. biblio graphy), p. 298; also Djemal,

(26)
P• 16J.
( 27)
e .f irst standard gauge trains passed the Taurus
funnels in ~
1918; the Amanus tunnels were completed
a little earlier. Cp~ ecord (see bibliography; text to
plate 54: Turkish Communications in 1918)
Ops. I, p. 27 notej tt.N:l
wavell, pp. 11-12 1 ~ " St-rtf,'M-{,..t,v ~J...
~w.-lwv..
1

Heinrich-August V
leissner Pasha , the German who in •1901-1908
had built the Heja

Railway whom even the British regarded

with considerable respect (28).

Djemal, when still a "Bey" ,

and Vali (governor) of Baghdad in 1912, had come to know and
respect Me issner, when the German had organized in

~es -

potamia the building of the southernmost stretch of the
Baghdad Railway (29).
Neissner Pasha :

His Activities to 1914.

A great deal about Meissner has already been said in

the foregoing chapter, where his building of the Heja
was described~
here.

rtailway

Only a few relevant details need repetition

Me issner had started his career as railway-engineer

in Turkey at the age of 2J in 1885 .

ow, in 1914, at the age

of 52, he probably knew more about the Ottoman Empire, its
government and its people, than any German, civilian or
soldier, then alive.

He spoke Turkish fluently and to judge
I

by his success in building the Heja~ Hailway to its completion1against very heavy odds, he had adjusted perfectly
to his oriental (or levantine) surroundings, without at all
losing his natural drive, or his organizing abilities.

(28) Meissner has already been very frequently referred
to in Chapter III, above, as the builder of the Heja~ ailway.
His biography will be found in Pe e ~' icke and ick (see biblio graphy) . Cp. also Kress, pp. 75, 156; and many references
in Auler (see bibliography for Chapter III) . As for British
references to Meis sner : Ops. I, p. 85 ; Wavell, p. lJ;
Woods (cp. bibliography) p. 53.
(29) As for Djemal's previous acquaintance with Meissner,
cp. P enicke, • 25, and also ~ick. On July 28, 1912, Djemal
turned the first sod at Baghdad , when Meissner started the
buildi ng of the Baghdad ailway to the north , Incidentally,
the first through-train from Gonstantinople to Baghdad ran only
on July 17, 1940, a few months after ooe i ssner 's death.

Holding the rank of
'

)

'

"Pasha"✓

he enjoyed wide recognition

') ~'

in the co untry (JO).

After the Heja

rtailway had been

completed in 1908, Neissner had joined the German-sponsored
Baghdad Railway Company, filling leading posts, first at
Aleppo and then at Baghdad .
for almost five years.

He stayed with the company

When Meissner left Palestine, two

of his building plans were in abeyance.
project to build a branch of the Heja

(

One was his 1906
kailway from ~a ian

in Transjordania, down to Akaba by the Hed ~ea, possibly
with a view to its extension towards Egypt through ~inai.
This project failed, owine to British opposition that led to
the Akaba Crisis.

His second plan was the extension of the

Haifa branch of the Heja

Ra ilway from

fule, through ~amaria,

to the south, in the direction of Jerusalem.

Thi s second

line, proposed by Meissner i n 190 8 , was actually started
by the Turks after he had left, and by 1914 had grown from
Afule, by way of Jenin, to ~ileth-ed-Dahr, in the mountains
of Samaria, as noted at the beginning of this c hapter (Jt).

(JO) MeissneF · was to leave 'I'urkey f or Germany after
the loss of the war in 1918 . He returned to Turkey in 1924,
engaged in rebuilding its war-shattered railways, and died
at Constantinople, a ged 78, in 1940.
(Jl) For l'1eissner' s 1906 and 190 8 schemes , cp. Pa e ~ icke,
pp . 14-15, 28. Als o } ic k . They were also dis cussed in ..,/
c hapter IIIo ~ileth ed-Dahr was also known by its short
name - !:>ileih .

-

- ') 1 1-- -

\

ooeissner's Abortive Hailway to Akaba, 1914
On August 2nd, 1914, Turkey had ordered general mobilization (32) .

On September 8, some seven weeks before Turkey's

actual entry into the war, the Baghdad Railways directorate
in Baghdad cabled the German Embassy in Constantinople that
Meissner

asha was willing to undertake a possible (etwaig~
,,

improvised continuation of the Heja~ Hailway from ~,a ' an to
Akaba-~uez .

The German Foreign Office, on ~eptember 12, 1914,

even wanted ~eissner to bring along certain members of his
staff to help in building the new line .

r·othing came out

of this scheme, as the Chief of the German ooilitary fuission
in the Turkish capital, the all-powerful General Ctto Liman
van ~anders (the future defender of the Dardanelles ) c onsidered

that the proposed line would not pay (ll), and also would be
too difficult to build.

~o, a cable by the embassy at

Constantinople to Baghdad, of ~eptember 20th (3J).

In

rejecting the plan, Liman van &anders merely adopted the

(

same opinion the German Auler ~asha had had eight years
before , in 1906 (34) .

Meissner ~asha stayed in Baghdad -

temporarily - and the whole intermezzo was perhaps interesting
only insofar as proving that the idea of attaaking bgypt
by way of ~inai, with a railway to back up the attempt, was
not regarded as extraordinary in Turkey even before it got
(32) Ops . I, p . 34, note .
(33) Files of the German .Foreign Office, as quoted
by Pe e n icke, pp . 28-29.
(34) For Auler ~asha's rejection of the ooa 'an-Akaba
branch, cp. details in chapter III .
~

involved in the general war.

This particular version of the

idea, though, came to nothing, and merely showed v1eissner 1 s
aggressive attitude, and his stubborn clinging to his 1906
scheme for yet another railway.
The Origins of the ~inai Railway
However , apparently sometime in ~eptember- October 1914,
another versio n of the concept of attaaking Egypt from
Palestine - with a railway to back up the operation - seems
to have cropped up.

This was, almost without doubt, the

scheme that was shortly afterwards to be adopted by Djem
as his own.

Details are very scanty and obscure.

.t:->asha

All that is

known is that in a meeting on Octo ber 19, 1914 - that is,
ten days before

urkey actually entered the war - the Baghdad

ailway Company in Frankfurt (Germany) decided to put its
entire staff (including rue i ssner) and all its resources, at
the disposal of a newly planned line , on account of its
'

?

I.

importance for the war effort ,01:::f!::!~michti ~

(J5) .

The new

Jf

line must have been regarded as having very great importance,
seeing that to further it the continuation of the baghdad
railways construction was interrupted, although the line to
Baghdad was vital for the supply of the Turkish troops fighting
the British , and at times the Russians , in fuesopotamia .
There is practically no doubt (there are no other possibilities)
that the proposed railway, for which even the Baghdad line was
relegated to the background, was a line to run through
alestine, towards r.gypt.

(J5)

Po eihicke, p . 29, quoting German official sources .
'-"

Unfortunately , it c annot now be ascertained who , on the
part of the Turks , at th i s early date , "pushed" the idea of
building a railway of such vital importance for the pro secution of the war , whic h at that time Turkey had no t even
joined 1 though she was about t o do so .

The co nc ept may have

originated in very high c irc les , for the Baghdad rlailway
Company to decide as it did .

At a gues s it might be surmised

that the idea originated in the Turkish cabinet , in whi c h
Djemal Pasha at the time was a most influential member
until he went to ~yria , in November .

}ossibly , though this

also is spec ulation , the line may also have had German
military bac king , as Liman von ~anders - who had shortly
before vetoed Meissner's ll'la ' an- Akaba- :;suez line - c annot have
been unaware of the operational advantages of a railway
built through relat i vely passable regions towards the
British enemy .
What is clear , and must have been obvi ous to the Turks
and their German allies at the time , is that there was already
(

a working nuc leus for any line it may have been intended to
build to the south .

This was the Haifa branc h of the Heja~

Railway , working from Dera ' a Junc tion to the ,iedi terranean .
This trunk line had already before the outbreak of war
sprouted a branch - mentioned earlier in this c hapter , and
also in chapter III - from Afule via
mountains of Samaria .

enin to ~ileh in the

This was the line, already envisaged

by Conder in the 1870s as going to Jerusalem lJ6) .

(J6)

As described in chapter II .

It was

- ';1) -

also the line that French pressure, just before the war,
had prevented from continuing to Jerusalem, limiting its
construction to Nablus (J7) .

However, this branch already

permitted through-traffic from Damascus to ~ileh, and its
continuation south, at least to ooaa sudiye (just north of
'homron/~ebastiye) was already in an advanced stage of
construction - including Ramin tunnel - the only one of its
kind in Western Palestine (JS) .

This line gave the Turks , now

free of ~rench pressure , the possibility t o continue south,
by way of Jerusalem .

It also gave them a choice of turning

west , onto the coastal plain , the ~haron , and going south .
Regarding the ~haron , the Turks may have borne in mind
that shortly before the outbreak of war the trench had
proposed a scheme to build a standard gauge line from Afule ,
down the Sharon , t o a point on the J:t'rench Jaffa - Jerusalem
rai lway - probably Lod or }{am]e: (39) .

This proposed line would

have gone north from Afuleh , past Tiberias and the Hule
Marshes , up the Rift Valley , to join the standard gauge
French railway to H sand Aleppo at

ayak .

~eeing that the

Turks in 1914 already had a rail - link of their own - albeit
of narrow gauge - from Hayak, via Damascus and Dera • a t o Afule,
they were not interested in the northern sec tion of the Frenc h
proposal .

But the concept of building down the co astal plain

to Lod/Ramle , may have given them f ood for thought .

(37)
(38)
(39)

Cp. chapter III .
Cp . ~a enicke P • 29 .
Imhoff (cp . bibliography, f or . c hapter iII ) , P• 866;

cods , p . 54 .

However, speculation~apart, the facts in November 191~
were the following :

The railways of Palestine, as they were

then, had almost no military value;

Djemal, the newly-appointed

military commander, wanted the railways in the country to
serve his strategic concepts;
the Turkish troops on the

he wanted a railway to support

alestine front facing the British

in Egypt, preferably a line to 1 and across 1 binai;

Meissner

was a renowned railway builder, and Djemal knew him from
Baghdad;

~eissner was available.

~eissner's Appointment and his Tasks
On November 10, 1914 ~ eissner was put under the command
of Djemal Pasha, after having been detached from the Haghdad
Railway (40).

He brought with him some of his staff from

Mesopotamia.

His seat became Damascus, which was also the

Civil and Iv;ili tary Headquarters of Djemal 1:-'asha.

.l:''rom now on,

and probably for four years, until the end of the war there are no dates as to the termination of his appointment he seems to have been, by reason of experience and seniority,
the virtual "generalissimo'' of the Turkish railways in
Syria and ~alestine.

These lines now included also the

French railways in both countries, that had been taken over
as enemy property as war broke out.

What ~eissner accomplished

in the field of railway construction in the years 1914-1918
is clear to a large extent (though some details are missing)
.......

and will be the subject of the following pa e '......s
(40)

P&enicke, p. 29.

It is less

9

clear how far he was concerned in the day-to-day running of
the Turkish network, though by the very nature of his construction work and its requirements he must have been involved
with routine running,

O V'

_ must have had an important say in it .

It is however obvious that he had to rely on the efficient
collaboration of another German railway- engineer with his
seat in Damas cus.

This was

isenbahn- Direktor (railway :

~vu.''

i:u 11ago1 ) Paul Dieckmann, who was Betriebsdire ktctv ( traffic =

ji1e~)

of the ~yrian and Palestine network, and apparently

responsible for its routine operations.

hether or not

Dieckmann was subordinate to r,ie issner, or acted independently,
is not known .

He had been in the service of the Heja

Hailway

for several years before the war, but was clearly junior to
Meissner , nor was he as well known, and figures relatively
rarely in contemporary sources (41) .
Afeissner•s tasks on being posted to }alestine may be
summarized as follows (42):

Planning the easiest, cheapest,

(41) Eisenbahndire ktor ~aul Diec kmann is mentioned by
P~enicke, p . 15, as the expert who re-vitalized the Beja
Railway about 1909- 1910, after Meissner had left . He later
wrote in the 'l!:. D. ~ . v. (cp. bibliography; vol. for 1914)
on the proposed Afule - Nablus-Jerusalem railway . After the war,
about 1922, he at least once may have written an article
in the German technical journal "Eisenbahn Archiv" on the
development of railways in alestine . This coul d not be verified .
In 1924 he wrote in the German publication,"iwischen Kaukasus
und ~inai" (cp. bibliography) an interesting article on the Heja
Hailway and the ~yrian (Palestine)rlailways i n the World ·ar
and aftero The article i s remarkable for practically i gnoring
fueissner and his work. He signed himself Regierungsrat (a
high Ger man Civil ~ervice rank), and gave his address- curio usly as Haifa .
(42) Moo..s sner ' s tasks are summarized by Pa enicke, p . 29.
They are also amply do cumented, though not f©-hma]: if! sorhma~1.2ed,. lm ·the writings of Diec kmann , (who did not refer to him by name)
I
Kress and Wiegand .

and most efficient layoug of the railways required by Djemal
Pasha for Turkish operations;

organizing and carrying out

work on the envisaged tracks and providing the necessary
work-force;

planning and building bridges ;

s iting and

building stations, and providing for their water supplies;
building and organizing workshops to fit existing equipment
for use, and to repair damage to stock that was to be progressively subject by wear and tear;

assembling the necessary

rolling stock for carrying out construction work that (as
(

it inevitably turned out) had to be carrie d out while the
new line was simultaneously used for military purposes;
providing fuel and lubrication material, a task that was to
become more f ormidable as time passed;

finally - his most

important problem - he had to provide rails and ties (sleepers)
in vast quantities.

In s ome of these tasks he probably had

the help of Dieckmann, but the final responsibility for
carrying them out was his alone.
should be mentioned again .

Incidentally a curious fact

As he did while building the

Hejaz Railway , Meissner in his new work probably used his
capabilities as a water-diviner in order to s ite stations and
develop their water supply ( 4J) .

All in all, hie issner' s tasks

( 4J) For l11eissner' s abilities with the di vining-rod,
cp. Kress , p. 145 . He seems to have been extremely successful,
as lack of water, that was so much to plague briti sh railway
construction, is never mentioned amongst the difficulties of
the Turkish railways in an arid country. It must be remembered
that there were no diesels, but only steam-locomotive s 1 in
the .r' irst world war , and water for raising steam was vital.

in 1914 were similar to the ones he had to carry out while
building the Hejaz Railway in 1901-1908, though with a
crucial difference - h e could expect no outside help , or
supplies, or equipment, in his work.

Owing to the incomplete

state of the Taurus and Amanus tunnels , and the gauge break
at Rayak - all already referred to above - his was prac tically
an independent rail network, that for most practic al purposes
co uld not be r einforced, and was not, throughout the war,
except for a few rare exceptions (44).

Such were the cir-

c umstances under which 1v1eissner reswned his activities in
Palestine, and was expected to provide the ra il communications
WP7±BP.Y~hich - in an almost roadless region - an offensive
against the British in ~gypt , or even a defensive front in
Palestine, were out of the questio no
One fact that worked in weissner ' s favor seems t o have
been that he apparently maintained good relations with the
all-powerful Djemal .

Nothing to the co ntrary is mentioned

anywhere, and Meissner ' s practical achievements under the
circumstances prevailing in the country bear out this supposition .

(44) Diec kmann, in "Kaukasus," pp. 56-57, says that
twenty locomotives ordered
·
in Germany in 1915 1
were supplied in 1917-18 in a disassembled state. ~hey
arrived piecemeal from 1917 and were put t ogether (except
the last ones in 1918) in OOeissner ' s workshops, probably in
Damasc us . Coal , 100 wagon-loads of it, arrived from Germany
in Palestine , about ~eptember 1918. If other supplies
ever re 'v-c hep. 1i1eis ner, there is no record of them 1 uuy-~ ~
,:,~(.; tM-(.,L ~ 'IVYVl,l\;V\. ~ ~ ( ) i . . , ~ 1 r;ih&- kt:i\l-u-cel ~ ~
l\v~ ~~

- s~D Indeed, both men ' s interests were complementary.

building

railways was now 1\1eissner 1 s patriotic vocation,, and the
Turkish commander, whatever his many faults, seems to have
been a man of wide horizons, and thus appreciated the vital
importance of railways in his grand design to attack the
British enemy.

It was almost certainly Djemal who had made

the German engineer his railway-builder-in-chief, and he had
every reason to support him .
Meissner ' s Opposite Number: Kt'ess .
rieissner, on reaching the ~alestine front, was to work
for three years very closely with a man who in many ways was
his German military counterpart.

This was Colonel , later

General, Friedrich Kress von Kressenstei n, the highest
ranking German officer attac hed to the Turkish forces on
the ~alestine front .

Biographical details about Kress are

very hard to come by, but he was undoubtedly the most important,
and the most efficient, soldier on the Turkish side of the
Palestine front, between the end of 1914 and the end of 1917 (45) .
\

As far as can be made out, he had originally been sent from
Germany to act as Chief of ~taff of the 8th Turkish a~my~eQrps,
l>ecam.e -a.ommander of the Turkish forces in ~inai to 1916 under
Djemal, and became Commander- n-Chief of the Turkish 8th Army.
He was relieved by the German General Eric i von ¥alkenhayn, of
Verdun notoriety, after he had failed (owing to lack of means,

(45) According to wavell, p. 28 passim, Kress was
"gallant, resolute, able", and always commanded the respect
of his British opponents . He is mentioned equally res pectfully in Ops ., the British official military history .

Aerial view of Beer Sheba , taken by Germans ca . early 1918 ,
after town ' s capture by British . Town , with grid-like layout,
in center . Meissner ' s Sinai railway on left , running from west
(bottom)to south- east . Photo shows shunting yard(left bottom) ,
triangular locomotive switchback (left center) , and Turkish
warehouses(on branch , left center) . ( at . Libr ., Phot . 258) .

Meissner ' s railway bridge over Vadi Beer Sheba , with town
in Background . The line to the left led to Auja . The bridge,
built 1915 , still stands , less one arch . (Source:Gullett,Record) .
(Pi ck , chapte
,
r - •

and through no fault of his) to stem the onslaught of
Allenby ' s British Imp erial Forces in the Third Battle of
Gaza (46) .

Kress was to depend in his operations very greatly

on Meissner s railways , and despite occ asional differences
of opinion between them - the engineer wanted to continue
building at any price , while the soldier preferred to consolidate what had been built - the two seem to have gotten
along well (47) .

In fact, since b eissner, as far as is

known, left no written records or memoirs, a great deal
\\

about what he accomplished can be gleane~ rom Kress l writings .
The following pages will be devoted to a detailed
description of what 1v1eissner achieved in building , and running ,
wartime railways in

alestine , at the behest of Djemal ~asha .

It should be stressed explicitly that the subject will be
Turkish railways, and not Turkish wartime operations.
Operations 1 howeve ~ will be mentioned incidentally.

The next-

f ollowing section, on the wartime building of British railways
in Sinai and Palestine , will contain more references to a c tual
operations, involving Turks as well as British, but also
only insofar as they pertain to the subjects under discussion .
The ~inai Railway:

Considerations and their Implementation

On December 8, 1914, when Djemal was about to arrive in
Damascus to take over his appointment, and only a bare few weeks
after the two Germans , fueissner and Kress, had started to settle

(46) For Kress' activities in orld ar I, cp. his
autobiography "Mit den TLlrken ••• " (see biblio graphy).
(47)

Cp. Kress, pp . 75, 124 , 1.3.3, 156;

Wiegand p . JO.

down in their new jobs as furtherers of the Turkish cause,
both met .

At their meeting they apparently came to a number

of decisions that were to be of vital importance for the
development of military activities on the Palestine front
during the war , as well as for the long-term history of
railways in the Near East as a whole (48) .

As far as they

can be reconstructed from the sources, and their accompanying
maps, these decisions were as follows:
A)

~eissner Pasha was to prolong the available, and

working 1 Afule - ~ileh branch of the Hejaz rlailway towards
the south .
B)

In view of the terrain difficulties presented by

the hilly areas ahead, and the time factor this involved,
the new line was not to be built in the direction, and
through, Jerusalem.

Instead it was to turn from Sileh

(actually from ~assudiye slightly to the s outh of it) towards
the west, and 'l'ul Karem .

From 1rul Karem it was to turn south .

From the later, actual, track of the new line , it may be
conjectured that, while utilizing to their advantage the
easy g~ound formation of the level Sharon coastal plain ,
Meis sner and Kress kept their railway distant from the coast,
and as far away to the east as possible, to run parallel to
the foothills of the Judaean mountains .

This in order to

protect it from sudden enemy naval descents, and out of
gun-range from the Allied navies .

(48) For the meeting, and the developments following
it, cp . , inter alia, Kress , pp . 75, 124, lJJ, 151, 156, 168;
POenicke, PP • 29-JO; Ops , I, pp . 76-77, 85- 86 ; Ruppin ,
pp . 298-299; Wavell , p . 12; Wiegand, p . JO . ~evelopments
~:pe also amply documented by the maps attached to most of
these sources .

C)

The new line was to run s outh from Tul Karem

through Lod and Hamle to Beer Sheba.

At a later stage it

was apparently to continue south, via As i uj (Revivim),
Auja Hafir (Nitsana), and west to Bir Hassana , and in the
general direction of Ismailia and the ~uez Canal.
to terminate, at least temporarily, at Bir Gafgafa .

It was
The

line was obviously to be aligned with a view to its water
supply (the wells at Asluj , Auja, Hassana and Gafgafa) .
D)

In order to utilize the rolling stock and rails
£;..w.\..

available in the co untryl>elonging to the Hejaz Ha ilway
I

and the French lines of the same, :~t ~si~~llF~ gauges that
had been taken over, the line was to have the gauge of the
Hejaa: Railway , 1,050 mm . (49).
(49) The decision to build the Turkish wartime railways
on the 1,050 mm . gauge was a fateful one, with repercussions
to the present day (1975) . But it was unavoidable, as there
was not enough standard stock in ~yria , no new stoc k obtainable,
and building the new line on the standard gauge would have
forced the building of a long connecting line between the
standard terminus at Rayak in ~yria, and ~ileh, which was
quite immpossible, on account of the lack of time and equipment .
As for the rolling stock of 1,050 rnm . gauge available,
details of the Hejaz Railway and Jaffa- Jerusalem effectives
will be found at the end of this c hapter . ~o details seem
ever to have been publ ished of French narrow-gauge stock.
According to "World .Kailways," 1952-53, (cp. bibliography)
p. 511, stoc k on the narrow Frenc h Beyrouth- Damascus line
in the early 1950s compri sed 40 locomotives, 83 passenger,
and 339 goods carriages . As in French manadatory times .
practically no money had been invested in this moribund
line, these figures might at least give a pointer as to
what stock Me issner had available, though several decades
earlier.

- 3i <j E)

In order to have as large a supply of rails and

ties (sleepers) as possible, the equipment in the country,
i . e . Hejaz Railway reserves, especially for the

edina- Mecca

line discontinued in 1908, was to be augmented by rails and
ties taken from other lines in ~alestine and ~yria, that
were not important to the war effort, and were to be dismantled .
meissner expected to finish his new project, presumably
as far as Beer ~heba, in 16 months (50) .
was to do much better .

In the event, he

'i'wo things should be noted in

connection with the meeting between iheissner a nd .Kress •
.t"irst , the possibility of building south from the existing
and well - equipped terminus of the Hejaz
was apprently never discussed .

ailway at Haifa ,

This on account of Haifa ' s

exposed position on the coast (it was indeed shelled from
the sea as the war continued (51~ , and the fear that a line
leading to the south along the narrow Carmel coastal strip ,
though easy to build , could be cut from the sea .

~oreover, as

the inland line was already operating a s far south as ~il@ ,
a parallel coastal line , though straight and easy to work ,
would have required some 50 kms . of additional rails .

The

sec ond point to be noted is that the proposed new railway
from Tul Karem to a point north-west of Beer ~heba followed
more or less exactly the eastern alignment of the anc ient
Via ~arisi

The proposed new track from Beer ~heba , to the south,

and ~hen west, followed first the southern continuation of the
(50)

Kress, p . 75 .

(51)

Carmel (Hebrew ; cp. biblio graphy) pp . 194- 195 .

ancient "Ridge Head" along the mountain backbone of .Palestine .
From about Auja to Bir Hassana and Bir Gafgafa , the new
railway was to follow the presumed track of the ~atriarchs,
i . e . the age - old Central Highway across ~inai .

Thus roeissner

planned his line along the tracks outlined for him by history (52).
The exact documented dates regarding ~eissneris line
to the south will be listed further on in this c hapter .
Meanwhile, it will suffice to say that actual building
operations started in , about , April 1915, i . e . some 4~ months
after iv'1eissner' s and Kress • crucial meeting .

rhe intervening

1

time was apparently spent by the German engineer in planning
the new track in detail, probably dismantling c ondemned
lines - also to be listed later - and assembling material .
Labor was provided by hiring l oc al workers, and, as the pro ject
was Djemal

~~

asha 0 s own , ~ y soldiers of the turkish army ,

rather as had been done while the Heja~ hailway was being built .
As for rolling stock to transport stores, ~eissner probably
at that time had at his disposal most of the many goods
wagons of the Hejaz Hailway as well as wagons of the Frenc h
Beyrouth- Damascus-f~1eseri b line , that were idle owing to the
closure of Beyrouth port by the waro

Later, when the line to

Beer ~heba had reached Lod, roeissner could also utilize the ,
in wartime, practic ally unused, rolling stock of the 1 , 000 mm .
gauee French Jaffa-Led-Jerusalem line , which needed only
(52) The historical highways of Palestine were discussed
in chapter I .

a little adaptation to run on the 1,050 gauge of the new
railway ,0J).

Even after the wagons used for military purposes,

both in Falestine and on the main Hejaz Railway trunk line
to Medina, and wagons for civilian supplies, are deducted,
it is a fair guess that at the beginning of the war, when
normal wear and tear, accidents, the weather, and enemy action,
had not yet taken their toll, the availability of rolling
stock for construction purposes was satisfactory.

As work

progressed, ~ieissner and Kress were to have another meeting

(

for coordinating purposes in Jerusalem, on June 20, 1915 .
When he started building, Meissner had some 350 kms.
of rails available that had originally been destined for the
never- begun railway from ~edina to mecca (54) .

To these he

could add some additional 150 kms. of rail from lines taken
up.

Consequently, there was no dearth of rails .

However,

there were only JO kms. of cross-ties ("sleepers" in British
usage) on which to fasten the rails.

Therefore local

resources had to be tapped at an early stage, and woods of
eucalyptus, pine, and other trees, were cut down in various
places (the ~haron plain, the Lebanon, and in the high hills of
(53) For the adaptation of stock and gauges, cp . woods ,
p. 54; also Wavell, p. 12. A rather poignant footnote
to the adaptation of the Jerusalem line stock will be found
in the report of Sir Felix ~o le (cp. bibliography to chapter V)
on the state of the railways in Palestine, dated 1935. In
a modest footnote it is stated that in the early 19JOs
one of the last original locomotives of the French-build
Jaffa-Jerusalem line had been sold for scrap. This was
almost undoubtedly one of the engines adapted by Meissner
from 1,ooi;t,.~ • .i..to _.=,t~(i)."!50 mm. gauge.
(54) Kress, p . 75; Ops . I, p. 85; ~oenicke, p. JO;
Wiegand, P• JO.

Transjordania

1 to

produc e ties .

To further the proc ess ,

s ome short lines were lai d down , apparently including a
c ableway in the Lebanese mo untains.

These will be detailed

further on , i n c onnec tion with the fuel supply .

~ome redundant

ties were apparently brought down fr om the unused stoc ks
of the Baghdad Ra i lway , t o be re - holed f or narrow gauge
use in the workshops at Damas c us (55) .
~eissner apparently started with a small supply of
(

lubric ants , that s oon gave out .

Sinc e lubric ants were

vital f or working the l oc omotives and wagons , and overheatedwheel - bearings in a ho t climate co uld c ause c ons i derable
damage and hold- ups i n the construc ti on work , experiment s
were made with wood- tars produc ed in the 'l'aurus mountains .
These failed , and the rail administratio n - Die c kmann in
Damascus was the man most i nvolved - \iltimately had t o fall
bac k on substitutes made lo c ally, from olive oil , sesame
oil , and castor oil ,06 )o
But , from the start , far and wide ooe i ssner ' s worst
trouble , when building and runni ng his new line , was the
lac k of fuel .

As already ment ioned , before the outbreak of

war, two last c olliers had d i s c harged the i r c oa~ at Haifa ,
but most of the available stoc k had been used up , even before
Meissner started building, in transporting troops from ~yria

(55) For the problem of the lac king t i es , c p . Kress ,
p . 170; Ops . I , p . 85; ~e eni c ke , p . JO;
iavell , P • 12 ;
Wiegand, p . JO . Also Di ec kmann , p . 63 , who mentions JOO kms .
of rails , plus 50 kms . of iron ties .
(56) For the problem of lubri c ants, Diec kmann, p . 57;
Kress , PP • 124 , lJO; Ops. I , P • 86 ; Wiegand , p . JO .

to the railhead at Sileh, in preparation for the abortive
Turkish attack on the ~uez Canal of early February 1915 (57) •
When in due course coal stocks at Damascus had also been used
up, the locomotives in Palestine were run in a surprising
variety of ways .

At one time the supply of c oal from the

mines of Eregli in Anatolia was tried, but while the 'l 'aurus
and Amanus tunnels were incomplete this involved transport
of great quantities by road, whi c h was imprac tic able.

At

the very end of the war , coal fr om Germany and fuel oil from
Humania were to arrive in limited quantities , but by that time
it was too late in any c ase .
were tried .

In the meantime other fuels

Lebanese coal proved to c ontain brimstone that

ruined the locomotives .

The r e were other , possibly quite

suc c essful , experiments with bitumino us shales from I'1iakkarin,
in the upper reac hes of the Yarmuk gorge .

resumably tec hnic al

difficulties prevented their large- s c ale exploitation .

In

the end ., 1v1eissner (and Diec kmann) had to settle on runnine;
trains by wo od- firing ~

This pro c ess de c reased the tractive

power of engines by one third and consequently the spe ed of
of trains went down, and on steep stretches s ometimes only
half- trains c ould be hauled ~

parks from the wood firing

frequently set fire t o fields , this in a c o untry that had been
ravaged by a catastrophic locust invasion in 1915 , and whose

(57) Acco rding t o Dieckmann , p . 53 (as also c onfirmed
by others) prior to the Canal operation, 9 trains of lJ wagons
eac h were run daily for 14 days to ~ileh . '1 his figure gives
an idea of the i mportanc e of rail movements for the 'lurkish
army in .Palestine, even before 111eissner started his extension
work t o the south .
1

- ":>90 population more and more teetered on the brink of starvation
as the war lasted.

However, there was no choice, and

the same branch lines that Me issner built to gather ties
were also used to supply wood fuel .

Requirements for the

Hejaz Ra ilway at its peak extensi on, including the ~inai line,
seem to have run to 150,000 tons yearly.

dhenever wood

ran out, train crews got accustomed to stay their trains
near any convenient copse - memories of this habit lingered
(

on for decades - and cut wood , mostly olive trees vital for
the livelihood of the villagers .

In semi-desert areas

thorn- bushes served as very efficient fuel.

A by- product

of this state of affairs was that, lacking power , trains
were perpetually late (58).
Minor, though annoying, trouble was suffered by ~eissner's
~

lines on·

older stretc hes , but especially al<mg ne ~
y........

built sections , by wintery flo ods and washouts,

'£he Yarmuk

track always suffered from flo ods, s ome disastrous i n the
narrow gO.Vge wi th its many bri dges.

But when 1v1ei ssner started

building1 his still~shaky embankment sin the ~haron, the
~hephela I and the NegeV were frequently to be undercut by rains (59),

(58) As for the lac k of coal, and the subst i tution of
wooct,and all its attendant evils, the sources are only too
explicit. They include: :iJi eckmann , PP• 55- 57; Kress, pp. 124,
lJO, 170; Ops. I, pp . 27, 85- 86; }~ enicke, p. JO; ~teuber ,
74 , 79; Wavell , p. lJ; Wiegand , p. JO.
(59) Acco rding to Kress , washouts were yearly occurrences.
Fl ood damages were recorded in I\ ovember 1914 ( Kress r p . 68 ),
during the winter 1915-16 (Kress p. 148), and i n 1916-17
(Kress, pp . 208, 209-212).

When, in the early building stages, bridge-building could not
keep up with track-laying- as had happened before on the
He jaz Railwr y proper - rails were temporarily laid across
the botto ~

adis, occasionally with dire results when the

rains came (60).
As his work progressed, ~eissner was to be permanently
torn between two conflicting alternatives.

One consi sted

in the policy of building hell-for-leather, as fast as
(

possible, and as far as possible, at the price of interfering
through his work-trains on the single-track line, with the
urgent military traffic for the uses of which the line had
been planned in the first place.

The other one stressed the

prior consolidation of what had been built , g iving for a while
priority to troop trains and supplies .

rhes e conflicting

possibilities lead several times to some friction with Kress ,
who preferred a shorter but better working line, as far
(temporarily)as Beer Sheba (61) .

Me i ssner preferred to push

his line forward, as it turned out, and as a result his lines
became seriously overburdened ( 62) •

1:t.'he previously mentioned

(60) Kress , p. 133. Laying tracks through wadi~ ,
instead of over thernp was not weissner ' s patent .
t a later
stage of the war the British were to lead their own standard
gauge main line across the adi el Arish on sandbags . It,
and they, were promptly swept away when the rains came.
(61) Kress , p . 153.
(62 ) There are many references in the s ource s , both
German and Britis h , ~ all Turkish lines being overburdened ,
a fact that, however , in particular handicapped the line to
the south that was needed for operational purposes. 1he
overloading of the ~urkish network lasted throughout the war.
Cp .: Kress , pp. 153, 17J, 180, 218, 251; ooassey (see bibliegraphy) "Desert ," p. 11; Ops. II, part 2, p . 454 passim ;
~teuber, pp. 22, 23, 25, 27, 31, J2, ec.; vavell , pp . 10 8109.

locust plague of fuay 1915 probably also added to the congestion of the line, as some supplies - there are no details must have been also carried for the civilian population (6J).
The civilian population probably continued to be a burden
on the trains.

In this connection it must be noted that

about 1915 ooeissner refused to dismantle the section LadJerusalem of the French railway, in order not to rob the
people of the Holy City of an assured means of supply of - which more latero
It should not be forgotten that while Meissner was
doing his utmost, from 1915 onward, to build his lines west
of the Jordan~ (other lines were to follow the track SilehBeer Sheba), the Hejaz Railway trunk line kept "milking"
the western network of rolling stock, in order to send
supplies to the ~urkish garrison in southern Transjordania,
and in northern Arabia.

Kress, at one later stage, even

pressed for the total abandonment of the line to roedina l64) .
In this he was unsuccessful, of course, as a retreat from
Medin, , following the earlier loss of Mecca, would have had
serious moral and political repercussions .

At one time

Djemal even insisted on sending,. for political as well as
for military reasons, 50 wagons with supplies daily to the
area south of Ma'an (65) .

(6J)
(64)
(65)

uecisions like that must have

Kress, p. 119.
Kress, p. 218.
Kress, p. 180, also p. 173.

impinged on building, and warlike supplies for ~alestine
proper (66).
All these problems should be seen against the background
of the perennial difficulties weissner, and probably also
Dieckmann , had 1 because they lacked reliable and intelligent
staff to run the lines, both on the organizational and the
technical levels.
to above (67).

These troubles have already been referred

The venality, thievery, ignorance, and just

plain Oriental obstructiveness and sloth 1 of his

1

urkish

and Arab subordinates fueissner had to fight continuously
for years .

As late as 1917, Kress, who was the military

"customer" of the Palestine network, suggested putting all
the Turkish railways south of Rayak, i.e. all the narrow
gauge system , under German mil itary management, but nothing
came of his suggestion (68), though the impression is that
individual Germans and Austrians did serve in various
capacities along the line.

Only in the winter of 1917-18,

when half of Palestine had already been lost to the briti sh,
(

two German railway- working companies were detached to the
Hejaz Railway, but then any initiative was too late (69) .
As the war lasted, and wear and tear increased, conditions
on the Palestine railways became worse even than should
have been expected from a relative~ makeshift war-time system .

(66) On the Hejaz ailway and on its value for the
Turkish war effort, particularly in rabia, c p. Kress, p. 170;
Ops. I , pp. 211-212 : Ups . II , part II , PP • JJO-JJ2; Wavell,

!);is 54 .

(67)

Cp. notes 19, 20, 2i and the appropriate text.

( 68)
(69)

Kress , p . 261.
Di eckmann , p . 61.

Endless complaints crop up practically in all descriptions of
rail travel in Palestine, especially towards the end of the
war.

Observers were practically unanimous in the describing

the more obvious reasons that led to pro gress ive chaos on
the lineo

Owing to lack of fuel, trains were late, and

there were no time-tables;
and not hourso

as travel took days and weeks,

Mec hanical breakdows were permanent, and

repairs were haphazard (?O)o
All the same , it mus t be stressed, and cannot be
stressed too emphatically, that whatever the almost fatal
difficulties caused in the running of the Palesti ne sys tem
by factors beyond its control (suc h as its isolation owing
to the non-completion of the Anatolian tunnels )1 and by
shortcomings within its own framework (such as the utter
inefficiency of the local staff ), the network continued to
function, and carry out its tasks, however creakily , practically
to the end of the war.

This was undoubtedly due to the

perseverance of 1v1eissner, and his associate vieckmann.
summary of the Turkish Wartime Lines in Palestine
The foregoing pages have dealt with the state of ~alestine
in 1914, with due regards to its suitability as a military base,

(70) On the progress ive dissolution of the Palestine
network, cp. Kress , pp. lJO, 184; ooassey i p. 11;
ups. II,
part 2, p . 454; Steuber , pp. 64-65~ 8~; 132-lJJ;
avell,
pp . 13, 99, 109; Wie gand , P • JO. Many more references
to the subject might be found.

and to its railway network.

They have further dealt with

the circumstances of 1teissner' s return to .1-'alestine, his
tasks, and the difficulties he, and the railways in the
country as a whole, faced as the war continuedo

~ome space

has also been devoted to his associates, and to his main
project, the railway from Sileh to Beer Sheba and the south,
that come to be widely known as the "~inai I·ailway."

However,

Meissner, during the war, was to build other railways in
(

~alestine 1 shorter than the Sinai line, but also important and interesting in their way.

These lines, as was the Sinai

line, were grafted onto the lines that had existed before
the war, and kept operating while it was in progress.

Other

lines were lopped off the pre- war network, in order to enable
the wartime lines to be built.

Without a thorough description

of all these lines (including further particulars about the
~inai railway) , and their operations, the picture of the
Turkish railway network in ralestine during the First world
War would be thoroughly incomplete.
The following columns will therefore be devoted to a
detailed description of:

A- pre -war lines that kept operating;

B - pre-war lines that were dismantled;

and C - newly con-

structed lines, ~ exclusively military, that::lp'gether make up
the history of railways in 1914~1918, on the Turkish side of the
front (71).

( 71) 'rhe following description of the ·urkish railways in
alestine , working , added, or dismantled, during 1914-18, is based
not only on written sources , but also on many, often indispen.:.
sable, maps. These will be found attached to Ops ., Kress , Record ,
Navell and other sources . Cp. the"I\ote · on 1viaps" attached at the
end of this chapter.

A)

Pre -1914 Railways Uperating in Palestine During the Var _
1)

The Lod- erusalem Line - This was the eastern continua-

tion of the

affa- Lod line , whose dismantling at Meissner ' s

orders will be described further on.

Both sections together

had formed the French-build Jaffa- Jerusalem line of 1892, the
oldest in the country .

~ost of the Jerusalem section was of

no military value to the Turks .
reasoni, refused to take it
Holy City (72) .

U P,, SO

J\!1e issner, for humanitarian
as not to cut off the

However , the part- section Lod- Wadi ~awar

was to become i mportant when ~eissner ' s new trunk line to
~inai was to reach Lod in the summer of 19150

This section

was widened from its original 1, 000 mm . gauge t o 1,050 mm .,
the gauge of all the other ( 'l'urkish and French) tracks in the
country (73) .

It thus, for a length of some 20 kms ., became

part of the ~inai line, whic h afterwards branched off to the
south at Wadi Sallfc:lr .

'l'he stretch Vmdi ::.;a ar- ..rnrusalem , may ,

or may not, have also been re - nailed to the 1 , 050 mm . gauge
along its 45 kms . length .

It dropped out of sight until

captured by the British late in 1917, when it gained promi nence .
(72) }oenicke, p. JO . fue i ssner could not foresee
that he was preserving the line for the use of the British,
when they assembled supplies for their two raids fr om occupied
Jerusalem on Transjordan , early in 1918.
(73)

Ops . I, p . 77;

Ruppin , p . 298 .

2)

The Hejaz Hailway

The Dera•~ aifa branch of the Hejaz H.ailway, with its
extension to ~ileh, kept operating throughout the war, without
being affected by military operations, until the very end of
hostilities, when Arab raiders blew up its bridg es near
Dera ' a, which were promptly repaired by the Germans (74).
The section
unused.

fule-Haifa, being a dead end , was practically

The short stretch

fule - Sileh was to become the

nuc leus of rueissner's Sinai h ailway, which will be

urther

(

discussed separately .
'l'he role of the Hejaz .Railway trunk line from Damascus
to Medina has already been no ted1 as the life-line of the
Turks in southern Transjordania and the Hejaz .
will be referred to again .

As such it

Only some 450 kms . of the 1,JOO kms.

long line , i . e . the sec tion ~amas c us - Dera ' a - Amman- ~a ' an~udawara , actually fit into the framework of this survey .
To this stretch belonged the branc h

I

assib- bosra eski - ~ham ,

that was dismantled during the war , and the branch Aneizeh-

Hi s beh wood that was added .

Bo th will be mentioned further on.

The Heja z tlail way trunk line kept operating undisturbe d
for long perio ds after the o utbreak of the war , and it was
never thoroughly put out of action by Lawrence , hi s british
subordinates , and his Bedouin allies,during the whole period
between June 1916 (when the Arab Hebellion started) and

(74)

Ops. II, part 2, p . 566.

pril 1918 .

- ~q-i Despite the Lawrence myth, it cost the British a full 22 months
to finally destroy ahd block the section 1v1a ' an-Mudawara,
despite the fact :that since July 1917 they had had a base
flanking the line from Akaba ( 75)
section of the Hejaz

P

'11he more northerly

ailway main line, ~a • an- Dera ' a, was

finally blocked around Dera ' a only in the last weeks of the
war, and even then i mportant stretches of the line remained
in working order (76) .
I

~

The, never generally appreciated, fact is that most
of the celebrated British and · rab raids on the Hejaz Hailway
did not permanently a chieve their purpose, bec ause until the
Turkish forces were on their death throes, they were always
strong enough to patrol the line with sufficient frequency
to allow Lawrenc e and his men nothing more than occ asional
chances to blow up a few dry c ul erts , short stretches of
rail, and a relatively few wagons and engines .
stations, significantly , were rarely attac ked .

efended
Until

April 1918 never more than insig:ri ificant damage was done to

(

the Heja z Railway, and it was never decisive (77) .

there were

also other reas ons why the line continued to operate and supply
(75) For the Arab He volt, cp. Ops . I , P• 225 . For the
capture of Akaba, 6.7~17• 1cp . Ops. I., p . 240 . fhe section
l\iudawara- 1'/la ' an was finally severed only in the middiilie of
April, 1918. Cp . Ops . II , part 2, PP • 407-408 .
(76) }or the final attack on the Hejaz rlailway , around
Dera ' a , in late September 1918, cp. Os . II, part 2, pp.563 -566 .
(77) Ops . I , p . 225: " 'l'he threat to Medina was never s ecious,
and the interruption of railway communication with Damas c us but
momentary ." '11hese lines refer to the opening of the Arab c ampaign ,
but anybody who £allows details of the future attacks on the He jaz
1ailway in ups. , will see that the above comments were to hold
good for a long time.

the considerable lurkish forces in the ~edina and in the
Ivia 'an areas , who had no other communications with the rear:
a)

The Turks ; for once 1seem to have organized a fairly

efficient mobile repair force, no doubt already trained in
peace-time 1 to make go od damage to the track by fl oods and
Bedouins , etc . (78);

b)

there seems to have been a fairly

adequate reserve of rails that lasted to early 1918;
c)

there was an adequate capability of repairing blown

bridges and culverts , either through local resource

(

(79),

or by laying rails through the bottom of wadis, a procedure
that had be~n amply tried out when the line had originally
been built and when bridges were not ready;

d)

it was

actually impossible in most cases to really destroy a railway,
at least in a level desert, since in emergencies by-passes
could be constructed by laying rails practically on the bare
earth, a procedure that did not hinder very slow- speed
trains from passing .
The systematic repair work on the Hejaz Hailway undoubtedly had the expert advice of its builder , ~eissner ~asha .

(78) ups. I , p . 2J1 , note . This is a most important
note, as it quite incidentally explains,from a nritish
source, why the Hejaz rtailway was never permanently cut .
The note says flatly that the Turks were equipped with
material and breakdown trains!
(79) As late as the very last stages of the war, in
~eptember 191 8 , the railway bridge at Vabir (south- east of
Dera ' a) was blown up by Arab irregulars . It was immediately
rebuilt in woo d(:) , and again had to be deotroyed, by
burning, exactly a week later: Ops . II , part 2, pp . 565-566 .

- L-t oo The definite fact is that the only two really vital railway
structures (that could not be bypassed) on the whole line
between .Amman and 1v1udawara - the double-tiered railway bridge,
and the adjoining tunnel at Kasr , (south of Amman), that
served as the targets of Allenby's abortive Trans -Jordan
raid of early 1918 - were never put out of action (80).
It was only when the many bridge structures round the vital
Dera ' a

(

unction were almost simultaneously blown after the

Turks had been broken in ~alestine in ~eptember 1918, it
was only then that both the Hejaz Kailway main line, as well
as the Haifa branch, were no longer operable, though futile
attempts at repair were still made (81).
b)

re-1914 ailways in ?alestine and Adjoining ~reas
Dismantled During the War
1)

The

affa- Lod Line

This section of the Jaffa- erusalem line became redundant
after the closure of the Jaffa port, owing to the war .
was some 21 kms . long and of meter gauge .

It

As it was seized

enemy (French) property, Me issner ordered it dismantled , early
in 1915, to utilize its rails for the line to beer -. Sheba (82).
(80) For the viaduct and the tunnel near Amman, and other
targets, cp. Ops . II , part 1, pp. 331, 338 , 339, 347. There are
instructive photos of the two structures in Gu] tt, q ~hotographic
- ecord" (cp . bibliography) and in Auler (cp. bibliography
for chapter III).
(81) Ops. II, part 2, p. 566. In this case it was the
Germans who tried repairs, in order to keep the line open for
their retreating units.
(82) Ops . I, p . 85, note; Rupp in, p. 298; Wavell , p . 12.
p

- l D\ rhis line was to be resurrected by the nritish early in
1918 as a 600 mm . field - railway, and during the mandatory
regime it was converted to standard gauge , re - linking it
with Jerusalem (SJ).
2)

'I'he Damascus - f!eserib (Hauran) Li ne

This French- built line was the southern extension of the
Beyrouth- Damascus Railway , and it was this line that had given
so much stubborn trouble to Meissner when he was begi nning
to build the Heja z Rai lway .

It was just over 100 kins . l ong ,

and of 1 , 050 mm o gauge , with rai ls eminently suitable ·

#'

For a decade it had c ompeted wi th the parallel Hejaz lai lway
t o Dera ' a , and taking it up , early i n 1915 , must have given
particular satisfac ti on t o roe i ssner , and a feeling of poetic
justic e .

I t s aband oned embankment was used by Lawrenc e ' s

armoured c ars , in the i r f orward dash t o LJamas c us , i n the
last days of ~eptember 1918, in order to steal a march on
hi s Arab allies ( 84 ) • i h,
J)

~ ~ LvltA- ~ \k, ~~ ~ ~

The (Haifa-) Beled esh- ~heikh- Ac re Line

This 17 kms . long line , branc hing off the mai n HaifaAfule t r a c k , was completed on the 1 , 050 mm . gauge , only

(SJ)

Davies ( c p . bi blio graphy) , p . 118 .
' ~ ~ ~~.," l...,__.,
(84) The taki ng up of th i s l i ne ,Yampl y di s c ussed i n
c hapter II• , i s noted in Ops . I , p. 85 , no te; ~e enic ke , p . JO ;
Ruppin , p . 298 ; Wavell, p . 12 ; woo ds , p. 53 . As f or
Lawr enc s r i de on t he rai lless trac k into Damas c us , c p . hi s
"Aufst~ nd ' n der u'.ste" (German) , Li st , Leip zi g , 1935 , p . 37 7.
The Meserib l i ne is shown on most contempora r y maps as a c t i ve
or di smantl e d . Its trac k was sti ll shown on an Israeli Ai r
For c e map as l a t e as 1973 , as were the trac ks of other lines
mentioned lat er i n thi s c hapter . Incidentall y , i t migh t be
no ted t hat ol d ra i lway tra c ks are obvio us landmarks when seen
from the a i r .

- y D2-

-

shortly before the war, as noted in the previous chapter.
~ince it served no useful purpose, it was taken up in 1915,
the rails to be used elsewhere .

It was relaid, and partly

re-aligned to Haifa , on the narrow gauge , to utilize existing
rolling stock , in mandatory time s .

In World War II it bec ame

dual - gauge (triple-railed) as part of the Haifa - Beyrouth line (85).
4)

The Nass ib- Bosra eski - ~ham Line

'.l1his JJ kms. long, 1,050 mm . branch, was completed a

\

few years before the war, as set out in t he previous c hapter,
to further grain exportso

It is often erroneously called

in sources the Dera ' a - basra line.
the Hejaz

Actually it branc hed off

ailway trunk line some kms . south of Dera ' a .

It was taken u

early in 1915 , and was relaid sometime during

the French mandate , after 1920 (86) .
Outside

alestine, the 19 kms. long light railway ("tram")

1 , 050 mm. line Beyrouth-Ma ' amilte in was also taken up , probably
to be used i n the south ( 87) •

In 1917 the '].'urks also took up

the standard gauge French main line Tripoli-Ho.ms, whic h was

(85) Apparently , because of its insignificance,this
line is not mentioned in any s ource as having been dismantled.
But it is shown as such on many maps, for instance on the
map ("The Gapture of Haifa r ) opposite p. 5JJ , i n Ops . II ,
part 2; and on the Railway ruap of the Near Last , no. 2J,
in the map ~case attached to Ops .; also on
e waps in
/iRe cord" (cp . bibliography), and elsewhere.
(86) this line i s shown as dismantled on the map
"Arab .ttaids against t he 1{ailway, " facing p .563, in ups . 1
II, part 2
.It is also shown thus on map 2J , in t he map ~
case attached to ups. (87) Rupp in, p. 298.

rebuilt after the war .

However, the heavy rail s of this

l i ne were probably no t used in

alestine, but to equip the

Baghdad Railway through the Arnanus tunnels (88)c
C)

New Lines Built i n Palestine and ~inai ~uring the First
World ar
1)

The Sileh-Beer Sheba-~inai

ailway

The military railway built by Meissner ~asha f or the
Turks between Sil 3 h, the railhead of the Damas c us - Dera 0 a Afule line i n the mountai ns of ~amari a, and beer 0heb~ was
(

the most important technical and organizational undertaking
carri ed out i n wartime Palesti ne ,

This railway has already

been surveyed in e;eneral terms at the beginning of this
cha pter .

It will now be di s c ussed i n detail.

The new line was roughly 275 kms~ lo ng , and its co nstruction - witho ut taking into a cco unt the perio d of planning ,
and assembling materials and man- power - lasted s ome lJ-1 4
months .

T'hi s was an a c hi e vement that compared favorably

with t he very hi gh buil di ne; rate of the Hejaz rlailway in
peacetime ,
The f ollowi ng are the c hief dates regardi ng the Turkish
inai railway, with s our c es indicated.

The sources have

been complemented wi th i ntell i gen c e from maps , many of which
are available today (89 ).

~ome of the s o urces are over-

lapping,in whic h c ase several are listed.

(88)

Woo ds, p . 52, and als o map 2J i n the map -;e ase of Ops ••

(89)

Cp. , "t,otes on 1v1aps " at the end of this c hapter .

The Sinai Railway:
Events
Afuleh-Sile
sec tion worki ng
~ile~- Massudiye trac k, including
Ram~n tunnel , completing
1V1eeting of 1,1eissner and Kress , result i ng
in deci sion to build line to the s outh
along coastal plain
Planning and material assembling stage
Approximate beginning of work on line
Further meeting rueissner- Kress in erusalem
Line reaches Lod , and Frenc h line to Jerusalem
Li ne reaches Beer Sheba

Line reac hes Aslut;i
lV!eeting 1vleissner- Kress; differenc es of opinion
Line reac hes Auja Hafir
Line co ntinued , Auja- Kusseima •
ca . 9 kms . finished to Birein
inai evacuated by the Turks
Birei - Auja line dismantled by Turks
Auja- Aslu J sec tion destroyed by Bri ti sh

-

Asludj - Beer ~heba sectio n dismantled by the Turks
Trunk line Beer uheba - Wadi ~aw-a.r c ut by
Br i tish artillery at Irqai q

Helevant Details
Dates
July 1914

!:>ources
J:-a enic ke, p . 29 ;

July 1914

1-'s.enicke p

p.

29 j

8.12.14
December ' 14-April 15
April 1915

Kress , p. 75 ;

20 . 6.1915
!::>ummer 1915
17/J0.10~1915 or
November 15

Kress, P• 124 i
, ttuppin, p . 198 }

1.J.1916
April 1916
N1ay 1916
After May 1916
End 1916
foay 1917
23.5.1917
?1v1arc h- 1viay 1917

Oc tober 1917

! Kress , p • 13 J ;
t iegarni p p . JOj

i

Kress, P.• lJJ;
ps . I , p . 85 ;
Ru_ppin , • 298;
Wavell , p . JO;
Wiegand , p . J0 I1
Wi egand , p.Jo :
Kress, 1'. 156 :
ps . I , • 90 ;
.Kuppin , P • 298;
iegand, P• JO
ps . I , p . J6J;
~ ~teuber , p. 8;
iegand, • JO i
i Wiegand , p. 30;
and others ;
Ops., ma_p~case , map 2J ;
~Ops . I , pp .J6J-J 64 1
and map 23 ;
S Ops. , ma]:J 2J;
l wavell, p . 90;

g

Kress , p . 271;

~

- l-\O':) -

~~

:::,ources

ates

Events

16.

All the line beer ~heba-Lod in
British Hands

11 1917

Ups. II, parts 1-2 '
I

All the line to IJiassudiye in
British Hands

jJ

I

•

Details of the sources will be found in the bibliography
As already noted before, the decision to build the
~inai railway, single track, and of 1,050 mm. gauge , was taken
by rv1eissner and Kress in their meeting on Dec ember 8, 1914 ( 90) •
While planning 1 they had the choice between two ancient
(

highways, both proceeding down

alestine from north to south.

One led along the main mountain ridge, from about Nablus, to
Jerusalem, Hebron and Beer Sheba.

The other was the more

easterly of the two parallel routes of the Via Maris, running
down the coastal plain, parallel to, and near the foothills
of the mountain ridge.

The two men chose the second alter-

native , on account of its easy topographical layout, and its
distance from the coast, and hostile naval descents.

':J.1hus,

turning west after coming from ~ileh to Massudiye , the line
reached Tul Karem .

From here, via Aphek/Antipatris, the

line ran on top of the eastern subsidiary brancb af the
Via Maris to Lod .

From Lod to the south the line continued

to parallel the Via Maris (whose exact alignment is conjectural
anyway) to Tel Sheria- perhaps biblical Ts iklag .

Here the

ancient highway turned south-west to the coast, while Meissner's
line turned south-east in a wide semi-circle, to enter
Beer Sheba from the west .

After the railway reached it,

Beer ~heba was to change from a sleepy administrative center1
and a post to hold down the Bedouins into what was to become
I

(90)

Kress , p. 75

one of the biggest, if not the biggest, Turkish military
base in Palestine, and the de facto headquarters of the
front against the British.

~he total length of the line

Sileh-Beer Sheba, including the renailed Lod- Wadi ~atl\'ar
section, was about 185 kms. (91) 1 ~ 'l~\U-¾, ""'-~
From Beer ~heba fue issner's railway continued south
via Aslu\ij to
'-'

uja Hafir , another 70 kms . or so .

'l'he track

was laid out in great curves, in order to adjust to the
(

contours of the country (a planning feat in itself) , roughly
along the ancient highway, along which the
presumably travelled to Egypt .

arch-fathers

From Auja ~eissner built

south-east to the wells at Kusseima.

By the time he had to

stop building the Sinai line in 1916, on account of British
pressure , but apparently chiefly owing to the lack of rails ,
his railway was ready

fo

Birein, 9 kms . approx. from

uja,

and the e mbankment was ready to Kusse ima and slightly beyond 29 kms . long (92).

As already noted above, Djemal Pasha ' s

wi sh to continue the line to Bir Hassana and Bir Gafgafa
c ame to naught .

Had Me issner been able to continue his work,

he would have laid his railway along the ancient highway to
(91) The National Li brary in erusalem has an excellent
collection of aerial photographs, made during the war by the
Royal Bavarian Flight Company No. J04. These photos belong to
collection Phot o 258, in the rtare Books ~ection. The photos
contain very clear pictures showing the Wadi ~a r - Beer ~heba
railway, and also Beer ~heba as a big military base, with all
its installations.
ior the leng th of the line from fiadi Salt(ar, cp . .Huppin
pp. 297-298. The line had taken some six months to build l t& '-'W~w,o),
and had cost approx. lJ0,000 'lurkish ~ounds.
(92) Gp. Wiegand , p~ JO. As for the approx. length
of the line Beer heba- Birein-r<usseime, cp. }{uppin, p . 297;
Dieckmann, p . 64.

_ ~ o1 _
Egypt through Central ~inai .

The British at that time (1916)

were already building their own railway, from Egypt, in the
opposite direction , along the historical high road by the
coast, across northern ~inai.
Although Meissner proceeded with almost incredible
speed, his line was, in the main, solidly built.

~requent

flood damage was repaired promptly, at least while the line
was new,(9J).
(

He built several sizeable bridges, at Antipatris,

Irqaiq, Beer Sheba , A~iy j and Auja.

It is not known how many

stations there were on the line Si l ~h-Hafir, and it might be
assumed that most of them were temporary huts or tents.
However , he had time to erect, also, a few handsome station
buildi ngs that are even t oday still re co gni zable by their
resemblance to those on the Heja z Ra ilway.

These were the

stations at Massudiye, Tul Karem (Lod had the original
French- built station),
possibly - Auja.

adi ua

r, Tel ~heria , Beer ~heba , and -

There were also laid out s ome big rail-

shunting yards, as can be seen by surviving aerial photo s
(Massudiye, Lod , Wadi Sa

r , Tel

heria , beer ~heba, Auja),

apart from smaller c r oss i ng place s .

There may also have been

double -trac king. i n two instances (near Tel ~heria and near
Asl uj ) , where there were two_.,parallel tracks, though at
co nsiderable distance ione from the other.

1hey may have

been cro ssing place s , but they may also mean that one track
was abandoned, through damage or f or other reasons (94).
(93) On the sol idity of fue i ssner ' s line , cp. Ops .I, p . 85 ,note.
(94) Cp. Survey of Israel maps , 1:100.000, sheet 14
(Beer Sheba ) and sheet 18 (Re vivi m/ Asluj ).

~eissner accomplished all this building work with the help
of the local contractors and their labor that he had mobilized,
as on the Hejaz Railway, and with the assistance of some
2,000 Turkish "askars" (soldiers) that .i.Jjemal could spare
for him (95).
It may be assumed that, as on the Hejaz Railway,
there were no signalling installations, simple telegraph or
telephone lines being sufficient to run the slow, and-relatively(

infrequent , trains .

There were no fixed timetables - a fact

that has already been noted before (96) .

Holling stock,

as also mentioned before, belonged to the Hejaz Railway , and
to the French lines ~eissner requisitioned.

There exist ,

apparently, only a few surviving photos of trains on this
line.

One shows a mixed troop- and- goods train in Beer ~heba

station, headed by a tender-locomotive.

~he stock obviously

belonged to the one working the Haifa- Dera'a line (97).
There are no surviving data of the ~inai lines capacity,
except one reference in which it was rated at a maximum of
JOO tons daily (98) .

Unfortunately, it was not stated whether

the figure referred to military loads only, or also included
building materials.

~ince JOO tons were equal to some JO goods

wagons , or approximately three trains daily, it might be
Pa enicke, p. JO; also iegand.
(96) Kress, p. 130; Steuber, p. 74.
(97) F'or surviving relics of the ;;:,inai line, including
photos, cp . note 102, be low.
(98) Wiegand , p. JO.
(95)

assumed that the JOO tons were military supplies only.

It

is however quite clear that 1in view of the fact that the line
had to supply simultaneously both co nstruction work and
military req~irements, it never reached its full capacity,
as far as either task was concerned .

ear and tear, weather

damage, and lack of spares and rolling stock, further impaived
its efficiency as time passed .

Though the line wao at the

time of its construction credited by the British with an
incredible carrying effectiveness (99), a fear that led them
to start their own "counter- railway" in 1916, Kress , was
freqquently complaining about its i~sufficiency (100).

He

may have been right, but 1v1eissner' s innate stubbornness
(already demonstrated before, on the He jaz rlailway ), made him
g ive work trains equal priority with military trains (101) ,
and Kress , for all his high rank, lost .

When the British

finally started their big push across

inai into ~alestine,

Kress ' worries proved to be academic.

After ~inai had been

given up and the sec tion Beer ~heba-Asluj-Auja had been partly
destroyed by the British or taken up by the Turks , the line
Wad i S~

r - Beer Sheba co ntinued to carry supplies to the

eastern section of the Turkish front Gaza- beer ~heba .

In 1918

it was used by the British , who converted it to standard gauge .

(99) ,es .aho.ai3• u:tc:;:;, , -(he Dritish thought Meissner's
line could supply and transport from 100,000 to 250,000
Turks , and even J00,000 were mentioned . Cp. Ops. I , pp. 158, 171.
iegand, p . 17; Kress , pp . lJO, 212, Z51, 261.
(100)
(101) :Kress , p. 156.

Meissner' s Sinai Railway :Tel Sheri a Station(N. W.
of Beer Sheba) in 1918 , after capture by the
British . Abandoned previous German track with broken
(bombed?)track on the left ~Source:Nat . Libr . Phot . 258)

fl. 304. 889. 9. 4. 18. 8°.0 l\<..!ICJ~ Ane.se. H.1ff00. Br.

2.1 .

,.
Hejaz Railway:Kala ' t Aneizeh Station . Iain line
in foreground . Wood-carrying , war-built line to
Hisheh Wood branching off , bottom-center . Black
rectangle is medieval pool reconditioned for supplying water for locomotives.(Nat . Libr.,Phot . 258).
(Pick,chapter IV)

- L-tll ~eissner•s achievement in building the ~inai ~ailway
is attested to by many of his installations that still survive,
despite the ravages of man, time, and weather, after more
than 60 years (102) .

(

(102) 'lhe traces of the Turkish 0inai Hailway , built
by Meissner , can be easily followed in the field even today .
irom bileh to Tul Karem the track is still in situ, though
without rails. 'lhe stations at ~il.§h, fiiassudiye and 'l'ul Karem,
still stand. From '11ul Karem to i ndas Bridge , i,1eissner ' s
old track is now overlaid by the track of the standard gauge
Israel Railway . From Jindas Bridge unto Lod the track,
judging from contemporary British military maps, and from
German Aerial reconnaissance photos taken at the time , continued
partly west, and partly on top, of old Lod ' s present main
road . One of Lod ' s streets is built right on top of the
line , which can be verified by the fact that it branches
off the main road at the unusual angle of some 25°. !il1eissner ' s
station at Lod (originally built about 1892 by the }'rench
Jerusalem railway) still stands, including its platform,
and today serves as the t owm. S ' First Aid ( ~agen uavid Adorn;
Headquarters. ~outh of Lod the line swung onto the old
(to 1918) trac k of the French Jerusalem line, which today is
a trail and can be followed , with some breaks, past the British
military cemeta ry (and east of the present, British builtin 1918 - railway trac P to Ramle . From Ramle to wadi ~a r
(the British "Junction ~tation," the present Nahal ~orek) the
~inai railway was identical with the present track, which
itself follows the old ~rench line . meissn~r 0 s old Wadi ·arrar
station still serves today . irom wadi ~arrar- Nahal ~oreks the
line turned south, through the present army camp , to join the
new , Israeli, Lod - Beer Sheba railway j outh of the c amps . From
there to about Ahuz ' am (south of ~inath Ga th) the new Israeli
line to Beer ~heba lie s right on top of ~eissner ' s old line.
~outh of Ahuz ' am the ~inai line turned south- west, through a
very deep , and still existin~, cutting , (leaving the present
track in the east) to continue south past ? el ~heria ( el ~har;
ancient Tsiklak) . It then turned south- east , and its co nt i nuation is no longer extant . However, the embankment at the
western approach to Beer Sheba , next to the airstrip , is still
much in evidence . The line then crossed present- day Beer bheba,
whose main thoroughfare lies right on top of it. There,
Me issner's Beer Sheba station still stands. The handsome
many- arched bridge ac r oss the Wadi Beer Sheba , which fue issner
built 1 still stands, minus one arch, carried away by floods .
In the 1950s this, the" '.i1urkish Bridge" carried road traffic
in winter when the "Irish" bride;e across the wadi was swamped .
Between Beer ~heba , . ~lliuj (Revivim) and Auja l Nitsana), most
of the track, less rails , is still there, and l 0ng stretc hes
of it can be seen from the main road, at ~hi v ta, ~heizaf;
and Bireil\l (Be ' e~tayim) . r,iandata ry , and Israeli , 1:100,000
maps still show most of fue issner's track, in the ~hephela

- ~ l1--

and in the legev. The line, as it was in the }irst world
War , is shown, sometimes in great detail, on the maps attached
to most of the sources quoted in the text, and listed in the
bibliography.
There are some few ground-level p hotos of ½eissner 1 s
line, and trains on it. ~ome, including a photo of a Turkish
troop train in Beer ~heba station, a bridge, and what may
be the terminal at Auja, are in the possession of wr . Horace
Spafford-Vester, of the American Colony in Jerusalem . Others,
i ncluding aerial views of Beer heba station, the line in the
Nege v, Tel Sheria, and Lod, belong, as noted, to the collection
of aerial photos made by the Germans during the War, in the /
possession of the Hebrew National Library.

- '1 ,3
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The ~assudiye-Nablus Branch

This, about 15 kms. long, branch of the Damascus-~ilehBeer Sheba-Sinai railway 1 was the last vestige of the oftenproposed Haifa-Afule-Nablus-Jerusalem line, mentioned in
previous chapters.

Thanks to a French veto of immediately

before the outbreak of war, noted in chapter III, this was
destined to remain a deadend, terminating at Nablus.
was built by Meissner, apparently in early 1915 .

It

Why it was

built is not clear, as it had meanwhile been decided to build
the ~inai railway 1 not through Jerusalem1 but down the coastal
belt.

This branch had no military importance until the fall

of Jerusalem, in December I 917 .

Then it became suddenly the

main supply line of the Turkish (7th) Army ,that held the front
a c ross the hills of Ephraim, with headquarters at Nablus .
As such it was the mainstay of ruus tapha Kemal ~asha , until the
Turks broke in the autumn of 1918 (lOJ).

The line operated

to about 1938, when it was closed .
J)

The Kala ' at Anei~ h- Hisheh Wood branch

This line , probably some
two respects .

JO kms. long, was peculiar in

It apparently was the only Turkish war- built

line in Transjordania, and, probably because of its remoteness,
in the southern fastnesses of the country, it was never
noted on World I/var I maps, even the ones that normally included
small details.

It was however shown as derelict on some later

(lOJ) The Nablu&' line, whose track, together with its
proposed continuation to Jerusalem, was shown on plate L III
attached to the ~ .D.P . V. of 1914, is mentioned by wavell,
p. 196, as having remained incomplete . In fact, it was
completed, and Huppin , p. 299, who lived in Palestine, says
it was opened in 1915 , It is shown on all contemporary maps .

mandatory maps , and is shown in outline on maps as late as
1972 .

It swept in a wide semi-circle from Aneize, on the

Hejaz Railway trunk line Amman-Ma ' an, to the west, past
~haubek Castle, and then turned south into the high mountains
(some 1,650 meters or more), to end in the local woods.

Its

purpose was quite obviously to provide wood fuel for the
Turkish trains to Medina.

It must have been built early in

the war, when the Turks anticipated a protracted struggle ,
as otherwise they would not have invested in such a long
track (104).
4)

The Tul Karem - annir/Kafr Kara branch

'1.1 his line was apparently s ome

terminus is not known .

25 kms . long .

Its exact

It was built north- west from Tul Karem

station, past Kakun, and then went north to end in the wooded
hills of the south- eastern lCarmel range, in the general area
of the Arab villages of
Givat Ada and Regavim.

annir and hafr Kara , near today's
Its sole purpose was to carry fuel

wood, and perhaps also ties (sleepers) for the ~inai railway .
(104) The details that follow are probably the only
ones ever collected about this remote line . Cp. Ops . II,
part 2, p . 328, where Hisheh v,o od is mentioned as a source of
wood for the Hejaz rtailway (and also of grain ! ?); also
cp. Ops . II, part 2, p. 401, where the line is mentioned
expl icit y . Also c p . Dieckmann , p . 65 . Gp. also Luke 0 s
"Handboo ," (see bibl io graphy ) of 1924, pp . 269- 270, which
may have been the only guideboo k ever to mention this line.
r his line is also clearly shown on the ~urvey of ~alestine's
1:250,000 map sheet J, of 1946. There is also a photo of
Al\,e ize Junction in the German aeri~lection in the
Jerusalem Library ,
r 1,--.,~

-
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The dates of its construction and dismantling are not known.
Its track was to serve later as the base for local roads (105).
5)

'l'he Jalameh-Liktera Branch

This line was less than 10 kms. long ;

its exact terminus

is not known» nor the date of its construction.

It branched

off the Tul Karem-Qannir line at Jalarneh, and ended near
Liktera, i.e. Hadera .

It may origi nally have been built to

carry eucalyptus wood from around Haders for ties and fuel.
~ore probably it was laid down in 1918 to serve the base
depots of the Turkish 8th Army that were located at Liktera,
after the loss of southern Palestine.

This branch, as well as

part of the Qannir branch from Jalameh to 1·ul .tCarem, was used
by the British, late in 1918, to carry their standard gauge
line 1'ul Karem-Hadera-Haifa, which is still in existence ( 106) •

(105) This line is mentioned by Massey , "'.l.'riumph"
(cp. bibliography)» p. 151, who s eaks about a "goods line"
at Beidus, south-east of today's Ein Sheme". ~here is also a
short reference to it in Ops. II» part 2, p. 515. Also
in Dieckmann, p. 65. The line is shown on three maps in the
map;case of Ops,, no. 19 · ( "f1eg iddo"), no. 20 ( "~haron and
Nablus"), and no. 21 ("Envelopment of the Turks "). Its
derelict track is shown on the 1:100,000 map of the ~urvey
of Palestine. The present road from Kfar Ha 1 roeh to Sha'ar
Menashe runs on top of the old track, part of the way, as do
some paths.
(106) This line will be found on the three
maps mentioned in the foregoing note. It is also mentioned
by Dieckmann, p. 65.

Probably the first Turkish train to reach Beer Sheba
on the war- time Sinai line . Fourth figure from the left .
in the front row(civilian,with fez and white beard) is
Meissner Pasha . Others unidentifiable . (Nat . Li br ., Y. 1717) .

Turkish mule-worked 600 mm . field-railway Auja-Maghdaba .
Photo , about 1916 , with ~ounded on stretchers,probably
taken outside Auja advanced hospital . (Nat . Libr ., V. 1717) .
(Pick , chapter IV) .

6)

'11he Auja Haf ir-1v1aghdaba "Tramway"

This line was not a railway in the normal sense.

Rails

were used, but the motive power was supplied by horses or
mules.

It was built by the German ooaj or von Leysser, no

doubt with the help of ~eissner , somet ime in 1916
was still in Turkish hands.

when ~inai

Its gauge was presumably 60 ems.

Its length was probably, there are no detailsp about JO kms.
This light tram line was intended to link the railhead of the
main ~inai line at Auja Hafir with El Arish (an important
German air base) on the coast of the f.iediterranean .

In order

to minimize British i nterference fr om the sea, it was built
along the Wad i el Ari sh , coming in from the s outh- east.
However, not enough light rails were available i n ~alestinep
and the line terminated at the Turkish base of ruaghdaba (to
be the scene of a stiff action in December 1916), about half- way
to El Arish .

Kress in his memoirs says that the lack of

rails f or this line had been due to the absence of through
co mmunications with Constantinople .

This line had a ca~acity

tl\,\.,~w&t
.
.
.
.
of 8 0-100 tons dail y - ~e ·•r locomotion no twithstanding -

c arried supplies , and evacuate d wo unded,

Before ~inai was

given up, the l i ne was dismantled for use elsewhere (107).
7)

The 'l'i neh- eir ~\\eid/ Bei t Hanun Branc h

This was one of the most important Turki sh mi l itary
railways on the Palestine front, though built late in the
war .

Its construction was first reported to the British

by aerial reconnaissance on April 7, 1917, i~e. between the
First and ~e cond Battles of Gaza (108).

The rails for it were

(107) Cp. Kress, p. 147; Wiegand, p . JO. A photo
exists of this line.
line w1~ 0~irsisn6~fc~aeb~p~hgx~~f~fsR~t@p~hoBs~£~ i?j29fU~!~8riwgfer£iS
Po

tl8 o

- ~li taken by the Turks , probably through Meissner ' s initiative,
from the Beer 0heba-Auja section of the ~inai railsway, that
was no longer needed , after they gave up ~inai.

The British

carried out a cavalry raid in considerable for c e in order to
prevent re - use of the redundant rails - well knowing the
Turks at that time had no spare rails (109 ).
of the line was some 54 kms. (110).
Sak'a.r - Beer
(

The total length

It branc hed off the Wadi

heba trunk line at Tineh (just west of to day ' s

Kfar fuenahem ) and ran f i rst west, and then $Outh- west,
approaching the sea ever closer, through Deir ~~ei d to
Be it Hanun , a few kms . north of Gaza .

The terminus was chosen

to be out of reach of the British guns shelling Ga za.

A

branch from Deir '" eid was built towards the s outh-east, to
the Arab village of Hu j, headquarters of a Turkish Army Corps
(the 20th).

It was $Ome 6,5 kms . long and ran parallel to,

and behind, the

urkish front.

The purpose of the Tineh-

Beit Hanun- Huj line was quite clear, and affords a striking
example how military operations depended on railways in a
r oadless country.

The l i ne , with its two branc hes , was

intended to supply the right (western), and mo st important,
flank of the Turkish Gaza- Beer ~heba front.

It was thus

the counterpart of the Beer Sheba main line thatr together
with its branches (detailed further on), suppliea the eastern
part of the front.

~upplies brought forward on the Tineh

branch, and the neighboring main line, enabled Kr ess and his
(109)
(110)

Cp . Kress , p. 220; Ops. II, part 1, p . 26 ; Wavell , p . 90.
Diec kmann, p. 64 .

Turks to hold the front for six months, April - Octo ber 1917,
until the de c isive British breakthrough in the Third Battle
of Gaza (111).
8)

The Tel

heria-~hellal ~ranch

This line was built , possibly about January 1917, by
utilizing the taken-up rails of the Auja- iv,aghdaba "tram"
line, in whic h case it must have been of

60 ems. gauge .

It started at the big station of Tel ~heria , on the . trunk
line to Beer Sheba , and went south-west for some 20 kms. ,
to supply the important Turkish redoubts overlooking Shellal
(today's area of 'l'el Sha~ en, the Nahal Bess o.r Bridge and
4agen).

The Shellal positions , using the steep banks of Wadi

Beer Sheba ( Nahal Besa r ), blo c ked the threat of a Bri tish
advanc e from Rafah to Beer Sheba , and also presented a threat
to the flank of the British advance north, along the co ast
to Gaza .

No trace whatever of this line remains today,

probably because its narrow gauge necessitated few
and these were wiped out i n the course of time.
mention is preserved in the pages of Kress (112).

arks ,

Its only
The ~heria-

hellal line had only a short existence, as by the beginning
(111) The layout of the Tineh branch can be seen in
s ome places, in today's Ashkalon area , though most of the
embankment has been ploughed under . However, the 1:100,000 map
of the urvey of ~alestine shows most of the line, and the
eqiivalent map of the Survey of Israel- in part . ooost maps
attached to the various sources ( Kress , Ops., Record, Wavell) ,
show the line in one guise or another, s ome as going to be it Hanun
or Deir S \l.l,ei d , some as endine.; at Huj . The best maps are in Ops .,
II, part 1, charts 1-6. Here , p . 26 states that it ended at
Beit Hanun , 7 kms . north of beleaguered Gqz~. Cp. also Dieckmann,
p.64 and Kress, p . 220. The junction at 1Jelr.::.~id is shown on a
The
German aerial photo. Of the track to Huj nothing is left
line Beit Hanun-Tineh was used by the .British in 1918 after they
had captured it. Cp. Wavell , p.165, who says its capacity was
small, as its track was liable to be washed away.
(112) Kress, pp . 213, 216.

of March 1917, following the British build-U}J for the First
Battle of Gaza , the Shellal positions were voluntarily
evacuated by the Turks , a task in which the line was of great
help for transporting materiel to the rear .

At least some

of the rails were taken up again, to be re - used a third time.
9)

The Tel Sheria-16th Divisi on ~ranch

About the middle of karch 1917, some 7-10 kms . of
rail from the dismantled ~hellal line were relaid again,
again from Tel Sheria station, this time however almost due
west, unto the area held by the 16th

urkish division,

about Abu Hareira Redoubt (today Tel Haror)

Abu Hareira ,

p

abo ut halfway between Ga za and Beer ~heba (and on today's
main road between the two towns) was one of the key- points
of the Turkish front in s outhern Palestine .

1he new branch ,

presumably of 60 ems. gauge , and worked by animals, carried
ammunition and supplies 1 until the whole front was rolled up
by Allenby late in 1917.

~o trace whatever remains of this

line , whose rails had by then served three Turkish railway
branches (fuaghdaba, 5hellal and 16th division ).

~his line

was the last built by the Turks , i.e. presumably (the fact
can only be surmised) by 1\ieissner .i:-asha , or under his supervision, during the First World War i n ·~alestine (llJ).

It

was also the fourth and last of the Turkish railways that
helped to hold the Gaza- Beer ~heba front against british
pressure.

These four vital lines were the ones that led to

(llJ) Kress , p . 220 , The 16th division line i s not
shown on any map, 'J.'urkish (German ), or .t:3ri tish . However,
the area held by the 16th division , and Abu Hare ira redoubt,
are shown by practically all relevant maps .

Beit Hanun and Huj (in the west), the 16th division, and
Beer ~heba itself (in the east).
A correlation between the Turkish operations in Palestine
(amply described in many sources but not specifically detailed
above) and the Turkish m'll~ary railways built and operated
in }alestine , will show the following facts.

In 1915 the

railways supported to some extent Djemal Pasha ~s attac k on
the ::::,ue z Canal, and permitted the build-up of
a base;
Sinai;

alestine as

in 1916 the same railways helped the turks in holding
in 1917 the railways enabled the Turks in s outhern

Palestine to hold their front against the british (advancing
with the support of their own railway);

in 1918 the remainder

offthe Turkish railways in western Palestine helped to

stabilize the ~haron front against the Briti sh1 until Allenby's
final breakthrough, while the Hejaz Ra ilway to the east of the
J ordan enabled the Turks in transjordania (and in the He jazJ
t o hold out to the very last month!, of the war .

_ ~lL _
Turkish Wartime Railways
Built by Me issner }asha
Section:

Approx. Length
(Kms.):

Working:
(Dates)

~il e h-~assudiye

10

Early 1915

~assudiye - Nab lus

15

~pring 1915

!Vlassud iye- Tul Karem - Lod

85

Lod-Wad i ~arrar
vJo..&
ti j{ Sarrar ... Be er , ,Sheba

20

;.:,ummer 1915
.duil t about 1890, cit~\~.
idened 1 , 000- 1, 050 mm .

80

October 1915

Tul Karem-Qannir
Jalameh-Liktera ( Hadera)

25

1915

10

Aneize - Hisheh Wood

JO

Beer heba- Asluj )
Asluj - Auja Haf i r )

71

Auja Haf ir-Maghdaba (, eehi&t a )
(Animal-powered)
Auja Haf ir-Kusse ime

JO

1915
1915
1.J.1916
1v1ay 1916
0ummer 1916

29

Not co mpleted, 1916

Tel esh- 5heria- ~hellal

20?

J·anuary 1917 ?

Tineh- Be it Hanun

54

~pring 1917

~ i_ t 2

- [. ~

i

L . ..:.a ·~; "",.~

Deir
id- Huj
T-l esh- ~heria-1 6th Di v i si on

6 ,5
7?

'l'otal: 492_, 5,_ approx .

~pring 1917
~pring 1917

.
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The British Railwaysa

Their Task in Gapturing Palestine

On February J-4, 1915, Djemal Pasha, who has already
been frequently mentioned in these columns, made his abortive
attempt to attack the Suez Canal, and British-occupied Egypt,
by way of the Sinai Peninsula.

The British easily beat off

the Turkish attack, using the Suez Canal itself as their
main line of defence.

However, the canal was blocked by

the attack for a short time.
(

The British had to contemplate

the possibility that further Turkish-attempted attacks
would lead to more stoppages of traffic through the canal,
which served as a vital British line-of-communications,
through which were passed forces from India, Australia,
and New Zealand, to the various theatres of operationso
However, on February 19th 1 the British and Allied naval
attack on the Dardanelles began, and,following an abortive
attempt of warships to break through the Narrows, the
British and their allies began their landings on Gallifflli
in April 1915.

At the beginning of 1915 the Turks had also

been attacked on their eastern front by the Russians, who
advanced in Armenia.

In the south"east the Turks also faced

an onslaught by the British in Mesepotamia, directed towards
Baghdad.

All in all, the Turks were kept busy, and the

British garrison in Egypt and on the Suez Canal had reason
to believe that another Turkish attack across Sinai, and
on the canal, like the one of February 1915, would not soon
be repeated (1).

However, the supposed British immunity in

(1) General wartime developments in 1915 are handily
summarized in Dupuy•s "Encyclopaedia of Military History"
(cp. bibliography). As for events in Egypt, cp. Ops. I,
PP• 5J-86; Wavell, P• 2J, passim.

Egypt began to fray, as military developments began to favour
the Turks, when the year progressed.

Towards the end of 1915,

the British advance in Mesopotamia had been successfully
halted, the Russians had been stopped in Armeniat and
eastern Anatolia, and Bulgaria had entered the war at the
side of the Central Powers (2).

Also, the Allies had seen

fit to open a new front at Salonika, which proved a running
sore in their side;

fighting had started against the Senussi, '

who began to threaten (though not seriously) Egypt from the
west.

Trouble was also brewing for the British in the

Sudan and Darfuro

Worst of all, the, mainly British, attack

on the Straits had bogged down bloodily, to come to its
inevitable end as 1916 began, with 252,000 Allied casualties (J).
The practical result of this event was - quite apart from
prestige cDnsiderations • that the Turks would, quite con~eivably, have considerable forces freed for yet another
attack via Sinai, on the Empire's lifeline, the Suez Canal.
The implications of the Dardanelles debacle were not lost on
the British, and it was then that the influence of railways
on the Imperial campaigns in Sinai and in Palestine was first
to be felt.
(2) Bulgaria's entry into the war on their side enabled
the Germans and Austrians from then on to send military supplies
directly by rail to their ally Turkey. Until then, Bulgarian
neutrality had barred the overland despatch of logistic stores
to Constantinople. The sea, of course, remained closed.
(J) Dupuy, P• 955~

- v\l-6 While trying to assess the influence of their military
reverses on their position in Egypt, the British had not
failed to take note of the fact that all through 1915 the
Turks - as personified by Meissner Pasha - had at the behest
of Djemal Pasha 1 speedily, and inexorably, been pushing a
new railway towards Sinai .

Linking, for the first time

northern and southern Palestine, it had reached Beer Sheba
in the autumn of 1915, and was in the process of being
continued south, to Auja Hafir, with an obvious possibility
of it being further extended into Central Sinai, and possibly
towards Ismailia (4).

While the British were generally

informed about the progress of the Turkish railway opposing
them, they seem to have had absolutely no idea of its technical
limitations.

As a result, its military capabilities -

though real enough - were vastly overrated, quite apart from
the fact the Turkish military manpower under Djemal Pasha
was never nearly as large as the staffs, both in London and
in Cairo, feared.
zt
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i:n8,

·i"he

G.o.c.

(General Officer Commanding) Egypt credited the Turks in
Palestine and Syria with
j)eu,v,...Uv
Jl:ll1B0Ma!F

1915.

26<>,ooo men

{5).

That was in a~t- e- e1,\A,~

At about the same time, the Imperial General

Staff in London calculated that by January 1916 the Turks
might bring to bear against the Delta some 200,000 men, whose
(4) The Turkish Sinai Railway has been amply described and discussed in the first part of this chaptero
how it appeared to the British, cp. Ops. I, PP• 76-77•

(5) Wavell, P• 41.
seetion of this chapter.

On this subject also cp. first

For

number could be augmented to J00,000 onl.y a month later obviously by using rail~transportation.

Even the more

conservative Chief of the I.G.S., General Sir William Robertson,
expected an onslaught of 100,000 Turks, as late as February
1916 (6).

Actually, by the beginning of 1916. the Turks

at the most had 150,000 troops between Jerusalem and Sinai,
fighting uni ts and logistic

t~.e ,

and these could be fed

and supplied only precariously by the one and only singletrack Turkish railway, that was, moreover, of narrow gauge,
and whose capacity could scarcely be improved by reason of
its other chores - building work and the supply of the
civilian population (7).

Anyhow, fear of the Turks, and

the threat of their lengthening railway, weighed ever more
heavily on the British in Egypt as the year 1915 drew to
its close, and some improved measures for the defence of
Egypt were called foro
During most of 1915, notwithstanding the Turkish attack
of early February, the defences of Egypt, and of the Suez
waterway itself, were strung out along the banks of the
canal , from Port Said, through Ismailia, to Suez, with the
width of the canal itself constituting the main obstacle
between the defenders and the enemy.

Only a few fortified

outposts were located at various places on the canal•s east bank (8).
(6) For the various British calculations, or rather
miscalculations, of Turkish stren~~h, cp. Ops., I, PP• 89,
157-158. Also Kress, P• 165-166. f1 ~ ~~t.l~ 'l~e>,~~ ~~
~ ~ ~it-~~tt l
,
(7) Ops. I, P• 158.
l
(8) For the canal defences, Ops., I., P• 22 passim;
Wavell, P• 27.

This state of affairs is supposed to have made Lord Kitchener
ask the command in Egypt,

11

Are you defending the canal, or

is the canal defending you?" (9).

When Kitchener, the

Secretary of State for War, came to the Middle East late in
1915 in order to decide on the abandonment of the Dardanelles
venture, he also had to take a deeision on how to save
Egypt from the repercussions of the Straits debacle.

In

consultation with the men on the spot, especially Lt.-General
Sir John Maxwell, then commanding the forces in Egypt, it
was decided to abandon the policy of defending the canal on
its own banks.

Instead, it was decided to build a fortified

defence line, parallel to the canal, and some 11-~2,000 yards
to the east of it.

This line was to keep away attackers

coming in across the desert, and was to hold them far enough
away to prevent the shelling of passing ships (10).

There

was to be also an intermediate line of defence, 6,500 yards
from the canal, to back up the main defence line.

This deep

defence system, leading from Ayun Musa (south-east of Suez)
to the Mediterranean some

JO kms. east of Fort Said, and

covering a trackless and waterless desert (and in the north
also an inundated swamp created by breaching the canal banks
north of Kantara), needed a logistic rail system to back
it up.

Thus the first railways in Sinai were built.

(9) Quoted by Schonfield (cp. bibliography), P• 70;
see also Kress, P• 166.
(10)

Ops. I, PP• BJ, 89;

Wavell, P• 40.

The man who built the Canal Defence Railways, and later
the British army trunk line across Sinai to Palestine~ was
Sir George Macauley, a retired officer of the Royal Engineers,
who subsequently became General Manager of the Egyptian
State Railways (11).

Owing to his familiarity with Egypt,

he was now appointed Director of Railway Services.

He thus

became, in some ways, Meissner Pasha•s opposite number on
the British side.

(

He was to be happier in his results than

his German opponent, insofar as he was ultimately to see
his own side victorious, owing to its infinitely greater
resources.

He, like Meissner, played a role of incalculable

importance in military operations, by means of the railways
he was to build.
was to be similaro

In another way, the fate of the two men
Both men were in the course of time

relegated to oblivion, and today their names are practically
unknown.
While the Suez Canal defences were being planned and
built, it was decided to lay a number of narrow-gauge trunk
lines from the eastern bank Qf the canal, through the secondary
defence line, to the main fortifieations (12).

Material was

provided from the reserve stocks of the Egyptian State Railways
(11) Owing to the unavailability of early editions of
the British "Who•s Whof~ no more pertinent details about
Macauley could be ascertained. For what is known of him,
cp. Ops. I, P• 91.
(12) Cp. Wavell, P• 40. A detailed description of the
lines will be furnished later, based on the despatches of
General Sir Archibald Murray. It might be noted that the
Suez Canal defences·of 1915, rather like the Bar~Lev Line of
some 55 years later, was not an unbroken defence line, but
rather a series of fortified strong points.

(E.S.R.),

and also taken from light railways in the Nile

Delta, of which there were many.

The delta lines, privately

owned, were taken up for use east of the canal, probably
on the understanding that they would be returned when no
longer needed, as was apparently done.

Some rails and their

ties were also provided by the War Office from light lines
earmarked for Gallipoli and not used there (lJ).

In order

to transport the vast loads of equipment needed for the new
(

defences ., and their rail links, the E.S.R. main line, 79 kms.
long, from Zagazig to Ismailia, was doubled~tracked within
six weeks, at the end of 1915, and later a by-pass main line
was directly built from Zagazig, via Salhiye to Kantara
(cutting off Ismailia)o

This energetic British activity

contrasted strangely with the Turkish inability, on the
other side, to push their own Anatolian main lines forwarda
When the speedy delivery of railway materiel to the Canal
area had been assured, spurs were laid down directly to the
canal banks (14), and railway equipment was ferried across.
Thus the first Sinai railways began their career by being
swum across the canal.

Work on some of them was started

even before improvements to the main line had been fw.ly
carried out.

{lJ) Regarding the stocks @f the E.S.R., etc. cp.
Murray's "Despatches (see bibliography), PP• 193~1971
for the Delta lines being taken up, cp. Opsa I., P• 9So
For other details, gauges and locomotives, etc., cp. Davies
(see bibliography), PP• 116-ll?j waa•• 7'ia••• :i.fi •••• Jh•••
0

af :slliag stock (plate '4£).

(14)

Cp. Murray, PP• 193-196.

I
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Between December 1915 and about August 1916, the British
built at least 10 separate narrow gauge military railway
lines into Sinai to back up their Suez Canal defences.
Nine c:Jf these lines were of 2 feet 6 inches (762 mm.) gauge,
one of meter gauge (1,000 mm.).

Decauville tracks (field-

railways of 2 feet gauge, about 610 mm.), led from the
railhead :depots to various outposts {15).
The following lines were builts
1)

Port Said - Mehmedia

This line led east along the Mediterranean coast, and
was built on a very narrow spit of land between the sea and

the Plain of Tine, that had been flooded by the British,
when they breached the eastern bank of the canal (16).
lllehmedia was a group of hovels near the eastern end of the
Bardawil Lagoon.

The line was abeut 41 kmso long., Despite

its narrow gauge, trains carried up to 90 tons each.

When

the standard gauge line Kantara-El Arish was later built,
Mehmediya was linked by a 5,5 kmso long standard gauge branch
with RomalJ,station.

This line was the only one amongst

the canal railways that worked for a considerable time, as it
eased the load on the wharves at Kantara when the Palestine
campaign was later in full swing, by enabling military
stores to be discharged at Port Said, for despatch to Palestine.

(15) Murray, PP• 194•195;
also has a photo,epp. P• 144.
(16)

Ops. I, P• 25.

Davies, PP• 116•117, who

2)

Kantara-Romani

This was the only meter gauge line of the system.
It was some 40 kms. long, and went north•east frQm Kantara
to Romani.

It had a 5,5 kms. long branch to Doueidar Oasis • •

This line was taken up after it had helped in the building
of the standard gauge line Kantara•Romanii and beyond.

Its

equipment had been leased and was returned to its owners.
J)

Eallah-'Ballybunion Station,; a humourously named

terminal in the desert, 8,8 kms. frgm the canal.
4)

Firdan-desert.

5)

Ismailia- desert, 11.J kms. l _o ng.

6)

Serapeum•desert, 9.4 kms. longo

· 7)

Shallufa-desert, 15,1 ms. long.

8)

El Kubri~desert, 7,4 kms. long~

9)

El Shatt (Suez) - Jebel Musa,~,3 kmso east of the canal.

10)

9,8 kms. long.

El Shatt (Suez)• Ayun

usa, 11,4 kms. to the soath•east.

There may have been an 11th line leading east frem ihe
Great Bitter Lakeo

All these lines had a total length of

over 160 kms., exclusive of spurs, sidings, and field ... track
extensions.

They were never interoennected (17).

The lines

(17) Details from Murray, especially P• 197• A map
showing all the canal defence lines, including an unidentified
!hn~i trom the Great Bitter Lake to the east will be foundton
at-p·:' fn Wavell, P• 24. The northern tracks are shown in
Wavell, P• 44, and also in Ops. I. sketch 10.

One of the British Suez Canal Defence light( 2ft ., 6 in . )
trains headed by a petrol locomotive , ca . 1916 .
(Source:Imperial War Huseum) .

Kantara~East railhead with installations . Top left:Suez Canal with two
ships discharging onto rail sidings and warehouses . Top:Camps . Bottom:
Base depots . Right center:Yard with five trains . (Gullett:Record) .
(Pick , chapter IV) .

(except no. 2) were worked by altogether JJ petrol engines
and 341 S~ton wagons.

The stock was never put to the test,

as the Turks never again attacked• perhaps because the canal
defences were too well supplied.

Lines 3•10 were shut down

in due course, as the Turks were pushed back, but some of
their rails and stock may have been relaid to back up the
Gaza front in 1917, as will be noted later on (18).
be seen that .Meissner Pasha,
(

•O n

It will

the other side, was not the

only one to re-use his lines - proof of the importance of
railways while campaigning in areas lacking roads.

Some

relics of the lines built by Sir GeQrge Macauley were still
evident in the 197o•s, in the form of deserted embankments
and desert tracks (19)~
While the defences of the Suez Canal against a Turkish
attack from the east were being augmented by the G.o.c. Forces
in Egypt, Sir JQhn Maxwell, and the building of railways
into Sinai was set in motion after .December 111~, the troops
of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Forces evacuated from

Gallipoli were being sent to Alexandria, to be rested. re equipped 1
8

(18)

Cpo Davies, PP• 116~1171

and also Murray, P• 198.

(19) Leftovers of the canal railways• traces, though
marked only as tracks. can be found in most good maps of
Sinai, for instance on the Israel Army 11250,000 map (restricted),
noa 449 of Octeber 1973. A (restricted} 1150,000 Israeli
army map of 1973 expressly notes an "old railway track"
leaiing east from Serapeum (near Ismailia), on the bloody
battleground of the "Chinese Farm," notorious in the October
1973 war.

- Li)~ re-trained and concentrated in the Canal area (20).

On

January 6, 1916, the former Chief of the Imperial General
Staff, General Sir Archibald Murray, arrived in Egypt in
order to take over the new concentratiQn of forces in that
country (21).

There was n@w an overlapping of responsibilities

between him and Maxwell.

On March 10, 1916

urray took

over command of all the troops in Egypt, as Co inc.
Egyptian Expeditionary Force (E.E.F.}, and Maxwell returned
to England (22)~

From now on it was Murray who had to selve

the problem of how to keep away the Turks from the Canal
and the Nile Delta.

Meanwhile, the TUrkish Sinai railway

was being extended from Beer-Sheba to Auja. an indication
that the Turks were planning to extend it to Central Sinai (2J).
i

Murray was no stranger to the subject ef the Turkish

railway threat, which had already cropped up towards the end
of 1915 when he had been C.I.G.S.

At that time Kitchener

and Maxwell had decided on the fortified zone, para~lel to,
and east of, the canal (24).

They had taken into account

three possible Turkish avenues of approach,

1)

In the south,

(20) The relevant details will be fcund in Qps. I,
chapters V and VI1 also in Wavell and other publications
dealing with the subject.
(21) Murray had been Chief of the Imperial General Staff
only from September to December 1915. His sudden transfer
to the Middle East indicated the anxiety with which the requirements of the defence of Egypt were viewed in Britain.
Cp. his biography in Webster and the Dictionary of National
Biography.
(22) Ops., I, PP• 95•96.
(23) Ops., I~ P• 90, note 2.
(24) Ops •• I, P• 84.

- 1)/ along the Derb el ...Haj ~•Pilgrims 11 Road ..) from Akaba to Suez .
This was almost impracticable, owing to the lack of water
for large military bodies;

2)

Through Central Sinai,

approximately along the axis Auja-Bir Gafgafa-Ismailia.
over which the Turks had indeed carried out their futile
attack of February 1915.

This was the passage towards which

the new Turkish railway headed.

However, prior tQ the

completion of a railway, this way of approaem was only
(

feasible for a limited number of troops in winter, when there
were adequate water supplieso

In the winter of 1915/16

the Turks were recuperating from their efforts at Gallipoli,
and in no shape to attaek.

However, the British were

worried about future possibilities.

At the risk of anti~

cipating events somewhat, it should be noted that this route
was. at least temporarily, blocked in some of Murray•s first
offensive actions after he ca.me to Egypt.

These were the

destructiDn of the limited water resources at Bir Gafgafa

(11-15.4.1916), and at .Moyia Harab 1 and in the Wadi Mukhseib,
east of the Little Bitter Lake (9-12.6.1916).

This put,at

least1 a temporary end to the Turkish threat by way of the
Central Sinai route (35);

J)

In the north, down the ancient

trade and military highway. along the Mediterranean coast.
This route had already worried Maxwell , as well as the Imperial
General Staff, in November 1915, as it was provided fairly

(25)

Ops., I, PP• 160, 178.

)
well with water resources, and permitted the concentration
of large hostile forces at El Arish and further west (26).
In the centext of the nerthern, coastal, route, the name
of the oasis of Katia had already cropped up in the considerations of the British General Staff in the autumn of 1915 (27).
Katia, and the neighbouring oasis of Oghratina, had already
been used by NaJ)Gleon in 1799 as staging-points for his
forces on their way to Palestine.

If not held by the British,

Katia had obvious capabilities of being used by a considerable
Turkish concentration destined for another large-scale
operation against the canal, and the delta (28). 80,000 troops
were mentioned.

With Katia garrisoned by the British, and

adequate communications to baek them up, it was assumed that
far fewer Turkish troops, some 50,000. could operate in the
area.

It was therefGre suggested, as early as November 191$.

that i ~lght railway should be built to Katia (29).
{26) For an extensive disoussion of the military threats
,
presen~ed by the three main. routes across Sinai, cp.
h Ll~'i.o
appree1.ation of 15.2.1916, in Ops., I, PP• 170-174.
~
(27) Ops., I,PP• 8J, 900
(28) Murray estimated that some 80.000 Turks could
subsist on the water resouraes of Katia, even in hot summer
weather. Cp. Ops. I, Po 179. That was in February 1916.
Earlier it had been estimatell. that with Katia in British
hands, only 50,000 Turks could operate in the area. Cp.

••••so •1.

Ops • , I , p • 90 •

(29)

Ops., I, P• 8J.

However, Murray, when he was still

c.r.G.S.,

was not

in favour of the occupation of Katia, because he considered
that even if it was carried out, the T1:.trks ooltld still
concentrate in the well-watered oasis of Bir-el-Abd, further
east along the coast.

Above all, he first wanted Maxwell

at that time to concentrate on finishing (including railways)
and strengthening his main line of defence along the Suez
Canal (JO).

This stance he apparently took because he was

greatly worried at the time by the .o ffensive implications
~

(.

of the railway which he knew was building with great speed
from Beer Sheba into Sinai (Jl).

He probably feared that the

new Turkish railway would enable Djemal Pasha to attack not
only along the Central Sinai route (which Murray took care
to block - as noted above), but that the Turks would work
their way, i.e. move their forces, north from their railhead
at Auja Hafir, via Maghdaba, to El Arish, to attaok frem
there towards the canal.

In this fear he was right, as

shoWl'il in April and August 1916~ in the battles of Katia
and Romani, when the Turks were to attack with forces supplied
by the railway from Beer Sheba..

They were also to try and

bridge the 100 kms. or so between Auja and El Arish by their
light railway (deseribed already in the section devoted to
the Turkish lines), that was built as far as Maghdaba.

This

was to be in the future ., but, in the meantime, early in 1916
the Katia line was to remain in abeyance, at least in theory,
though not in fact.
(JO)

Ops., I, P• 90.

For Murray's worry about eissner•s railway, Ops.,
I, PP• 84, 90r and for Kitchener~s - Ops. I. P• 77.

(Jl)

.. '-\4D The actual fact was that amongst the almost a d6zen
railway lines (already described above) initiated by Maxwell
to provide the backbone of his Suez Canal defence system,
there was the meter gauge railway from Kantara to Romani.
Since this place, in the northernmost sector of the canal
defence belt. was only a few kms. west of Katia, Katia•s
occupation eould have been carried out any time by moving
troops to Romani on the meter ga\ilge railway from Kantara.
Troops to seize Katia could have also been c&neentrated
by means of another of Maxwe11•s light railways, the line
from Port Said to Mehmedia, which endea only a few km.s.
n@rth of Romani.

As it turned out, Murray, when he went to

Egypt, within a few weeks was to propose to the authorities
in London his own scheme for a railway line, much more substantial than a light line"i> Katia, and of far greater
implications.
With the arrival of Sir Archibald Murray in Egypt,
and his taking over command mf all the forces in the country,
in March 1916, entirely new concepts, radically opposed to
Sir John Ma.xwe11•s ideas Qf relying on a static defence belt
along the canal, came to the fore.
to the new

G.o.c.

The instructions issued

by the Secretary of State for War, L~rd

Kitchener, and by the new C.I .G .s •, liurra:;..s.ta:-ucceaailr»j9?.

au-~wll1iaa1R0Der•1on, stressed defence as his main task (J2),
and he did carry out his orders as far as the completion of the
(32)

For the terms of the instructions, Ops., I, PP• 98-100.

- ~L1l Suez Canal defences {including the non-seizure of Katia)
was concerned.

But Murray was in favour of an active, not

a passive-static, defence of Egypt, and he made his different
views abundantly clear in his appreciation of February 15th,
1916, sent to the Imperial General Staff one month befGre
the recall of Maxwell.

The appreciation began as follows,

"It is clear that the security of Egypt against an attack
from the east is not best assured by the construction of a
(

great defensive position in proximity to the Suez Canal ,, .,. .
among other reasons because such a position is wasteful in
men and materiel.

In erder to effect the object aimed at,

it would be far preferable to push out across the Sinai
Peninsula, towards the Egyptian frontier (JJ), making disposition for an active defence.

Less;_· troops will actually

be required for an active defence than for a passive, or semipassive, defence of the Canal Zone."

The appreciation then

went on to say, after some elaboration, that the true base
of the defensive zone of Egypt against an invasion from the
east was nGt the 80-90 miles long canal, but the 45 •

miles

stretch between El Arish and Kusseima (34).

These points

were made in section I of the appreciation.

In section II

Murray contended that in the spring (1916) the Turks would
be able to get to Sinai (and aeross it - depending on water

(33) The reference is to the Egyptian-Turkish frontier,
fr0m Rafa to Taba on the Gulf of Akaba, fixed after the 1906
Akaba Crisis. This crisis erupted, as described in chapter
III, as a result ~f Meissner Pasha's plan to build a railway
from Ma'an to Akaba, that the British regarded as a threat to
their hold on Sinai, and to Suez .
(34) Murray's appreciation is printed in full. in
Ops., I, PP• 170-174. The area he mentioned was roughly
the, same area where warlike operations did take place in
195 and 1967.

resources) by means of their railway some 250,000 men.

In sectien III he went on to stress that, in these circumstances
it appears certain that it will

be

necessary to build a railway

for the maintenance of any considerable force pushed ou~
. \r~ tul.le£: /
across the northern part of the Sinai Peninsula~ance
A

on the railway, yet tQ be constructed, necessarily limits
.

n

the possibilities (available) to a gradual forward movement (J5).
Thus Murray•s appreciation inexorably linked the execution
of his new defensive-offensive strategic concepts with the
building of a railway, and it was to become the genesis of
the line betwean Egypt
!:I

vii th

;

and

Palestine, betwean Africa and Asia.

Murray• s idea of building a railway, there came

to an end a period of many decades during which Britain had
succeeded by design. or by accidental benign neglect, in
keeping Sinai as some sort of a "curtain of sand," passable,
but by camels, between Turkey's possessions and Egypt (J6).
The end of this period had been forced by the Turkish effort
to build a railway with palpably aggressive connotations ihto
Sinai.

The Turkish line had been built, roughly, from the

north to the west.

The British then were forced by their

opponents to build their own , "counter-railway" from the west.
It was to end up far in the north of Palestine.

{35)

Ops., I., P• 173•
(36) In Stein•s book on the Balfour Declaration (ep.
bibliography), PP• 51•52, Sir Edward Grey's, the British
Foreign Secretary's, objection, as late as 1913-14, to any
link between Egypt and Palestine is noted. Cp. also Friedman
(see bibliography), PP• 1-2, on the cerdon sanitaire for the
Suez Canal, and for the opinion of the Committee of Imperial
Defence in 1906 on the need for the preservation of a 130 miles
wide desert between the canal and the Turks.

Murray, in proposing the constraction of the new railway,
had, of course, no choicee

The new line was needed to give

him mobility. supplies, and offensive capabilities.

Except

by means of rails, there was no other way at all to move
large bodies of men, and their supplies, through a desert
of shifting sands.

It was also to remain the only way, as

Sinai was left road.less (except for temporary trackscreated
\

by laying ..... \leffing acress the sands) until some years
(

after the end of World War I (37)•

Few, if any, railways

in history had, or were, to have the military importance
of Murray•s line, after it was built (J8).

It was to be

the one and only means that enabled the British Imperial
Forces to cross Sinai into Palestine and beyond. a process
that ended with the dissolution ef the Otteman Empire, with
all its consequences.
Sir Archibald Murra~•s memo of the middle of February 1916,
about the necessity for a defensive-offensive, and a railway,

(37) Apparently sometime in the 192o•s (there is no
exact date) the little-used and difficult road from Ismailia
via Auja was built, to link up with the Palestine road-net
at Beer Sheba. This rQad remained the only link between
Egypt and Palestine, apart from the railway, until World War Ir.
Only then was the track Akaba•Sue~ impNved, and a road built
from Rafa, via El .A.rish, to link up with the main highway
at Bir Hassana in Central Sinai. This is evident from maps
in the Official British History of the Second World War in
the Middle East (cp. bibliography), and from a restricted
Army Road ap of Cairo H.Q. of 19440 Today's road along
Murray's railway. Kantara-Rafa, was, as far as cauld be
ascertained, built after 1945 by the British, or even after
1948, by the Egyptians. Details are lacking.
(J8) It was to reach Haifa in 1919, Beyrouth and
Tripoli in 1942, during the Second World War.

seems to have convinced both Kitchener and Robertson in
London.

Even before his overall oommand was gazetted, ieeo

already at the end of February, he started preparations to
occupy in foroe not only RomaE.i, which lay within Maxwe11•s
original defence belt. but also Katia ., which Maxwell had not
~een permitted t& do (39).

For this purpose he - more

correctly, it was Sir George Macauley - also took the first
steps towards pushing out a stal'ldard gauge (1,435 mm.) railway
(

from Kantara towards Romani and Katiao

This was laid parallel

to the original meter gauge line (one of the ten Canal
Defence Railways) Kantara-Romani/Doueidar, which helped

in hauling material, and was, at a later date, taken up after
serving its purpose.

Actual work began on Mar~h lOjh, 1916,

when the first shipload of rails and ties had been unloaded
at Kantara (40).
Before describing Murray's Sinai Railway in detail,
it might be useful to list some relevant dates, distances,
and remarks regarding the line, from its inception in March
1916 to June 28, 1917, when Sir Afchibald's appoiatment as
G.O.Co terminated (41).

The list of stations may not be

complete, as there might have been crossing-places not listed
in the sources.

~me of the stations may have been of a later

date than the original line.
Murray, PP• 194, 198; Ops., I, P• 15?; Wavell, pp.42,61.
(40) Ops., I, Po 160.
(41) The following list was compiled from the two volumes
(3 parts) of Ops., and from the map case attached to them,
especially map no. 23. Many particulars were taken from Wavell,
and some also from Gullett, and Kress. Maps also used included
the Survey of Israel 1,250,000 map of Sinai (El Arish sheet),
and the Israel Army Map no. 449 {restricted), El Arish, of
October 1973•
(J9)

Stations

li)ates
(if' available)

Distances
(from Kantara)

Kantara
Tel el Ahmed
Station (unnamed)
Gilbane
Baluza (Pelusium)

Work started -,ii 10~3.16

15.5.16

(

Mehmedia

Reached ea.
20.6.16

Km. 47

t

46 kmso

Terminus of standar£auge
branch from Romani,to
terminus of narrow gauge
line from Port Said.

47 kms.

Rabbi
Ingila
El Kreibeh
Bir•el-Abd
Bir Salmana
Mazpak (Bir
Bir Mazar

40,5 kmso

Reached ab~ut

Romani

Remarks

Station for Katia(?)
Station fQr Qghratina (?),
15ol0ol6

76

17.11.16

113,5

kmso

Worked delayed by
Battle of Romani (August~

osefig?)

El Subeiba
Ma''adan
El Bardawil
El Arish
El Arish East
Km. 170 (El Kuteifa)
El Burj (?)
Sheikh 'l;uweid
Rafa
Khan Yunis
Km. 215
Deir-el-Balah
Balah-Beach

kmso

Here the line was 96 km.so
distant from the ~urkish
railhead Kusseima.

137 kms.
15.5 kmso
170 kms.

200 k:ms.

28o3o17

4/5.4.17

226 kms.

4 kms. long, 2 foot 6 in.
branch west of main line.

Stations

Dates
Distances
Remarks
(if available) (from tantara)

Wadi~& - Front line
Network

19 kmso long1
2 foot 6 in.system
east of main line,,

Sheikh Nuran

22 kmso branch line
eastward from Rafa.

Gamli

7 tmso branch to
south from Nuran .

Shellal

Extension from Nuran
towards Beer Sheba,i'e
26 kms. from Rafa

\

Notea

Some dates and distances may be approximate

One of the most interesting features of Murray•s new
railway was its alignment, which followed, more or less
exactly, the ancient caravan

oute from Egypt to Palestine/

Syria, the Via Maris, the bi0lical "Way of the Land of the
Philistines"(42).

This was the highway 1 well-nigh deserted

and practically obliterated in 1916, that countless hosts
had trod long before the advent of the British, on their
way from the fortress of Pelusi.tua!1past the strongholds and
(

battlefields of El Arish, Rhinocelura/Rafa, Daram/Deir elBalah, Gaza, Hirbiya, Ashkelon, and beyond, unto the Holy Land.
Though Port Said had been suggested several times,
from 1848 onward 1 as the starting point of a railway to
Palestine (43), the new British railway set out from a far
more historical point of departure, Kantara.

Port Said was

too isolated by its encompassing lagoons frgm the main
bulk of Egypt, and too cramped by its watery surroW1dings,

to serve as an extensive base for a large-scale miliuz,
expeditien.

,

~

Though, as previously noted~ a narrow-gauge

railway had indeed been built to the east from Port Said t-0
Medmedia, it had to be laid an top of a very narrow spit of
land~ at places only some dozens of meters wide, 'between
the Mediterranean,on the one hand, and the plain of Tine/
Pelusium, flooded by the British on the other (44).

This

trace was too precarious, and too liaGle to be eut off both
Exodus, chapter 13, verse 17.
(43)
Jill
· st we as ti-om the suggestion of Assad Khayat1
in 18481 onward; cp. chapter II.
(44) Opso, I, Po 250
(42)

by the sea and by enemy action, to be suitable for a standard
gauge line.

Thus Kantara - "the Bridge" .. was chosen as a

starting point, situated at a point where the ancient track
from Egypt to Palestine passed (from south-west to north-east),
a natural defile between the ridge of El Jisr, in the south, and
Lake

enaaleh and the swamps of Tine/Pelusium, in the northo

Kantara had ample space for a base, it was situated on the
Suez Canal (and indeed was to sprout wharves and turn inw
a port in due course), and it was close to the Sweet Water
Canal that ran parallel to the big shipping way, and thus
had ample supplies of water.

Its communications with the

interior of Egypt and with Murray's

tt,.,Q.

at Ismailia - it

was later transferred to Cairo~ were excellent.

Two standard

railway lines ran from Kantara into Egypt proper, one through
Ismailia and the other through Salhiya.
As already noted, the British started building their
standard gauge railway from Kantara on March 10th, 1916.
Actually they be~an their work from a point across from
Kantara, which itself lay on the western bank of .the canal.
This terminus formed the beginnings of Kantara"East. which
was to develop into a huge base, with wharves for ocean geing•
ships along the canal banks {45)o

It was to wither e_cirely

after 1918, to be resurrected again in W o r l ~ r
which it grew into a sizeable town, until occupied by Israel

on.

i•

(45) The Kantara base will be described more fully later
There is an interesting aerial view of
in Gullett.

in 1967.

Rails and ties were unloaded from ships directly

onto the base, great marshalling yards grew up, and rollifig
stock of the S.S.R. was ferried across the canal, and at a
later stage moved across by floating swing-bridges.

These

also served vehicular and pedestrian traffic.

As noted before, the new line was laid parallel to ~he
tracks of Maxwell's meter line to Roma'@Jn, whieh played a
leaaing role in bringing up equipment.
(

The track was laid

in a north-easterly direction in order to bypass, as did the
ancient caravan highway, the area of sand dunes (some very
high) that lay due east.

A 6-inch pipeline was laid parallel

to the new railway, a water-supply system that was to grow
to huge proportioms - with the help of the railway - and
finally to extend as far as the 'borders of Palestine (46)o
These first British steps towards building a railway
eame to the ears of Kress von Kressenstein through Bedouin
"

agents, and made him decide on a reconnaissance-~force,
which led on April 2J, 1916, to what the British-playing it down called "Affair .. at Katia, while the Germans regarded it as a
fully-fledged "Action" (47}.

The object of the Turkish attack

was to interfere with the new railway.

It resulted in quite

a number of British casualties, both at Katia, and especially
r"\

at neighbouring Oghrat~ina.
"-"

However, the Turks retired, lost

territory was recaptured, and the construation of the line

(46)
(47)
P• 4J.

Ops., I. P• 175•
Kress, PP• 158-1641

Ops. I, PP• 162•170;

Wavell,

- l\~ continued.

It reached Romani on May 15th, 1916, and regular

traffic started four days later.

At the same time it was

decided to build a 5,5 kms. s~andard gauge branch from Ramani
to Mehmedia in the north.

When this was finished, about the

middle of June, Re.mani became a forward base, with two rail•
ways to serve it. one from Kantara (standard) and one from
Port Said (narrow) (48).

Thus, the whole Ramani~Katia-

"""'
Oghratltlna
area had mere.than adequate supply lines to back
~

it up.

This was to cost Kress dear a few weeks latero

Meanwhile, the British government had eome to a mQmentgus
decision regarding the continuatiGn of the war in Sinai,
and the share of the railways in it.

On July 6, 1916, the

British ,,war Gommi ttee ''recGmmended that 1
should direct the

G.o.c.

1)

The

C.I • G.s.

Egypt to prepare to occupy El Arish -

and Akaba, as well - since a force established at these places
would directly threaten the Turkish communications between
Syria and the Hejaz and encourage Syrian Arabs1

2)

The CoI.G.S.

(48) Ops., I, PP• 169 and 170, note. During the first
week of its operations the Kantara-Ramani standard line
carried 1,125 tons of supplies, 420 tons of engineering
supplies, 960 tons of drinking water ~ (• 215,000 gallons} .,
150 tons of railway equipment, and 150 tons of miscellaneous
stores - and 700 troops, a total of 2,800 tons. Considering
that a camet could carry some JOO kgs. of load under favourable
circumstances, the advantages of having a railway to back
up a campaign became apparent. Cp. also Murray, P• 198;
Wavell, p. 46.
A good aerial photo of Ramani Junction, the main line,
and the spur to ehmedia, will be found in photo 611, of the
German photo collection (cp. Note on Photos) in the Jewish
National Library (Ph0t. 258).

should direct the

G.o.c.

Egypt to push on at gnce with the

Qatiya (Katia) railway, making preparation for its extension
to El Arish (49).

Thus the railway to El Arish, which

Murray had envisaged in his appreciation of February 15th,
had been given an official "green light" some five months
later.

Building the line from Ramani had been resumed on

July 7th, but was stopped on July 18, at km. 47, as another
storm .. caused by operations in the area• was about to break
(

aWJut it (50).
By July 1916 Kress had deeided on another move against
the British.

He had received reinforcements from Germany,

and planned another attack on the Canal and the growing
railway ~installations at Kantara, by means of bombarding them
with his newly-acquired long.range 210 mmo gunso

He also

wanted to cut the new railway west of Rpani, and to inflict
on it as much damage as possible. The Turks attacked on
t~.J,S.ei.
August 4th, 1916, and in a• ••
that lasted altogether
some 10 day~were heavily defeated in what became known
as the Battle of ~ n i .

This time the British were well

prepared 1 and used their newly-built railway efficiently fQr
bringing up reinforcements and evacuating wounded.

They

even had an armoured train in readiness at Kantara (5l)o

(49)
(50)

Ops., I, P• 231•
For the dates, cp• Murray, P• 1980
(51) For the British use of the railway, Ops., I ., 189.
For the Turkish intention to cut the railway, cp. Wavell,
P• 47, and also the instructive sketch no. 10, in Ops. I,
For the armoured train, cp. Qps., I, P• 184. For the
evacuation of the wounded, op. Ops., I, P• 204. note.

This was the last time the railway was threatened, and a few
~ e:..-)
days after the battle~ugust
10th, 1916, building the

line was resumed, never to be threatened again .($i) •

From

now on the Turks, who of course had no railway of their own
in northern Sinai to back them up, were to be inexorably
pushed back.,

They had to retreat before the growing forces

of the British could concentrate against them with the
help of their own railway.
(

After the Battle of Ramani, construction of the British
railway continued towards the east, through the slot between
the Bardawil Laggon by the

ea in the north, and the trackless,

waterless, and empty desert in the south.

During the very

hot months, no work could be done after 10 o~clock in the
morning (53), so progress was relatively slow" it was
speeded up later - and amounted to abeut 25 kms. (15 miles)
a month.

Construction was carried out by railway companies

of the Royal Engineers and by native laoour recruited in
Egypt (54), of whom more later.

Thus the line catered to

thousands of troops and workers, apart from bringing up
supplies.

Hosts of camels were employed in building the

line, which in turn supplied their needs in fodder.

In the

meantime, the water pipe-line, carrying Nile water from the
sweet-water canal of Kantara, also kept growing into
alongside the railway that carried its pipes (SS)•

(52)
(53)
(54)
{55)

inai,
Though

Murray, P• 1980
Ops •• I, P• 1760
Wavell, P• 61; also Davies, P• 117.
Ops.11 I, PP• 175, 242... 243; Wavell, PP• 61 .. 62;
cp. also diagram 1, opp. Po 271, in Qps., r. Also, Murray•s
despatches.

in the beginning it lagged usually - and later, occasionally behind rail construction. the importance of the pipe"line was
enormous, because it supplied sweet water to the locomotives
that could not use the local brackish saline wells, and made
the despatch of huge quantities of water by tank-trains,
to supply men and beasts, unnecessary.

There was a curious

interdependence between 'thil-line and pipe-line because,
on accQunt of the total absence of even hardened tracks through
(

the sands, the individual water pipes. 6 in, to in., and
ultimately mostly 12 ino (305 mm.), could only be brought
forward by rail (56).

Thus the railway helped in building

the pipe-line, while the pipe-line helped in running the
railway.
Bir el-Abd, 76 kms. from the Suez Canal, was reached
on 5010.1916 and the line continued through Bir SalmanalL
and through Mazpak (also called Bir Mesefig inoone source)
~kms. from the Canal. This place was
to Bir Mazar,~
reached on 17.11.1916 (57).

It will be noted some of the

places the British railway had passed were called .. Bir,"
i.eo "well."

These were the wells that had used to supply

water to the travellers on the ancient Egypt~to-Palestine
caravan route.

But these wells had water of indifferent

quality and their capacity was far below the one needed to supply
an army on the march, like the British Imperial Forces which

(56) sometimes the pipes were rolled out of slowlymoving trains. In case of need they were dragged further
by tracked tractors. 6p. Ops., I, P• 24J.
(57) Dates are taken mGstly from Murray's despatches,
which probably have the most reliable figures. According,
hewever, to the maps in Ops. and iri Wavell, Bir Mazar was
reached about 1012.1916.

at that time numbered well over 150.000 men all told, and
many thousands of beasts <58).

Thus the new line provided

a prime example of the military importance of railwayso
While it carried the materials fer its own continuing construction. it also provided the supplies on which exclusively
the progress .o f the E.E .F. depended.

In this way, it acted

as the ram that pushed the British forces forward.

The

further the rails prQgressed, the harder the troops depending
(

on them kept pressing the Turks backo

The story Gf the

British advance in Sinai illustrates this fact very explicitly.
In the words of the offi<:ial history of the campaign, "The
speed of the British advance had oeen, and was to remain.
dependent on that of the railway,"

The im})Grtan~e of the

vital railways for operations was even mere vital than might
have appeared superficially, beGause the forces advaneing
along the coast could get no logistie support whatever from
the sea, on account of very shallow waters that did not
permit app»oach.
by rail.

Thus supplies could only be brought up

The fact that the railway did its job very well

is eoni'irmed by a statement of Kress, who noted sadly, "Step
by step, in conformity with the advance of their (i.eo the
British)railway construction. we (i.e. the Turlts)had to retreat"(S9)o

(58) The ration strength, i~e. the total effective&~
including auxiliary and service troops, of the Egyptian ...._/
Expeditionary Force at that time,was 150,000 British and
6,000 Indian treops, and lJ,000 men of the Egyptian Labour
Corps. Cp. Ops., I, P• 247. Figures were to grow much
larger as time passed.
(59) For the British quotation, Qps., I, P• 272; for the
German quotation - Wiegand, P• JJ.

The oocupation of Bir Mazar. and especially the British
railhead there, had decisive strategic results.

Not only

were the British now within striking-distance of the very
important Turkish base ef El Arish in the east (60). they
were also about to bypass a number of Turkish outposts
strung out further south along the Central Sinai route.
These were posts in the Maghara Hills (at Bir Hanun), at
Bir Hassane and at Jebel Libni •
(

.All these places, conse•

quently, had to be evacuated by the Turks towards the end of
1916.

The British railhead at Bir

azar also threatened

the Turkish base at Maghdaba, wouth-east of El Arish, and
halfway along the track between the latter place and auja Hafir,
on the one hand, and Kusseime, on the other.

Maghdaba was

the terminus of the Turkish male-worked field-railway from
Auja, previously mentioned.

The British at Bir Mazar also

threatened the Turkish camp at the Abu Auweigila track-junction,
protecting Kusseime (61).

From Murray•s railhead at Bir Mazar

to Meissner Pasha's railhead between Auja and Kusseime (the
ultimate spot the Turkish Sinai railway was to reach), the
distance was only about 100 bis. (62).

A

short additional

advance of the British along the coast would have outflanked
(60) El Arish was well fortified and held by about
1,600 Turks as a permanent garrison. It had many installations,
including a large field-hospital. It also had a very important
airfield that had allowed German planes to dispute the air
over Sinai with the British for many months. It also had
the best and most plentiful water resources in Sinai. Gp.
Kress, PP• 159, 171s Ops., I, P• 251.
(61) All these places, except Maghdaba, were to feature
largely in two other struggles, between other protagonists,
in 1956 and 1967.
(62) Ops., I, P• 2460

Egyptian Labour Corps men laying the standard gauge line
Kantara- Rafa in the Sinai Desert under British supervision.
Photo 1916 . Note heavy rails and sturdy ties . This line was
taken up by Israel after 1969 .
(Gullett:Record) .

German
railhead at El- Arisn ,1.ate 1916 .
Top left:Mediterranean Sea and Coast . Near them-station and
triangular locomotive switchback , and camps . Bottom right:El
Arish town . Top right dark patch:Wadi El Arish . (Nat . Libr . ,Phot . 258) .
(Pick , chapter IV) .

most of the Turkish forces in

inai.

Kress, mindful of his

growing inferiority in the face of unceasing pressure,
decided to evacuate all of Sinai.

El

The T:u.zaks relinquished

Arish, which the British forces entered on December 21, 1916,

with the railway following closely behind them.

There is

thus little doubt that the progress of the British railway
~ ... (,~
contributed an g 1;rto the loss of Sinai to the Turks.
The railway from Kantara reached El Arish on January 4th,
(

1917.

Steps were now taken to carry it, by means of a bridge,

over the one big water course in Sinaie the Wadi el-Arish
(probably the biblican Nahal Mitsraim).

This was a normally

dry river bed, liable to be swamped by vi&lent floods in
the rainy season (6J).
Immediately after the British capture of El Arish,
and even before their tracks had reached this place, another
engagement had taken place that had some bearing on a railway~
in this case, the Turkish one.

After the Turks had evacuated

El Arish, there was at first some doubt as to in which direction
they had retreated, either along the coast to Rafa, or sou-e?east
to

aghdaba or Kusseime (64)o

A retreat along the coast to

{6J) The collection of German aerial photos (Phot. 258)
in the Jewish National Library, Jerusalem, contains several
instructive shots of early British railway building activities
at El Arish.
There is reason to believe that the British line was
first carried across the wadi on top of sandbags, for which a
steel bridge was substituted later, cp. Murray, P• 200.
One of the earliest childhood recollections of the writer
is watching, from the windows of a stationary train, the whole
steel bridge (probably the one built during the war) over the
Wadi el"Arish being swept away into the nearby sea, by a
sudden winter flash .. flood. This was in the 1920's.
(64) Opso, I, PP• 252-253•

Rafa would have been logical, it being both shorter and
easier, on account of the configuration of the terraino
Nevertheless, aerial reconnaissance established that the
biggest Turkish concentration was at b1aghdaba.

The grounds

for the Turkish withdrawal there ~an only be surmised, but
it might be assumed that they had gone there with the intent
to protect their railhead at Auja against a British attack
from El Arish.
(

The base at Maghdaba blocked any British

advance directed against the Turkish Sinai railway coming
down from Beer Sheba.

Moreover, Maghdaba, which was well

fortified, had relatively good rear comm.unications by means
ef the field-railway, with mules as motive power, that linked
it with the Turkish main line at Auja (65)o

This light

railway might have been expected to supply the garrison
in its blocking task.

It also could have served to move any

men and material saved from El Arisho

However, on December 2J,

one day after Kress had inspected its defences (66) and only
two days after the capture of El Arish itself, the Turkish
base at

aghdaba was wiped out, lock, sto~k, and barrel,

by the railway~0ased British Imperial Desert Column.

This

was the definite end of Turkish warfare under Kress in Sinai .

{65) Kress, P• 147; Wiegand, Po
had a capacity of 80-100 tons daily.
(66)

Kress, PP• 206~2070

JO. The field railway

Five days after Murray•s railway had reached El Arish.
and while the line continued to be pushed forward - now
through partially cultivated country - another crucial engagement was fought over a Turkish position that would have
blocked the progress of the line, unless neutralized.

In

fact, the railway track was to pass within a few hundred
meters of it, a short while later.

The reference is to the

bloody action of Magruntein - also called the Battle of Rafa.
(

This place was situated on a classical battlefield over
which ancient armies had fought.

agruntein itself was a

low fortified hill that sat astride the old high road from
Egypt to Palestine, and barred the appreaches to Rafa.
The action was fought on January 9th, 1917, involved several
mounted attacks, and ended with a resounding British victory (67).
The Turks now had to evacuate Rafa, the military key to
Palestine .

British casualties in the battle were evacuated

from El Arish by newly introduced hospital~trains that now
8

plied the railway (68).
On 1.J.1917 the track from Kantara and El Arish reached
Sheikh 'Liwei~ some 16 kms. from Rafa, and on 21.J reached
Rafa itself, just across the Turco-Egyptian border of 1906 (69).
Thus Murray's railway had attained its goal, in bringing the
British Imperial Forces Ma huge army~ out of Egypt, across
the desert, and into the Holy Land.

(67)
(68)
(69)

In the precess it had

Ops., I, P• 270.
Ops., I, P• 274.
The share, indireot, of Meissner Pasha in the
laying down of this border was mentioned in chapter III.
As for the railway crossing the border into Palestine, cp.
Ops., I, P• 279•

- V)~O \

pushed the Turks back by some 200 kms., counting from the
banks of the Suez Canal.
The original 1917 track of the line post Rafa was slightly
different from what it was later, the rails passing much
nearer and north of the town, instead of south-east of it.
as they were realigned at some time later ( 70 ).•

From Rafa

the line continued north, parallel to the coast of the
Mediterranean, but slightly inland, so as n<i>t to be blot:ked

(

by duneso

At El Arish, the line had left the total desert

behind, and passed through sporadically cultivated land.
From Rafa onward it entered the fruitful, relatively well•
watered, and inhabited,southern coastal plain of Palestine,
the ancient Shephela, the Land of the Philistines.

The

implications, espeeially psychological ., of the British army.,s
crossing the desert with the help of the railway must have
been great.

The practical importance of the line for the

army's operational capabilities remained undiminished after
its arrival in greener fields.

There were no roads in

southern Palestine, and the British expeditionar¥ force
continued to depend on the services of its railway. just as
it had in Sinai ( 71) -•
(70) The original track &f Murray•s line past Rafa is
shown on sheet 14 of the lal00,000 survey of Palestine map.
German reconnaissance photos seem to show why the line was
realigned. The original track ran very close to high dunes,
whiah probably threatened to engulf it. The later, and present,
track lay through solid earth area. The old and new tracks
are both shown gn map 6, in Kress.
(71) As for the state of total roadlessness of southern
Palestine, Ops., I, P• 280; Wavell, P• 67.

- ~6( On 28.J.1917 Gonstruetion of Murray's railway stopped
at Km. 215, on account of the first Battle of Gaza that had
developed just ahead of the line on March 26~27 (72)o

This.

rather hastily conceived, and sloppily executed 1 battle was
a failure owing to bad staff work.

However, Sir Archibald

Murray, from his advanced headquarters aboard a train standing ·
in El Arish station (73), reported a victory to London, and
as a natural corollary was urged to continue his attack and
(

try to take Jerusalem..

Thereupon Sir Archibald, on Jl.J.1917,

toned down expectations in England by stating that

11

his

progress would be measured by the progress of his railway,
and the best he could hope for was 20 miles a montho"

This

was probably as convincing a statement as was ever made
stressing the importance of railways in the Sinai and Palestine
campaigns (74).

Murray concluded by letting London know that

he might have to ask for material to doable-track his line
from Kantara to Rafao
to be raised again.

This was quite a new idea, and it was
It might be mentioned just as a possi•

bility, that the hasty attempt to capture Gaza originated
perhaps in a certain decision of Murray's, of about two
weeks earlier, on 9.3.1917.

At that date he had decided to

continue his railway from Kantara up the ooast of Palestine,
through Gaza, instead of turning inland (another possibility)
to reach the Turkish Beer Sheba railway, and then go into
the hills to Jerusalem (75).
(72) The First Battle of Gaza, and also the Second,
that followed soon after, have 'been amply described elsewhere .,
and will be noted here only perfunctorily.
{73) Ops., I, P• 289.
(74) Ops., I, P• 318,
(75) Murray, P• 2001 Ops., I, 319, J25 c

The results of the First Battle of Gaza obviously demanded
another attempt to reach a decisiono

This, perhaps, the more

so as, at the other extremity of the Middle East, Baghdad
had been captured from the Turks on 11.J.1917.

However, the

Turks, and especially their commander, Kress VGn Kressenstein,
were now ferewarned, and quite aware of the threat.

While

during the first battle their slender forces had hung onto
Gaza by their eyelids, they now turned the place into a welldefended and entrenched fortress.

They even started buUding

a new railway from Tineh on their main Beer Sheba line, to
Beit Hanun, near Gaza, with a branch to Huj, all this to
bolster up and supply their Gaza entrenchments (76}.

This

line was not complete when the Second Battle of Gaza started.,
but it was to support Gaza up to Allenbyts overwhelming
breakthrough late in 19170

It is reasonable to assume that

the operation of this line (and of other Turkish lines
backing up the Beer Sheba end of the front) contributed to
the subsequent British decision to construct a supporting
network of lines on their side of the front too.
The British, on their part, were eager to try another
assault.

In order to facilitate the bringing up and employment

of their effectives and supplies, they at once started again
to push forward their railway at great speed.

With a few days,

on April 4/5 1917, their line had reached Deir el-Balah (77).

(?6) This line has already been dealt with in the
sections describing the Turkish railway building effort.
(77) Murray, P• 199, gives the date of reaching Deir
el-Balah as 4.4.1917; Ops., I., P• 327, says 5.4; wavell,
P• 84, just says "early April 1917."

North of this townlet, at km. 226,2 from Kantara, the railhead
was to stay for some seven months.

The temporary terminus

of the line lay just a few kilometers south of the Wadi Gaza,
along whose northern banks the front now ran, from west to
east.

The railhead was extremely close to the forward troops

-

which had been the intention - and was even·Junder enemy
observation, and occasionally - fire.
Gaza itself was about 15 kms. (78).
(

Its distance from
While the forward

momentum of the standard gauge British trunk line was now
blocked, it began to sprout (just like the Turkishkmain
line on the other side) at least two lateral branches.
These were of 2 ft. 6 in. (762 mm) gauge.

First a 4 kms.

long branch was built from the main line to Mediterranean
beach, where supplies were unloaded from ships anchoring
in the road-stead of Deir el-Balah.
done immediately.

This seems to have been

In due course, when the Gaza front froze

into stalemate, another branch, or rather a complete network,
some 19 kms. long, was built towards the east, from the mainline,
(

tb back up the British positions along the Wadi Gaza .

All

told, 2J kms. of tracks were built, and material came apparently
from Maxwell's redundant lines in the Suez Canal defence zone,
now far away from the front (79).

These light lines rendered

invaluable services, in permitting stockpiling of ammunitions
and supplies for the big British push of late 1917, that
captured Gaza (80).
(78) Wavell, P• 841 8-9 miles.
(79) Davies, P• 117;
urray, P• 199; Record, P• 9lc
The beach branch is shown on various maps in Record, and also
by Kress, map 6. The branches to the east - ignored by other
maps - are shown in Davies' map on P• 115.
(80) Davies, P• 117.

- ~G~ On April 17-20, about a fortnight after the railhead
had been consolidated at Deir el-Balah, the Second Battle
of Gaza ran its course.

The advantage of surprise had been

lost to the British and despite the use of tanks - the first
instance of their use in the Middle East - the battle was a
costly failure.

The tanks, of course, could only have been

brought up from Egypt on the railway (81).

The British were

now stuck in front of a Turkish defence system that extended
from the coast, through Gaza, all the way (with a few gaps)
to Beer Sheba.

Along this extensive front there now occ~red

a development that was the parallel of the growth of branch
lines about Gaza itself after the fighting thereo

Onl.y it

was on a much larger scale, in conformity with the length
of the fronto

Three days after the end of the Second Battle

of Gaza, on April 23, 1917, orders were issued to build a
new railway, to branch eff the main line at Rafao

It was,

unlike the light lines around Gaza, to be of standard gauge.
The intention was to route it almost due east, to Sheikh
Nuran (Magen of today).

From there it was to run to the

banks of the Wadi Gaza at Shellal - tae short-lived terminus
of a light Turkish line that had soon been taken up by Kress,
aeter the British arrived in the area (82)o

From Shellal

(61} Ops., I, Po J28; Wavell, P• 880 Only 8 tanks had
been sent. Kress, P• 241, counted only 7. But for the railway
there would have been no way to move them, whatever their
exact number.
(82) The Turkish Tel Sheria-Shellal line has been
previously mentioned in connection with the Turkish railway
effort. This 60 em. line probably only lasted for two
months before being taken up.

(

Shellal railway bridge on the line Rafa-Sheikh Nuran-Beer Sheba .
End of trestle is not showing as it was built as a curve . This was
one of the biggest railway edifices built by the British , and
necessitated a steep embankment into the wadi and out of it . 1917/18 .
( Sol!trce:Imp . War Museum) .

The double- tiered Hejaz Railway trunk line bridge south of Amman .
Photo taken after its capture by ANZAC mounted forces , late 1918 .
This bridge was the target of Allenby's abortive attack , early 1918 .
The bridge still operates to-day.
(Gullett:Record) .
(Pick,chapter IV) .

the new line was to turn south and run along the southern
bank of the wadi, here called Wadi Shellal, to Gamli (SJ).
The initiation of this line by Murray, was in obvious contradiction to his previously mentioned resolve to build along
the coast towards the north, and not easto

It was, however,

obvious that by building a large-capacity standard- and not
narrow-gauge- branch line to the east, he intended operations
against the Turkish front to be widened and intensified.
(

It is significant that the decision to widen the front to the
east came immediately after the advanee past Gaza had proved
to be blocked.

To this

urray reacted by envisaging a new

railway without which any extension of the front would not
have been feasible.
Work on the new line started about the end of April,

but many details are lacking.

Sheikh Nuran was reached on

18.5.1917, and a station was built there.

The terminus at

Gamli, very approximately 29 kms. from Rafa, was reached on
(

13.6.1917 (84).

At some unspecified date, at km. 22,75,

about where ~the line started turning south, another branch
was begun (later to be a main line), pointing due east,
in the direction of the yet distant Beer Sheba.

This branch

had grown to 5 kms. length when it reached, on 15.6.1917,
the banks of the Wadi Gaza, here

•••1--Aws

0alled Wadi Shella!.

(8J) Murray, P• 1991 Ops., I, P• J56a Wavell, P• 91.
The upper reaches of the Wadi Gaza, alongside which the line
was to run, were at the time called Wadi Shella!. Today
it is Nahal 19

I IL

~~;

"''•

(84) Kilometer lengths are only approximate and there
are ~ontradictions in the sources. Owing to uncertainties
in the alignment of the Gamli line, meas.artng on maps is
useless.
Gamli (or Bir Kamleh) is today's Be'er Sharuhen, about
1 km. south-east of the-then" Tel Fara, today's, and ancient,
Sharuhen.

- ~~1 This wadi here had a very wide bed, running, owing to the
semi-arid nature of the land, between very high and precipitous
banks.

As there was no time to build the long, and high,

bridge needed, and in view of the fact that the wadi's bed
was dry most of the year, the track was laid in a wide curve,
on sloping earth embankments, down into the wadi on the one
s i d ~ i t on the other side.

This was one of the

most diffi~ult constructional tasks yet encountered on the
(

whole line from Kantara (85).
While work~on the new line had barely begun, Sir Archibald Murray wrote at length to the c.r.G.S. in London about
his railway problems (86)0

He pointed out that the single-

track railway at his disposal, with its capacity of 13 trains
a day - of which 6 trains alnne were required to maintain
services and construction work - was barely sufficient to
maintain 5 infantry divisions.

In addition, it might be

noted, he also had the equivalent of J mounted divisions (87).
He taerefare 6.titlilned two
problems:

l}

· as:tble so.lJ.ttiJcabs tb tke railway

He proposed t0 construct larger stations and

(85) For the various dates and details, cp. Murray,
P• 199; Ops~, I, P• 356; Record, P• 90; Wavell, P• 910
The,mostly approximate;layout of the Rafa-Gamli-Shellal line is
shown on various maps in Kress, Ops., Record, and Wavell,
and also on the 11100,000 map of the Survey of Palestine,
and early editions of the Survey of Israel 1,100,000 map.
(86)

Ops., I, PP• 359-360.

was 7.5.1917.

The date of Murray's letter

(87) Details about the strength of the forces the
Sinai railway had to supply, and the means it had to do so,
will be given later on. At this point a reference to Wavell,
P• 91, will suffice.

- V(G1 crossing-places, and also wanted to work more locomotives
and wagons:

2)

He suggested double-tracking the line.

The first solution would have enabled him to raise the
number of daily trains from Egypt to 16, thus permitting
to maintain at least 6 infantry divisions and J cavalry
divisions, with all ancillary services.

The second solution

would, of course, have solved all his immediate problems,
and also provided for the future.
(

In any case, he stressed

the vital necessity for improving communications during
the three, or so, summer months of 1917 during which no
large-scale operations were enYisaged.

But, since he wanted

to be adequantely prepared for future offensive action,
in the autumn, he himself advised to double-track the line which would have taken 8 months t

To double-track the line

he needed a decision from London (88)1
he wanted to implement at once.

his minor solution

He also pointed out that

his larger scheme required considerable amounts of material
from England and elsewhere, as the E.S.R. had already given
all it could, without paralyzing the vital railway services
within Egypt itself (89).
Incidentally, Murray also mentioned his Nile-Water
pipeline, whose interdependence with the railway has been
mentioned previously.
to be doubled.

He wanted the pipeline capacity also

The 12 inc. (305 mm.) pipes had indeed reached

El Arish, but further on, up to the pipe-head of the Wadi Gaza,

(88)

Ops., I, P• J60.

(89)

Murray, PP• 200, 205.

only lines of 6,5 and 4 in. diameter had been used, Murray
pointed out, and added that out of the 600,000 gallons of
water pumped daily from Kantara towards Palestine, only
J6,500 gallons dail y were reaching the frontline.

The

remainder had been tapped on the way by the railway, by the
various bases, and by service - not fighting - troops.
Trains, he noted, had to carry 100,000 gallons a day from the
wells at Rafa, to the forward positions around Deir el-Balah.
What he meant was, by implications, that without the water
supplied by tank.,.....trains, there could be no front-line.
He feared that a breakdown in supplies from any cause
whatever, i.eo enemy action, the weather, or accidents,
would not only affect the troops, but might also completely
disorganize railway services as well, whose locomotives
needed large quantities of water when working both the
main line and the spurs backing up the front (90).
General Murray was not to receive a binding reply to
his queries.

On June 11th, 1917, he was recalled to England.

General Sir Edmund Allenby was sent out from France to
Palestine to take over as G.o.c. (91).
command on June 28.

Allenby took over

Later, in 1919, he was to pay tribute

(90) Cp. Ops., I, Po 361, for a description of Murray's
water troubles. On P• J67 there is a breakdown of water
requirements, in which the large quantities required by the
locomotives for raising steam are very obvious.
(91) Ops., I, P• J68; Wavell, P• 91.

- l\ 7D ;to his predecessor who"had carried a standard gauge railway
to the gates of Gaza," and who had made possible the successful conclusion of the campaigns by "his bridging the desert
between Egypt and Palestine" (92).

Indeed. while he did not

gain resounding victories, Murray, by his far-seeing appreciation of the vital role of railways in a trackless desert,
laid the foundation for the conquest of Palestine.

A correct

idea of the importance of the British military railways can
(

be gained by speculating on what the campaigns of 1916-17
would have looked like without railways.

Most probably

they would not have started at allo
Between Allenby's assumption of command, and the renewed
Palestine offensive, about four months elapsed.

The Third

Battle of Gaza - though Wavell with very good reason called
it the Battle of Beer Sheba~ started on October Jlst, 1917•
As already noted above, the Turks,under their German commander
Kress,had used their period of grace to back up their frontline
by various new railway spurs . that branched off their Beer
Sheba trunk lineo
on their part.

But the British had not been idle either,

While there is no certainty on the point,

the palliatives suggested by Murray prior to his recall,
namely, the building of more crossing-points, extension of
stations, and the augmentation in the numbers of rolling stock.
seem to have been at least partially carried out during the
summer •

.Anyway, the capacity of the railway from Kantara

was stated, after Allenby took over, to have grown to supporting
(92)

As quoted from Wavell, P• 92.

- G\1l seven infantry division,
troops (9J).

J cavalry divisions, and ancillary

The total strength of the forces the British

railway had to furnish with all th~ir needs in the summer of
1917 had reached 260,000 men, including 60,000 Egyptian
labourers.

To this had to be added forage for the tenis
'-'

of thousands of beasts. horses and camels.

These effectives

JJ% or more (data are lacking)

may have been the equivalent of

of Palestine•s total population at that time (94)o
(

By the time Allenby had taken over in the Middle East,
Czarist Russia had collapsedo

Palestine had become the most

important fighting front of the Allies outside Europe,
as Salonika, the Caucasus, Persia 1 and even Mesapotamia
were only minor theaters~of waro

The Prime Minister,

Lloyd George, badly wanted Jerusalem as a "Christmas present"
to bolster up morale (95)o

TherefQre illenby received the

important news that the double-tracking of the railway
from Kantara to Rafa had been authQrized in Londen on July 21,
(

some three weeks after his taking over (96).

This work,

which Allenby estimated would take six months, was now
begun, and progressed at an extraordinary speed, due to the
unflagging energy of Brigadier"General Sir George iacauley,
Director ef Railway Transport.

He was the same man, previously

mentioned, who had already built railways for Maxwell and
urray from the very beginning of the war.

Seeing that he

(9J) Ops., II, part 1, P• lJ. Henceforth the shortened
version Ops., II/1, or Ops~ II/2, will be used to denote
Ops. II, part 1 and Ops. II, part 2.
(94) Ops. II/1, P• 140 According to a Foreign Office
Handbook (ep. 4'ibliography) Palestine•s population about
1919 was approx. 718,000, but there were no exact figures.
(95) Wavell, PP• 95-96.
(96) Ops. II/1, Po 15•

I
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had succeeded so well, he had been kapt at this task.

Now

his work had become materially easier, owing to the faet
that rails and ties could be delivered on the original
railway track, that ran parallel to the new one.

Incidentally,

he also greatly enlarged the Kantara railway yard, and its
technical facilitieso

Construction speed for two menths,

owing to the pressure of impending operations, reached the
unprecedented average rate of one mile (1,6 kms.) daily.
(

Thus by the end of October 1917, some three months after work
had been initiated, double-tracking had been completed to
Bir Mazar, 113,5 kms. from Kantara (97).

The savings

in the operational time of locomotives and wagons, and the
enhanced efficiency of rail transportation just on the
eve of Allenby 0 s first offensive, were very great.

Up trains

no longer had to wait at crossing-points for down trains to
pass, and the number of trains working kept growing.
According to a reliable source, the double-track, before
Allenby's attack, had even passed Bir Mazar, and had reached
Ma'adan station, at Km. 137 (98).

Double ... tracking was

resumed, after a short pause owing to the Third Battle of
Gaza, on 1.11.1917, though with only a small work-force.
The second track reached El Arish in January 1918, and doubletracking was completed to Rafa on April 17th~ 1918 (99).
Ops. II/1, P• 20. Also Wavell, P• 104.
Record, P• 91.
Ops. II/1, PP• 185, 29J; Record, P• 92; Wavell .,
P• 104. The resumption of work was undertaken with only
limited labour, owing to more immediate operational requirements further forward. This was the reason for the relatively
slow progress of double-tracking to Rafa.
(97)
(98)
(99)

\\

)

Meanwhile, considerable work had been done to extend
and improve the railways right behind the British front line,
where, owing to the continued total absence of viable roads,
they were still the only means of

oving supplies and water (100).

Henceforth it will be instructive to note how far the railways
backing up the front kept blending into Allenby•s operational
plans (as they had into ~urray's), and influencing them.
Some idea of their importance can be gained - at the risk of
(

some anticipation - from Allenby's words regarding them, or
rather their chief operator, in his despatch to London after
the Third Battle of Gazao

There Allenby paid tribute to the

"invaluable services in the organization of his railways
rendered by the Director of Railway Transport, Brig.•Gen.
Sir George Macauley"(lOl)o

In the despatch 1acauley is

mentioned after the High Commissioner in Egypt,, Sir Francis
Wingate, and the representative of the Royal Navy, but before
all other officers on Allenby's staff.
(100) The lack of roads of any kind keep being men•
tioned in sources, sueh as Ops. II/1, P• 8, and Wavell, Po 102,
and others. It was also mentioned in Allenby's despatch
mo/ th"-, S:eeretary of State for War, of December 16th, 1917,
quoted in Record, po 2o It is also proved by maps, as,
for instance, sketches 1 and 2 in Ops. II/lo
Even the appearance of lJ4 tractors, some with trailers,
could not make up for the lack of roads, and the railways
remained the mainstay of supplies and water over more than
short distances.
(101)

Record, P• 10.

Allenby•s plans for his first major operation in Palestine
did not include another frontal assault on the, by now,
very strong fortifications of the alert Turks round Gaza.
Instead it foresaw an offensive against the left Turkish
flank (from the right British flank}, around Beer Sheba
which, though extensively protected also, was nothing as
strongly held as the Gaza defences.

In this offensive the

railways were to play a vital role.
It was during the preparatory period for this offensive
that Allenby indulged for the first, but by no means for
the last, time in hisiropensity for misleading the enemy.
The story of how Colonel Meinertzhagen managed to "lose"
to the Turks a fake plan for yet another British frontal
assault on Gaza is by now a well"known and classic instance
of deliberate dis-information (102).

But it is not at all

Jnown that his railways also served Allenby to mislead the
enemy.

The fact that 23 kms. of light railways were built

behind the cramped frontline along the Wadi Gaza, and near
the sea, has already been mentioned (103).

But apart from

their practical value, these lines were now apparently used,
by means of heavy and ostentatious working, to mislead the
enemy into believing that great concentrations of troops
were being assembled once again facing Gaza.
did more.

But Allenby

He deliberately pushed forward his standard gauge

Ops. II/1, PP• 30-Jl.
(103) These light lines were originally initiated by
Murray for entirely practical reasons, with no thought of
misleading the Turks.
(102)
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main line from Kantara past Deir el-Balah, on top of a
newly-built bridge across the Wadi Gaza, practically into
his very first trenches facing the town.

There he built

a dummy station, that could not at all be used, because it
was located practically under the very barrels of the
enemy's artillery (104).

However, it was assumed. probably

correctly, that the dummy station would serve as yet another
proof to the enemy that the next offensive would again
be directed against Gaza.
In fact, as already noted, Allenby wanted to launch
his offensive on his right flank, against Beer Sheba, where
he expected to have the advantage of surprise.

However, the

trouble was that between his points of departure, along
the line from Shellal to Khalsa (today's HalutsaJ, and the
objective, Beer Sheba, some JS kms. distant (where ample
water resources were expected - unless destroyed), there
was practically no water, and few possibilities of bringing
up supplies and ammunition (105)0

Yet the total force

directly involved in the offensive against Beer Sheba, and
requiring logistical back-up, included no less than 47,500
infantry and 11,000 cavalry (men and beasts that needed water)
apart from 242

guns ✓ tthat

wanted shellsl (106).

The daily

water requirements alone for this force reached 400,000 gallons,
(104) Ops. II/1, P• 21; also Record, P• 9. The line
across the wadi was, in fact, to be of great use after
Gaza had fallen, and did serve as the continuation of the
main line towards the north.
(105) Only the barest details of Allenby's operations
will be given in the following text. These are described
in full in Ops., Record, and Wavell. And also elsewhere.
(106) Wavell, P• 112.

)

•r 500 tons (107)0

Therefore steps had to be taken to

extend the railway (and an accompanying pipe-line) as far
as possible towards Beer Sheba.

Some J0,000 camels were

expected to take over where the railway stopped (108).
Work seems to have been done, at least partially, at night,
in order to give the enemy no inkling where the attack was
to come from, and brown camouflage was used to cover the
track built (109).

This was another of Allenby's ruses.

The camouflage was taken away when the attack was launched.
(

The lines extended by Allenby had, most of them, been
initiated by Murray .
Railway construction had been resumed,from where
Murray had stopped,, already in August 1917, a few weeks
after Allenby had assumed commando

A light line, perhaps

of 762 mm., more probably of 600 mm., was laid eastward for
some kms,, perhaps 5-8, from the standard terminus at Gamli,
across the Wadi Shellal, to El Buggar (or El Bakkar), in
the direction of Beer Sheba (110),

The standard gauge

line Rafa-Shella~ that had to be carried laboriously, across
the Wadi Shellal, was extended eastward 1 first to Imara,
and then to Karm, both on the camel track to Beer Sheba .
(107) Wavell, P• 102,
(108) Record, P• 2,
(t 09) Ops. II/1, PP• 21, 40. Kress, P• 274, also
noted that work on the railway was done at night, but claimed
that the Turks were aware of it,
(110) Ops. II/1, P• 21; Record, P• 2; Wavell, P• 111,
El Buggar (not shown at all on modern maps), will be found
~n map VIII in Wavell. The line itself is shown on map IX,
P• 114, in Wavell, which also shows hritish movements during
the battle, and, for comparison, also the Turkish railway.

-

\ i)

~1~

-

The station at Karm was J6,8 kms. distant from Rafa. It
-~ Sv
was operating on October~. three days before the battle
started.

Simultaneously with the construction of the

standard line to Karm, a light railway had been laid from
that place even further towards the east, to get as near as
possible to the Turkish positions.

The rate of construction

of the standard track was unprecedented, even disregarding
the hot seasono
(

After the track had been prepared, rails

were laid down at the rate of J,6 kms. a day.

White the

battle was actually being fought, the rails had reached 39 kms.
from Rafa, which was more than half the distance from Shellal
to Beer Sheba (111).

Turkish cavalry attacks at el Buggar,

just before the battle, were driven off, and in any case
were not persistent, as the Turks had failed to realize
what was being done in the area regarding railway construction (112).
Thus the railways built on the rlritish side of the
front were to enable Allenby to concentrate an overwhelming
attacking force on his right wing, that was to strike the
main blow (llJ).

What forces the Turks, supported by their

(111) Ops. II/1, P• 21, and also sketches 1 and 2.
Also Wavell, P• 111, and Record, PP• 2, 91.
(112) Ops. II/1, P• 37; Kress, PP• 274-275• The
state of the railways west of Beer Sheba on the eve of
the battle is shown in sketch map no. 6 in the memoirs of Kress.
(llJ) Allenby's ferce was summarized by Wavell, Po 112.

own railway, had around Beer Sheba, is not precisely known.
However, the grand totals of both forces facing each other
between Gaza and Beersheba have been recorded.

The British,

operating some 240 kms. from their base in Egypt,had succeeded,
thanks to their standard railway, in assembling altogether
some 75,000 infantry, about 17,000 cavalry, and 475 guns.
The Turks, badly handicapped by having only a narrow railway,
had been able to concentrate some 40-45,000 infantry, 1,500
cavalry, and about JOO guns.
service troops (114).

These figures did not include

The bulk of the Turks was concentrated

round Gaza, while most of the British faoed Beer Sheba.
The Third Battle of Gaza, or, more correctly, the
Battle of Beer
1917.

heba, opened early in the morning of October Jlst,

By nightfall, Beer Sheba, with its water resources

and its great railway station, had been captured.

Thereupon,

while the Beer Sheba area was being consolidated, Allenby
switched his attack to Gaza, which,outflanked from the east,
was evacuated by the Turks and entered by the British on
November 7.

These decisive British successes had to a~------~

extent been made possible by G,eneral Maoauley•s railways.
Following the capture of Beer Sheba, construction of the
Rafa-Sheikh Nuran-Shellal-Karm standard line was temporarily
(114) Wavell, PP• 112-115. Ops. II/1, Po 35, puts
the;- .number of Turks at JJ,000 + 1,400 cavalry, and 260 guns.

\

suspended.

Howe er, even in its incomplete state it was

to exert its influence on the capture of Jerusalem.

On

\

1.12.1917, Allenby had formed "Mot-es Detachment" (one
division and supporting troops, named after its commander
Maj.-Gen. S.F. Mott)o

Mott's force was to advance ... and did ...

from Beer Sheba along the Judae't. mountain ridge, through
Hebron and Bethlehem towards Jerusalem from the south, while
the bulk of the British forces was to move up the coastal
plain, parallel to the Turkish railway, finally to swing
round towards Jerusalem from the south-west.

Mott's detach•

ment was to play an important part in the capture of Jerusalem
on December 9.

The way its supplies reached it is not

generally known.

Mott 0 s supplies were sent up from Egypt,

via Rafa, to the railhead beyond Karm.
hauled some

lJ

From here they were

kmso cross-country by tractors to Abu Irgeig

(Irqeig) on the now-severed Turkish railway from the north
to Beer Sheba.

At Irgeig station supplies were loaded

onto captured Turkish flatcars and, in the absence of locomotives, were dragged by mules another 10 kms. into Beer Sheba.
From here they were transported by a combination of motorlorries and camelbacks along the (war-built} Turkish road
to the front outside Jerusalem (115).

Some time later,

the date is not availablei but probably early in 1918, the
continuation of the standard line from Karm to the east
was re-started, and the track linked with the Turkish
· (115) Ops. II/1, P• 239, note.
map xf, P• 134.

Cp. also Wavell~s

\'l.\

railway to Beer Sheba at Abu Irgeig.

From here the British

standard line was laid on top of the Turkish narrow line
into Beer Sheba.

Beginning May Jrd 1918, Beer Sheba had a

standard gauge link, via Rafa, with Kantara.

Supplies

from Egypt for the front north and east of Jerusalem could
now be sent up the Beer Sheba... J,e rusalem road (116) o

But that

was to be in the future.
Returning to the coastal plain, and events there in
November 19171

there, extensive railway development took

place, closely linked and coordinated with
towards Jerusalem and the Sharon Plain.

llenby's offensive

As will be shown,

the interaction between military operations and railway
construction and utilization was to be striking.

AJlenby's

advance was to come to a stop from late in December 1917.
along the line from the Auja (Yarkon) River in the west,
through points north of Jerusalem, to the Eastern Auja River,
a tributary of the Jordan in the Rift Valley (117)•

However,

railway consolidation and extension went on even after
the frontline had stabilized.
On November 10, only three days after the capture
of Gaza, the construction of the main line Kantara-El ArishRafa was resumed by the British, from the railhead (the dummy
station) just north of the Wadi Gazap and the track was
(116)

Ops. II/2, P• 4J9•

Record, PP• 91-920

(117) Allenby's campaign has been amply documented
elsewhere, for instance in Record, and will be mentioned
here only insofar as is needed to explain railway developments.

British 600 mm.field railway train,Jaffa-Lod,carrying Jewish
volunteers for Allenby's army,being welcomed while passing
Tel Aviv.Summer 1918.
(Source:Zionist Archives) •
.,

'./

Captured Turkish 1,050 mm.rolling stock,carrying Turkish
prisoners,and worked by British crew,in Wadi Sarrar(Junction
Station)on Lad-Jerusalem line,about November 1917.
(Imperial War Museum).
(Pick, chapter IV).

continued through, and past, the town, into captured territoryo
Within days the construction detachments were to reach
Beit Hanun, just north of Gaza, the terminus of the Turkish

1,050 mm. military line from Tineh, on the trunk line from
Wadi Sarrar - called Junction Station by the British - to
Beer Sheba (118).

On November 17th, Allenby's forces captured

Wadi Sarrar/Junction Station, and also Tineh Junction to the
south of it, both on the Turkish trunk line.
(

Some locomotives

and 60 narrow-gauge Turkish wagons were captured intact {119).
Practically the whole of the southern section of the Turkish
rail network was now in British hands, as Ramle and Lod
stations were to be occupied a few days later.

The British

lost no time in putting the captured lines to use for backing
up their advance.

By 20.11.1917 the narrow-gauge line

Beith Hanun-Tineh-Junction Station was operating, the gap
between the forward-creeping British standard line and the
Turkish narrow line being temporarily
transport.

bridged by motor-

This became unnecessary when the British standard

(

linep having been laid parallel to the Turkish track from
Beit Hanun, reached Deir Slleid on 27.11.

There1 extensive

transshipment platforms for stores were constructed from one
gauge to the other.

Also four narrow-gauge locomotives

had been sent by rail from Egypt, and were put to work -

(118) A most useful map of the Beit Hanun-Tineh line,
in its relation to the Wadi Sarrar-Beer Sheba trunk line,
will be found in sketch no. 10 (opp. P• 155) of Ops. II/1
(119) Ops. II/1, PP• 162-1641 174: 21J.

probably after adaptation - on the captured Turkish line.
By December 1st. seven trains a day, each carrying 100 tons,
were run from Deir S~eid to Junction Station.

On 5.12

narrow-guage traffic was extended from Junction Station to
Ramle and Lod, and even earlier the narrQw line had been
reopened to the east, as far as Artuf (Deir Aban,
HartuV).

8

The continuation from there to Jerusalem was

still closed because of blown bridges (120).
(

today s

From Junction

Station, Ramle, and Lod, supplies were now being sent by
road and tracks to the frontline in the hills.

Here was

a use of the Turkish railways that their German builder
Meissner Pasha could not have foreseen - the utilization
of his work for the drive to capture Jerusalem .
On the Turkish line into the hills, that Meissner in
1915 had refused to take up for humanitarian reason~~ , four
bridges had been destroyed.

Repair work was started immediately1

and on January 27, 1918 the narrow-gauge line to Jerusalem
was reopened, with all that the event implied for the front
that had stabilized just north and east since its capture~on
December 9.

The working narrow railway Deir SW!id-Jerusalem

was now about 85 kms. long (121).

Savings in road and track

(120) Ops. II/1, PP• 185, 2J7; Wavell, PP• 157, 165.
(121) Ops. II/1, P• 237. Page 293 in the same volume
gives the date as 28.1.1918. Also cp. Record, P• 91. Two
of the blown bridges had a span of JO metres, one of 16
and one of 10 metres. Owing to the lack of access, they
could not be repaired simultaneously, but only one after the
other, material being bDought by rail over the spans already
repaired. These bridges are still in use, two some kms.
east of HartuV, and two on either side of Bittir.

transport - the frontline troops had up to then to rely
mainly on the one available metalled road to the Holy City must have been very considerable.
Jaffa had been captured on the 16tholl.l917, and since
stores had up to then been unloaded on open beaches at the
mouths of the Wadi SukhW-eir (Nahal Shikma) and thp Wadi Rubin
(Nahal Rubin) down the coast, the capture of the ancient
port and what installations it had {and its skilled manpower)
at once opened up the possibility of unloading supplies
there.

However, there were two difficultiesa

a)

The track

of the original Jaffa-Jerusalem line had been taken up at the
behest of Meissner between Jaffa and Lod in 1915, to supply
rails and ties for his Sinai railwayso

Consequently, movement

of supplies by rail out of Jaffa port was impossible;
b)

Owing to the initial stabilization of the Sharon front

along the Auja (Yarkon) River, the port itself, and any
proposed railway to Lod, were exposed to Turkish artillery
shelling (122).
problems.

The British set out at once to rectify the

They built, probably in the beginning of December

1917, a 600 mm. light railway, from Jaffa port through the
town itself to Lod, to link with the 1,050 mm. line from
there to Jerusalem (12J).

Except in its first section, from

(122) Ops. II/1, PP• 268, 277. but especially P• 275;
also Wavell, p. 169, where the subject is summed up unequivocally.
(123) Davies, P• 118, and map, P• 115, also photo facing
P• 144. Also Record, P• 91, and Massey, "Triumph," p. 176.
One sheet of a British army map 1:40,000 (of ca. 1919),
preserved at the National Library in Jerusalem, shows the
exact track of the 600 mm. line through Jaffa and beyondo
The line is also shown on map 19, in the map case attached
to Ops.

the port to Jaffa station, this line was just relaid on top
of the track of the old French railway, of 1888-92.

In

order to free Jaffa and its port, and the light railway
from any Turkish threat, the British initiated what was later
called, , with some exaggeration, the Battle of Jaffa, that
consisted mainly of the forcing and crossing the line of the
River Auja on December 20-21, 1917.

As a result, the Turks

were pushed out of range, north of the river, as far as
Arsuf (Rishpon), and thus the threat to the port and the
railway ceased to exist (124).
The beginning of 1918, only a few weeks after the
start of their successful offensive, saw the British in
\\IU')-"

possession of a complet~ilway network in southern Palestine,
l!tM

t".

e which. -'•'iill-i@l!IJ!hl!=IIN!!-•l!!!l111l•

t

Turks.

had been captured from the

This network comprised the following lines,

Sheba-Tineh;

4)

Station,

2)

Deir Sneid-Tineh;

J)

l)

Beer

Tineh-Junction

Junction Station-Artuf-Jerusalem;

5) Junction

Station-Ramle-Lod (1,050 mm.), with its British-built 600 mm.
extension Lod-Jaffa.

This network provided an indispensable

logistic backup for Allenby's frontline, by distributing
supplies brought from Eg y ~ and Beer ShebaE -•~. .1£111•·•••l-t1111t2
al d :is a:1 1 111171111d directly, and from Egypt via Jaffa port.

At the same time the lateral track Jaffa-Jerusalem helped
distribution all along the front line from the coast into
t he hills, a front that s tretched parallel to the railway
track.

It was this narrow system that was to provide Allenby

(124)

Cp. note 122, above, for detailso

- Y. ¥1

-

with the means to capture Jericho in February 1918 , push
the Turks from the commanding height of Tel Assur, nor

'~ of

Jerusalem, in early March 1918, and carry o this two big
raids into Transjordania (March~April and April-May, 1918).
It might be noted that the first of these raids was directed,
unsuccessfully, against the Hejaz Railway's important bridge
near Amman.

The second, equally abortive, may have been

aimed at the Hejaz Railway's vital junction at Dera•a (125)0
However, it seems to have become apparent that a local
narrow-gauge system, even fairly extensive, fed by labourious
transshipments from the standard-gauge line from

gypt, did

not suffice to feed and supply an army the size over which
Allenby held command. which was charged with the large-scale
operations intended to force Turkey out of the war.

Also,

the more the Turks were pushed back, and distances from
Egypt lengthened~ the more dependent the British became• on
the smooth functioning - wit~ransshipments - of their
railway.

Perhaps the British were also aware of the infinite

trouble the Turks, on their part, had with their unfinished
railway backup, owing to the breaks in the Taurus and Amanus
mountains - where however the imcomplete tunnels were bound
to be ready one day.

Thus in their endeavour to win the

"railway race" in the Near East, the British, even after the
Turkish debacle in the autumn of 1917, and perhaps because of
it, continued the development of the standard gauge trunk line
(125)

Wavell, PP• 180, 182, 184.

Also cp. Ops.

- Yf¥ ...
from Egypt into Palestine.

The standard gauge line was to

grow into another network that was to eclipse Allenby s narrow
gauge lines, and was to grow into Palestine's permanent
rail system destined to last for many years after World War Io
It has already been noted that only three days after
the capture of Gaza, 7011.1917, building the trunk line from
Kantara, via El Arish, Rafa, and Deir el-Balah, was resumed
towards the northo
C

It followed the coast as before, but

getting towards Yibna (Yavneh), was forced slightly inland,
north-north-east, by the necessity of bypassing the wide
area of sand dunes south of Jaffa.

It was then directed

towards the hub of the country~s narrow-gauge lines, the
area of Ramle-Lodo

Progress of the standard line towards

the north was as follows:

Deir Sneid, north of Gaza, was

reached on 17 or 28.11.1917 (126)1
on 8.12.1917 (127);

Isdud (Ashdod) on Christmas day, 25012 , (128);

Deiran (Rehovoth) on 8.1.1918 (129);

<Jt..2.1918 (lJO)~

Mejdel (today's Ashkalon)

and Lod, finally, on

Here a very extensive station grew up, with

transshipment facilities to the narrow-gauge line from
Jaffa to Jerusalem (lJl)o

As the British standard-gauge

line came into Lod from the south-west, and quickly sprouted

(126)
(127)
(128)
(129)

Ops. II/1, P• 185;
Wavell, P• 1650
Ops. I.t/1, P• 292.

Wavell, P• 150.

Record, P• 91.
( lJO) Ibid.
(131) A number of very clear aerial reconnaissance
photos made by the Germans, and included in the collection
Phot. 258, in the National Library, Jerusalem, provide
graphic proof of the rapid growth of Lod staiion early in
1918.

..
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into a large- and still Meth t ~ marshalling-yard, there
existed for a time two Lod stations.

One was the British

station, and the other, to the east of it, the old narrowgauge station built for the original French line from Jaffa
to Jerusalem (132).

This station, after 1915, also had

served the Turkish Sinai railway, built by

eissner, that

had come in from Tul Karem in the north, continued on the
original French track from Lod via Ramle• to Wadi Salltir
(Junction Station), and there diverged south to Beer Sheba.
As proved by aerial photos, the narrow 1,050 mm. track at
Lod passed across the end of the standard 1,4J5 mm. track
at right angles.

However, when in due course the Jaffa-

Jerusalem track itself was converted to standard width
(as will be noted later), it was relaid.

It then came in

a wide arc from the westlJaffa)into the British station,
and left it. at its southern end, in a wide arc to the
south-east towards Ramle.

The old French-Turkish track

from Lod (old) station to Ramle was abandoned (lJJ).

The

Turkish track ( eissner•s) from Tul Karem to Lod (old)
station was also taken up ultimately by the British, but when,
(132) The French line, and its stations, including
Lod, were extensively dealt with in chapter III.
(lJJ)
iost of it still exists today, including culverts,
and partially serves as a foot path. It was photographed
by the writer. The old station at Lod still stands today,
unrecognized but well kept, and its platform is intact.
It survived the British mandate as an Arab boys• school
and today serves as the Lod First Aid Headquarters.

...
in due course1 the British continued their standard line from
Lod to the north, they laid it parallel to the defunct
Turkish narrow track.

In fact, soon after reaching Lod,

the British continued their standard line due north, to
Km. Jl5 (from Kantara), just beyond Rantiye village, some

6,5 kmso from the front line (1J4).
The new line, intG Lod, was by no means to remain
Allenby•s standard gauge mainstay.
(

After the standard gauge

branch from Rafa had reached Beer Sheba, as mentioned above,
on 3.5.1918, the British set to work to convert the Beer ShebaJunction Station track - actually the late Turkish ~inai
railway - to standard gaugeo

The section from Abu Irgeig -

from there the section to Beer Sheba had already been standardized was converted very rapidly between May 14 and July 8th 1918,
when Junction Station was attained.

Allenby now had two

alternative standard - though single track - main lines
from Rafa to the north.

One led by way of Shellal" Abu

Irgeig (Beer Sheba), and the other (the present main line)
passed through Gaza and Rehoboth (1J5)o

This 1 in addition to

the originally used narrow line Deir Sneid•Tineh.

Sometime

in the spring or early summer of 1918, the light railway

(1J4) Ops. II/2, P• 4J9; Record P• 920 The railhead
of Rantiye, and the line itself, are shown on map 19 in the
case attached to Ops.
(135)

Ops. II/2, P• 4J91 ·--Ricord, Po 920

'"°f -

- \,,\ ~ (
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from Jaffa to Lod

.,.

-~~

alsoYcoriverted to standard gauge (136),

greatly facilitating the transport of heavy supplies arriving
by sea.

Even more important was the standardizing of the

vital lateral link between Lod (standard railhead from Gaza)
to Junction Station (standard railhead from Beer Sheba).
Between 27.2 and 31.3.1918, the whole lateril line Lod-Junction
Station-Artuf was widened to standard gauge.

Thereafter1

~1,050 mm. rolling stock was exclusively concentrated

at Artuf to serve the section from there to Jerusalem (1J7)o
However, even this was not sufficient for operational needs,
and on April 22 it was decided to extend the standard gauge
to Jerusalem.

The line up the Judaean hills was converted

in less than two months and the station in Jerusalem was
reached on June 9th, and open to standard traffic on 15.6.1918(138).
With this, Allenby's main line system had been totally
converted for all practical purposes, and now he had~ on
the eve of his next, and as it turned out, last, push against
the Turks - a fully fledged railway network linking both his
frontline and his rear areas with his main base in Egypt.
In Kantara too a momentous - by military and railway standards even had taken place.

The huge base that had grown up on

the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, and the main line that
(1J6) Ops. II/2, PP• 439, 442. In the archives of the
Israel Information Office, Tel Aviv, there exists a photo
of the then High Commissioner for Palestine, Sir Herbert
Samuel, in the early 1920's riding on the footplate of the
first standard gauge train from Lod to Jaffa. This probably
is a mistake, though Ops. too may have erred in the date 1918.
(137) Ops. II/2, P~ 439; Record, P• 92.
(138) I bid.

extended from there to Palestine, had both been linked in
July 1918 to the western bank and to the E.S.R. main system
by a railway-bridge across the canal.

The first standard-

gauge through-train on the Cairo-Jerusalem run, operated on
15.7.1918 (139).

This bridge was supplemented by the train

ferries - already mentioned - that had been crossing the
canal since early 1916 (140).
One curious, and probably unprecedented, feature of
(

Allenby's, or rather Macauley•s, railway conversion worklin
1918 must be mentioned.

While tracks were being widened

from narrow to standard gauge over lines that extended
for long distances, supply traffic could not be interrupted,
and all available wagons ., whatever their gauge, had to be
used to the full.

This rule applied to the Jaffa-Jerusalem

line and probably to the Beer Sheba-Junction Station line
as well.

As a result, while work was in progress, and

possibly for some time after, the narrow-gauge track was
not taken up, and the lines could boast of three rails, and
were of mixed, narrow-standard, width.

Thus for a time

trains made up of two different gauge stock were worked,
drawn by one locomotive, and run as one unit on the same
track.

The sight of narrow and standard gauge stock composite

trains must have been unique in railway history (141)0
This completes the tale of British standard gauge
construction in southern and central Palestine, prior to
Allenby's final offensive of September 1918.

But something

(139) Ops. I I/2, Po 440; Record, Po 102.
(140) Murray, PP• 201-202.
(141) Opso II/.2, P• 439, A photo of the triple-rail, dual
gauge, trac~ from Artuf to Jerusalem! will be found in the "Sefer
Ha'fiagana" (cp. bibliography), vol, , part 2, opp,p.642.
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remains to be said about the local narrow-gauge lines built,
in the absence of useable roads, in order to move supplies
and ammunition in the immediate near areas of the British
front.

Very little indeed is known about these lines

from written sources and these are very few.

There are few

definite details about their gauge, and their dates of · ½
1

~ down

or taken up.

A great deal of the scanty parti-

culars available had to be assembled from maps, by field
trips, or from aerial photos.
in

aa

These lines were listed

one comprehensive source as "light railways," apparently

in order to distinguish them from the much heavier 1,050 mmo
lines.

One other reliable source describes all of them as

having been of 600 mm., which, to judge from surviving
photos, and the stock shown in them, seems to be substantially
correct.

But some may have been 2 ft. 6 in. (762 mmo)

relics of the Canal defence railways (142), and one, possibly,

a.: 1,050 mm. Turkish relico
The following narrow-gauge light lines were built
in central Palestine after November-December 19171 (14J)
1) Jaffa Port-Jaffa Station~Lod.

Th~s line, of 600 mm.,

until, unlike the others, it wa~~rted to 1,435 mm.
standard gauge, was the first light line built after the
Third Battle of Gaza.

(142)

It has already been discussed above.

Davies, P• 118, and map on P• 115;

Record, P• 920

(14J) The light railways built around Gaza, and west
of Beer Sheba, in 1917, will not be included in the following
list.

'-

2)

Sheikh Muannis-Carrick Hill.

The latter hill,

whose name was bestowed on it for identification purposes
by the British, was a low hill, north of Auja (Yarkon)
River, near today's Neveh- 1agen.

This line, mentioned

only once, and no* shown on any map, may possibly have been
a branch, separately listed, of line J (144).
I""'"\

J)

Jaffa-Sarotma (today Hakirya, part of Tel Aviv) -

Jellil (Geliloth-Yam). This line, together with its spurs,
\

must have been altogether some 20 tmso long, or more.

It

branohed off from the Jaffa-Lod line where this crossed the
Jaffa-Kalkilya• track, i.e. where some J5 years later Tel Aviv
(Beth Hadar) station was located.

It followed the Kalkiliya

track past Satana, crossed the Wadi Musrara (Nahal Ayalon),
and then paralleled the Auja river for several kms. to Tel
Abu !eitun, (today near Bnei-Berak station).

On top of this

line lies today's main road from Elite Square to the RamathGan Stadium.

A very short spur about here turned south-east

to "Bulf in• s Hill•• ( today one of the prominent hills of
Bnei-Berak), headquarters of the British XXI Corps, under
Lt.-Gen. Sir Edward Bulfin .

Near Tel Abu 'feitun the line

turned sharply north (as still does today's main road that
lies on top of it), to cross the Auja river at Hadra Bridge
(today's Yarkon bridge at Yad Hama•aviV")o
river the line split into several branches.

Once across the
One turned

west to split again into one short and one long spur, both

(144)

The only mention of this line is in Record, P• 920

ending near Sheikh Huannis.

The main branch continued

north, to throw off a very short branch to "Carrick Hill" perhaps the line mentioned under no. 2, above.

The main

branch~ntinued north, to end in two short spurs at '':\'enkin~s
Hill ," north-north-east of Jellil, practically in what are
today the western outskirts of Hertsliya .

This line supplied

the western sector of the front line, occupied by the XXI
British corps ~ (145).
4)

Lod-Ras el-Ain (Rosh Ha'ayin)o

This line may have

been of 600 mm. gauge, and British built.

But there is a

fair possibility that it was a section to the north of Lod,
of Meissner•s Beer Sheba line, taken over by the British,
who had adequate rolling stock for it.

It certainly lay

on the Turkish track, to judge from contemporary maps, and
led from Lod junction to the muah-shelled spot where it was
broken by the front line, between Ras el-Ain (Antipatris)
Castle and Mirabel (Mejdel Jaba) Castle (146).

This line

was apparently not identical with the standard-guage line previously mentioned - that had been laid alongside it as
far as Km. 315, the advanced depot at Rantiye (Rinath-Yah)
(147).

The lighter line served only the front line troops

to September 1918, when Allenby's final offensive started.
(145) Ops. II/2, PP• 4J9, 442; Record, P• 92. Also
especially map 19 in the Ops . map~case, and plate (map) 49
in Record, though it is not exact. There are many aerial
photos of the light lines around Jellil in the collection,
Phot. 258, of the National Library, Jerusalem.
(146) Massey "Triumph," P• 120; Record, P• 92; and
especially Map . 19 in Ops.
(147) Ops. II/2, P• 457; Reoord, P• 92•

~f
·

5)

"London Bridge" - Tireh. This short spur branched

off line no. 4, to the east, from a railway bridge designated
on army maps as "London Bridge," near (Wilhelma (Bnei Atharoth),
south of Rant~ye.

The purpose of this short line has remained

totally obscure, unless one takes into account the fact that
some 45 years later Israel Railways built another spur
practically from the same spot, again to the location of
Tireho
(

This was done to haul stone for the construction

of Ashdod harbour from the big quarries at Tireh.

AJJenby's,

otherwise unexplained, spur line may have hauled railway
ballast, and material for fortifications (148), but this
remains a guesso

6)

Kafr-Jinnis - Lubbano

This line, some 20 kms.

or more long, including spurs and sidings, corresponded
in importance in the eastern seotor Lof the Sharon , to the
Jellil line in the western sector.

It branched off the main

line towards the east at Kafr Jinnis (just east of today•s
Ben-Gurion/Lod airport).

It then continued deep into the

hills of Ephraim, following a succession of wadis, past
Beit Nabala (Nevalath), to end at the village of Lubban,
approx. one-third of the distance from the Plain of Sharon
to the watershed, and the road Jerusalem-Nablus, on top of
the north-to-south main mountain ridge.

This line supplied

the entire eastern,hilly, sector of the XXI corps., and,
conceivably, also some units of the neig~bouring XX corps ;
that held the front in the hills.

Supply and ammunition

(148) This line is shown only on maps 19 and 20 in the
map: case of Ops.

dumps were established alongside it, as evidenced by the
sidings shown on the maps of this line, and these were to
play a considerable role in Allenby's final advance (149).
7)

Jerusalem - El Bireh

This narrow railway, probably

of 600 mm. gauge (150), was about 25-JO kmso long, on account
of its serpentine tracks through the Judaean hills.

It was

perhaps the most interesting amongst the British military
railways and has been dubbed "the most important" amongst
(

them (151).

Its very existence, as well as its layout, have

been forgottenv

It led through a, today, densely populated

area, and few traces of it remain, though its construction
in its time was quite an engineering feat.

It probably

operated for less than a year, from early 1918, just after
the capture of Jerusalem, to the autumn of 1918, when the
front-line moved away.

Its military importance was very

considerable, as it backed-up the whole British front north

(

(149) The Lubban branch is mentioned in Record, P• 920
It is shown on maps 19 and 20 in Opso In British mandatory
times it was kept operating only as far as the army camp at
Beit Nabala, where there developed large sidings, especially
in World War II. Its railless track, further east, was
still shown on the lsl00,000 Survey of Palestine map, and
is still partly shown on the Survey of Israel lsl00,000 map.
Allenby's 1918 supply and ammunition dumps in the Wadi Ballut,
through which the line passed, are imentioned in Opso II/2, p.4920
(150)

Davies, Po 118.

(151)

Ops., II/2, P• 439.

- vi qq of Jerusalem, from Tel Assur, on the watershed of the
mountain ridge, and the main road Jerusalem-Nablus, to both
flanks of the front, towards the Sharon in the west, and
the Jordan Valley in the east (152).
This line, which an account of its different gauge,
had no direct connection with the main line from Jaffa/Lod,
started at a transshipment point in the "German Colony"
quarter in Jerusalem, next to the (then, and today's) S~ Carlo
(

Borromea;:1 Hospiceo

It then climbed the hillside south of

Talbieh to a hilltop very near St. Simon, and then in a
\JOO

practically -

curve (15J) turned, very sha rply, and went

downhill, crossing today's Gaza Street, to the Monastery of
the Cross, whose sole gate it practically brushed.

It then

continued north, past Sha'arei Hessed quarter, and in a wide
loop passed to the western side of the Valley of the Grosso
It then turned west, passed underneath today's Knesseth building,
and from there followed the contours of the hills round the
western1 and then~orthern1 outskirts of Jerusalem.

It continued

(152) Ops. II/2, P• 4J9; Record, P• 92. The track of
the El Bireh line is shown on a number of aerial photos in
the Phot. 258 collection of the Jerusalem National Library.
It can also be found on quite a number of maps amongst them
the one in Vilnay "Yerushalayim" (The New City), po 165 .
Also in Dalman (map at the end of his volume) who has a
very good and complete layout of the track; also in Record,
map J9 (inset) and map 44. It is a curious fact that, though
the line is mentioned in Ops., it is shown on none of its
numerous maps. The line is also shown, partially, on the
mandatory map of Jerusalem, 111,000 (ca. 1924)0 Cp . also
Massey, "Triumph," P• 176.
(15J) This extraordinary curve, on top of which lies
today's Palmah Street {approx.) is shown very clearly on a
German aerial photo of 1918, in possession of the Jerusalem
National Library (Phot. 258).

- s~o . .
\
practically on top of the Tombs of the Sanhedrin, and proceeded round the western slopes of Mount Scopus (today's
Givat Hamivthar, which is the historic Scopus), to join
the main road north, to Nablus, just west of the "French
Hill."

From there the line paralleled the road, and the

main watershed of the Judaean ridge,to end at some unidentified
spot on the outskirts of El Bire-Ramallah.

A good many

streets in Jerusalem now lie on top of this lineo
(

So much for the history of the British-built or Britishadapted railways in Palestine.

While some details are known

about the standard lines, the British narrow-gauge railways
are all but unknown (154), and the above details may be
the first ever published.
Allenby's first great offensive, of late 1917, had ended
when he had outrun his communications, i . e . his railwayso
The greater part of 1918 was spent by preparing adequate
communications for the next big push of the British army.
While this was done, the Turks were kept busy by harassments
of the communications on their side of the front, i . e. the
Hejaz Rai lway, until the heat of summer practially put an
end to operations.

By the autumn, Allenby and his forces had

at their disposal a railway network that, though not sophisticated from the point-of-view of signals and of comfort,
was excellent, and as efficient as any in Europe (155).
(154) The best summary of British railway building in
Palestine in 1917-1918, though not detailed, will be found
in Record. All the details not mentioned here specifically
regarding the British lines will be found in that :. 1 c-f ....,'"-e.,
(155) Ops. II/2, PP• 4J9, 442.

- 50\
It might be added in this connection that while railways
thrived, there are only a few and very perfunctory references
in all the contemporary literature to road building by the
British.

They apparently built only short feeder-tracks,

and made do with what - if anything - the Turks had left.
While he kept pushing the railways in southern Palestine,
Allenby also indulged in some weighty speculations about
the more distant future.

(

He insisted that he could not

undertake large-scale operations against the north - meaning
Syria in the main - without railways to back him up.

As

early as February 1918 the G.o,.·c . was already considering the
extension of his main line from Egypt, possibly as a doubletrack railway from Rafa to Haifa.

From there he envisaged

a single-track line via Tyre and Sidon to Beyrouth - all this
while these places were still being held by the Turks.
In this connection he did stress the vast amounts of equipment
that were going to be needed, including an increase in the
delivery of coal, which at that time already had reached
6,000 tons a month (156).
Allenby's final offensive started in the early morning
hours M ..._

· g1 I

of September -

19, 1918, and railways

were to play a prominent part in it, as will be elaborated
in the following section.

However, the railways that were to

influence his victory were, in the main, Turkish.
(156)

Ops. II/1, P• 298, 299;

The

Wavell, PP• 176-177•

-

r
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British-built rail network had largely terminated its role
when the offensive began.

As for the British lines, there

only remains to note that scarcely a day after fighting
resumed, railway construction was restarted.

The standard

gauge main line was rapidly continued north from its railhead
at Ranti~ on top of a new track that had been prepared
beforehand.

On 28o9ol918, the British switched to laying

their standard rails on top of Meissner•s narrow track,
from which the rails had been removed.

Using the Turkish

ready-made embankment, the British now progressed at an
average rate of some 2 kms. a day.
station was reached.

On 15.10 Tul Karem

Here transshipment facilities were

built towards using the Turkish 1,050 mm. line past Massudiye ,
through the (luckily undamaged) Ramin tunnel, to Afule.
From there the line could be utilized to Haifa, on the one
hand, and to Beisan and Samakh, on the other.

Allenby's

advance had been so swift that the Turks had had no time to
destroy their railway (157).

From Tul Karem the British

standard line was laid on top of the Turkish branch railway
to Liktera/Hadera.

From there the line was continued along

the coast - the British had no fear of naval bombardments -

'
through Tantura (Do v ) and Athl~th,
round Cape Carmel 1 into
Haifa.

Haifa station was reached by the standard gauge line

from Kantara early in January 1919, two months after the

(157)

Record, P• 92.

- so~ First World War had ended.

Here the new 1,4J5 mmo line

that came in from the south linked up with the ex-Turkish
1,050 mm. Hejaz Railway branch that came in from the east,
and has been put back into service by the British more than
three months previously ,(158).

The standard line into Haifa

was, unfortunately, to prove in later years a prime example
of a railway that had been built for purely military reasons,
with no economic considerations at all, or regard to urban
(

concentrations.

That was partly the fault of the British

builders, but it was also to a great extent due to the
alignment of the original Turkish railway, whose tracks the
British had used because it was there and readyo
Railways in Palestine During the Final Phase of the War, 1918,
With Special Reference to the Hejaz Railway and its Haifa Branch
It had been fleetingly pointed out in the previous
section that it was the Turkish railway system, built by
Meissner Pasha before, and during 1 the war with the intent to
(

further his own side and not a wartime enemy, that played a
prominent, though mainly passive, role in Allenby's victory.
The British G.O.C,, mindful of what his own railways had done
for him, also had had ample time to reflect on the importance
of rails for his opponents.

It was on the Turkish railway

junctions, and their envisaged capture, that he based his
(158) Massey, p. 285;
P~ 92; Wavell, po 2150

Ops. II/2, P• 562;

Record,

- ~o\ -

\

plans to smash the Turkish forces in Palestine - and beyond
(159).
Allenby's first draft for his autumn 1918 offensive
foresaw a break through the Turkish front to capture the
rail junction of Massudiye (Sebastiye) in the Turkish rear.
By this means he would have cut the rail communications of
both Turkish armies operating on the front in western Palestine.
These were the 8th Turkish army in the Sharon plain, supplied
(

by the line from

assudiye to Tul Karem, and the 7th Army

(under Mustapha Kemal) astride the hills of Ephraim, and
supplied by the line Massudiye-Nablus.

Nor was Allenby

unmindful of the fact that the Turkish 4th Army, in the east
across the Jordan, was being kept supplied by the trunk line
of the Hejaz Railway coming down from Damascuso

Most important

of all within the framework of his planning was the railway
junction of Dera'a in the Hauran (160), where the railway
for Samakh (Tsemah), Beisan, Afule and Massudiye, which kept
the two Turkish armies in Palestine supplied, branched off
from the Damascus-Ma'an line, that kept the army in Transjordania
supplied - and the Hejaz garrison, and Medina, as well.
(159) Details of Allenby's offensive plans, and their
execution, will be discussed here only insofar as they
involved railwayso They will be found on a day-to-day basis
in the pages of Record. Allenby's overall plans have been
amply outlined in Ops. II/2, chapter XX, especially on
pp. 448-449, and in Wavell, chapter VII, especially P• 197
passim. In this connection cp. also Kress, P• J07, on the
fatal military results of the Turkish failure to develop
their rail communications with the Middle Eastern fronto
(160) Opso II/2, P• 448; Wavell, P• 196.

\ "'-

Capture of Dera•a would have cut off entirely all three
Turkish armies and the Hejaz, in addition.

However, he

considered that Dera • a was too far away from·J the starting
line in central Palestine, in the autumn of 1918.

He therefore

left the capture of this vital railway junction and the
harassing of the railway in Transjordania to his Arab allies
under the command of Feisal and Lawrence.

It might be

pointed out, anticipating events, that the Arabs, having
(

failed before to capture Medina, and having failed more
lately to evict the Turks from Ma 0 an (which posed a heavy
and continuous threat to the British base at Akaba), did
n o ~ d in capturing the vital Dera•a junction eithero
This place was to be reinforced by German troops brought
by train from Damascus and Afuleh - a prominent example of
shifting troops by rail behind the Palestine fronts - and
did not fall until September 27th, owing to the total c llapse
of the Turks, and the cutting of the lines leading into it,161).
However, all this was to be in the not too distant

(

future.

Meanwhile, Allenby, who considered that he could

not attack Dera•a directly himself, decided, at least, on a
wider envelopment than he had envisaged in his original draft.
In his final plan of attack, he decided to make, instead of
Massudiye, the railway junction of AfuleR in the centre of
the Jezre'el Valley, the target of his offensive.

This plan,

whose execution was to be recorded in history as the Battle of
Megiddo, and which decided the war in the Near East, was
(161)

Ops. II/2, PP• 467, 565-566.

intended to give the British all the advantages expected
from the capture of Massudiye - and more.

Incidentally, it

might be pointed out that Allenby•s plan, far from stressing
the capture of towns or salient geographic features - as was
the rule in Europe and elsewhere - concentrated on the capture
of focal Tail junctions, and there can be few better proofs
than this, of the great importance of railways in the
Palestine campaign.
(

The capture of Afulel and its junction was intended
to give the British two choices of further advances, and
relatively easy going in both of them.

From Afule the

British - on the one hand - could move alongside, or with the
help, of the Turkish railway, to Haifao

They could use the

town•s sheltered anchorage, and from it ~hey could advance
north, to Acre, and from there, along the coast (possibly
building a railway as Allenby had considered) to Tyre ,
Sidon, Beyrouth and beyond - along the ancient coastal

highway.

The other choice of the British might have been

to turn south-east from Afule, going to Beisan also along,
or with the help, of the Turkish railway.

At Beisan they

had the choice of turning south, down the Jordan Valley to
Damie bridge, thus cutting off the last venue of retreat to
Transjordania for the Turks trapped in the Sharon plain, and
in the hill country.

Alternately they could turn north from

Beisan, and go up the Turkish railway to Samakh, and continue
to Tiberias, and perhaps Rayak or Damascus.

Allenby's first

draft would have given him control of another stretch,

- fDl
perhaps 60 kms. in all, of the Turkish railways.

His final

plan, however, to capture Afule, offered him a fair chance barring failure - of taking over most of what had remained
of the Turkish railway network in western Palestine1 which
served as the backbone of all the Turkish forces and without
whose supplies they were doomed.
Allenby•s superiority in manpower and equipment late
in 1918 - all brought up and concentrated by rail - was
overwhelming.

He had 57,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry, and

540 guns, not counting reserves and rear-area personnelo
These he was about to throw against the Turks , who, including
reserves, it was estimated, had only J2»000 infantry,
2,000 cavalry, and 402 guns.

These forces, except some

German and Austrian contingents, were ragged, starving,
ill-equipped, and hopelesso

On overall numbers cpo the

note below w(l62).
(162) Wavell, P• 195; also Ops. II/ 2, Po 452, where
figures are not substantially different. On the condition
of the Turks ("hungry, ragged, verminous, comfortless,
hopeless and outnumbered"), cpo OPSo II/2, Po 446.
"Ration strengths.a"/ that is overall forces in the
theatre, were about J40,000 for the British, as against
247,000 for the Turks, according to Ops. II/2, 4540 This
means that railways on both sides supplied 587,000 mouths,
as against a total population of Palestine of about 720,000o
The British railways also fed 62»000 horses, 44,000 mules,
J6,000 camels, and 12,500 donkeys.
On the total inability of the Turkish narrow-gauge
line south of Rayak to supply, much less move, the Turkish
forces, opo Ops. II/2, P• 454.

- <5"D 1

..

Thus, when Allenby's attack started, his forces cut
through the Turks like a hot knife through butter.

After

the first day's fighting (19.901918), the Turkish 8th Army
in the Sharon had virtually ceased to exist, and the Turkish
railway fell into the lap of the British with very little
fighting.

Tul Karem, and its station, were captured on

20.9., the important Ramin tunnel (the only tunnel in
Palestine) was also seized intact on the 20th.
(

Massudiye

junction was captured in the pre-dawn of the 21st, and further
up the line Jenin, and the prize of the offensive, Afule,
were also seized already on the 20th o As all organized
Turkish resistanc e had broken, the British continued their
attack and extended ito

Beisan was captured the same day

as Afule, namely on the 20th, Haifa on 23.9., and Samakh
on the 25tho

Valuable Turkish rolling stock was also taken,

eleven locomotives, and some 70 wagons (163).

One of the

fiercest fights of Allenby's final offensive took place
in Samakh railway station, between a German rear- guard and
Australian mounted troQps on 2509.1918.

The German GoOoC.,

Otto Liman von Sanders, had ordered the village of Samakh
to be held to the last man, as this place, linked by rail
through the Yarmuk gorge with Dera a, held open a road of
retreat for the Turkish and German formations, and might in
the future have served as a sort of bridgehead in the Jordan
For details and dates cp. Opso II/2, PP• 508,
also Wavell, PP•
210, 214P 223. Map 21 in the Ops. map:ease provides a
good background to events.
(163)

509, 520, 521, 525, 531, 537, 543-544;

Valley, covering Tiberias and even threatening Beisan (164).
The German troops had entrenched themselves in the station
itself, and also amongst the rolling stocko

The Australians

made a mounted attack on the station and a bloody hour~long
fight developed, during which little quarter was asked for
or given.

Samakh station was captured at last and in it

100 dead Germans o Australian casualties numbered 78, and
some 100 horses (165).

With the capture of Samakh itself1

situated just east of the J ordan, the whole of the Turkish
(

rail network in western Palestine had fallen into the hands
of the British.

Four days after the capture of Haifa, ioeo

on September 27, 1918, British supplies were being landed
at that port (over the quay .built by Meissner ), and the
railway Haifa-Samakh had been put in working order (166).
But at first the parlous state of the captured rolling
stock hindered operations.

Later1 probably useable 1,050 mmo

locomotives and wagons were brought north from Judaea, where
they had become redundant - owing to the conversion of the
lines to standard gauge .

In the north they could now help

to supply Allenby's push to Damascus .

The British were lucky

in having captured the big, many-arched Maj alll.i bridge over
the Jordan, south of Samakh, intact .U67).
(164)
(165)
battlefield
(166)
(167)

Ops.
Ops.
will
Opso
Ops.

II/2, P•
II/2, P•
be found
II/2, P•
II/2, Po

However, they

5420
544., A moving picture of the
in Gullett,

562.
522.

\
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were less fortunate in the fact that an important viaduct
east of Samakh had been blown up by the Turks - quite apart
from the demolitions carried out further up the line, near
Dera•a, by the Britishers• own allies, the Arabs.

The

broken bridge east of Samakh took some weeks to repair with important results unnoticed even by military historians
( 168).

Because of the blown bridge, Allenby•· s main thrust

on Damascus had now to be supported solely by an indifferent
road over the Jordan passage at the "Bridge of the Daughters
(

of Jacob, " and through Kuneitra .
sent from Beisan via Irbid.

Other supplies had to be

After the capture of Damascus,

and of the Hejaz Railway, (described in the following section),
supplies were apparently also sent from Jerusalem to Amman
by truck and from there by rail to the north.

All this on

account of the blown bridge in the Yarmuk gorge.

Had the

Turks been less broken, and had resisted on the road to
Damascus, the interruption in rail communications between
Palestine and Syria might have had unpleasant operational
consequences (169)0

But at least the Western Palestine line

was working to Samakho
While the Turkish railways in western Palestine had
played a mainly passive role in Allenby 1 s offensive 1 until reactivated by the Britishr they were mere pieces of property
(168) Ops. II/2, P• 545, note.
(169) Ops. II/2, PP• 562-5630 According to Record, p.
97, after the capture of Damascus, troops there were fed by
trucks based on the railhead at Samakh. The return journey
back took 3-4 days. The columns operating near Meserib ,
after coming up from the Jordan valley, had no sup,Plies at
all, and depended on requisitioning. Cp. Ops. II/2, P• 584,
also P• 600.

\'\
fought over - the position was to an appreciable extent
different on the eastern side of the Jordan,

Here the only

existing railway, the Hejaz trunk line from Damascus to
.Ma 1 an and beyond, became a factor of quite weighty operational
significance in the 12 days that ended with the loss of
Palestine and Transjordania to the Turks.
The Hedjaz Railway, the lifeline of the Turkish garrison
in northern Arabia, had become a veritable thorn in the
side of the Arabs and their British allies ever since the
Sherif Hussein had raised the standard of rebellion against
the Turks in the Hejaz, on June 6, 1916.

It may be a moot

point whether the British really wanted the line destroyed
in order to extirpate the Turks and hand their holdings
in Arabia to Britain's volatile friends, the Bedouins, or
whether they just wanted to harass the railway in order to
draw off Turkish manpower for its defence.

However, the

facts were that the line had been the target of many raids
by T. Eo Lawrence and his henchmen ever since June 1917 (170).
Up to the end of 1917, during which year the British had
established themselves at Akaba, there were eight raids on
the line and also an air raid on Ma 0 an station (171).

However,

the line was never permanently cut, as the Turks had developed
an efficient repair service - and the British and the Arabs
(170) Cp. Wavell, PP• 55-56, for a discussion of the
Hejaz Railway's importance. Also Ops. I, PP• 209-2100 For
Lawrence's first attack, cp. Ops., I, P• 239.
(171) Ops. II/2, P• 399.

()

had to repeat their raids uver and over again (172)0

It

has been pointed out already that Allenby 1 s first raid against
Transjordan of late March 1918,in order to cut the
railway viaduct, had failed (17J).

Amman

Also a rather com-

plicated three-column attack further south on April 11-17,
which led to a temporary occupation 8f Ma•an station, likewise
ended in a British retreato

The Turks in the town of Ma'an

itself had never budged and after they had received rein(

forcements from the north, presumably by train (as they had
before during the action at-fafileh three months earlier)
they reoccupied the station too (174)0

Thus the Turks stayed

in Ma'an and also held all the line to the north.

On the

other hand, on April 19-20, 1918, almost one year after they
had started their attacks on the railway, the British at
lon! last succeeded in cutting it towards the south, between
Ma'an and Mudawara (175), and now did it so thoroughly that
the line stayed derelict for the next 50 yearso

In this way

MedinA was finally isolated, though it did not surrender
until 1919.

But in Transjordan, between Ma•an and Dera•a,

the Turkish 4th Army stuck to its guns undismayed, secure in
the knowledge that it was being supported by an unbroken railway.
Thus the Turks across the Jordan held their own until September
1918, when Allenby's final offensive began to threaten their rear.
(172) For the efficient repair service of the Turks, cp.
Ops. I, P• 2Jlo Also Dieckmann, P• 65, and Massey, PP• 58, 274.
(17J) Ops. II/1, chapter xv, and especially p. J47.
(174) Ops. II/2, PP• 406-407.
(175) l'.6.i.d. :;::; .?

...
When planning his final offensive that resulted in the
destruction of the two Turkish armies in western Palestine,
Allenby necessarily had to devote some thought to the Turkish
forces across the Jordan as well.

All the three Turkish

armies were supplied, through and dependent on, the focal
junction of Dera'a in the Hauran.

It has already been pointed

out above thatDtra'a had been had been too far away to be
designated as a target in Allenby's original plans for his
(

attack.

Th·s of course was to change after the Turkish forces

in western Palestine had been obliterated and after the
British had broken through and were engaged in their headlong
advance from Palestine into Syria.

Before that had happened,

and while he was still organizing his attack, Allenby had
ordered Lawrence and his Arab allies in the desert to attack
Dera'a.

This was to be done just prior to his big move 1

and all he wanted was chiefly moral effect and harassment
of the Turks (176).

At the same time he charged "Chaytor 0 s

Force," under the command of the Australian Maj.-Gen. E oWoC.
Chaytor, to hold a waiting brief in the Jordan valleyo
As events unfolded, Ghaytor was to advance at his discretion
across the Jordan and up Onto the plateau in the east, to
attack the Hejaz Railway, and the 4th Turkish Army that was
both depending on it and defending it.

Chaytor had an

Australian and New Zealand ("Anzac") mounted division, and
some infantry, including two Jewish battalions (177).

(176)
(177)

Ops. II/2, P• 56J;
Ops. II/2, P• 450;

Wavell, P• 2000
Record, p. 44; Wavell, P• 219.

The British Jerusalem- El Bireh light railway , 1918 . The photo shows ,
near top center , right , the extraordinary loop of the line , crossing
St . Simon ridge , s . -w . of Jerusaiem.(Also cp . attached map . )Leftstandard railway to Lod , and track to Bittir. Right-track t o Malha
and Gaza .
(Nat . Libr ., Phot . 258 ).

(

The Zionist Commission to Palestine , April 1918 , in front of their
Kantara- Lod train . Second from right:Dr . Weizman . (Zionist Archives) . ~
(Pick,chapter IV) .

On September 16, 1918, three days before the start
of the great offensive, Lawrence and the Arabs set out cutting
the railway lines leading into Dera'a junction.

But German

repair detachments, rushed by rail both from Afule and
Damascus, strove valiantly to repair the breaches.
were only partially successful (178)0

The list of the places

attacked on the Hejaz Railway reads as follows,
of Dera'a - 16.9;

·They

~ abir, south

Tel Arar, north of Dera'a - 17.9;

west of Dera'a - 17.9;

Meterib,

Nassib, south of Dera'a - 18.9;

Mafrak, about halfway between Uera'a and Amman - 19.9;
~ abir - the second attack that finally blocked the line
Dera'a-Amman - 2Jo9;

and a place north of Dera 0 a - 27.9;

In addition, two stations were temporarily captured, Izra
and Ghazaleh, north of Derata, the latter with a Turkish
troop train (179)0
was twofolds

A)

The net result of all these operations
In their first stages the attacks stretched

the nerves of the Turks and their German helpers and turned
their attention to the area east across the Jordan, exactly
a s Allenby had wished, just on the eve of his great offensive;

B) In their later stages, from about 23.9, the attacks
effectively and finally prevented the three Turkish armies
(or what was left of two of them) depending on Dera 0 a, from
using both the main Hejaz line and the remains of the Haifa
branch for their retreat.

Indeed, this chapter of Allenby's

final offensive strikingly demonstrated the importance of
(178) Ops. II/2, PPo 565-566.
(179) The list of breaches and their dates is based on
Ops. II/2, PP• 565-5660 For the background of all the events,
cp. their chronological day-to-day description in the pages
of Record.

-
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railways for forces like the Turkish, that almost totally
depended on themo
The second cutting of the section Dera•a-Amman at 'J'abir
(23.9), where the Arabs had burned a wooden bridge put up to
replace the one destroyed a week earlier, finally isolated
the bulk of the Turkish 4th Armyo

This army by then was

about to make its way north along the railway (and the
ancient King's, or Pilgrim's, highway paralleling it),
which provided its last rallying pointso

While the demolition

at Me, erib (17.9) and the capture of Samakh (25.9) had

-

also finally cut communications with the sorry re~ants
of the 7th and 8th Armies in Palestine, the junction of
Dera 'a itself held out for a few more days, as its rail
link with Damascus had apparently not been permanently
severed.

There, all the Turks who r·still could walk 1 and all

the still-orgarized German unit~ set their faoeo
~

*

field, supplied by the railway with fuel, kept operating1

and its German planes kept bombing the Arabso
(

Dera'a

At least one

Turkish gun in the area that had apparently been mounted on
a railway wagon kept bothering the Arabs (180), and as a
result the Bedouins did not dare to attack the station.
Some trains 1 that carried Turkish troops who had succeeded
in walking their way into Dera'a,were also despatched ) g I
to Damascus (181).
(180)
(181)

It was only in the morning of 27.90 that

Ops. II/2, P• 565.
Opso, II/2, po 567.

- s- 11 Colonel von Oppen°s 700 men of the German Asia Corps evacuated
Dera'a, following the orders of the overall commander, Liman
von Sanderso

They retreated to Damascus by train, though

it took them nine hours to repair,on their journeY,a breach
of some 450 metres that had been made in the trackp some

50 tms. north of Dera'a (182). Only after the departure of
the Germans, the Arabs ventured into Dera'a station, carrying
out fearful slaughter and even looting a Turkish hospital
(

train standing there.

The British took over the junction

the next day, September 28, 1918 (18J)o
Meanwhile 1 further south,"Chaytor•s Force" had on the
22nd of September crossed the Jord4n at various places
on its way to attack the ~th Turkish Army.

It was on the

same day that this army had decided on its retreat from
Amman to Dera'a (that had not yet fallen)o

This was three

days after Allenby's breakthrough in the westo

Up till then

the bulk of this army had waited for its detachments at
Ma'an, that were retreating to the north along the railway their only guideline in a roadless waste (184)0

On 25.9.1918

Amman was captured by Chaytor~s force, which thus had cut off
the Turkish battalions that worked their way north from Ma•an o
On the other hand, the bulk of the 4th Army, and some troops
that had joined it from Katrani station, apparently by rail,
(182) Ops. II/2, P• 595, noteo
(18J) Ops. II/2, PP• 582-58Jo
(184) There had been seven Turkish battalions garrisoning
Ma'an, with another eight guarding the railway between that
place and Amman. The total strength of these forces is not
known, but it must have been several thousands altoge~her.
Gp. Ops. II/2, PP• 548, 551-552; Wavell, po 222, mentions
4,000 men.

escaped Chaytor•s clutcheso

All these Turks had managed to

leave Amman the day before (24.9) in several trains, towards
the northo

They were not, however, to get very far, as the

line to Dera•a had already been cut at Mafrak and at'U'abir
(185).

After seizing Amman and its station, Chaytor 0 s

troops split, gaing along the railway, some turning north,
and some following it to the south.

The troops going north

captured Zerka stail-li.on on 2609, and

afrak, with one hospital

train and several ammunition trains, on 28o9•

The 4th Army,

or most of its troops, moved from September 25 on foot,
leaving their stranded trains behind and bypassing Dera•a,
on their bloody way to Damascus (186).
men who had gone south

Those of Chaytor's

from Amman - after blocking the line

-

were met outside Ziza station (east of Madaba), by a railway
trolley flying a white flag and carrying a Turkish offer to
surrender.

On September 29, the whole garrison of Ma'an~

as well as three trains that had accompanied it along all
its way, surrendered to the British (187)0

The broken line

(

from Ziza to Amman was now repaired, by the British, in order
to pass Turkish hospital trains througho

In the eight days

it had operated on the Transjordanian plateau, mostly along
the Hejaz Railway, Chaytor•s force had collected 11,000
prisoners at trifling cost to itself, an achievement due
not a little to the fact that the Turks had clung to their
(185) Ops. II/2, PP• 554-5550
(186) Ops. II/2, PP• 555, 560.
(187) Even prior to the formal surrender ., Turks and
Australians had cooperated throughout the night in guarding
Ziza station, and the trains and Turks in it, against the
attacks of the bloodthirsty Bedouins. Gp. Ops. II/2, PP• 556-558;
Wavell, PP• 221-222p

rails like a lifeline and could be collected along them
with no great effort (188).

Also 11 locomotives and 106

carriages and goods wagons had been capturedo

They were no

doubt worked again as soon as the main line had been repaired,
carrying supplies to Damascus after its capture on October
1st, 19180

It will be remembered that while the railway

section between Samakh and Dera a remained cut

bw~•

broken

bridge for several weeks after 25.9, some supplies were carried
(

by trucks from the railhead at Jerusalem to Amman, and
went from there by.i:rail to Damascus o
The total number of railway stock captured 1 intact or
damaged 1 by Allenby's forces up to the armistice with Turkey
on Jl.1001918, and incl:Uding unspecified effectives taken
over in ~yria, was 89 locomotives, and 468 passenger carriages
and goods wagons.

These figures may not include total

losses during operations (189)0

Some of these losses probably

occurred already during operations in southern Palestine in
1917.

But at that time the Turkish forces had not been

broken and most, though not all, rolling stock that had not
been totally destroyed could be evacuatedo

It might be

assumed that most losses of the Turkish rail system occurred
during the final phase of the war when no time or lines were
available for evacuationo

A good many total losses of stock

were also probably incurred by bombing attacks of the Royal
Air Force (Royal Flying corps to 1.4.1918), during
final offensive.
(188)
(189)

llenby's

During those operations British air«raft

Ops• II/2, P• 558 ,o
Opso II/2, P• 618.

- S-lo \
carried out numerous bombing attacks on such Turkish railway
junctions as Tul Karem, Massudiye, Afule and Dera'a (190).
These attacks seem to have caused heavy damage.
tatistics Pertaining to the Wartime Railways in Palestine
In order to round off the history of railways, both
Turkish and British, and their operations in Palestine,
Sinai and Transjordania in the years 1914-1918, some statistics

(

regarding their working should be give~o
Very little details, technical or statistical, have
survived about Meissner Pasha's railwayso

The length of

his newly-built lines and their dates of building have been
summarized in tables aboveo

The carrying capacity of his

Sinai Railway - JOO tons a day - has also been mentioned.
~

\.~l",~

As for his rolling stock, there were no acces~ e

M ,

except

for 20 locomotives delivered late in the war and probably
only assembled in parto

For this information, and for a

few other details, one has to be indebted to Dieckmann (191),
who , together with Kress and Wiegand (and British sources)T
provided the little that is known.

An attempt, and it is

nothing more than an attempt, to assess Turkish railway
stock l in wartime Palestine and its losses will look about
as follows.

The following table does not include the rolling

stock of the French Beyrouth-Damascus-Me,erib railway that
was utilized by the Turks, but about which nothing is known (192).
(190) Ops. II/2, PP• 487-488; Record, PP• 112-11);
Wavell, p. 20J, passim
(191} For Dieckmann, as well as other sources, qp.
the attached bibllograph~·
also cpo note~4t, 44, J~ t<..e.
~t O_t.Nt- e,L, ~ ~~ I
wJ'L ~ '-1~.-fu,.l ~ •
Up\iJ._) ~ £-kJ'\ "'-0,»e, L ') c.fl.,,, ¾. t
,J

r~·

Turkish Rolling Stock in Palestine 1914-1918
(exclo French Beyrouth-Me~rib Stock)
Locomotives
Carriages (Passenger,
Goods, etc o)
Hejaz Railway Stock
(state in 1913) (193)
1,168
96
Jerusalem-Jaffa
Stock taken over (194)

5

Wartime additions (195)

20

121

1,222

Captured by
Allenby (196)

89

468

Approx. wartime losses

J2

754

Total
(

54

It will be seen that 1 even without taking into consideration the French Beyrouth line stock that was taken
over1 losses were heavy, in particular as far as carriages
were concerned (197).

A comparison of the quantities of the

Turkish narrow-gauge stock operated during the war with the
standard gauge stock- listed further on - worked by the
(192) For a speculation about the French stock, cpo
note 49 abovec.
(193) For the sources of these figures, cp. chapter
III; also Ruppin , p. 4180
(194) For the source of these figures, see chapter IIIo
(195) Cp . Dieckmann; also notes 41, 440
(196) Cp. end of previous section, and note 1S9.
(197) References to captured and intact rolling stock total losses were not normally recorded - abound, and will be
found in 0pso PP• 164, 185, 509, 510, 520, 544, 558, 566,
583, and elsewhere; also in Massey and Wavell, on many
pages. The frequent mention of captured stock stresses the
importance attached to the subject.

)

British during the same perioa, will be illuminatingo

As

already noted (in part) 1 in 1918 the Turkish railways had to
provide for a ration-strength (ioeo total rations for fighting
and non-fight· g troops) of 100,000 in the area south of Damascus.
Of these were 32,000 infantry and 2p000 cavalry.

Ammunition

had to be supplied for 402 gunse

Feed had also to be provided

for approx. 39,000 animals (198).

The overall ration-strength

of the Turks in Palestine and the Hejaz, including civilian
(

workmen, has been put as high as 247,000 (199)0

As local

resources were scanty, most of these supplies had to be
brought and distributed by railo

It might also be assumed

that the limited rolling stock of the Turksi apart from

~~t..lt

supplying the army, also had to some }i; t

i degree to

provide for the needs of the civil population under the
control of Djemal Pasha.

Owing to the different administra-

tive boundaries of the Turks as compared with what these
were later, the population of the country can only be guessed
(

at.
~

According to the British Foreign Office, it was about

liillir',ooo (200).

At least some of the needs of this population,

containing some foreigners, and many clerics, must also have
(198) Wavell, PP• 194-195. Also Massey, P• 29.
(199) Ops. II/2, P• 454.
(200) Cp. note 940 The figure of 850,000 has been
worted out from Ruppin, pp. 13-15, and is based on the approximate population figures in 1915 for the districts of Kerak,
Jerusalem, Nablus, Acre, and half the population of the
Haurano The population figure for Palestine according to
the census of 1922 was (according to Vilnay in his Hebrew1
"Guide" of 1935) 757,000.

- Q, -
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been furnished by railo

Nothing more is known, or can be

worked out, regarding the statistical aspects of the Turkish
railways in Palestine during the First World War.
The position regarding the British railway network in
Sinai and Palestine during the Great War is entirely different.
Statistical and other details are plentiful and indeed superabundant.

The following particulars are merely extracts

from the available materialo
By the middle of 1917, that is, some 15 months after
the building of the standard-gauge Sinai railway had started,
its rolling stock included 82 locomotives, 75 passenger
carriages, and 1,J60 goods wagons

Of these 53 locomotives,

6J passenger carriages and 898 goods wagons had been provided
by the Egyptian State railways, the balance having been
brought from England (20l)o

By the time the Palestine

campaign was over, effectives stood at 169 locomotives,

50 passenger carriages, 98 hospital carriages and 2,573
goods wagons.

The length of the lines laid, including

the double-tracked section Kantara-Rafa, and the section
Hadera-Haifa, completed after the armistice, reached a total
of 1,009 kms.

The number of wwitches (points) included in

these lines was 748.
( 202)

o

The number of stations built was 86

These figures do not include 11.5 kms o1 or more1 of

(201) Murray, P• 201; also Massey, Po 1750
(202) The above figures, and also the following, are
based on a summary in Record, Po 920

- s2~ -
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narrow-gauge railways (2 ft. 6 in. and 600 mmo) or their
rolling stock, that may have been considerable.

The average

construction speed of the standard-gauge t r ack was about
24 kms. (15 miles) per month (20J), though the impression
is that at times it may have reached 2 kms. or more per day.
The lines were operated by a special Railway division of

5,500 men, and some smaller units~

Building the lines

was undertaken by British Royal Engineers construction
companies, Canadian bridging troops, Indian pioneers, and
almost JO, 000 Egyptians (?~t&q oce ~ ~1f"~ ~ k.,~ufv ~ ~ ~~ .)
By the summer of 1917 the standard lines carried an

~ ·

average of 22,890 tons of freight a week (as against 2,100
tons a week on the narrow Turkish linet), including building
material for the new tracks, and pipes for the water supply.
In the summer of 1918 provisions only, food and forage1 but
not including ammunitionr accounted for a daily average of
2,000 tonso

This figure rose to an average of 2,J17 tons

daily in August 1918.

There were lJ trains daily from Egypt

to Palestine in 1916, when the main line was single-tracked,
each consisting of 25-35 12-ton goods wagons.
were construction trains carrying material.
16 or more trains into Palestine.

Of these six
Later there were

The total number of

trains, in both directions in 1916, was 2,714.

Unfortunately,

no figures are available for 1917-1918, but some idea of the
size of the traffic is given by the fact that as early as
February 1918 monthly coal requirements reached 6,000 tons,
(20.3)

Wavell, PP• 60-61;

also Opso I.

_ 5'2<_
a figure that led to an attempt to convert to oil firing (204).
Ammunition transports averaged 250 tons daily, during operations
( 20 5) •

Also moved were 15,000 gallons of gas for :: at

transport, 8,000 gallons of aviation spirits, and 5,000 tons
of kerosine for cooking - this daily (206).

Apart from all

these supplies 1 the railway also transported hosts of animals
(as further noted below), troops (as will.: be noted below),
and human debris, the casualties of battle and climate, for
whom the aforementioned 98 hospital coaches were intended.
On the eve of the final battle for Palestine, 19.9.1918,
the British forces that depended on the railway for all
their needs had a ration strength of altogether 467,650 men,
of whom 226,900 were British, 111,800 Indians, and 128,950
were workers of the Egyptian Labour Gorps.

Also to be fed

were 159,900 animals, consisting of 74,600 horses, J9,100
mules,J5,000 camels, and 11,000 donkeys t (207} .

By the time

the war had been won, there were also some 70,000 Turkish
and German prisoners to be fed, and transported (208) .

lso

(204) Data are taken from Murray, PPo 200-201, 204;
Ops., I, P• 359, II/2, PP• 4J9-441; Record, P • 95. Supplies
carried included 250 tons of biscuits daily, 900 tons of
forage, and 100,800 boxes of matches. For coal requirements,
cp. Ops. II/1, P• 2990 For the conversion to oil, Ops. II/2,
P• 441.
(205) Record, P• 1020
{206) Record, P• 95.
(207) Record, P• 94. Wavell, PP• 194-195, gives
slightly lower figures, as he possibly did not include the
Kantara base in his totals.
(208) Record, P• lOJ.

\ ~)

amongst the consumers relying on the railway at one time
or another were 5,905 assorted motorized vehicles and seven
squadrons of the

R.A.F., whose needs in fuel, brought from

Egypt, were alrea{;iy noted above (209).
Translated into purely military terms, all the above
details - quoted in order to prove how vital rails were in
the framework of the Palestine campaign - mean that the
railway enabled Allenby to put into the field for his final
(

offensive the equivalent of eight infantry divisions and
four cavalry divisions, or 57 , 000 fighting men , 12,000 sabres,
and 540 guns, with all their logistic bac kup.

In this

connection it should be noted that in many ways Allenby s
army of 1918 was quite a different one from the one he had
had at the end of 1917 .

Owing to the threat of the last

German offensive in France1 in March 1918,the Imperial
General Staff in London had practic ally coerc ed Allenby in
the spring of that year to send s ome of his most experi enced
troops to the Western Front .
in their stead .

He had to take Indian troops

This very big reshuffle could only have

been carried out by means of the railway through Kantara (210).
(209) Record, PP• 96, 113. The motor vehicles included
a few tanks (7-8 in 1917) , lorries, ambulances, tractors,
staff cars, motorcycles, etc.
(210) For Allenby' s strength in 1918, cpo Ops II/2,
p . 452; Wavell , p . 194-195 • For the great troop exchange, Ops .
II/2, pp . 412-413, 417 (where the share of the railways is
referred to), 421; Wavell, P• 183 .

\ '\)

This creation of the railway, (East-) Kantara, the
terminus of the desert line into Palestine, had meanwhile
grown into a huge base and shunting and repair yard, from
which practically all long-distance trains originated.
Without Kantara, the British railways in Sinai and Palestine
could have been neither built nor operated.

As mentioned

before, the place had by means of a railway bridge (from the
summer of 1918) direct access to the E.S.R. system, to Egyptian
(

workshops, and the refinery at Suez, and to the big ports
in Egypto
ships.

Itself it could now unload up to five ocean-going

It had many kms. of rails~ and a

litary and semi-

military population o f ~ s s than 100,000 men.

There

probably was not a soldier on the Palestine front who had
not passed Kantara.

Very late in the final Palestine

offensive, Kantara also served as a port for a curious
kind of export.

At that time stores, redundant in Palestine,

that had to be sent into newly-conquered Syria, could not be
moved north, owing to the broken rail-bridge at
(

and the dearth of roads.

amakh,

These stores were returned by rail

to Kantara, and from there were shifted by sea to Beyrouth,
Tripoli and Alexandretta (211).
(211) References to Kantara are very numerous indeed
in Ops. and Wavell, ~he ones in Ops. II/2, p. 440, and in
Wavell, P• 104, must suffice. Cp. also Massey, ppo 1.3,
175, JJ2. There are very important data on Kantara in
Record, text facing plate 540 For the re-shipment of
stores, cp. Record, p. lOJ. Gullett, "Photo Record," has
an interesting aerial view of Kantara.

,
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The Jewish Aspect
There remains to point out a few links - a mere selection
between Allenby• s railways and the ~~f.f3.l.~~ .. of the Jews in
Palestine.

Lt.-Col. John Patterson, the gentile Irishman,

commanding officer of the J8th Royal Fusiliers - the Jewish
battalion - gave a moving description of his men's train
journey from Egypt into Palestine in his reminiscences (212).
As he tells it, the spectacle of his men following the
(

locomotive, belching smoke by day and fire by night, into
the Holy Land, reminded him of the Children of Israel being
led out of bondage in Egypt by a pillar of smoke in the day
and a pillar of fire at night.

All the remaining Jewish

battalions of course also reached Palestine by train.

The~e

are a number of photos showing Jewish volunteers riding
in open wagons on the 600 mm. line from Jaffa to their
training camp (21J)~

The "Zionist Commission" corning to

Palestine via Egypt in 1918 of course also travelled by train,
and there is a well-known photo of the members of the
delegation, with Weizmann at their head, standing beside
their carriage (214).
The further Allenby*s railway lines advanced north,
the more the starving people of the Yishuv benefited by
their services, their supplies, and the links they provided
(212) Cp. Patterson in the attached bibliography;
Cp. also Elam, P• 239.
(213) Photos of the Yishuv•s volunteers aboard a train
can be found in the "Sefer Ha'hagana, volo 1, part 2, opp.
Po 499; in Elam, opp. p. 169; and in the Zionist Archives,
Jerusalem, and elsewhere. Davies, opp. p. 144 also has a
graphic shoto
(214) Encyclopaedia Hebraica, vol. 6, col. 5Jlo
11
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Turkish supply train , probably in the hills of Samaria ,
derailed by British bombing attack , late .an the war .
Note light rails and makeshift ties . (Nat . Libr., V. 1717) .

Aful~ station and supply trains for Turkish Sharon front,late
1918 , being bombed by Australians . Station still stands 1975 . (Source:
Gullett , Record) .
(Pick,chapter IV).

with Egypt, where the Yishuv's refugees lived, and with the
outside world.

Allenby's Deputy Quartermaster, General,

Maj-Geno Sir Walter Campbell, employed empty wagons returning
to Kantara for the transport of Palestine goods, probably
agricultural produce for sale in hgypt (215).

It is hoped that the above description of the British
railways in ~inai and Palestine in the First World War will
have proved their decisive role in the attainment of the
British victory in the Near East that knocked Turkey out of
the war, and had far-reaching repercussions~

The Palestine

campaigns were to a great and quite unknown extent a "Railway
War" between both opponentso

Victory went to that side

that, in the words of an American Civil War general, "got
there firstest with the mostest."

(215)

Opso II/1, P• JOlo

\q

Background Sources

The following articles and books contain references
to railways in Palestine in 1914-1918, but were not quoted
in the text.
Mit Jilderim ins Heilige Land, Ravensburg, 1919.

Drexler, J.1

A Handbook of Arabia, London, 1916

Great Britain, Admiralty,

Guthe, H.1

Handbook on Syria, London, 1919

ido, ,

ido,

Die Hedschasbahn von Damaskus nach Medina, ihr
Bau und ihre Bede tung, Leipzig, 19170

Kress von Kressenstein, F.,

Published two articles on events

in Sinai and Palestine, 1) In "Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft
fur Erdkunde,"

s.

46J

Berlin, 1919; 2).

Kaukasus und Sinai," So 9-54, Berlin 1921.

In "Zwischen
Both contain

no more information than his writings listed in the
bibliographyo
.
Liman
von Sanders,

Range, P.1

.

o.,

"
jl k ei,
.
Funf
Ja h re Tur
Ber1·in, 19 200

.

.

,,

Vier Jahre Kampf uns Heilige Land, Lubeck, 19J2.

Wavell, A.P.1

Allenby, a Study in Greatness, London, 1940.

Notes on Maps

\ '1-)

There is an abundance of maps as to the building and
operation of railways in World War I Palestine.
The following books, listed in the bibliography, contain
mapsc

Dalmann, Davies, Military Operations (both in text and

in map~caseo

Very valuable!), Gullett ("Australia," and

"Imperial Forces"), Kress (very valuablel), Brief Record
(very usefult), Ruppin , Vilnay, Wavell (very valuablet),
Woods,

a:z:a .r .v, ~.J>.f?(..

The following sets of maps were also consulted and
found useful:
British Army, 1:40,000 maps, of 1919 - partially
available in map library of National Library1 Jerusalem.
Headquarters, M.(Eo:

Road map of the Middle East, 1944 -

in possession of writer.
Survey of Israel 11100,000 maps (26 sheets)o
id.

1: 50,000 maps, Israel & Sinai (restricted).

Survey of Palestine
id.

1:100,000 maps (16 sheets)
111,000 map of Jerusalem (6 sheets),

ca. 1928, for Jerusalem - El Bireh railway
Useful maps showing railways will also be found in
contemporary guidebooks like Luke {cp. bibliography),
Meistermann (cp. bibliography for choV), and also in Imhoff
(lines on the eve of the First World War; cp. bibliography
for cho III)•

-~;yNOTES ON PHOTOS

\1~)

In preparing the foregoing chapters, considerable use has
been made of photos, either for providing a general backg round ,
or fbr pinpointin~ details as to railways .

Photos will be found

in the follo wing books listed in the Bibliography:

Auler , Davies,

Elam , llicyclopaedia Hebraica , Gulle tt'(!) , Mas sey , Tolde th
Ha ' hagana , Steuber , Wiegand , Woods .
Photos relating to the period under discussion will also be
found in E. Berghaus , "Auf den Schienen der Brde , 11 Mtlnchen , 1966 ,
(which contains a ca . 1917 photo of a flatcar , powe red by an aircraft engine and a propeller , used by German airmen on the line
Aful6-Haifa);

H. Ellis , Tne Pictorial En cyclopedia of Railways ,

London , 1969; Pictorial History of

1972 ;

ailways , part 36 , London ,

I

B. Moritz , Bilder auS Pal a stina , Nord- Arabien , etc.,

Berlin , 1916 .

All three illustra te the warti me Heja~ Railwayo

A considerable number of contemporary railway photos will

be found in archives , and similar institutions .

Especially use-

ful were pictures k ept by the National library in Jerusalem :
Collection Phot . 258 , and File 1717 .
Other sources f or photos are :

The Australian 1fa r Museum ,

Canberra; The Imperial 1/ ar Museum, London; the Archive of the
Matson Pho ~o Service in the possession of Mr . Hora ce SpaffordVester of the American Colony , J erusalem; and the Zionist
Archives, Je rusalem.
The above is only a selection of sources .

r
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Epilogue:

Railways in Palestine,
and Israel/Jordan, Since
1918P
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The State of the Railways in Palestine , 1919 and After;
Contrac tion of the Network
The previous chapters have attempted to trace in
some detail the History of Railways in Palestine during
the eighty years 18J8-1918.

The following chapter will

bear the character of an epilogue only.

References to

sources will be fewer than in previous chapters.

Never-

theless, it is hoped that a concise postscript to
earlier events will be useful to describe events after
1918.
It is hoped that the foregoing chapter has shown
that the struggle over Palestine in World War I had been
influenced to a considerable degree by the use of railways
by both contending parties.

To a certain extent, the

campaigns in Palestine even constituted a "railway war,"
not intrinsically different from earlier struggles involving
a decisive use of railways,

that had been waged in North America, in Europe, in South
Africa, and ~~ in -the Fa r East (1).

The contest in Palestine

had developed into a trial of endurance between the narrowgauee, single-track, and limited-capacity Turkish net-work,
and the standard gauge, multiple-tracked, high-efficiency,
rail system built by the British.
the British wono

As has been shownp

It will now be described how the railways

built, or inherited, by the British were to fare at their
(

hands in mandatory Palestine and Transjordan.

Finally 1

some limited space - an epilogue to an epilogue - will
be devoted to a description of what Israel and Jordan
were to do with railways handed over to them by their
British predecessors.
With the end of hostilir:tde;s late in 1918, the railways
in Palestine and its adjoining territories, for some two
decades, ceased to be instruments for making historyo
They lost the military and political importance they may
have had before, as factors in the power game that went
on in the Levant.

They also lost a great deal of the

importance they may have had previously in the economic

1) The American Civil War (1861-1865), The ustrianPrussian War (1866), the Franco-German War (1870-1871),
the Boer War (1 qq-1901 )p and the Russo-Japanese War
(1904-1905), were greatly, and in some ways decisively,
influenced by the use of railways4 So was the First World
War. This, on account of the fact that before the
development of capacious road-nets, and efficient motortransport , trains were the sole means of carrying troops
and their supplies over medium and long distances.

- s-Yf
development of the areas through which they passed. (lA)
They came to stagnate because the lands they had been supposed
to open had been cut up, owing to the demise of the Ottoman
Empire.

The newly-conquered, and later mandated, territories

of Palestine and Transjordan ceased to face north, towards
the former center of power in Anatolia, but now looked west,
to the sea, and to the holder of the mandate (from 1922),
namely Britain.

The newly-established boundaries hindered

railway traffic, though they did not prevent it.

The unstable

political situation in Palestine from 1920 did not permit
resources to be spent on railway improvements.
At the beginning of 1919, while Palestine and its
adjoining territories were ruled by a military government,
the "Occupied Enemy Territory Administration," there were
in the country the following railway lines, many of them
operational, some laid up, and a few destroyed and inoperable.
A)

Standard Gauge Lines (l,4J5 mm.).
1)
2)

Kantara-Gaza-Lod-Haifa;
(Jaffa-) Lod-Jerusalem.

The Jaffa-Lod section of

this line may already have been of standard gauge at this time,
converted from 600mm.

But it may have remained of narrow-gauge

until converted by the civilian mandatory government .

lA) For some economic aspects of pre-1914 railways in
Palestine, cp. chapter III; also Enc. of Islam article,
"H'-jaz Railway"; P• J65; Hecker, PP • 769, 770-71; 1550, 1564-65.
Also Ruppi n , pp . JOl, J07, JOB. Most sources considered the
undoubted economic aspects of the railways as secondary, and
devoted little space to them.

)

3)

Rafa-Sheikh~ Nuran-Beer Sheba;

4)

Beer Sheba-Tineh-Junction ~tation (Wadi 5alf'a,r)o
All these lines were operationalo

B)

Narrow-Gauge Lines (1,050 mm .).
1)

Haifa-Afule-Beisan-;:,amakh-El Hameh;

2)

El Hameh-Dera ' a-Nassib.

This stretch of

the old Hejaz Railway, partly destroyed in the last days
of the war, was repaired in 1919.

When the war ended

it came to run through territory ceded to the Frenc h,
and was run by them.

At some unknown date (in the 1920s)

the French also relaid -

the branch Nassib-Bosra eski-Sham,

taken up by the Turks (Meissner) during the war;

3)

Dera 9 a - Damascus1

This sec t io~ also1 of th

old He jaz Railway1 c ame to be in Frenc h territory and was
henceforth operated by themn

The parallel Mes erib-Damas c us

Railway, taken up during the war, though originally
French-built, was never relaid by them;
(

4)

Nassib-Amman- Ma ' an-Mudawara (-Medi na ).
This line was repa i red i n 1919 and operated

to Amman.

The remai~r of the line, as far as Ma ' an,

was to be inoperable to the middle 1920s 1 owing to the
uncertain political state of southern Transjordan.

The

section Ma'an-Mudawara was t o stay derelict f or almost

50 years.

When Transjordan became a British mandate,

its railways were to be operated, to 1948, by the railway
authorities in Palestine proper, though the two systems
were separated by the French- run El Hameh- Nassib section;

(,)

5)

Aneizeh-Hisheh Wood.

6)

Beer Sheba-Auja.

Laid up;

Partly destroyed, partly

taken up

7)

Beit Hanun - Tineh.

8)

Lod-Tul Karem. Taken up and relaid as British

Laid up;

standard gauge;
9)

Deir S

id- Huj.

Probably taken up;

not

operating in any case;

(

Laid up;

10 )

Tul Karem-Qannir.

11)

Tul Karem-Liktera (Hadera) .

Relaid as part

of the standard gauge line Lod- Tul Karem- Haifa;
12)

Tul Karem-Massudiye-Nablus.

13)

Massudiye - Afule.

14)

Beled esh- Sheikh- Acre .

Probably operational ;

Probably operational ;
This line had been

taken up by the Turks, but its embankment remained.

The

relaying of this line will be noted later.
C)
(

Field Railways (probably all of 600 mm . gauge) .
1)

Jaffa Port - Jaffa Station - Lod .

This line

has already been referred to above, under the standard
gauge lines .

It certainly started its life as a 600 mm.

line (the successor of the old French 1892 meter gauge
line to Jerusalem).

It c ertainly was operational in 1919 .

It may have been converted to standard gauge by the mi l i tary,
but the possibility exists that this was done only lateri
by the civilian authorities .

1-1

2)

Sarana-Jellil and Branches.

Laid up, and

possibly already taken upi
J)

Kafr Jinnis - Beit Nabala - Lubban.

4)

Jerusalem - El Bireho

Laid up;

Laid up;

The local network of 2 foot 6 inch field railways,
laid down before Allenby' s first great offensive of 1917, $.

to~ Cni.'l-<i-,

probably had been taken up already in 1918P as the front
had moved away.
(

It will thus be seen that when the war had ended,
Palestine, Transjordan and Sinai were covered by a relatively dense network of all sorts of railways, most of
which, by far, had been laid down to serve military uses.
Most of them had no peacetime use.

Their total length

may have been 1,000 kms,, or more.
Here it might be noted in passing that long stretches
of the standard gauge lines that were operating in Palestine
were guarded by Jewish formations of Allenby's army,
after the armistice.

These were chiefly the line Kantara -

Lod - Haifa, and also (if a surviving photo can be trusted)
the line Lod - Jerusalem.

Itshak Ben-Zwi (later to be

President of Israel) served in one of these units, and
references to railways, both as objects to guard, and as a
means of travel to meet his political comrades, abound
in his letters.

There are also references to Jewish

- ')L(jvia Egypt

Time-Tables of Palestine Railways .

KANT ARA EAST

41

Journey I.

From Egypt to Palestine by Railroad

1923 .

The railway arrangements in Palestine have hitherto
been provisional. It is hoped, however, that in the near
future travelling will be facilitated. The traveller should
obtain a time-table.
According to the time-tables of April r, r923, there is a
d a ily train, except Sundays, from Egypt to Palestine, and
as many returning, with restaurant and sleeping carriages.

Ri ght:Egypt- Palestine standard
gauge main line .
Bottom right:Ex-Turkish narrow
gauge line Tul Karem-NablusAfule(closed in 1930 s) .
f
Bottom 1 eft :Rafa-Beer Sheba line (
(closed ca .1 927) .

TIME-TABLE (1923).
From the Stations in Egypt to
I
Kantara West.
I

-- - Dep.

STATIONS.

Arr.

·1

16.00 21.30
18.15 21.30
18.00 18.45

Ale xandria
Ca iro
Port Said

From Kantara West to the
Stations in Egypt.

(Source:Meistermann . )

STATIONS.

Dep .

Kantara West
Por t Said
Cairo
1 Alexandria

·22.6
. 19.15
19.rs

i
!

I

-

·I

Arr.

18.55
23.00
22.15
5.30

r. At Benha passengers from Alexandria join the Cairo train.
2. Motor-cars, and sometimes railway trains, cross the Suez Canal by
ferry.
N.B .-Passports are examined at I{antara West, and the cus/0111s
examinatioa takes place at Kantara East.

From the Suez Canal to Palestine
One train daily, either way, excepting on Sunday. 1st, 2nd , and
3rd class. Restaurant cars, daily. Sleeping cars, :Monday, Wednesday, and Friday.

Arr.

STATIONS.

Dep.

-

Kantara East
El Arish
Rafa
Gaza
Ludd •
Jerusalem

3.02
4.03
4.53
6.30
9 .00

r.30
5.31
6.43
7.55
IO.I

-

STATIONS.

II

I

Dep.

I Arr.

1Jerusalem
· Ludd .
: Gaza
j Rafa
.
.
1El Arish
i I<antara East

-

7.30
9.47 IO.IS
II.SO 12.5
12.53 12 .58
13.57 14 .0
17.30

-

r. The train goes on to Haifa (see Journey XI . Passengers for
Jnusalcm and Jaffa change h ere (see Time Table Journey II).
2 . Intermediate stations arc indicated in the text and on the maps.

Pick,chapter Y.

{

TIME- TABLE.

I. Between Nabltts and T6ul-Keram.
Daily, with exception of Sunday; 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Class .

672 Journey XXVI. ROUND BERSABEE From Hebrou

STATIONS.

STATIONS.

JOURNEY XXVI
Nablus.
Sebastieh
:Mass udieh .
Anebta
Toul-Keram

BERSABEE AND THE BIBLICAL TOWNS
SOUTH OF HEBRON
froDutif\ ~he t"'anr (r9r4-1917) the Turks constructed a carriage
m e ron o ersabee, and another from Gaza to Bersab

re, J

a_

k~~~

.I

Ludd
Rafah
Bersabee

;

8.33
12.15
15 .15

STATIONS.

Monday, Wednesday, Friday;
1st, 21:1d, and 3rd class.
Stoppmg at all stations.
. Bersabee
Rafah
Ludd

An.from Haifa .
,,
Ludd .

I

I

14.5 5
17.57
18.00
18.19
18.43
19.03
19.45

Toul- I<eram
Anebta
Massudieh.
Sebastieh
Nablus

II. Between Nabli1s, Afule, and Haifa.
Tuesday and Saturday ; 1st and 3rd Class.

Tum-TABLE

l
'

. 7.59
9.33

Dep. for Haifa
,,
Ludd

;!rtiittb~:1at~a; s\~t::nGih:e~l~~~~~~~ connected B crs:bec \~;:
fbile the Guide to the H oly Land was reprintin;~,~a;;2~0
(Ly_cl ~l:i).
ron arranged for three special trains per week to be run
_m1111 s r:,.
from Ludd to B ersabee, and returning the next day.
' gorng di n CJ

Tuesday, Thursday, Saturday;
1st, 2nd, and 3rd class.
Stopping at all stations.

- 6.10
6.40
7.00
. 7.26
7.50

7.30
9.30
14.20
I

I
I
;--j

NABLUS
Sebastieh
:Mass ud ieh .
Sile
Arrabeh
JENIN
Afule
HAIFA

STATIONS.

I

I

13.lS
13.45
14.03
14.56
15.35
I 16.02
16.50
18.15

1 HAIFA

I

1 Afule

}ENIN
Arrabeh
Sile
Massudieh.
Sebastieh
NABLUS

I
7.00
8.I 7
9.00
9.40
10.07
II.0 3
II.21

12.00

]
I

soldiers guarding the railways in a monograph devoted
to the "Jewish Battalions." (2)
After the cessation of hostil.itrles, and especially
after

the establishm~nt of

,

civilian government in 1920, ·

a wholesale taking up of tracks took place in

Palestine.

The exact details of this process are very

hard to come by, and, except for the details listed further
below, can only be gleaned from maps and inferred by a
(

process of elimination - the subject was not one to interest
chroniclers (J).

In any case, the foremost victims

were military, narrow-gauge and field railways, both
Turkish and British-built.

In 1920 the Turkish narrow line

(Beit Hanun/Huj-) Deir Sneid - Tineh was taken up. (4)
2) Gp. Ben Zwi, "Writings" (Hebrew; see bibliography) ,
on many pages, find Elam (cpo bibliography) pp. 280, J02-JOJ.
A photo showing Jewish soldiers guarding the line to
Jerusalem appears in the "Sefer Toldoth Ha 'hagana" (cp.
bibliography), vol, I, part 2, p. 6420 See also text on
PP• 517-518.
(

3) Any good map of Palestine in the early 1920 ' s
will serve to show which of the co u~try vs wartime railways
s u~vived into the era of peace. Such maps can be found in
traveller's reminiscences
d i n good gq\ ~es .Pl~~e Luke ' s
"Handbook" (cp. bibliography). There a~n~ps==Yn the
volumes of "Military Operations" (cp. bibliography)
that date to about 1924. Railway timetables surviving,
such as the ones in Meistermann 's guide of 1923 (cp.
bibliography), will also be useful.
4)

Dieckmann, (cp. bibliography), p. 394.

In the same year what was left of the Auja - Beer Sheba
line,after its destruction by the British and dem ntage
by the Turks,was taken up.

Also in the same year1 t he

standard (previously narrow, Meissner ' s) line Beer Sheba Tineh - Junction Station (Wadi Sarrar) was taken upo
In 1925 the remnants of what there had been of the
unfinished Auja - Kusseimeh section were lifted.

What

was more important - the second track of the Sinai railway,

(

Kantara - Rafa, was also removed in 1925, limiting Palestine's
link with Egypt to a single track - the inheritor of the
Ancient Via JV1aris (5).

So much, at least, can be learnt

from soJrces, though details and dates may perhaps not
be quite exact.

Other wartime lines were brok6n up,

without being vouchsaved a note in any source .
disappeared from sight.

They just

These were the 1,050 mmo lines

(already listed above), Aneize - Hisheh wood , in Transjordan, and Tul Karem - Qannir fun the Carmel hills .
The 600 mm, field-railways that were removed quietly at
(

unknown dates in 1919-1920 were all the lines of the
SarQna - Jellil network and the line Beit Nabala - Lubban,
in the hills of Ephraim.

The section Kafr Jinnis - Beit

Nabala was later converted to standard gauge to serve an
army camp.

Also taken up was the line Jerusalem - El Bireh.

5) Cp. Ettinger (see bibliography), P• 60. It might
be added that Ettinger ' s doctorate on the traffic network
of Palestine, mainly irfl;he 1920's, is most useful. It
was submitted to a German university in the early Nazi
era ( J ), and printed in Palestine. It is practically
unknown.

Anticipating somewhat, at the expense of chronology,
but in the interest of completeness, it should be noted
that in 1927 the standard gauge line Rafa - sheikh Nuran Beer Sheba was closed for lack of traffic.

In 1928 the

spur Jaffa Port - Jaffa Station was taken up, and in 1932
the narrow gauge line Afule - Massudiya - Nablus was closed
for traffic (6).

There may have been some attempt to

reopen this line for goods traffic about 1935, but it was
(

definitely abandoned during the Arab Disturbances of a
few years later, though most of its rails were left in
situ, for another

JO

years.

The section Massudiye -

Tul Karem, as far as could be ascertained, was closed
about 19J8, owing to the Arab disturbances (7) .
Holling Stock Statistics
1ost of the railway retrenchment in the country
must have taken place just before, or just after, the
establishmentp about 1921, of "Palestine Railways and
Operated Linesp" as part of the civil, and,since 1922,
✓

Bonne (cp . bibliography), p. 2J1; Ettinger,
pp. 14, 60; Report of the General Manager of Palestine
Railways ( cp. bibliography), pp. 6-7. The closure
date of the line Rafa - Beer Sheba is variously given as
1926 and 1927.
.
, -:-.,_. , Following Bonne it seems
to have been 1927. Cp. also rof. Ettingen ' s review of
traffic developments in Palestine at that period, in vol. 6,
col. 961, of the Encyclopaedia Hebraica.

6)

7)

Personal information of the writer. The date
1938 is based on a conversation with the late Profo Ett ingen.

u.__/;

I,·

I\.

mandat ory government (8)

The length of the Palestine

network at that time (i.eo about 1921) was given as 518
kmso standard, and 539 kms. narrow gauge, 1,057 in all (9)o
This apparently included all the lines working or workable
at that time in Palestine proper, in Transaordan (minus
the sections worked by the French), and in

inai (whose

line was worked by the Palestine system, but now actually
belonged to the British Government, i.e. the War Office)o
(8) Details on the organizational aspects and the
operations of Palestine Railways will be found, apart from
in the Foreign Office Handbook of 1920, listed in the
bibliography, in all the relevant publications of the
mandatory government to 1947. These included periodic
reports of various descriptions on the administration
of the country, statistical abstracts, reports to the
andatory Commission of the League of Nations, reports
of the General Manager of Palestine Railways (from 1930,
but containing references to earlier years), and special
reports following investigations of Palestine Railwayso
There are also figures submitted to various Royal Commissions,
like the Peel Commission (1936-1937), and the Survey of
Palestine submitted to the United Nations' "UN COP" (1947) ..
The files of the Colonial Office in London undoubtedly
also contain many details concerning Palestine's railways.
These files were not viewed by the writer. It is assumed
that these files contain, in a diffuse form, merely the facts,
presented concisely, in the various reports, abstracts, etc.,
listed above and seen by the writer, as far as they are available
in Israelo
Various books on the economy of Palestine ( Bonne, Ettingen,
Ruppin, etc.) also contain many relevant, though often repetitious ,
details on the railways in the country..
aterial of this type,
as far as used, will be found in the biblio graphy .. Cp. also
Dieckmann (in l
1 · t n tt to :t bibliography) o For a survey
of day-to-day operations, contemporary timetables will also
be found useful, such as the Palestine and Egypt Lloyd timetable
of the late 1920s, in possession of the writer. Gp. also note 390
(9) Cp. Ettingen, P• 120, for the establishment of
and length of tracks.

~o.h1tJ.we., ~

·QJI\ :>
~
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It probably included also the Jerusalem - Jaffa line that
was to be shortly after (1922), to be purchased from its
original French owners, that had come into their own
again, after having been on the victorious side in the war (10).
There are no details as to rolling stock available at that
time, but it probably must have been less than the figures
quoted by the Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly for
about 1918, namely:

(

Standard gauge - 164 locomotives

and 2,035 passenger carriages and goods wagons;

narrow

gauge - 127 locomotives(and rail tractors), 845 passenger
and goods vehicles (11).

Some ten years later, in 1931,

10) For details about the owners hip of the Sinai
section, and for the purchase of the Jerusalem line from
the French for 565,000 Pounds Sterling (a tremendous suml),
cp. Bonne, P• 232: also see httinge~ p p. 240 For the
working of the French section of the old Heja z Railway,
cp. Report of the General Manager of Palestine Railways
(listed in the bibliography), p. 5. It was worked by them
until taken over by the Syrian State Railways on loJ,1945.
Cp. Railway Directory (s ee bibliography) P• J04.
(

The taking over of the Hejaz Railway after 1918
by the British and the French , raised some legal questions,
as the original Turkish line had been "Wakf" (religious)
property~ For this cp . Report , note 14, and the article
on the"Ht,jaz Railway" in the "Encyclopaedia of Islam."
The ques~ion of ownership was to preven~ yhe ~:~urrecti~ ~
of the line for over _50_ years 1 tt..0 ir(;)Y,~~.,~~l"\ ~ \,e.,V>~-:> ~ \ l>
+k ,~ tL ku4.~- tfdJ-CL ~ ~ -l,e.., ~~ - I
The body that worked the French section of the Hejaz
Railway to 1945 was the "Chemin-de-fer Damas, Hama , et
prolongements," that operated in Syria since the 1890's,
and was mentioned in chapter II.
11) Cp. Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly,
pp. J4-41, for 1920, quoting the journal,"Modern Transport."
The figures quoted were not appreciably different from
the ones noted at the end of chapter IV. Ettinge~ , pp.
26-27, mentioned 117 locomotives and 2,105 sundry vehicles.

the comparable figures were (12):

Standard gauge track

length, including Sinai - 528 kms ., narrow gauge track,
including Transjordan - 527 kmso
inc uded1

Rolling stock in 1931

Standard gauge locomotives - 70, passenger

carriages - 75, goods wagons - 2,099;

Narrow gauge

locomotives - 55 (plus some superannuated relics, probably
of the 1892 Jerusalem line), passenger carriages -29,
several railcars, and 349 goods and service wagons of
(

various descriptions (13) .

The railcars were both petrol

and steam-driven like the ones that served with the
I

Egyptian Delta railways, and constituted an i nnovat ion
in Palestine.

They served the Jewish settlements i n the

Jezreel and the Jorda

valleys

They apparently were

the only instance of progress on the Palestine Railways .

A comparison of fieures for the
19JO' s wi

arly 1920~s ad the early

provide amp e proof of the Atagnation that

ad overtaken the Pa esti e network under the mandate .
Overall Stagnation of the Palestine Network, and its Reasons
The reason

for the stagnation of the Palesti ne

rail system were many.

Most prominent, however , amongst

them 1 was the unfortunate l ayout of the lines ,

a fact

that had its roots in the historical development of railways
in the Holy Land.

The country s trunk line, Rafa - Haifa,

bypassed the main centers of commercial activi ties, and of

12)

Report, P• 5, also ~ttinge , P• 61.

13)

Cp. Report , pp

46, 84.

population, progressively bunc hed by now in the JaffaTel Aviv area o

The co untry ' s mai n railway hub, and its

c hief junction, was s ituated not there , but at Lod
(Lydda).

Owi ng to the r o undabout configuration of the

tracks, trains f om Jaffa- Tel Avi v to Jerusalem, and even
from Jaffa-Tel Aviv to Haifa, co uld not compete with the
much more convenient road system that was by then being
cons olidated.
(

The mandatory authorities did their best

not to underc ut the government-owned railways , and as a
result the country ' s most important arterial road, from
Jaffa-Tel Aviv to Haifa, was not fully complete
the early 1940'so

unt i l

But road transport kept beine more

popular than the railways .

he more mobil e 1

and commercially more a c tive sections of the population ,
I

i.e. to a laree extent Jews, for almost two decades pre ferred to travel from Jaffa-Tel

viv to Haifa and its

port (open since 19JJ) by the roundabout , but faster,
route through Tul Karem, Jenin, and Nazareth, rather than
take the trains (14) .
Most of the country ' s rail tracks pas sed through
scantily developed Arab areas that needed few bulky goods,
and had little to despatc h .

Central Palestine was served

14) The same wi sh, not to undercut the railways,
led to the government ' s refusal to build a road from
Jaffa to Gaza. Cp . Zeitschrift des Deutschen Pal ~stina
VereiPs, vol. 5J, 19)0, p. 570

- 55~ only by a narrow-gauge branch line that, owing to the
gauge break, provided no direct link with the country's
commercial center of Jaffa-Tel Aviv, or the capital,
Jerusalem.

Goods traffic with Egypt was cheaper by sea,

for all sections of the population, as it required no
transshipment at Kantara across the 1 now bridgeless 1 Suez
Canal (15),

What loads there had been of petrol and

kerosine from Egypt to Palestine no longer needed rail
(

services after Haifa became an oil terminal in the early
19JO's, and Palestine acquired a refinery of its own.
Traffic on the Haifa-Damascus line must have shrank
into insignificance - surviving timetables indicate only
three through-trains a week .

This, owing to the establish-

ment of the French mandate over ~yria, and the presence
of new boundaries, that resulted in the French running of
the railway east of Samakh

~yria now certainly needed

no imports or exports through Haifa, as it used Beyrouth
exclusively .

The wheat crop of the Hauran now was trans-

ported on the French railway from Dera ' a to Damascus and onward.
As for the Transjordan section of the defunct Hejaz
Railway - this isolated stretch of the Palestine Railways
network between 1918 and 1948 had no raison d'~tre at all.
This line had originally formed part of the Turkish pilgrims•

15) The railway bridge at Kantara had been taken up
after the armistice (the date could not be ascertained) as
it hindered ships passing the canal, and the relatively
light rail traffic did not warrant keeping a hazard to
navigation. Press,(cp. bibliography) in his 1920 guide,
still mentions it.

railway to Medina.

After the line had been broken during

the World War~ and after North Arabia and the Hejaz had
been plunged into turmoil through the rise of Ibn Saud,
pilgrim traffic ceased altogether.

Apart from three

trains weekl y to Dera 1 a, and onward through French territory
to Haifa or Damascus, the line was practically dead and
useless.

~evertheless, the British kept working it,

first from (Dera 0 a) Nassib to Amman, and later, after the
(

Wahabis had been pushed back from Akaba and southern
Transjordan, they worked it to Ma an (16).

The track

from Ma' an to Mudawara, in Transjordan territory/ to the
Hejazi border (established in due course), was left
derelict, and as time passed its rails were systematically
stolen by the local Bedouin (17)o

However, reference

must be made here to a curious event reported by the
famous H. St. J. Philbyo

He noted in one of his books

that in 1924 the Emir Ali, son of King Hussein, had
succeeded in bringing up - not without difficulties - a
number of trains from Medina to Amman, on the occasion of
his father's visit to that place.
16)

Philby did not fail to

~tratton (cpo bibliography), Po 1980

17) Report, p. 26. It might not be amiss to note
here that the rails stolen by the Bedouin were ocoslem
"Wakf" (religious) property, as the defunct Hejaz Railway
had stayed Wakf even after it had been taken over by the
British (and in Syria by the French). On this legal aspect
of the line cp. note 10, above. Also see Konikoff (cpo
bibliography), p. 79; Report, p. 6; and Twitchell
(cp. bibliography), p. 1JJ.

\t

mention that this was done despite "the supposed destruction
of the line by Lawrence and his dynamiting gangs" in the
war (18).

However that may have been, for practical purposes

the line was dead .
While the most striking feature of the Palestine
Railways network during most of the mandatory period,
and certainly during the first 15 years of British rule,
was its stagnation, not much less striking was the fact
(

that it was capable of working at allo

Everything

militated against the mandatory railways:

their unfortunate

layout, based on military and not economic cons iderations,
the necessity of working a system cut up by two different
gauges in a very small area, the severing . . - of the
Transjordan section, and the fact that half the standard
lines, the Sinai railways, did not even belong to the
country 2 s network, but to an outs ide owner, the British
Government.

Moreover, theoretically the building of the

rail-link between Egypt and Palestine during the war
closed a wide gap in the railway system of the ~iddle
East as a whole 1 and at long last linked Europe, Asia and
Africa by rail through the Levant States.

This~ theoretically,

should have been of inc alculable value to Palestine, as it
should again, at long last, have made the country what it
had been in past ages, the natural "bridge" of land routes
18) Philby, "Midian" (op. bibliography), p. 169e
might be noted in passing that Philby had not been an
admirer of Lawrence.

It

between the continentso

In fact, the country after 1918

became nothing of the kind.

This was due to the gauge

break between Palestine and Lebanon/Syria, between Haifa
and Rayak, which made through traffic impossible, and
kept the country from fulfilling its natural role as a
link between continents.

Thus the railways in Palestine

stagnated and remained of local importance only, if that,
kept alive most years only with the help of the government,
(

and hardly~paying their way~
The Palestine Railways and Politics
Details as to the working of Palestine Railways
dnring the mandatory regime will be found galore in
the various sources mentioned in the bibliography, which
will not be quoted here.

However, mention must be made

of a factor that did not at all - or only quite incidentally show up in statistics and which greatly influenced working
I

(

of Palestine Railways since the inception of the network.
This factor was politics.

It has already been · noted that

the Palestine network to a great extent, though not entirely,
served Arab areas.

Alsop Palestine Railways were, of

necessity (in view of their small returns) paying local
employees relatively low wageso

As a result, the system

was worked to a very great extent by Arab labour, and
came to be regarded by the Jews - perhaps more than any
other governmental sector - as an Arab stronghold, where

- 0~ Jews could not compete, and were not welcome.

"Conquest"

of the mandatory railways, unlike work in the policep
and in the harbours, had no particular national importance
attached to it.

For secur ity and also for purely commercial
I

reasons, the Yishuv, the Jewish sector in Palestine,
rapidly developed a transportation system all its own,
based on motor transport functioning on the roads.

Thus '
I

to a large extent it became independent of the government/

owned, Arab-worked railways, except perhaps for the
yearly moving of the bulky citrus exports.

There is

little reason to doubt that the stagnation of the mandatory
railways was caused by their inability to put themselves
at the servic e , and share in, the variegated economic
activities of the developing Jewish National Home .

The

mandatory government - it might be assumed - was aware
of these facts, but ada pting the existing (or rather,
inherited) system , to the needs of the Yishuv would have
surpassed its, in any c ase, limited financial means, and
would also have left it facing Arab charges of showing
particular favour to the Jews.

Thus, the only steps, taken

in the 19JO's to make the use of the railways more attractive
to the Jewish sector was the introduction of combined
bus-rail services.

This involved a bus trip ~r Jerusalem-

Lod, or bus travel from Tel Aviv to Ras el-A l\.. (Rosh Ha'ayin),
in order to link with the trains to Haifa.
/

This was intended

-~to save time in travelling to, and through, and changing
trains at, Lod (Lydda) Junction, which lay in a totally
Arab area, with all the implications in tense periods,
of which there were many.

These services, apparently,

were introduced following the 1929 disturbances, which
shifted Jewish travel from the dangerous roads to the
relatively safe trains (19).

The combined bus-train

services, however, still involved an unpleasant transfer
(

and rush from bus to train and vice-versa, and seems to
have been a limited success until the 1936-1939 disturbances,
when they may have picked up greater volume (20)o

The

long=mooted building of a cut-off loop just north of Lod
Station, only a few hundred meters long and relatively
very inexpensive 9 never materialized, perhaps as it would
have deprived the Arab town of Lod of some services to
Haifa.

The proposed loop would have bypassed Lod Junction

and would have made possible direct fast trains from
{

Jaffa/Tel ~viv to Haifa.

The fact that this desirable

and cheap bypass was never built, while the mandatory
government spent money on various spur lines (to be listed
later), signalling1 and improvements 7 in the permanent
road-bed, was taken by the Jewish sector to denote a
political bias.
19) As for the sudden popularity of train travel
in 1929, for security reasons, cp. 1! ,D.P.V., Vol. 53,
1930, P• 237. As for Jews working on the railways in the
early 1920's - the Jewish National Library has two issues
of Hebrew periodicals of 1922 and 1925 published by and for
railway employees. Some years later few Jewish workers
were left.
20) The Palestine and Egypt Lloyd's railway timetable,
probably of the late 1920's (possibly of the 19JO's - there
no date) 1 lists Rdbuses.dailv from and to LodA.ontthe 1
}·seru$aiem
serv~ce1- a
~ aaily onses rrom Ras-e~ - in
o ~e
viv;Ja1·ra, ana oac •

[

Kibbutz settlers waiting at"Hassadeh"halt(to-day's Sdeh
Nahum)for"Emek Railway"train,on Hejaz Railway's Hai:faJordan Valley-Dera'a branch . Date probably in the 1930 s.
(Source:Zionist Archives)

British-built L . M. S. type 2-3 passenger locomotive at
Haifa,ca . 1935.
(Source:Imperial War Ifuseum)
Pick,chapter V.

- ~51 The Pole Report and &ther Proposals
Far more unfortunate in its results, and serious
for the economic viability of Palestine Railways, was
the miscarriage of another, much more thoroughgoing, and
expensive✓ railway

improvements scheme proposed in 19J5 , by

the British expert, Sir Felix Pol e.

The independent-

minded Pole apparently considered that the ills of the
(

Palestine system could not be c ured until it had been
integrated more fully in the dynami~ a a 'vit ie s of the
Jewish sector, and that this would mean a radical change
in the layout of the existing networko

Therefore, noting

that "having co nsidered the whol e matter and basing this
opinion on what (he) believed to be the interests of
Palestine without regard to classp race or creed, " he
formulated the following proposals (21):

He proposed

building an entirely new section of the Rafa - Haifa trunk
line in the Jaffa - Tel Aviv area.
(

This was to branc h

off the existing line at Magdiel and was to lead south- west»
directly into Tel Aviv with a large station about today's
Beith Hadar, or near Mi 4(veh Yi srael.

The line was then

to continue south-east, crossing the old main line Lod Rafa - Kantara, to join the old track to Jerusalem at
Na ' aneh (Na'an).
21)

This new line would have had a branch

Quotation from Pole (cp. bibliography), p. 8.

to Jaffa and its port (22),

Pole 's proposed new track

would -... have served a large Jewish population, i.e.
the settlements of Magdiel, Petah- Tikvah , Bnei- Berak ,
Ramath-Gan, Rishon le-Tsion, Nes-Tsiona , Rehovoth, and
others, providing them with rail service~

Its express

purpose was to bypass the ill-situated rail junction
at Lod.

It would also have practically ignored the Arab

towns of Lod and Ramle and would have left Jaffa dangling

(

at the end of a spur line.

These latter facts, plus the

cost of the proposed new line - a hefty 656,000 Pounds
Sterling - and probably Pole 0 s unguarded referenc e to the
wonderful growth ofnpopulation and• industry that has
taken place (in the country) in the last few years,"
were probably enough to doom his scheme (23) .

Nothing

more was heard of it, and there were no official explanations
as to why it was not acted upon.

But it is very reasonable

to assume that such a thorough re-alignment of the Palestine
• Railways • network would have called down the wrath of
the Arab population and its leaders on the head of the
then High Commissionerp Sir Arthur Wauchope, seeing that
Pole's scheme would have benefited mainly the Jewish sector as it probably had been intended to do.
22) Cp. Pole, map between pp. 17-19, According to
Ettinge~ ~ p. 52, a scheme s imilar to Pole ' s had already
been aired 10 years before, in 1925. For this, and
further corroboration, cp. also Z,D.P .V., vol. 48, 1925,
Pe 412, vol . 49, 1926, P• 178, and vol. 53, 1930, p. 57.
23) Pole, p. 7.
Ettingetr, p. 52.

For the cost of the line, cp.

Thus, Palestine Railways and the Yishuv stayed apart.
The fact that the railway station at Tel Aviv, at that
time turning into the most important commercial center
in the country, remained a dilapidated wooden shack,
practically all through the mandatory period, was symbolic
of the prevailing state of affairs.

It might be mentioned

that about 1934-1935, two other Bri tish railway experts,
Sir Lawrence Halsey and Mr~ Co M. Jenkin-Jonesp also tried
(

to improve the operating conditions of Palestine Railways,
though by less deep-reaching methods than Sir Felix Pole (24).
The visible effects of their 1 mainly technical1 proposals
were negligible.

Limited Improvements in the Mandatory Rail Sys tem
The fact that the hallmark of Palestine Railways
was stagnation should not be taken to mean that bhere were
~ot at least some positive developments in mandatory times.
While, as mentioned before, it is not clear whether the
Jaffa-Lod section of the line to Jerusalem had been
converted from 600 mm. to standard 1,435 mmo gauge by the
army, or by the civil authorities, it seems,in any case,
to have been opened to civilian traffic about 1920 (25).
24) Ettinge~ , p. 42. In the stock of the Jerusalem
National Library the reports of Halsey and Jenkin-Jones
are bound together with the report of Sir Felix Pole.
25) Railway Directory, 1975 (c p . bibliography),
p . 295. There are other interesting historical data in
the directory, though they are not always exact.

'l

In the Jewish Agency's archives there is a photo showing
the first British High Commissioner, Sir Herbert ~amuel,
on the footplate of the locomotive hauling the "first"
(civilian?) train on this line.

Sometime in the early

192O 9 s a spur, some 4 kms long, was constructed from the
Jaffa-Led line into Sarafand camp, the main British
military base in Palestine.

Apparently British military

traffic on the railway was big enough to warrant building
this spur,which seems to have served mainly troop trains
coming up directly from Egypt .

As a reference to contem-

porary maps will show, at that time there seems, a,J

j-

to have been ~o metalled road whatsoever between Egypt
and Palestine (26).
A War Office map, correcte

to 1924, shows that by

that time the old Hejaz Railway narrow-gauge branch line
Beled esh-Sheikh - Acre (A~ko)» from which the rails had
been removed during the war, had been relaid (27).

A map

in Vilnay's "Guide to Palestine" (Hebrew) of 1935 shows
the same line with a subtle difference.

The line now no

longer branched off to Acre at Beled esh- heikh, but
had been re -aligned to start from just east of Haifa
,..

26) Neither Ettinge~ , nor Bonne, or Luke before them,
mention a direct land link, in form of a useable road,
between Egypt and Palestine at that time.
27) Cp. Ops., map-case, map 2A.Luke, dating from
1924, also shows the relaid line.

- f~ \ .main station - mute evidence of the fact of Acre's decline
and of the rise of Haifa (28).

Thus, under the British

this line became a suburban track linking the ancient
city with the upstart port.

It has stayed that way ever

since.
In 1925 there was built what later came to be known
popularly as "The Jewish Railway," a short spur, some

6-7 kms. long, from Ras el-Ain station to Petah-Tikvah.
(

This was financed jointly by Jewish agricultural interests
(P.I.C.A. (Palestine Jewish Colonization AssociationJ
and others) and the Palestine Government, and was worked
by Palestine Railways.

~

~\(.M~

It was planned to move citrus

crops to the harbours and never carried any passengers (29).
After 1948 this spur was to form the beginning of the
Israel Railway's Sharon line to Hadera.
gauge .

It was of standard

At the same time, perhaps about 1930, a short

branch line, some

3-f.t

kmsi . long,was laid from Tul Karem

to Noor Esh- hams quarries to the east of it.

This

standard track- probably- was designed to deliver stones
to Haifa port, then building.

It was laid onto the narrow

28) Vilnay (cp. bibliography), "Map of the Valley
of Zebulun," p. 175. The remains of the old track from
Beled esh-Sheikh are still shown on the ~urvey of Palestine
1:100,000 map, sheet 2, of 1942.
p. 6;

29) Bonne: p. 2J1; Ettingelt"', pp. 42, 60;
Rakavoth (cp. bibliography) p. 1.

Report,

track to Massudiye Junction, and so this bit of line
was triple-railed.

From about 19JI a short stretch of

the narrow Haifa-Acre line also became triple-railed.
This was to link the very big and well-equipped railway
workshops that had been built in Haifa Bay with Haifa
main station. Up till then, and since the end of the
War,
G,reat/repairs of Palestine rolling stock had been carried
I

out in distant Kantara (JO).
(

A short while later the

triple-rail track was extended into the neighboring refineries
of the Iraq Petroleum Company, to permit the distribution
of fuel by railway tank-wagons.

About this time some

6 kms. of the narrow Haifa-Afule track were triple-railed

to provide a link with the Nesher cement factory at
Yajur (Yagur).

This se c tion also sprouted short standard

gauge spurs into the Wadi Rushmiya quarries at Haifa,
and, later, to the subetrranean oil tanks built by the
Royal Navy into the slopes of Niount Carmel.

Further

south a standard gauge branch, some kms. long, was laid
from Kafr Jinnis, north of Lod, to the big British ordnance
camp at Beit Nabala,

This branch was laid on top of the

first section of the old British narrow wartime line from
Kafr Jinnis to Lubban in the Hills of Ephraim .

One more

standard spur on top of an old narrow embankment was laid
from Wadi Sarrar (ex-Junction) Station into the neighboring

JO)

Ettinger , p. 28;

Report, pp. 24-25.

- 5(i~ "'l..-t

British ammunition dump.

This spur was laid on top of

the first few hundred meters of the Turkish wartime
Beer Sheba line that had branched off to the south from
Junction Station.

There were also industrial sidings

built by Palestine Railways, especially around Haifa,
of which the ones to the Shemen Works, the Montacheff
oil installations, and the "Grands Moulins" should be
mentioned.
(

There were others (31) .

A great deal of the Palestine .h'.ailways·• administration's attention in the early 1920's, and even much later~
was taken up by trying to right some of the smaller,
remediable, defects inherent in a war-built and war-worn
network.

This task included building, or improving,

stations, re-aligning tracks, widening curves, extending
shunting yards, improving ballast, changing outworn rails,
replacing jerry-built bridges and culverts, and installing
a signalling system.

These activities pre- empted a

great proportion of available resources.

The biggest

item of construction work undertaken by the mandatory
railways was probably the building of the modern Haifa
Central Station (about 1935).

Side by side with this,

31) For the various sidings, cp. Report, p. 23,
and also Jenkin-.--Jones, p. 51. Most of the other details
as to spurs and sidings have been culled from maps,
supplemented by details in Ettinge~ .

'Li)
there proceeded the gradual conversion of locomotives
from coal to oil, a fuel of which there was plenty after
the inauguration of the Kirkuk (Iraq)-Haifa pipeline.
Probably the most vexing day-today problem facing
Palestine Railways was the motley assembly of rolling
stock it had to work, or to phase out, if it could not
be refurbished.

As late as 1930, one locomotive, 7 derelict

passenter carriages, and 2J goods wagons that had survived
(

from Navon's original 1892 meter-gauge railway to Jerusalem,
were sold4J2).

All the 1,050 mm. stock used by the

Palestine network was of German, Belgian and Swiss origin,
and had mostly already survived many years of use, from 1901,
including 4 years of rough wartime wear under the Turks ,
Meissner Pasha and Kress .

Of the standard gauge stock

in 1935, 7 shunting locomotives were no less than 52 years
old, having originated via Allenby's wartime effectives,
on the old London and South-Western Railway.

Out of 64

passenger carriages working in the middle 19JO's, 2J were
at least JO years old and of British origin and some had
been amongst Allenby's hospital coaches.

Most of the

go ods wagons, all very small, with 10-12 tons carrying
capacity, were also of war-time vintage (JJ).

The mainstay

~J2) The Navon line has been discussed in chapter III.
Report, p. 21. This long life-span of the stock serves
as ptoof that it was actually used during the war perhaps with minor adaptation - on the Turkish/French
1,050 mm. track, though it was itself of meter gauge.
A difference of 50 mm. in widthl
JJ)

Jenkin-Jones, pp. 17, J2.

----

of the system were some 40 locomotives built by 1920
by the Baldwin Locomotive Works of Philadelphia, U.S.A.,
to replace British and Egyptian locomotives that had to
be returned or scrapped after serving Murray's and Allenby's
lines in the war (J4).

Some more color was added to the

variety of rolling stock by the sleeping and dining cars,
belonging to the "Cie~ Internationale des Wagons-Lits,"
that added their (literally) plush presence to the
(

Kantara - (Jerusalem-) Haifa trains (J5), from the early
1920's onward.

Accessions to the rolling stock of

Palestine Railways during the mandate were few and little
is known about them;
19J4/J5 (J6).

6 locomotives were purchased about

Some stock may have been rented at various

times from the Egyptian State Railways, and some was
rebuilt extensively in the Haifa Bay workshops, already
mentioned above.

A new feature on the network were a

few steam- (and petrol) driven railcars, already mentioned
above, that served on the lines from Haifa to Acre, and
(

on the Yezreel and Jordan valley section, up to ~amakh,
and were a benefit to roadless Jewish settlements (J7).
J4) For details, cp. Jane's "Railways" (cp. bibliography), 1949, P• E. 22.
J5) Report, p. 47. One of the very earliest recollections of the writer is travelling in the luxurious
sleeping car, laid out in blue plush, or velvet, attached
to the daily train leaving Kantara-East about 1:JO a . m.
and arriving at Lod about 6:JO a.m. next morning.
J6) Ettinge1Y, p. 27; Jenkin-Jones, PP• 16-17, J2;
Jane's, 1949, p. E. 22.
J7) For sources regarding the railcars, see note 1J
above. Also, Z.D . P.V. vol. 5J, 19JO, P• 57. Gilbert
(cp. bibliography) p. 14, has a useful map showing the
"Emek Railway" in relation to the (new) Jewish settlements.

All in all, Palestine Railways did provide adequate
service .

They never managed, as can be learnt from

statistics, to make large profits, or, sometimes, any
profits at all. (J7A)

The customers of the network were the

military, and tourists, especially, on the line from
Kantara, which was able to compete with the sea passage
from Egypt .

There were also local passengers, amongst

them Arabs in disproportionate numbers, since Jews shied
away from the trains when they could.

About 1/J of the

system's revenues came from passengers who travelled in
its three classes.

Goods transported were cement, potash,

petroleum products, citrus fruit, sulphur (from the
quarries southeast of Gaza), building materials, and,
to a small extent, agricultural produce (apart from oit~us
fruit), foodstuff in bulk (rice, wheat, etc.), machinery,
and heavy equipment of all descriptions.

For a while, in

the 1920s, even water was amongst the "goods" carried,
and water-tank-wagons were run during several summers
from supply points on the coastal strip to waterless
Jerusalem . (38)

Considerably more could be said about

the following subjects pertaining to the running of Palestine's
mandatory railways,

Timetables, frequency of trains,

passenger fares, goods tariffs, personnel, financial results
J?!) Statisttes as to the operating results of Palestine
Railways will be found in the annual reports (from 1930)
of the General Manager of Palestine Railways, in Jenkin J anes
(cp. bibliography), and in various statistical handbooks.
J8) There are references to the transport (by rail)
of water from Sarafand to Jerusalem in Z.D. P . V., vol. 48,
1925, p. 405, and in z.n.P.v., vol. 49, 1926, p. 172.
A water pipeline from the coast to Jerusalem was not
finished until the middle 19J0s.

(income and expenditure), breakdown of traffic (passenger
and goods), technical details (rolling stock, tracks, etc.),
as well as general policies.

Owing to considerations of

space, this will not be done here, though all these headings
might well form subjects for researcho

All that can be

done here is to refer to appropriate sources listed in
note 8, above, and in~ote below (J9).

(

(

J9) A list of sources as to details regarding Palestine
Railways will be found in note 8 above. The following list
of sources on the subject constitutes an elaboration of
some of what has been said in the above note, plus a few
additions:
Bonne, PP• 2J0-233; Ettinge~ , PP• 22-42, 51-56,
60-6J, 64; Konikoff, pp. 77-80. There is a short and
very good survey of the mandatory railways by the late
Professor Ettingen in vol. 6 of the Encyclopaedia Hebraica,
cols. 960-9620 Meissner Pasha 0 s wartime collaborator,
P. Dieckmann, published a historical and statistical
summary of the state of Palestine's railways to about
1927, in the German ''Archiv fur Eisenbahnwesen ," 1928
(or 1929?), pp. 387-398 . There are many illuminating
details in the reports of Jenkin-Jones and Pole, liberally
quoted above, and dating from the middle 19JO's. The
Peel Report of 1937, also referred to Palestine Railways
on pp. 169-170, and J22-J23, though in a general way.
Finally, the eminent German publication, Z.D.P.V. generally
dealing with archaeological and biblical research, also
devoted space to the railways of the Holy Land in its
vol. 47, 1924, pp. 246-248, and elsewhere.
General details, some quite valuable (and including
advertisements) on the workings of the Palestine rail
system,can be gleaned from practically all guidebooks,
especially Baedeker , Cury, Luke, ress and Vilnay.
Timetables for all lines worked in alestine in 1923-24
can be found in Meistermann's guide . All the above-named
sources will be found in the bibliography attached to
this chapter. Finally , references to the railways in the
country will be found in many travel accounts and photos
in illustrated albums. Also see Holdheim (cp. bibliography)
in his "Zionist Handbook ," P• 329.

Palestine Railways in the 19J6-J9 Disturbances
A fleeting reference has already been made above
to the value of Palestine Railways to the Yishuv during
the Arab disturbances of 1929 and 1936-39.

During the

latter period, especiallyI when road travel was mostly
possible only in convoys, at a heavy cost in casualties,
the use of the railways for moving from Jerusalem to
Tel Aviv, and from Ras el-Ain (Tel Aviv) to Haifa provided
l

(

Jews with relatively safe routes.

In an indirect way,
k'lloN"'-~.l,J.

and unintentionally , Palestine Railways even 1 •• tide d

an important contribution to the defence posture of the
Jews.

Continuous Arab attacks on the railways, though

no more than a nuistnce 1 as they were rather dilettante
(they involved some derailments and bridge blowings
and firing Jewish fields from passing trains), led to the
establishment of the Railway

efence Formation of the

Palestine Supernumerary Police .
practically only Jews .

This formation included

Its men ' patrolled the railway,

particularly the trunk line in the Sharon, by means of
armed reconnaissances, and motorized trolleys, and also
manned fortified posts .
into World War II .

They were to carry their work

However, their greatest importance,

as far as the Yishuv was concerned, lay not in the fact
that they guarded the railway tracks, but in the fact that
they were able to carry arms legally, and amassed operational

experience, which they employed in the defence of the
Jewish population generally (40).
Railway Schemes in the Mandatory Period
The stagnation which, as stressed above several
times, characterized actual railway operations and development in mandatory times did not at all extend to the area
of planning.

(

In the years especially to 1935/ there were

quite a number of proposals (apart from the official
reports of Jenkin-Jones and Pole) as to how to improve
the existing Palestine network.

Some , though not all,

of the proposals and plans aimed at making the Palestine
network what it should have been - instead of being a
comparative dead:end owing to the gauge break between the
Palestine and the 5yrian systems.

Some envisaged making

Palestine Railways an all-through standard gauge railway
link in the center of the Levant area, joining Anatolia
and Egypt .
(

Others aimed at extending them - for Imperial

military-,and also for political and trade reasons towards Mesopotamia and the East.

Most of these plans,

including those of purely local character, had one feature
in common - they did not emanate from official bodies,
determined and able to take practical steps for their
\

40) Cp. "Sefer Toldoth Hahagana," vol. II, part 2,
pp . 907-910; Rivlin (cp. bibliography; Hebrew) pp . 259-278,
who also has some relevant photos of the railway guards
at work.

- ~--1D implementation.

One or two, though, had lukewarm semi-

official blessings.

All shared one feature - they were

never carried out.

The more important of these proposals

deserve at least a cursory review.

Some of them would

stand a much more thorough treatment than the one given
below.

Some more schemes there may have been, of which

no record has survived.
About 1926 there seems to have cropped up a scheme

(

for working the Jaffa/Tel Aviv - Jerusalem line by electric
power.

This scheme, of which there are few known details,

kept being aired for a few more years (41).

A similar

rail electrification scheme had some twenty years earlier
been proposed (as noted in chapter III), for the Hejaz
line through the Yarmuk gorge , using that river's water
for hydro-electric power .

The 1920 ' s proposals may have

come up in connection with the concession granted in
1921 to Pinhas

Rutenberg✓ who

in fact did later build a

hydro-electric power station worked by the combined waters
of the Yarmuk and the Jordan rivers.
In 1929 ~. Novomeisky received a concession to
exploit the minerals of the Dead Sea , and sometime afterwards the Palestine Potash Company started operations .
This immediately raised the question as to how the bulky
produce of the new undertaking should be exported.

In fact,

41) Cp. Z.D . P .V., vol. 50, 1927, p. 99, and vol. 52,
1929, pp. 178-179.

C

- 571 the problem of how to move large quantities of potash
was solved for almost 20 years,to 1948, by moving the
potash by trucks to Jerusalem, and sending it from there
onward by rail to Haifa p

A special bulk loading installation

was erected for the purpose at the Jerusalem station .
But this was to be in the future .

While the Potash

Company was preparing to inaugurate its works, a proposa l
became public - its sources are not at all clear - that
(

a railway along the Jordan valley should, or would , be
built to provide means for transporting potash in bulk.
The new line was envisaged as leading from the northern
shore of the Dead Sea , where the potash plant was lo cated,
parallel to the Jordan River to Beisan, where it would
have joined the existing railway to Haifa.

There was a

distinct resemblance between this line and the Jordan
valley line proposed by Laurence Oliphant in about 1880 ,
and described in chapter II , though the motives for the
two lines were differa nt .

The proposed track was to be

supplemented by another railway leading from the planned
facilities of the Potash company at the southern extremity
of the Dead Sea, at ~edom, through the Aravah valley , to
the (then railless) port of Akaba on the Red Sea.

This

proposed line, too, bore an uncanny resemblance to Oliphant ' s
visions of a railway down the Aravah of 1880 (42) .

,,

42) Bonne, p. 157;
bibliography) , p . 25 .

Ettinge~ , PP• 53, 64;

Kohn (cp .

These two lines seem to have become, at the time, inextricably muddled with another nebulous scheme (ignored
in previous chapters owing to the total absence of details),
that may have been mooted decades earlier for building a
railway from Haifa to Akaba.

This scheme allegedly had

also been considered by Lord Kitchener in World War I,
as a means of bypassing the

uez Canal,

This bypass

scheme may well have been a dim reflection of Oliphant's
(

plans of 50 years earlier, and in any case such an AkabaHaifa line had practically been in existence (though+-tM,..,t~\--6...k~

t~

at Ma 'an) ever since the He jaz Railway had been

built in the early 1900's (43).

The British representative

at the Mandatevs Commission of the League of Nations,
Lord Lugard, had been questioned about the Rift Valley
railway schemes as early as 1928, when the Potash Company•s
concession was itself as yet one year away.

Quite apart

from other obscurities (gauges, etco), it has never
become clear who had been intended to build the railways,
the Potash Company or the Government of Palestine.

But

the scheme, or schemes, must have become known enough
to deserve mention in Sir Felix Pole 's official report on
the Palestine Railways of 1935 (44).

Matters also came

to the attention of Palestine's Arabs, who, in 1934, saw
43) For these, and other relevant details mentioned
in the text, see Stratton ~ (cp. bibliography) pp. 197-199.
I

44)

Pole , p. 7.
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a connection between the Hi gh Commissioner's visit to
Akaba and a supposed British intention to abandon Malta
as a naval base and to substitute for it Haifa and Akaba,
both connected by a Jordan Valley-Arava railway.

In 1935

the Arabs even linked a shortage of railway wagons with
the start of work on the proposed line, and even reported
a British request to Ibn Saud - who still claimed Akaba
after being pushed out of it in the 1920's - to permit
building the line (45).

The Report of the Palestine

Royal (Peel) Commission of 1937 explicitly mentioned the
"contemplated railway down the Araba valley .,", and the
commission's suggestion to establish a "mandatory enclave"
in the north-western corner of the Gulf of Akaba quite
possibly was intended to provide for a future terminus
of some future railway line (46),
The Jordan-Arava railway was never built.

Nor were

other contemporary proposed lines, of which even less is
known, such as railways from Palestine to Port Fuad (at
the northern entrance of the Suez Canal, opposite Port
Said), or from Port Fuad, across the Sinai peninsula, to
Akaba.

Since nothing detailed is known about these lines,

they may even have been identical.

In any case, they were

45) Details from Stratton, who claimed the Arab
daily paper, "Filistin" as a source.
46) "Peel Report,"

(cp. biblio graphy), pp. 385-386.

mere rehashes of much earlier abortive schemes, dating
from the beginning of the 20th century, or even much
earlier. (47)
Much less speculative, and much more practical
railways schemes, that may have had grest economic and
probably also military impact 1 were raised in the 1920s,
with the intention of bridging the obstructive gauge gap
between British-ruled Palestine and French-ruled Lebanon
and Syria.

The very existence of this relatively narrow

communications-gap between these countries, that was to
last continuously for more than two decades (to 1942),
reflects on the nature of relations between the two mandatory
powers.

The schemes for bridging the gauge gap had to foresee two

alternatives.

A)

A standard gauge link between Rayak,

the terminus of the standard line from Aleppo and 'l:urkey,
down the Rift Valley to Afule and Haifao

B)

A standard

line, down the coast from Tripoli, another terminus of
the normal gauge line from Aleppo and Turkey, past Ras el-Na~irah,
to Haifa .

At Haifa both the proposed schemes would have

linked with the standard gauge trunk line to Egypto

Both

the above possibilities already had a history of their own.

(47) For both these lines, the southernmore of which
was intended to facilitate the exploi.tation of manganese
and copper resources in the pehinsula, cp. Ettinge~ , P• 53,
and Pole, p. 7.

The inland line Rayak - Afule (-Haifa) had already been
proposed in pre-war Turkish times, in 1912, (as noted
in chapter III).

The coast line had also been proposed

in Turkish times, as early as the 1870's (as mentioned
in chapter II), and had been revived during the war by
Allenby (as set forth in chapter IV) P
Of these two possible lines, it was the proposed
coastal railway that cc:tm e in for most attention.

(

mentioned as early as 1923-24.

It was

It was then apparently

discussed for several years, especially in 1926-28, when
it was reported to have drawn the attention of the
International Sleeping-Car(" agons Lits" ) Company, which
in any case was already working its carriages on the
Palestine Railways line from Kantara to Haifa .

Th

company may have had a special interest in running a
through-service of sleeping-car trains (combined with
its dining-ca~

all the way from Istanbul, via Syria ,

Lebanon and Palestine to Kantara , and possibly into Egypt.

(

Tht~ would have been a natural extension of the Orient Express
from (London) Ostend to Istanbul.

This 1 probably very

tentative1 plan was reported to have been quashed about
19~

by the Frenc;k,who , it will be remembered from previous

,,~k-~

chapters ,already had quite a record of • 1 t c · :sg-railway
development in the Levant when it was not to their liking.
In this case they are supposed to have feared the new line

- o/ Gwould draw passenger traffic (on French ships from ~arseilles)
away from Beyrouth.

By 1931 it was reported that the

French were reconsidering their negative attitude, and
during the following years the line was still under
discussion.

Sometime or other, it seems to have also

bee~roposed to build a light "steam ;-~.:" down the
coast.

Nothing concrete was done, however, and the Haifa -

Beyrouth - Trip6li railway came to be realized only during
(

World War II, in 1942, under entirely different circumstances (48)o
At that time the gauge gap between Palestine and Lebanon
and Syria was finally closed, unfortunately only for a
few years.
Perhaps the most intriguing railway building scheme in view of the secrecy surrounding many of its features
and its far-flung background - that cropped up in the
inter-war years in Palestine , Transjordan, and the fuiddle
East region as a whole, was the proposed Haifa - Baghdad
railway.

The interest attached to this scheme was based

on its potential political, commercial1 and military ,
influence on British Imperial policies, and also on the
grand scale on which it was conceivedo

While the suggested

48) The following sources are onli a selection
of the material that might be found regarding the PalestineLebanon - Syria standard gauge schemes: EttingeF ,
pp. 52-53; Keeling (cp. bibliography), P• J8J; Kohn,
p. 25;
tratton, p. 129; and especially the Z.D . P .V.,
vol. 48, 1925, P • 167; vol. 52, 1929, pp. 178-179;
vol. 54, 1931, p. 78.

Haifa-Tripoli railway, discussed above, was only about

2ijo kmso long ( and the mooted line to Rayak even shorter),
the line Haifa - Baghdad would have bridged a distance
of some 1,000 kms. or more.

It would have passed not

through cultivated, easilr accessible areas, but through
a remote 1 dangerous,

1

,o~t~

3 ?ltciig waterless, howling wilderness.

Relatively little has been written aboui/this scheme which,
unfortunately, will also be treated here rather perfunctorily,
(

owing to the limitatinns of a chapter that is planned
merely as a summing-up and an epilogue (49).
The proposed Haifa - Baghdad railway - not to be
confused with the much more famous Baghdad Railway of
German ancestry, that led from Anatolia to Mesopatamia like some other railway schemes already mentioned, by the
end of the First World War already had quite a history
of its own.

In a way it was a near relation of the British

railway schemes that had proposed building lines across
the Syro-Arabian desert at least since the days of
(

Colonel Chesney, around the middle of the 19th century (50).
Its own particular history has been described, unfortunately
only in a very general way, by Christina Phelps Grant in
49) Background information as to the proposed
trans-desert railway will be found in Hoskins (cp.
bibliography). A general review of the area involved,
from the British Imperial ~oint of view will also be
found in Kohn, pp, 26-32.
'rhe latest effort to describe the "near relations
of the Haifa - Baghdad railway is the book by E , Elath ,
mentioned in the bibliography of chapter II.
50)

11

- ~1-g her book on the Syrian Desert (51).

Some more details

were added to the subject in chapter 11.
Grant, a railway Haifa/Acre -

According to

alkhad ( Hauran) - Wadi Sirhan -

Jauf - Kuweit/Basra had been proposed ~by sponsors unknown)
as early as 1878 (52).

According to Stratton (5J), who

seems to have made a deeper study of this particular
subject, this railway scheme seems to have entered the
level of international power politics at the time of the
(

Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916,

It then became an item

of Anglo-French negotiations at the Paris Peace conference,
and was finalized in articles 5, 6, 7 and 9 of the San Remo
Convention (1922) on the allocation of mandates in the
Middle East .

While details will not be gone into here,

it might yet be said that, beginning with the SykesPicot Agr~ent, which provided for a British sphere of
influence running from Mesopotamia to Jordan, with a
British enclave on the Mediterranean about Haifa/Acre (54),
up to the San Remo Convention, which provided for a
(

temporary British use of the Yarmuk gorge, and of the
French-run railway from El I ~o (Dera'a) Nassib ,
everything.pointed to a serious British intention of building
51)

Grant (cp. bibliography), pp. 122, 266-269; 390.

52) According to Grant, there had been a variation
to this scheme in 1908, when a certain C,E. Drummend-Black
had wanted to build a line Port ~aid - Akaba - Jauf Basra/ Kuweit .
53) Stratton, pp. 116-129 and 189-203, but especially
pp. 119-122. His survey also contains maps.
54) Lenczowki (cp. bibliography) pp. 70-72, with a
useful map on P• 71.

\!>...(.: ~ ~

a trans-Arabian railway.

This, Cl:&? t~. was to run in

tandem with an envisaged oil pipeline from Kirkuk/M• ssul
to the Mediterranean.

While at San Remo the northern

borders of the British mandated areas in Palestine,
Transjordan and Iraq were delineated, an agreement with
Ibn Saud in 1925 also fixed the southern boundaries of
the British controlled territories in the Syrian Desert,
thus creating the well-known "funnel" between Transjordan

(

and Iraq, which still features largely in all maps of
the Middle ~ast, up to today, and which was obviously
shaped intentionally to secure the southern flank of any
railway and pipeline (which was indeed later built) from
the Tigris- Euphrates Valley to the sea.

A very reputable

ahd meticulous German encyclopaedia of about 1928, already
showed on a map of the Middle East , not only the "funnel"
mentioned above, but also a complete railway leading through
it from

aghdad to Amman (55).

The envisaged British trans-Desert railway did not
(

remain an abstract exercise in diplomatic negotiations,
though to this day it seems not to be clear who would
have had to build it in actual fact.

~ince it was conceived -

55) Meyer's Lexikon (cp. bibliography), 1928, vol. 9,
map between pp. 592-59.3• Gilbert also shows the "funnel"
on several maps, the first on p. 9 , "Britain and the
Arabs, 1917-1971." Few readers of present-day atlases
realize that the present territorial link, of great
strategic importance, between the sovereign states of
Jordan and Iraq ,was originally fixed in order to pass
through a never-built railway.

'-\.

)

exactly by whom is still a matter for research - as a
key-piece of the all-British route from the Mediterranean
to the Persian Gulf .._,by-passing troubled Egypt and
its Suez Canal, since it also might have been of considerable commercial importance as the most direct trade
link of Persia and Iraq with Europe through Britishcontrolled territory, and since it also would have served
as a barrier to Ibn Saud's ambitions, a couple of expeditions were undertaken, apparently under various pretexts
and suitable disguises, to reconnoitre the territories
through which a railway might be laid.

Amongst the men

who took part in these expeditions, from the early 192ovs,
were Brigadier-General

o.

Manc e, a 1r. Taylor of unknown

antecedents, Colonel Newc ombe, one of Lawrence's collaborators, the famous H, St . J. Philby, and Major A.L. Holt (56).
The best documented of these expeditions was the
one carried out in 1920-1922, in several instalments, by
Najor Holt, and with the partial participation of Philby.
(

Holt himself was, signific antly, a railway engineer .
There exist the minutes of a lecture by him on his expedition, but they are not very enlightening.

On one

occasion, at least, one of his journeys was described as a
quest for possible landing- grounds for the Royal Air Force,
in the Syrian Desert (57).

There is some uncertainty

56)

Cp. Grant , p. 269;

57)

For details about this lecture, see bibliography.

Keeling, p. J78;

~tratton, p.122.

)
about the proposed first stretch of the line, from Haifa
to the borders of the desert.

It might have been planned

to climb to the Transjordanian plateau through the Yarmuk
gorge, either utilizing the French rail section, mostly
along the northern banks of the river, or using a new,
British, track along the southern reaches of the river.
Perhaps an entirely new line was envisaged, branching
off at Beisan from the Haifa - 5amakh track, to climb
(

up south-east through the valley of the River ierka
(Yabbok).

What is certain is that Holt wanted to start

his trans-desert railway either at Mafrak (according
to Grant), or at Samrah station, (south of 1"1afrak;

according

to ~tratton), both on the trunk line Dera 0 a / Nassib to
Amman/Ma'an.

He wanted to continue his track through

Kasr Azrak, Rutba, and Hit, to Baghdad (58) ,

The vexing

question of what gauge the new line would have had - a most
important detail in view of its many implications - was
not mentioned in the 1920 ' s, nor was it broached at a
later stage.

Palestine Railways, and £gyptian ~tate

Railways, with which the line should have linked up,
were (except for the short stretch east of Haifa) operating
on the more efficient standard gauge.

On the other hand,

most of the Iraqi railways with which the proposed line
was expected to link up at its eastern extremity, were of

58)

Ettingel(, pp. 54-55;

Grant, p. 269;

tk.

Strattonp p. 193,

- S- ~L much-cheaper-to-construct narrow g\fage.
In any c ase, the trans-desert line was not built
in the 1920's, for reasons that can only be conjectured.
The post-World War I period was one of retrenchment in
Britain;

for a number of years the areas through which

the line would have passed were palpably unsafe owing to
Bedouin raids;

in view of the, at that time, undeveloped

state of Iraq and Persia, no early commercial returns
~~

~ c t e d from the railway.

Another reas on for

leaving the line in temporary abeyance may have been that
the former perennial threat of Czarist Russia to the
Middle East - which provided the background for earlier
schemes of railway building - had re~ded.

Yet the Haifa -

Baghdad railway project was not quite dead.
After 1929 the planning and building of Haifa harbour
was begun, and this large undertaking invited speculations
about the possibility of making the new harbour an outlet
(

for the trade of Iraq.

That country at the time was
I

I

on its way towards becoming independent, and expected
considerable development, partly based on the exploitation
of its oil resources.

A railway from Mesopotamia to the

Mediterranean might have served as an alternative to a
pipeline for transporting raw oil, and it would have been
more flexible, serving many other purposes, as well.
In 1930 a possible Haifa - Baghdad railway was mentioned
both by a professional British journal, the "Railway Gazette,"

- $~3 and in the foremost daily, the London "Times"(of 17.9.1930).
About this time, the British "Colonial LJevelopment Fund,"
acting, perhaps ,in concert with the Palestine Governmentg
allotted 100,000 Pounds Sterling, a very large sum, for
a thorough survey of the route for an eventual Haifa Baghdad railway.

The survey was carried out in 19J0-19J1

and employed 540 engineers and surveyors.

The work was

undertaken by the British firm of Rendel~ Palmer, and
(

Tri tte n - the selfsame firm that was engaged in building
the harbour at Haifa (59).

The results of the survey

were - for unknown reasons - never published . Kowever,
its salient features became known (60).

It bore a strong

resemblance to its predecessor of Holt's days.

The line

was to have climbed the Transjordanian plateau either
through the Wadi Zerka (or through the Wadi

rab, to the

north of it), and was to have crossed the Dera'a - Amman
track near, or at, Mafrak .

It was then to have continued

through Rutba and Hit , to pass along the Euphrates via
Ramadi and Faluja, to end on the Tigris at baghdad .
There were to have been seven tunnels and eight viaducts,
most on the Transjordan desert stretch.

However, by the

time the survey was being completed, Britain was in the

59)

Ettinge~, PP• 54-55;

Keeling , P• J78;

~tratton, p.19'31

60)
ost of the following details are from Keeling
(cp. bibliography), who also has a map. Keeling was quoted
by Ettinge\l'•
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throes of the World SJ.ump.

As it also was to turn out,

Iraq refused to participate, Transjordan never had any
resources of its own, and Palestine by itself could never
have been expected to pay the estimated cost of the railway,
that ran to some 7-8 million Pounds Sterling.

Thus the

line was never built, the Kirkuk - Haifa pipeline of the
Iraq Petroleum Company partly substituted for it, and the
whole scheme was dead.
never revived (61).

As far as can be made out, it was

In due course, the place of the

railway was taken first by a rough track, and then by a
metalled road, Haifa - ~e isan - Sheikh Husse in br idge
Irbid - Mafrak - Rutba - Ramadi - Faluja - Baghdad .

It

led, very roughly, along the track that had been proposed
for the railway.
Palestine Railways as fuilitary Carriers .
In the late 1930's Palestine Railways played a
largely unsung role transporting some 25-30,000 British
troops to Palestine , in order to quell the Arab disturbances
of 1936-39.

In these years, as indeed throughout the whole

of the inter-war period, railways were the chief strategic
means that served to shift British forces, including the
R.A.F., which for long periods was the sole representative
of British might in Transjordan and Iraq, throughout the
Middl e East area administered from London.

Troops, and

their supplies, were moved by train from Egypt , or through
)

,'

,_. : I.

... ~!

~

61) The Haifa - Baghdad project was also mentioned
by Pole, p. 7, and by Kohn, p. 26 passim, as might be
usefully noted again.

- S-y'{ Haifa port,
(62).

The Reak movements probably occurred in 19J7-J8

In 1939 there operated in the country some 27,500

soldiers who depended entirely on the railway for their
logistic support (6J).

The rolling stock at the disposal

of Palestine Railways, with which it entered the Second
World

ar, was as follows:

were of narrow gauge:

92 locomotives, of which JO

78 passenger carriages (standard

and narrow gauge); and 2,358 goods wagons, of which
(

JJ7 were of narrow gauge.

Total carrying capacity was

24,867 tons (64) .
Palestine Railways in World War II
It ·has already been noted above that in the two
decades between the "1ars 1 Palestinets rail network had
been stagnating as far as development was concerned.
Owing to the absence of a bridge across the Suez Canal
it had no direct links with Egypt, and owing to the gauge
break on the line to Syria, it had only insignificant
ties with that country.

For most purposes, except for the

carriage of troops and tourists from Egypt, it worked
in relative isolation, and was of little consequence
62) The British forces in Palestine consisted of
two divisions as early as 1937, Cp. Connel (cp . bibliography), p. 191, In the process of moving them, rolling
stock was sabotaged (despite the presence of the Jewish
railway guards) by Arabs, though never to an unbearable
extent . Cp , Kirby, p. 26.
63) Playfair, p. 93,
64) Cp. Prof . Ettingen in: Encyclopaedia Hebraica
(Hebrew), vol. 6 , col . 962. The source also gives important
details on financial returns of the railways from 1922
right down to 1946.

)

within the traffic framework of the ~iddle East, on the
grand international scale.

The coming of World War II

changed all that 1and made the Palestine railway system
the most important one in the Middle East, after the
much more extensive Egyptian State Railways, and far ahead
of the railways of Syria , Iraq and the Sudan, and possibly
Iran .

As will be shown later ona (though not in the depth

the subject deserves) 1 the war years were to become a

(

period of considerable development, and great strategic
services.

If the following treatment of ~alestine Railways

in 1939-45 will be relatively perfunctory, the reasons are
tw9:

The present chapter is only in the nature of

1)

an epilogue;

2)

Very few sources are available as to the

work of the Palestine network in World War II, as the
subject was secret at the time.

After the war the country

was in the throes of civil disturbances that finally
led to the relinquishment of the mandate, and there seems
,'

to have been no time for, or interest in, the subject.
No full study of the subject seems ever to have been made,
let alone published , either locally or in Britain.

All

there is are a few maps , some reports and statistics,
some photos, and the possibility of drawing conclusions
from general, and military1 events in the area.

However,

it is hoped that what there is will suffice to draw at least
a very general picture !65).

65) Main sources are Kirby , Playfair , "Rakavoth
Erets -Yisrael," and a (restricted) Army Handbook on
Palestine - all listed in the bibliography.

- Sf]
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When war broke out in 1939, and spread to/Eastern
Mediterranean in the summer of 1940, Egypt was the main
British base in the Middle East, with Palestine an
important subsidiary base (and rest and training area).
Its light, and food, industries, came to play an ever more
important role in supplying the troops of the Middle East
Forces.

Haifa became an important ancillary naval base.

After the Vichy French pulled out of the war in the summer
(

of 1940, Palestine and Transjordan turned into forward
outposts watching over a potentially hostile Syria.

In

July 1941 Palestine became a springboard for the invasion
of Syria.

From it the forces set out which captured

the northerly neighbour, and also from it the forces

JuUl

departed, almost simultaneously, that had to subjugate
rebellious Iraq .

After the occupation of ~yria and Iraq

(and also of Persia, in August 1941), Palestine became
the geographic and strategic focus of the British-occupied
states of the Levant.

In railway terms - it might be said

that it became the military "shunti ng yard" of the Middle
East Forces.

It also became sort of

0..,

ti.

commercial center.

To it, and from it, were shifted - by rail - soldiers,
equipment, and military stores, and also civilian supplies
distributed by the British Middle East ~upply Center, that
fed the populations of the Levant.

The country became the

hub of military and civilian traffic, to and from ~gypt,
in the south, Cyprus in the north-west, Lebanon and Syria

(and also neutral Turkey) in the north, Iraq and Persia
(the area of "Paiforce"), in the north-east, and Transjordan in the east.

Towards 1942 Palestine became, too,

the base for American installations, that had to be supplied
by rail.

It also became a major concentration of air-

fields that played an ever more important role in 1942-43,
operating as far away as Libya and the Italian Dodecanese.
These air-fields had to be supplied by rail with fuel and
(

ammunition.
Owing to the fact that the British Official History
of the Second World War in the Middle East had not been
completed to 1975, there are as yet no statistical figures
available as to the size of the forces that were stationed
in the fuiddle East, and especially in the Levant, at
various times in the Second World War , and had to be fed
by rail.

But rations strengths must have been enormous,

running into hundreds of thousands (66)0
(

upplies for the civilian populations domiciled
in the Eastern Mediterranean countries, coming mostly
from overseas, through unloading ports, mostly in Egypt ,

66) A fair guess is more than 200,000. Some idea of
the military logistical needs of the Middle East at the
beginning of the War, in 1939, is given by the chapter
"The Logistic Foundation, 1939-40" in Playfair (cp.
bibliography), I, pp. 59-80. Details of the British
Land Forces Order of Battle (units only, though no figures)
as of mid-November 1942, are found in Playfair, vol. IV,
appendix 6, pp. 483-484. These give some indication as
to the numbers of men and supplies that had to be moved.

also had to be movedg efficiently and by rail, if not
for humanitarian reasons then at least for political
reasons, in order to keep the natives quiet and impressed
with the Empire's capabilities to look after them.

The

civilian populations that had to be; at least, partially
supplies, at a guess, must have numbered (excluding Egypt)
some 10 million souls (67)o
In assessing the importance of railways in wartime
(

Palestine (and neighbouring countries) in the years
1939-45, it must be noted that at the time the utilization
of motor transport over roads was not practicable, except
to a very limited extent, and usually over only short
distanceso

Trucks, with a large total carrying capacity,

existed only in limited numbers in Palestine (and in
adjoining countries), and they also demanded spares and
petrol which were in short supply (68).

But perhaps the

greatest handicap in developing motor transport for
logistic purposes in those years lay in the state of the
main arterial road of the Middle East as a whole, the
highway linking Egypt with Palestine, Syria/Lebanon,

67) Figures based on Bullard (cp. bibliography),
appendix I, p. 534, with some appropriate changes , as he
gave estimates for 19450
68) There were only some 14,700 motor vehicles, of
all types, with trucks in the minority in Palestine about
1944. Their numbers had actually decreased since 19400
Cp. Encyclopaedia Hebraica , vol. 6, col. 956. The number
of trucks in the other Levant States must have been even
less, as there more reliance was placed on traditional
means of transport, camels and donkeys. The usually informative British "Statesman's Yearbook" was unfortunately
silent on the subject of motor transport for these years,
perhaps for security reasons.

- S-9o Transjordan and Iraq.

Throughout the ~econd World War

this road - already mentioned once above, very fleetingly was the only link practicable for motor transport joining
Egypt with the Levant.

It crossed the Suez Canal at

Ismailia by means of a limited-capacity ferry, and went
to Bir Hassanein Central Sinai, where it divided into
two branches.

One continued along the ancient "Patriarch's

Highway ," via Auja Hafir and Beer Sheba, to Jerusalem

(

and onward.

The other turned north to El Arish, to parallel,

from there, the railway to Gaza, into the ~here-la, the
Sharon, and north.

This road, though asphalted, was

narrow and in a permanent bad state of repair over long
stretches, owing to the nature of the ground and the absence
of adequate soling.

Apart from it, there was only one

improved track, very steep in parts, that led along the
ancient "Derb el Haj" (PdJlgrirrfs Road) from Akaba to Sue z,
which was never suitable for major motor traffic (69).
These facts effectively limited the use of motor vehicles
(

as a practical means of large-scale transportation between
Egypt and the areas lying to the north of it (70).

69) The source for these details is a military road
map of 1944 issued by British headquarters in Cairo, and
in possession of the writer.
70) It might be noted that some 75-100 of the, at
that time, standard , J-ton lorries, were needed to carry
the load hauled by one train (of approx. 15-20 ton wagons).
See "Rakavoth" (cp. bibliography), p. 7,

Therefore, Palestine Railways were left, in fact, as the
sole mainstay, and central link~ of long-range wartime
transportation in the ~iddle East .

Fortunatl ly, owing to

Murray 's and Allenby•s building activities in World War I,
w-€.A

the track alignment lay in the right direction, s 1 r~. to
north , from Egypt to Palestine, and beyond .

Thus it came

about that the Palestine network managed to show some
impressive working results during World War II.

In 1942,

during the British build-up for the Battle of Alamein
(October), there was a 7 million ton~kilometer rise in

ju&t one month (71).

In the one month of August 194J

alone, the standard gauge network (excluding narrow-gauge
lines) reached 46 million ton-kolometers, as against
~

116 million ton-k~lometers during the whole of the year
1938-39.

Inl94J- 44 the standard network reached altogether
(

a total of 501 million ton- kolometers, i.e. an increase
of 330% over results for 1938-39.

These results were

achieved at the price of a temporary increase of serious
accidents, that led to an augmentation of staff, many
of them Jews (72).

Earlier, in 1941, Palestine Railways

provided logistic support for the invasion of Syria , and

71) The term ton-kilometer denotes the total weight
of loads, in tons, that pass over one kilometer of line
during a given time.
72) These statistics, and many of the following
details, were taken from a summary by Kirby, the long-time
Manager of Palestine Railways (cp. bibliography).

2-3-2 tender locomotive of Palestine Railways , built about
1920 by Baldwin Locomotive Works , Philadelphia .
(Source:Israel Information Office)

- --
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One of 23 British-built(l942) 1-4 heavy freight locomotives
which worked World, ar II trains on the line from Haifa to
Kantarao
(Source:Israel Information Office)

Pi ck , chapter V.

)
the re-occupation of Iraq, by way of Transjordan.

After

the successful completion of these operations, traffic
on the narrow-gauge line to Damascus doubled.

The Trans-

jordan section of the late Hejaz Railway returned to work
only after the Vichy-French had been evicted from the
\u..~~
section El-• illl•.rDera'a, which they had held for a year
prior to July 1941.

Before the Battle of El Alamein,

already mentioned above, the Palestine network was
(

practically choked with troops and supplies going down
to the Egyptian front across the newly-built Firdan Bridge
across the

uez Canai (7J).

Wartime Expansion and Improvements
In order to live up to the tasks imposed on it by the
war, the Palestine rail system underwent an expansion
comparable to that of World War I.

Derelict rolling stock,

locomotives and wagons and carriages in all stages of
dilapidation, was pressed into service again, largely
thanks to the efforts of the expanded Railway Workshops
in Haifa Bay.

Amongst the derelicts were some of Allenby's

ambulance-carriages, originally built in England in the
years 1895-1906 (74).

The lack of passenger carriages for

73) Personal observation of the writer who travelled
by rail to Egypt on October 19, 1942. The Firdan Bridge
will be noted later.
74)

Details from Kirby.

- f9~ transporting troops led to the hiring of a considerable
number of coaches from the Egyptian State Hailway (75).
The number of goods 1 wagons increased by almost 100%,
owing to the addition of some 2,000 vehicles, mostly
large American-type 4-axled wagons, which were a novelty
on the network since the original Palestine stock had
always been small and 2-axled.

A number of tank cars,

for petrol and aviation fuel, were also added.
(

While the

standard Palestine go ods wagons c arried 10-12 tons each,
the new wagons, supplied by the American War Department ,
hauled 20-35 tons each.

Altogether, the Palestine network

now operated some 4,500 goods vehicles.

The number of

steam locomotives also rose very sharply by the arrival
of 50 new units, some very big indeed (with up to 4 driving
r-,.

we.heels),
which offered an unusual sight alongside the
\./
staid Palestine motive power.

Some were British-built

(23 London-Midland-Scottish freight locomotives) and some
were American-built "Pacific" type passenger locomotives,
(

supplied, as far as can be ascertained,by the Baldwin works
of Philadelphia, which in 1892 had also built the miniature
meter-gauge locomotives of the Jaffa- erusalem railway.

75) The daily train from Haifa to Cairo in 1942-44,
contained up to 16 coaches (including a dining-car and
a sleeper), of which no more than J-4 on the average
were Palestine stock. Extra troop-trains consisted
almost exclusively of Egyptian carriages. Personal
observation of the writer.

The first diesel locomotives, originally intended for
the British military line Alexandria- Tobruk , in Egypt and
Libya, also came to work in ~alestine.

The first diesel

ever to climb to Jerusalem - the big steam engines were
unable to negotiate the narrow JudaLan curves - was an
American-built Al co locomotive, late in 1942.

Diesel

shunting locomotives of various descriptions were also
added.

Owing to the shortage of coal, older locomotives

were converted, and gradually the whole network went over
to oil traction.
As the war went on , sections of the tracks were
realigned and shortened, bridges were strengthened for
heavier trains, and stations improved.
were greatly expanded;

hunting yards

Kantara was ultimately able to

handle 2,000 goods wagons a day, Lod - 1,000, and Haifa - 900.
Considering that wagons carried anything between 10 and J5
tons apiece, these figures give an indication of the
amount of loads handled (76).

Perhaps the most important

improvement in the working of the Palestine network
resulted from a development that was actually undertaken ,
probably by the E.S.R., outside Palestine Railways jurisdiction.

76) A great many of the foregoing details and also
some of the following ones, have been taken from the (at
that time, "restricted") Handbook on Palestine , of British
Headquarters in Jerusalem of 1947 (cp. bibliography)
in the possession of the writer.

This was the building of the Firdan swing-bridge over the
Suez Canal, south of Kantara, about 1941-42 (77).

The

building of this bridge probably had quite incalc ulable
results for the pursuit of the war in the Middle Easto
It enabled trains to be run without the previously necessary
transshipment at Kantara, directly from Haifa to Cairo.
Later 1 through~trains could be run (at least theoretic ally)
from Constantinople to Alexandria, and also from ~yria
(

and from Baghdad in Iraq to Assuan in Uppel" Egypt.
New Wartime

purs and Lines

Apart from the items of expansion detailed above,
considerable lengths of track were laid down ~
and adjoining areas during the war .

~

Palestine

They may have reached

77)The exact date the bridge was built is unknown .
Nor is there any certainty as to who operated it in
practice, which might have been the Egyptian railways,
as Palestine Railways worked only as far as Kantara .
However , there is no doubt about the importance of the
bridge for the Palestine network , which, but for its
construction, might have continued to operate in isolation .
Gp. also c honfield, p . 109, who places the bridge at
Kantara, while actually it stood quite a distance to
the south . The bridge survived the 1967 and 1973 wars ,
though it is not at all clear if the original bridge
had not been meanwhile replaced (after an accidental
ramming by a ship) with a newer structure .

in all some 240 kms . or more, and can be traced on still
available maps, especially of the 1:100,000 series of
the Survey of Palestine, and on contemporary maps of
Sinai and Jordan.

A considerable number of military

spurs were laid down to link the main lines with installations
and camps.

Some of the spurs were quite long, reaching

serveral kms.

The more important of them were at the

following places:

(

Bassa (near the Lebanese border);

at both sides of Tel el-Fuk\,.ar (Acre);
Bay);

Kurda~(in Haifa

Beled esh-:Sheikh ~ to serve the Navy ' s underground

oil storage tanks, already mentioned before);
and Tire (both south of Haifa);
R. A. F .);

Neuhardthof

Ras el-Ain (for the

Kafr Jinnis (to beit Nabala ;

possibly already

laid down in peacetime, on top of a World War I line to
Lubba~;

Wadi Satta,r;

El Jiya~ and also at other places

in the j outh . of the country, especially around Gaza and
Rafa .

In August 1942 a ca. 10 kms. long spur, actually

a fully- fledged branch line, was laid down from Kafr
(

Jinnis to Tel Litwinsky, to serve the new American base
there.

All these spurs were of standard gauge .

In

July- September 1942, just before Alamein , 12 crossingplaces were opened on the section Kantara-Rafa .

These

were actually long stretches where the single - track line
had been double-tracked, to permit an easier flow of
traffic .

To some extent this was a partial

revival of Allenby's double-track railway of World War I times.

These crossing-places (and the supervising new stations)
enabled the capacity of the Pales tine-Egypt trunk line to
be increased to about 17-18 trains daily.

In other words,

the carrying capacity of the line rose to some

5-6,ooo

tons daily.
Apart from the various spur lines, three entirely
new railway lines were built after 1941 that were of
very great importance.

One of them was the narrow-gauge

branch line of the old Hej az Railway , which led from
Ma 'an in Transjordan to Naqb Ashtar, halfway to Akaba .
This branch was completed in
kms. long.

arch 1942, and was some 40

The line was clearly built by the British

in order to anticipate a possible conquest of Alexandria ,
or all of Egypt, by Rommel's German "Africa Corps," in
which case Akaba might have served as a possible outlet
for Palestine and Syria.

This stretch of track was

closed down in August 194J.
(

It is not known why con-

struction was never continued to Akaba.

Either the

military position had improved sufficiently in 1943
to make a continuation superfluous, or the geogr~phical
difficulties of leading the line down from the high
Mountains of Edom into the Arava rift valley were too
great to be overcome.

In any case , the terminus at

Na1 b Ashtar was connected with Akaba by a very good road.
This line was a direct successor of the railways that
~~

Oliphant in 1880, and Me issner }asha in 190~had wanted

to build from the Transjordanianl{ejghts down to the
Red ~ea.

Its derelict trace is still shown on most maps

of Jordan {""l-1- A.) "
Of much more actual importance for several years
was the railway line built by the British in 1941/42
(dates are lacking) down and along the eastern bank of the
Suez Canal.

This line led south from Kantara to Firdan

Bridge, being identical on this section with the Haifa (

Kantara - Cairo line.

The Firdan nridge also served as

its link with the E.S.R. System, and with the railway
Port Said - Ismailia - Suez , that paralleled it along the
western side of the ~uez Canal.

From Firdan Bridge this

new line continued south, along the eastern bank of the
Canal, along the eastern shores of Lake Timsah, and of
the two Bitter Lakes, to reach El Shatt, and end at
Port Taufik , at the southern entrance of the ~uez Canal,
opposite the harbor of Suez itself.
120 kms. long.
(

The line was about

Its practical importance was very great ,

as it enabled stores, military and civilian , for Palestine
and the Levant as a whole, to be discharged directly from
ships into trains over the new, war-built, jetties of
Port Taufik.

Some goods were perhaps also unloaded

unto a branch line that led down to the shores of the
Great Bitter Lake.

In this way loads coul d be carried

directly to their destinations in

alestine and beyond,

Goo without cluttering up wharves on the western bank of the
Canal, especially at Suez , that were busy enough to supply
the needs of Egypt and all the North African front.
Thus Port Taufik , with the help of the new railway, in
World War II, came to fulfill the same port functions
on the Suez Canal that Kantara and its railway yards had
discharged in World War I (78).

As the line is mentioned

nowhere in sources, it must have ceased operations when
(

it became redundant after the war moved away from the
Middle East, about 194J.

Its rails, however, were left

in place and intact, to be used to bolster up Israeli
strong-points along the ~uez canal after about 1969-70.
However, easily the most potentially important of
the three major railways built in

alestine, and adjoining

areas, in the Second World War, was the standard-gauge
line, about 40 kms. or so long, built from Haifa, via
-·

Acre, Naharia,E-Zib, and Bassa to the Lebanese border
at Ras en-Nakura.

It followed the age-old western branch

of the Via Maris to the north .

Its immediate importance

lay in the fact that it constituted the southern segment
of the British-conceived, army-built H.B.T. (Haifa-Beyrouth-

78) Details of the Ma 'an-Naqb ~ tar line, few as
they are, have been taken from the British Army Handbook
on Palestine, p. 47. As far as could be ascertained,
there exists no description, or even a reference anywhere,
to the 120 Jons . long line Kantara-Port Taufik. The above
details were arrived at by a process of deduction, by
personal visits to various stretches, and by references
to the Survey of Israel 1:250 , 000 map "El rish," of 1974.
This map was drawn in 1964 and updated in 1973. It shows
the whole line, including stations.

Tripoli) Railway, the long-awaited, often-planned (since
the days of the Austrian Arc hduke Ludwig Salvator in 1879 ) ,
and frequently discussed rail link that was to close the
gauge gap between Lebanon/ Syria and Egypt.

It was the

"missing link," that, even more than the sec tion Nisib'1nTel Kotchek on the Baghdad Railway , fin i shed in July 1940 ,
was finally to wield the Middle Eastern standard gauge
railway network into one integrated system .

(

The line from

Haifa was started in November 1941 , reached Beyrouth in
eptember 1942, and joined up with the Syrian/Lebanese
standard-gauge line at Tripoli in December of that year.
Most of the work was carried out by Afric an auxiliaries
under the supervision of South-African and other Dominion
troops .

It involved conversion of the Haifa ,Kurdani) - Acre

stretch from narrow to standard gauge, building a big
station at Bassa, and punching a tunnel (in two sections),
altogether some J50 meters long, through the Ras en-Nakura
promontory.

During the five years it was to operate

(to 1947), this line carried only military traffic, and
was never open to civilian use.

Probably like the

Kantara-Port Taufik line, it was run by ~alestine Railways ,
under British army control ~(79),

Thus, only for five

short years the railways of Palestine carried out the
task (and that only partially) of being a link between
continents, as the successors of the country's ancient highways.
79) Details from Handbook, p. 47.
1942 show this line .

All maps of after

- ~02--

Haifa-East Station,February 1945 . Departure of daily train for
Cairo , with sections for Jerusalem/'rel Aviv . Left corner:Hejaz
Railway narrow stock . Center:Standard gau~e train headed by two
Palestine carriages,followed bf International dining-car(dark),
and by mostly Egyptian-lent stock . What appears to be British
troops entraining at end of platform. Center foreground:One
standard(l,435 mm . )and one narrow , Hejaz track(l , 050 mm . ) .
(Source:Palestine Information Office)

Military , combined troop and freight , train,blown up ca . 19J6/47
near Hadera(?) . One,very ancient , carriage,torn open . (Source:
Imperial War Museum)
Pi ck, chapter y .
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Postscript to the War

During the Second World War, the Palestine network
carried on its tracks a variegated selection of peoples
with few equals in the world:

Jewish and Arab civilians,

local and British soldiers, Australian, New-Zealand,
South-African, American, Free French, Czech, Polish,
and Greek troops, and also German and Italian prisoners.
Over its tracks there travelled also the few European Jews
that succeeded in making their way, by rail via Turkey, to
Palestine .

It might be claimed that railways,and in

particular Palestine 's railways, owing to their great
expansion, held the British and British-occupied territories
in the Middle East together during the war, making them
function both as viable civilian and economic entitiesg
and as military bases that played a considerable role in
ending the struggle victoriously.

The End of Palestine Railways
By the time hostilities ended in May 1945, there had
been already the first indications of Jewish resistance
that was to sweep the British out of Palestine within
three years.

From 1945 to 1948 the country gradually

came to be engulfed by a mounting wave of violence that
found in the railways a tempting targetG

Railways came

)

~o~

-

to be progressively more important as objects to be
attacked, the more they served the British as a means
of moving and supplying the forces that were used to
suppress Jewish opposition.
In 1946, even after army rolling stock and carriages
lent by the E •• R. had been returned, }alestine Railways
were still a formidable organization, which even still
showed occasional profits (80).

In the "Night of the
It

Railways," as early as November 1st, 1945, the Hagana",
the Jewish Defence Organization, in cooperation with other
resistance groups, sabotaged a considerable number of
points on the railways .

In the "Night of the Bridges,"

on June 17, 1946, one of the major bridges in the Yarmuk
Gorge east of Samakh was so efficiently blown that the
line was never again restored.
Palestine,

The rail links between

yria and Transjordan have stayed severed

ever since (81).

When the Hagana ceased its operations,

the two dissident groups, the "National Military Organization"
("Etsel"), and the "Stern Group" ("Lehi") took over.
British troop-trains in particular were attacked, usually
by means of mines.

Stations also were attacked, for instance,

80) Cp. Universal Railway Dictionary (see bibliography),
1946, p . 94. Encyclopaedia Hebraic a ( Hebrew), vol. 6,
col. 962; Statesman's Yearbook, (cp. bibliography),
1946, p. 204.
81) Details of these two sabotage actions are given
at length (including a map) in the "Sefer Toldoth Ha'hagana"
(Hebrew; cp. bibliography). Pages are listed in the
index volume.

- ~D_) in Jerusalemp at Lod Junction, and in Haifa, where most
of Me issner Pasha's imposing Hejaz Railway Terminus
(dating from about 1905) was blown up.

Rolling stock

was burnt and there was even a daring attempt on the
vital Railway Workshops in Haifa Bay .

Most of the large-

scale raid~ were carried out by Etsel (82).

The list

of the attacks on the railways by Lehi included at least
19 operations, between 19.10.1946 and 29.2.1948, which
(

caused some 60 British casualties, including 28 killed (83).
The result of all these raids was a creeping paralysis
of Palestine's rail network.

At times it temporarily

ceased operations entirely, on account of the destruction
of tracks, blowing up of bridges, and the sabotaging
of signalling installations.
all, only in the daylight.

Finally, trains ran, if at
Cumulative losses of rolling

stock became heavy, and the staff became progressively
unwilling to risk its life in a lost cause.

Ordinary

citizens ceased to use the railways, andp as far as can
be established, civilian rail services stopped functioning
entirely about March-April 1948 (84).

By that time Arab

82) For Etsel operations against Palestine Railways
cp. Niv (Hebrew, see bibliography), vol. III, pp. 183-186;
258, 266-273.
83) Banai (Hebrew; cp. bibliography), pp. 667-677.
84) A good idea of the state of Palestine Railways
in the very last stages of the mandaters dissolution
(including statistics) can be gleaned from the pages of
"Rakavoth" (Hebrew; cp. bibliography). Freier ..-r
(Hebrew; cp. bibliography), whose study of the last months
of British rule in Palestine has unfortunately never been
published, devotes some space to the role of railways in
the spreading chaos. Cp. especially pp. 103-105.

guerrillas too had joined in making railway services
impossible.

Use of the railways for military purposes,

i.eo for the evacuation of stores after the British had
finally decided to ,. withdraw from the country, continued
s poradically, as occasions demanded.

Trains , assembled

ad boc , were used to move bulky military items, and heavy
fighting vehicles, and were despatched under heavy guard .
Destinations were the two main evacuation bases, Haifa

(

port, in which equipment was concentrated for loading
on ships bound for the United Kingdom, and the camps at
Rafa , that sprawled across the Palestine-Egypt border,
from which equipment was progressively moved by trains
through Kantara to the British-held Suez Canal Zone.
Thus railways, that had played such a major role
in the conquest of Palestine by the British under Murray
and Allenby in 1916-18, also played a vital role - only
lightly touched upo n above - in the evacuation of Palestine

(

by the British (85).

By the end of the mandate, on

iv.lay 15, 1948 , apart, possiblyf f or some train movements
in the Haifa enclave (evacuated 30.6.1948), railways in
Palestine had ceased to operate, or even to exis~as a
viable body.
85) FreierLs above-mentioned study contains practically
a day-to-day description of the evacuation of the British
Forces, their troops and equipment, from Palestine in
1947-48. His survey proves unequivocally that, movement
by road being out of the question owing to the blockages
instituted both by Jews and Arabs (which the British
f orebek to fight), the British evacuation of all important
areas of Palestine , at all times, could only have been
carried out by means of the railways.

Epilogue to an Epilogue:
Railway Developments after 1948
When Palesti ne Rai lways stopped operati ng in the
spring of 1948 , its system c hanged fr om be i ng the c entral
link of rail transportation in the Middle East - as it
had been during Wor l d War II - into a trunc ated network
that had no more than l ocal importanc e.

Wi th the breakup

of the Palestine network, Egypt had no land link anymore
(

with the northern Levant Statesg Lebanon and

yria,

nor with Anatolia or Mesopotamia , nor they wi th her .
J ordan was left c ut off entirely from the Mediterranean ,
exc ept through Beyrouth or the Suez Cana l.

Newly- f ounded

Israel, of co urse , had no rail - links with any of the
neighbouring countries.
In the field, the state of the network was as f ollows :
1)

The main line from Kantara (with its southward

extension along the

uez Canal t o Port Taufik) t o Lod

and Haifa was cut at Deir Sneid , at the northern end of
the Egyptian- occ upied Gaza Strip;
2)

The main line Haifa- Beyrouth- Tripoli was cut by the

Le~anese at Ras en-Nakura, the tunnel there being bloc ked;

3)

The main line Haifa-Lod was cut by the Jordanians ,

who held a 2-3 kms. stretch around the Tul Karem station;

4)

The main line TelAviv/Jaffa t o Jerusalem was cut by

the J ordanians for a distance of some 12 kms . from about
Bittir to Beit Safafa, just outside Jerusalem;

- ~Ob -

)
5)

The narrow-gauge Haifa- Beisan-Samakh line was cut by

the J ordanians over a 3 kmso stretch, at Naharayim, where
the line crossed both the Jordan and the Yarmuk rivers
near their confluence.

Further up, east of ~amakh, the

line had already been effectively broken in 1946, in the
early days of the Hagana s operations against the British
9

mandatory government;

6)

The narrow-gauge se ctions in the mountains of Samaria,

(Afule~)Jenin- Massudiyf - Nablus/Tul Karem , passed entirely
into Jordanian hands .

However, these stretches of line

were entirely isolated by Israeli-held territory from
their Jordanian parent system, and there was no rolling
stock left on themp as they had been shut down for regular
traffic even before the ~econd World War ;

7)

The only part of the defunct Palestine Railway system

unaffected by the Arab-Israeli War of 1948 remained the
section Nassib-Ma 'an of the erstwhile Heja z Railway in
the Kingdom of Transjordan (86).
There now remains to give a necessarily short and
perfunctory sur'\e,,y and summary - an epilogue to an epilogue
of the successor-railways to the Palestine network that
grew up after 1948.
86) The breakup of Balestine's railway system is
graphically demonstrated by any general map of Palestine/
Israel, topographical and political maps, and war maps
of 1948 and after . It is also shown, including maps,
in the periodic editions of Jane's World Railways, and
other professional publications (cp. bibliography).

- ~09 Lines in Egyptian Territory
After Egypt occupied the Gaza Strip the trunk line
from Kantara came to be worked by the Egyptian State
Railways .

There is little doubt - though nothing was

ever published on the subject - that t he operations of
the Egyptian army i n the southern areas of the Holy Land
during Israel's

ar of Independence were to a considerable

extent facilitated by the logistic support of the war-proved
(

Sinai line.

It is not definitely · known whether this

stretch of track was ever purchased from the British
Government (which had built it in World War I), but it
seems to have been sold by the British to the Egyptians
on April 1st, 1948.

The line Kantara-Gaza was normally

proba bly operated once a day (according to observers
on the Israeli side).

The section from Gaza station,

north to the armistice line at Deir Sneid, altogether
some 10 klns. long, was partially torn up.

The war-built

line Kantara- Port Taufik was not worked by the ~gyptians,
though kept in a useable state, as proved after 1967.
During the

uez Campaign of 1956, the greater part of the

Sinai railway, up to about 16 kms. (10 miles) from Kantara,
fell into Israeli hands, and the whole line was hooked up
within a few days with the Israeli network, the section
Deir Sneid-Gaza being speedily rebuilt.

On that occasion

some Egyptian rolling stock was taken over.

After Israel ' s

withdrawal early in 1957, the line was again cut at Deir
neid, and traffic to Egypt was restarted by E .S. R. •

~ \0 During the Six Day War of 1967, the Egyptian lin es
i n Sinai again fell into Israeli hands, together with a
quantity of rolling stock, some diesel locomotives, a few
passenger carriages, and perhaps a few dozen goods wagons.
These could not be withdrawn owing to the blocking of the
line by blown ammunition trains on both sides of El Arish (87),
After the clearance of the tracks, and another link-up
with Israel Railways at Deir Sneid, the Egyptian ~inai
railways were put to fruitful use in evacuating captured
war material.

There are no details, but under the management

of Israel technicians,many thousands of tons of load
(tanks, guns, trucks, ammunition and stores) must have
been moved into Israel.

Even the British-built wartime

railway~along the eastern bank of the Suez Canal was
reopened after more than 20 years of disuse,
but not certainly, as far as Port Taufik.

possibly,

It was probably

used to transport into Israel abandoned Egyptian war
material from the fu itla-Giddi Passes area.

However, this

line was abandoned again as the hgyptians shelled trains
carrying military loads near Kantara, causing damage and
casualties.

About 1969, or after, most of this railway

was taken up, as were also the rails in the Kantara station
and shunting yard, in order to use the rails as stiffening

87) Personal observation of the writer. ~ome of
the ex-Egyptian diesel engines were still in the service
of Israel Railways in 1975,

Railway Relics in Israel.
(1965-1970)
Top:Abandoned Jaffa Station,
built ca.1890 for French
line to Jerusalem.
Center:Abandoned Tel esh-Shammam
Station in Jezre'el Valley
(to-day Kfar Yehoshua).On
ex-Hejaz Railway branch,from
Haifa to Dera'a.
Bottom:Abandoned track and
cutting of Turkish Sinai
Railway of World War I,in
northern Negev.

( Photo s : Pi ck. )

(

---------....--

Pi ck, chapter V.

- 6\1- for the strong points of the " Bar - Lev Line" along the
Suez Canal .

hortly afterwards , apparently, the rails

of the section Kantara-El Arish were also taken up by
the f sraelis for fortifi c a t ion PUTposes - a use the original
British builders c ertainly could never have foreseen .
Thus, some 50 years and more after Sir Archibald lVrnrray
started laying down his trans- Sinai line, a railway gap
of some 150 kms. again opened up between Egypt and its

(

northern neighbour,

When war broke out again between

Israel and the Arabs in 1973, prac tically nothing had
been left of the Sinai railway amid the wind- blown desolati on
east of the Suez Canal , exc ept for some abandoned station
buildings (the one at Mazpak served as the nuc leus of the
Israeli settlement of Nahal - Yam ), a few broken- down signallingmasts , and the relic s of some rusty, railless , goo ds
wagons .

Nothing was left of the rails that made history

in two World Wars .

The present t erminus of the line fr om

Lod and Gaza is at El Arish .

The elaborate railway

swing- bridge over the ~uez Canal at F.li.rdan, south of
Kantara , that was built by the British about 1941- 42 ,
was not damaged by either protagonist in 1967, or in 1973 ,
and its two sections survived .

Lines in Jordanian Territory
After the abandonment of Palestine Railways by the
British in 1948, the running of the orphaned section in
Transjordan was taken over by the local kingdom, under
the name of "J·ordan Royal Hashemi te Railways . "
length, altogether, was 366 kms. (88).

Its

All that was

worked at first were 323 kms6, between Nassib and Ma'an .
Traffic up to the middle 196ovs was meagre (89).

(

The

rolling stock left by the British was limited in the
extreme.

The lines Ma van-Naqb Ash tar, and Ma ' an-lviudawara

(derelict since World War I), were not worked.

The

isolated sections in the Jordan-occupied territories
Samaria , west of the J ordan, were, of course,
These were destined to be taken up by Israel after 1970,
as far as they had not been previously stolen (90) .
The most revolutionary events on the Jordan rail network
were two, and they occurred after 1963.

They were the

reconstruction of the trunk line from Ma 'an to the ~audi
border south of Mudawara, and the construction of the
new line to Akaba, that branched off the trunk line .
88)

Railway Directory, 1975, p . 304.

89)

Hachette ,"Guide" (cp . bibliography), pp . 523, 533 .

90) The scant available details about the development
of the Jordan rail system after 1948 were ·taken, apart from
out of the Railway Directory (various years), and Hachette
already mentioned above, from World Railways, especially
for 1971-72, p . 501, and the Pictorial History of Railways,
part 36, pp . 705-708 (cp . bibliography) . Roll ing stock
left by the British seems to have consisted, d.t" the most ,
of 17 locomotives, 8 passenger vehicles and some 370
goods wagons and tankers .

~)

About 1954 the three governments of Jordan, Syria
and Saudi Arabis agreed to rec onstruct the Hejaz Pilgrims »
Railway down to iedina.

After considerable disagreement

between the three partners, rebuilding the line was started
late in 1963 , or early in 1964, by a British firm, whic h
completed the reconstruction of the whole trac k - everything
except fo r t he laying of rails - by 19~9.

Here disa-

greements again intervened, and Jordan apparently continued
the work alone .

(

By ~

early 197o•s the whole of the line,

some 120 kms. long , from Ma ' an to the ~audi border was
workable again .

While the Saudi- Arabian track to 1v1edina

(which in any case does not fall within the framework
of this survey) remained railless, Jordan, with German
financial assistanc e began, in November 1972, to build
a 116 kms . long branch to Akaba, which was completed in
June 1975 ,

The line , like all the network in Jordan ,

is of 1, 050 mm . gauge , and intended to facilitate phosphate
exports from Russeife (north-east of Amman) and from
El Hasa (north of 1v1a ' an) .

It branches off at Hattiye ,

a,~t-

halfway between lVJa ' an and IVIudawara, and passing very
I

difficult and waterless territory, succeeded where the
British wartime line to Naqb Ashtar failed, namely, in
giving the Transjordanian plateau a rail outlet down to
the Red Sea .

The new railway was built by a German firm ,

and is being temporarily run with the assistance of the
German Federal Railways.

Its official opening took plac e

late in June 1975.

Thus, after the lapse of 69 years,

there came to fruition the project of the German Meissner
Pasha who, as described in a previous chapter , in 1906,
(and again in 1914) envisaged linking Ma ' an by means of
his Hejaz Railway with Akaba (91) .

The line to Akaba

can already be found on maps (92).
Lines Left in Syrian Territory
(

For the sake of completeness, a very short reference
should be made to the fate of the section El-Hamme-Dera ' a
of the late Hejaz Railway, that fueissner Pasha had built
up the Yarmuk Gorge .

It has been noted already that this

line came to belong to the French- mandated territory of
Syria after the First World War , and divided the network
of Palestine Railways proper (west of the Jordan) from
th__e «· British- operated lines in Transjordan .

This sec tion

was run from 1919 by the "Chemin-de - fer de Damas1 Hama 1
et prolongements" which had worked Frenc h- owned railways
(

in Syria since the 1890 ' s .

After the establishment of the

91) The c ompletion of the German- built Ma ' an-HattiyeAkaba line was reported by the Munich daily Stddetttsche
Zeitung" on 2.3 , 5 . 1975 . The antec edents of this work
were described by K. Becker , in the German periodic al
"Orient", p . 19.3 passim, in October 196.3 . For further
details of the Jordanian network and its expansion , see
Railway Directory, 1975, pp . J04- J05; World ~ailways
1971-72, PP • 472, 501, 510; Encyclopaedia of Islam
("Hijaz Railway") , p . 1365;
tatesman ' s Yearbook 197.3- 74 ,
pp . 1110 , 1287. Also Hoade (cp. bibliography) pp • .31.3- 317 .
92) Cp , maps: Railway Directory, 1975 , p . 305;
1
K~mmerly and :Frey, Na n.e r Osten (German), 1:5,000 , 000, ca , 1973;
Carta, "Israel and Adjoining Countries," 1:750 , 000, c a . 1974 ,
11

quasi-independent Syrian Republic in 1943, the section
was taken over by the Syrian ~tate Railways Administration
on 1 . 3.1945.

However, the line stopped operations in

the summer of 1946, after the Jewish "Hagana" blew up a
railway viaduct in Palestine territory, and thus severed
its continuation towards ~amakh and Haifa.

This section

never operated again, and long stretc hes of its track,
especially where it meandered across the Yarmuk several
times into Jordan territory (only to cross into 5yria

(
again), were taken up when Syria and Jordan started their
abortive project to build the Muheibe Dam across the
Yarmuk Gorge .

Meissner ' s tunnels, though railless,

still exist (93) .
The Development of Israel Railways
The above survey of the fate, after 1948, of the
components that used to make up the Palestine Railways
system should fittingly conclude with a short description
of what happened after the British evacuation to the
nucleus of what used to be the mandatory rail network,
i. e. - Israel Railways.

It might be stressed that this

particular subject - like other subjects mentioned earlier

93) Railway Directory, 1975,P• J04, on the "Hedjaz
Railway . " In 1973 the writer had occasion to observe
the railless and dilapidated remnants of the Yarmuk section
from a vantage point on the Israeli side of the gorge.

in this chapter - also deserves more than a mere perfunctory reviewo

Data on the development of the railways

in Israel are ample and available in the shape of press
notices, official reports, government statistics and maps.
Unfortunately, they never had a thorough treatment.

The

following details will also, necessarily, be in the nature
of a short summing up only.
Active preparations for the establishment of Israel
(

Railways seem to have started at least as early as April
20, 1948 . (perhaps even before this date), that is almost
one month before the end of the mandate (94).

The network

actually taken over by the new State of Israel was not
only cut off from the neighbouring countries - a situation
that was to persist ever since - it had also been cut up
by hostilities into unconnected fragments.

There was no

traffic on the main trunk line between Tel Aviv and Haifa,
because of the short Arab-held stretch at Tul Karem, and
there was no link between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, on account
of the Arab blockage between Bittir and Beit Safafa , just

94) ~ources for the above details, and for some that
will be used on the following pages, are a list of relevant
details published by the Publ ic Relations Department of
Israel Railways , and also the Railway Directory and Yearbook
for 1967-68, p. 248. The writer distinctly remembers having
read sometime an account of the preparations made by the
Jewish pre-state authorities to take over }alestine
Railways when the British mandate ended, but unfortunately
failed to note down bibliographic details. The moving
spirit behind these preparations may well have been
Mr . Peikowich, one of the highest Jewish officials of
Palestine Railways , and father of Yigael Allon .

outside Jerusalem.

Most of the rolling stock of Palestine

Railways had been providentially concentrated at Haifa the British enclave that was to function until the final
evacuation on June
it south .

JO~
- and there was no way of moving

ome stock had also been left at Lod

where it was soon captured by Israeli Forces.

unction,
The British

had been scrupulous in leaving all mandatory rolling
stock in the country, and had moved out to Egypt only
leased E.S.R. wagons, and the sleeping and dining-::.cars
(

of the Cie . Internationale .

But the passenger and goods

stock left was mostly old, and certainly worn, after nine
years of World War and civil disturbances, with their
inevitable results from the point of view of mechanical
repairs and upkeep .
steam-driven;

All remaining locomotives were

all the wartime diesels had been returned

to their owners, the British Army .

The signalling system,

archaic to begin with, and not renewed during the war,
was totally disrupted, the state of the track deplorable.
Details about the quantity of rolling stock taken
over by Israel Railways (the Arabs had inherited practically
no stock at all) differ.

JS

They range from 52 locomotives,

passenger carriages, and 2,400 goods wagons - all of

standard gauge - to some 106 locomotives (14 of narrow-gauge),
79 passenger carriages (18 narrow) to some 2,450 assorted
.

'"

\.

...

,, ,,

Arrival of first Israel Railways train at Jerusalem station ,
summer 1949 . 0n the left-Guard of Honor . Locomotive already bears
Israel Railways emblem , but station name board is still"mandatory" ,
English , Arabic , Hebrew .
( Source :Zionist Archives)

Lod Junction in the 1950 s . This was the country ' s most
important station ever since 1918 . Dominating platform is
watchtower,dating from 1945-48 disturbances . (Source:Isr . Inf . Off . )
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goods wagons (215 of them narrowj 0 i95),
I

The leneth of the

standard gauge track taken over was close on JOO kms ••
The narrow-gauge line Haifa-Jordan Valley was never
operated again;

long sections of it were subsequently

taken up, and the narrow rolling stock was sold in due course.
The first trains run by Israel Railways served the
suburban line Haifa-Kiriath Haim , from 20.6.1948.

The

first inter-urban service was started to Hadera, on 3.5.1949.

C

In the Rhode s• Armistic Agreement between Israel and
Jordan of April J, 1949, railways seem to have figured
to some extent.

The Arabs agreed to withdraw from the

stretch Bittir-Beit Safafa, outside Jerusalem, and as a
result traffic between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem was reopened on August J, 1949 (tli} The price for the re-opening
of the line was Israel's permission to let Arab landholders from Bittir to work their lands on the Israeli
side of the track which here actually formed the border.
This little known arrangement worked with nary a hit h
for 18 years to 1967, though for a decade or so armed guards

95) The lower figures are taken from the Encyclopaedia
Hebraica, vol. 6, col. 962. It should be stressed that
the late Prof. httingen , who provided the figures, was an
ardent railway fan, and all the technical details he
included in his survey in the Encyclopaedia as to the
railways of Palestine/Israel up to 1955 are i nvaluable.
The hi gher figures quoted in the text have been taken
from World Railways, 1952-53, p. 457. The Railway Directory
for 1946, p. 94, gave the stock of Palestine Railways
(apparently of both gauges) after the end of World War II
as 94 locomotives, 15 railcars, 1J6 carriages and 2,459
wagons.
96) These dates, and s ome of the following, were
supplied by courtesy of Israel Ra ilways. It is assumed
that they are substantially correct.

accompanied each train on the last lap of the journey
through the mountainsp from Hartuv to Jerusalem.

The

2 kms. of track from Jaffa station to Tel Aviv,that had
witnessed so many bombs thrown from passing trains in

1936-39, were taken up.
On the Haifa-Led trunk line the Arabs did not agree
to relinquish their hold on Tul Karem station, where
for many years one abandoned locomotive and two goods
(

wagons stood in desolate isolation.

However, the Arabs

agreed, following the armistice, not to interfere with the
building of a short Israeli detour, bypassing Tul Karem
station.
in

This hurriedly-built section came into operation

eptember 1949, and thus, at last, the two isolated

main sections of Israel Railways were again linked up,
and passenger and goods traffic between north and south
was re-established • . At about the same time, planning
was initiated for the building of a new railway paralleling
the coast, through the ~haron plain, from Hadera directly
to Tel Aviv.

This was a far more ambitious scheme than

the similar one proposed in 1935 by ~ir Felix Pole.
There were other developments about, and after, 1950.
Tracks to former military camps were taken up, at Akko,
Tel Litwinsky, Beit Nabala, and in the south.

Services

were gradually extended, for instance from Haifa to Akko
and Nahariya, and train frequencies increased.

~ervices,

though for goods only, were reopened on the trunk line

62-1- from Lod, via Rehovoth, to Ashkelon (former lVlajdal)
and its factory complex.

In August 1952 the first of

three diesel-electric locomotives furnished by the

u.s.

was put to work, a revolutionary step that within several
years led to the total dieselization of the whole Israeli
network.

For a number of years a long line of mute

steam locomotives, some of which may have served Allenby,
stood in Lod station, as a reminder that the steam era

(

had passed in Israel as well.
In April 1953 the direct coast line through the
Sharon was opened into Tel Aviv.

The new track branched

off the 1918 trunk line just north of Hadera, at Remez
Junction, and went via Nethania to Tel Aviv North (now
Benei Berak).

From there it continued east to join the

Petah-Tikva-Rosh Ha'ayin (Ras el-Ain) "citrus branch"
that had been built by Jewish interests in the 1920°s.
Some time later, in 1954, the coastal line was led directly
into the new Tel Aviv Central (now-North) station.

Mean-

while Tel Aviv South also acquired a new station, a rebuilt
the
warehouse that replaced/ramshackle wooden shed that
significantly - had served Tel Aviv throughout the whole
mandatory period.

Early in 1956 Israel Railways began

to operate German-built diesel railcar sets that had been
delivered under the Reparations Agreement, to be followed
by other passenger stocko

This was the beginning of a

process that led gradually to the total withdrawal of the

(

Awaiting scrapping outside Israel Railways Haifa Bay workshops,
caol950.Swiss-built(Vinterthur)locomotive of the former '.l.'uricish
Hejaz Railway . Built in 1909,this 1,050 mm. gauge locomotive lasted
through two orld Wars .
(Source:Israel Information Office)

)
One of Israel's first diesel locomotives,about 1952.An Americanbuilt General Electric locomotive heading former mandatory,Britishbuilt,stock in Haifa-East station.(Source:Israel Inform. Office)
Pick,chapter

v.

ancient Palestine Railways passenger carriages, and their
replacement by German, French, and Yugoslav- built carriages.
Goods wagons , too, were progressively replaced, and some
of the new wagons were assembled locally in the Haifa Bay
workshops.

In the 1960 1 s Israel Railways rolling stock

bore prac tically no resemblance to the stock left by the
British in 1948.

Contemporaneously modern signall i ng was
I

introduced, first on the Haifa- Tel
elsewhere .

viv line, and then

Rails and ties were also replaced systematic ally ,

permitting much higher speeds (100 kms. p . h ., and more ,
on the Sharon stretc h) than the 80 kms. top speed of
mandatory times .
On March 29 , 1956 a new line , to Kiriath Gath and
Beer ~heba , was inaugurated , whic h branc hed off the LedJerusalem line at Na'an.

Parts of this line were laid on

the embankment of 1V1eissner Pasha's 1915 5inai Railway.
The c onstruc tion of the deep- water port at Ashdod led,
in November 1961 , to the openi ng of a new branc h line,
several kms. long, fr om Plesheth Junc tion , on the trunk
line Lod- Ashkel on , to the new harbour installations.
About at the same time a s hert branc h had been built fr om
the main line north of Lod, to the big quarries at Tirath
Yehuda .

This for the purpose of supplying roc ks - trans-

ported by rail - for the construction of the Ashdod
breakwaters .

In September 1965 the extension of the

Beer Sheba line to the development town of Dimona was opened .

(

Israel's biggest,American-built,diesel locomotive,ca .1 973,outside
the Haifa Bay workshops .B ehind it-diesel shunting engine . Right : One
carriage of German-built diesel sets,delivered under 1952 agreement
on Reparations .
(Source:Israel Information Office)
✓------~-----------------------------------

Double-headed special train of French-built carriages inaugurating
Beer Sheba-Oron section,1970 . This section is part of the HaifaElath railway,under construction.
(Source:Israel Inform . Office)
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Early in March 1970 this section was extended to the
mining complex at Oran, deep in the Negev .

Shortly after,

a branch of this line was built from fuamshith (on the
line to Oran) to the chemical complex at Tsefah.

In the

same year, 1970, the new Tel Aviv ~outh station was
opened, outside town, near Mikveh Yisrael, which now
serves as the terminus of the line to Jerusalem, replacing
the old station that cluttered the center of town.

(

The

fact has already been mentioned that since June 1967
Israel Railways have been linked up with the previously
Egypt ian-run line Gaza-Kantara and beyond, across ~inai.
This line is still being operated to El Arish, as occasion
requires, though a 1972 attempt to run a passenger service
Gaza-Tel Aviv miscarried.

However, goods unloaded at

Gaza port are still occasionally being carried north by
rail (97),

On January 28, 1975 work was started on the

extention of the line terminating at Oran down the very

+~

difficult descent into the Arava rift valley, )WIit the
mining works at Hor Ha 'har• • • • • • - - - - •

This stretch

will involve the building of the longest, and highest,
railway bridge in Israel, over the Nahal Tsin.

It will be

97) As already noted, a number of the above dates
were furnished by Israel Railways. fuore details will be
found in the various editions of World hailways , and of
the yearly Ra i lway Directory.
A very useful map, 1:750,000 of the Israeli network,
including all stations, and showing also proposed lines,
was published in English about 1969 by Israel Railways .

i )

an additional section of the railway linking central
Israel, via Beer Sheba, with Sdom on the Dead Sea, and
with Eilath on the Red

ea (98).

Operating results

of Israel Railways, traffic breakdowns 1 and technical
details for the period 1948-19]j 1 will not be detailed
here for reasons of space, and because, unlike the historical
subjects of the above survey, they will be found, well
summarized, elsewhere (99).
In the middle 1970's the Israeli railway system
consisted of the following sections:

98) Date from the Israeli press. The railway to
Eilath/Sdom is being built in accordance with a preliminary feasibility study entitled " The rlailway of the
Thre e Seas " (Mediterranean, Dead and Red eas) prepared
under German a uspices in 1963. Cp. Regling-Voss, in
bibliography.
99) Israel Railways have published statistical
abstracts and reports for many years. These also, occasionally,
contain illustrations and are frequently published in
languages other than Hebrew. Statistics regarding the
Israel network will also be found in relevant professional
publications (cp. bibliography), in the Statesman's
Yearbook, and in the handbo~ of "Europa" Publications
(London).

Israel Railways ~ystem
British-

~\\.""-

to 1948

Section
Haifa-Naharia-Lebanese Border
Haifa-Lad
Lod-Rehovoth-Ashkelon
Tel Aviv-Jerusalem
Rosh Ha'ayin-Petah Tikvah
Haifa- Nesher
Ashkelon-Gaza-El Arish, about
Totals
Overall Total:
Note:

Length in
Kms .
37
llJ
42
87
6

6
120
411

Israeli-Built to 1970

Length in
Kms.

~ection
Bnei Berak- Petah Tikvah
6
Remez Jcto-1el Baruh~-Bnei Berak 4J
Tel Baruh- Tel Aviv (North)
4
Na 'an- Beer Sheba
74
Plesheth Jct.-Ashdod
7
Beer ~heba-Dimona
37
Dimona-Ora n
29
lV1amshi t - Tsefah
--12
Total:
215

626 kmso (approximately)

The above Grand Total does not include various spurs, occasional
short double-tracked sections, and multiple rail tracks in stations
and shunting yards.
Some distances may be approximate.
Details compiled mainly from Ha ilway Directory, 1975, and corrected.

The latest available figures for Israel Kailwaysf
from a reliable source, give the overall length of track,
including spurs, and lines open but not at present worked
(like the section Remez Junction-Rosh Ha'ayin, closed since
1970) as 809 kms .

Rolli ng stock comprises J4 diesel-

electric main~line lo comotives, 21 diesel shunting locomotives, 107 passenger carriages and 2,305 goods wagons
of all varieties (l00)o
(

There is another ~igure from

another professional source that gives the total length
of the Israel network, excluding ~inai, in 1973, as 793 kms.
While slight discrepancies in railway track mileage are
usual, the figure of 1793 kms. is of interest, as it works
out the density of the Israeli system at 3,91 kms. of
railway track per square km. of country, without ~inai.
This gives Israel a higher density of railways than has
the U•• - which has 3,52 kmso of rail per square kmo(l01).
The attached two maps, showing the present rail systems
of Israel and Jordan, illustrate the ultimate stage in the
chequered development of railways in Palestine-Israel,
and adjoining are as, that started about 18J8 with an idea
that came to Sir ~oses Montefiore, and has continued for
almost 140 years.
100) Figures for table and statistics are based,
with corrections, on Railway Directory, 1975, p. 295.
j~v~tL.J..e,

101) 11· U iiii
pp. 124, 126, 130.
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Pick , chapter V.

Note on Maps and Photos

~I

Tht~ is no dearth of maps to illustrate the
development of railways in Palestine sinc e 1918 , and in Israel
and J ordan after 1948 .

Some have already been referred to

in the notes to the text of the foregoing chaptero
The best maps, most reliable and detailed,
are the mandatory maps , 1 :100,000, published in various

(

editions by the

urvey of Palestine, and the maps of the

Survey of Israel , 1:50 , 000 (restric ted)$ 1: 100,000, and
1:250,000.

They will be f ound to lend a useful background

to what has been said in the text .

Two very useful maps ,

with adequate c overage of railway developments in recent
I/

years, are:l)Naher Osten/Middle East~ 1:50~ 000 , Kummerly
and Frey , Bern, late 1960 1 s;
2)

Carta ' s Israel and Adjoining Countries ,
II

1:750 , 000 , Kummerly and Frey , Bern , early 1970 ' s.
As already noted , most guidebooks to Palestine/
Israel . contain maps, some very good, and showi ng railways.
Some travel descriptions have good maps, as have professional
railway publications that c ontinually ( Usually annually)
update their maps .

The "Atlas of Israel " (Hebrew

&

English

editions) has maps referring t o the development of communications in the Holy Land at various periods. Gp . the
bibliographie s to the various c hapters of this survey f or
further details.

There are also many photos to be had of railways
in falestine/Israel.

These will be found in institutional

archives (Israel Information Office, Tel Aviv;
War i\'J.useum , London;

Keren Haye sod Archive, Jerusalem;

Zionist Archives, Jerusalem;
collections .

Imperial

etc.), and in newspaper

Israel Railways also provide (mostly con-

temporary) photos.

Older illustrative material may be

found in advertisements , travel posters, and pamphlets
destined for tourists.

There are also private collections

of amateur photos (of which the writer has one).

Pro -

fessional photographers also have interesting, but expensive,
pictures.
Bo oks on various aspects of Palestine/Israel also
will prove fruitful sources of photos.

Especially useful

are illustrated travel descriptions, photographic records
of the country , and monographs dealing with particular
periods in the history of the country.

In most of these

publications photos of railway details are wholly incidental ,
but very illuminating nonetheless .

To this type belong the

books (listed in the bibliography) by Rivlin (for the

19J6-J9 disturbances) and by Banai and Niv (on the period
1945-48).
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Rakavoth Erets Yisrael Ve'nimleiha (Palestines' Railways and Pe rts;
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Geographical Journal, vo • 50, PP• 32-57 , London, 1917
World Railways ("Jane's"), annual, various issues, especially
1952-53 ed, section "Syria," P• 511, London, 1954
Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palgstina Vereins (Z.D.~.V.), monthly,
Leipzig, 1878 Zimpel, Ch. F., Mahnruf ..... zur Befreiung van Jerusalem,
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1) The above bibliography contains a number of titles
referring to the Baghdad Railway. These sources invariably
also mention railway developments in Palestine as well.
2) A number of titles in the above bibliography do
not appear in the text. Most were included in the original
draft of chapter III but were omitted from the text when
it was cut by approximately half. As these titles constitute
valuable background material, they were kept in the bibliography.
J) A limited number of titles taken from periodicals,
and a very few books (K<ibel, IV1ygund, Schmidt) were not
available to the writer, and could not be traced through
!nter- library Exchange. As they did exist at some time,
and may have survived two world Wars somewhere, they were
included in the G
bibliography, for the sake of completeness.
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